https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/13134

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **MILIMANI LAW COURTS** **CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION** **PETITION NO. E479 OF 2024** **KATIBA INSTITUTE …………..........………………………… PETITIONER** **-VERSUS-** **INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE ..............................1ST RESPONDENT** **ATTORNEY GENERAL ................................................ ….2ND RESPONDENT** **HEAD OF JUDICIARY POLICE UNIT ........................... 3RD RESPONDENT** **NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION ............4TH RESPONDENT** **AND** **JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION ....................... INTERESTED PARTY** **JUDGMENT** **Introduction** 1. Goal 16 of the 2030 United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development is about promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. It is therefore envisaged that all Governments put in place mechanisms to ensure that people everywhere live free from fear and all forms of violence, feeling safe as they go about their lives. 2. World over, the independence of the judiciary is crucial, and it is essential, for a government to function in a way that allows its organs to be both independent and interdependent. This means that the judiciary, specifically in its role of administering justice, should operate without any coercion or manipulation in favor of the executive, the legislature or any other person or entity. 3. At the opening session of the Asia Pacific Justice Forum (December 8-9, 2022), **Professor Margaret Sattherthwaite, UN Special Rapporteur *on the independence of judges and lawyers*** and professor of Clinical Law at the New York University School of Law, outlined the importance of an independent judiciary for countering rising authoritarianism. She stated, *inter alia*, that: ***“Independent judges have never been more important, and to the shame sometimes of the global community. The very independence, competence, and wisdom these judges bring to their work is sometimes the thing that puts them in danger.”*** 1. The above introduction sets the stage for determination of the petition dated 17th September 2024. The description of the parties is as given by the Petitioner. 2. The Petitioner Katiba Institute, describes itself as a Constitutional Litigation and Research Institution established in 2011 to promote knowledge and understanding of Kenya’s Constitution and Constitutionalism and to defend and facilitate the implementation of the Constitution. 3. The 1st Respondent, the Inspector General of the National Police Service, is sued in person under the doctrine of command responsibility. The office is a Constitutional office established under Article 245 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and mandated to supervise the investigation of offences or enforce the law against any person or persons. 4. The 2nd Respondent is the Attorney-General of the Republic of Kenya and a public and Constitutional officer established under Article 156 of the Constitution with well-defined functions, including representing the national government in court or in any legal proceedings to which the national government is a party. 5. The 3rd Respondent is the head of the Judicial Police Unit and is responsible for the security of Judges and the Judiciary. 6. The 4th Respondent is a constitutional commission established under Article 246 of the Constitution and oversees the human resource functions of the National Police Service. 7. The Interested Party is a constitutional commission established under Article 171 of the Constitution of Kenya. The commission is tasked with promoting and facilitating the independence of the Judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent administration of Justice. 8. In this Petition, Katiba Institute challenges what it considers to be the State’s retaliatory withdrawal and disarmament of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi’s security detail after the judge had sentenced the Acting Inspector General of Police, Mr. Gilbert Masengeli, to serve six months imprisonment for contempt of court. 9. The Petitioner asserts that this arbitrary action directly threatens judicial independence, violates ***Article 160(4) of the Constitution*** by unlawfully diminishing an accrued judicial benefit to a judge’s disadvantage and abuses police power, in breach of constitutional national values, fair administrative action and non-discrimination principles. 10. The Petitioner seeks formal declarations that the Respondents’ acts violate the Constitution, an order declaring the withdrawal invalid, declarations that Acting Inspector General of Police Gilbert Masengeli and the Head of the Judicial Police Unit are unfit to hold public office, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the withdrawal or disarmament of a judge’s security detail without prior consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. **The Petition** 1. The Petition dated **17th September 2024** seeks the following Reliefs: 2. ***A declaration that the Respondents’ actions violate Articles 10, 19, 20, 21, 27, 47, 73, 159, 160, 244 and 245 of the Constitution of Kenya.*** 3. ***A declaration that the 1st Respondent’s action of disarming and withdrawing the security detail of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi violated Articles 10, 19, 20, 21, 27, 47, 73, 159, 160, 244 and 245 of the Constitution of Kenya by suspending a constitutional right.*** 4. ***A declaration that the 1st Respondent’s action of withdrawing and disarming the security detail of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi is unconstitutional and invalid under Article 2(4) of the Constitution.*** 5. ***As a consequence of orders (b) and (c) a declaration do issue that the 1st Respondent, Acting Inspector General of Police, Gilbert Masengeli, is unfit to hold public office.*** 6. ***As a consequence of order (a), a declaration do issue that the 3rd Respondent, the head of Judicial Police Unit is unfit to hold public office.*** 7. ***A permanent order of prohibition prohibiting the Respondents from withdrawing and/or disarming the security detail of a judge without prior consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.*** 8. ***Any other prayers this Court deems fit.*** 9. The Petition is premised on the facts on its face and is further supported by the sworn affidavit of Emily Kinama, the Litigation Manager at Katiba Institute sworn on 17th September 2024 in which she outlines the timeline beginning the 23rd August 2024, when Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi issued *ex parte* habeas corpus orders in ***Law Society of Kenya & 3 Others v. Inspector General of Police & 4 Others (Petition No. E436 of 2024)*** regarding the alleged abduction of **Bob Micheni Njagi, Jamil Longton,** and **Salam Longton.** 10. She depones that after the 1st Respondent repeatedly failed to honor court orders and court summonses scheduled for 3rd, 5th and 9th September 2024, the judge convicted the 1st Respondent of contempt of court on 9th September 2024 and sentenced him on 13th September 2024. 11. The deponent states that during the proceedings, the court highlighted intimidating conduct by a Senior Police Officer Lazarus Opicho, who contacted the judge’s driver and bodyguard to track the Judge’s whereabouts. 12. The deponent swears that over the weekend following the said sentencing for contempt of Court, the State disarmed and withdrew Justice Lawrence Mugambi’s security detail, a fact confirmed by a Judicial Service Commission in its public press statement issued on 16th September 2024. Ms. Kinama deposes that these actions by the State machinery through the 1st respondent directly violates ***Article 160 of the Constitution*** by stripping away a judge’s accrued security benefit to his disadvantage, in violation of ***Article 160(4),*** thereby interfering with judicial independence. 13. Further deposition emphasized that the police leadership has abused its powers to bypass the Bill of Rights and create a chilling effect where judges fear rendering adverse merit decisions against state organs. The deponent warns that unless the court grants urgent relief, the Respondents will continue to intimidate the Judiciary into subservience, threatening to shift Kenya from a constitutional democracy to an executive dictatorship where the executive's word overrides the law. 14. The Petitioner states that delayed remedies would render the Petition nugatory, as leaving the judge without security undermines functional judicial independence, disregards the rule of law and leaves the Inspector General as the sole, unchecked arbiter of judicial security. 15. The Petitioner further averred that the action was brought in the public interest under ***Articles 3(1) and 258 of the Constitution*** to protect judicial independence, constitutional values and the rule of law. **Responses** 1. In response to the Petition, the 1st 2nd and 3rd Respondents (the Inspector General of Police, the Attorney General and the Head of the Judiciary Police Unit respectively) filed a joint response through a Replying Affidavit sworn by Assistant Inspector General of Police Ibrahim Omar on( date is illegible), citing ***Articles 245(b) and Article 244 of the Constitution of Kenya,*** as well as ***Section 24 of the National Police Service Act***, outlining the police mandate to protect life and property while maintaining high standards of professionalism, discipline and compliance with human rights. 2. The deponent also referenced the 2016 Policy on the Provision of Protective Security to VIPs and Other State Officers, which was created to address the *ad-hoc* and inconsistent deployment of protective security to public officers. 3. He states that under ***paragraph 5.3 of the 2016 VIP Security Policy***, officers selected for VIP protection must undergo a three-week training course or periodic refresher courses to effectively handle emerging security threats. It is his evidence that in accordance with this requirement, the police service recalled the security detail assigned to Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi, alongside other officers assigned to VIPs, to attend a refresher course. That subsequently, on 14th September 2024, the Commandant of the Security of Government Buildings and VIP Protection Unit issued deployment letters assigning new officers, SGT Reagan Okello and APC Francis Mulei, to provide protective security to Justice Mugambi. 4. According to the deponent, Justice Lawrence Mugambi rejected the newly deployed security detail, resulting in his original officers being reassigned to him before they could complete the requisite refresher training. 5. On legal advice, it was deposed that the Petitioner failed to provide evidence of probative value to support its petition and application. Consequently, the respondents urged this Court to dismiss both the Notice of Motion Application and the with costs. 6. **The 4th Respondents** filed the Replying Affidavit sworn by Peter Leley, the Chief Executive Officer of the National Police Service Commission in which he outlines the constitutional mandate of the Commission under **Article 246 of the Constitution** and **the National Police Service Commission Act**, clarifying that its authority is strictly limited to human resource oversight such as recruitment, appointments, promotions, transfers and disciplinary control. He this statutory human resource function does not extend to the independent operational command of the National Police Service, which falls solely under the Inspector General of Police pursuant to **Article 245 of the Constitution**. 7. Citing the decision in ***International Centre for Policy and Conflict v Attorney General & 2 others [2014] eKLR,*** the deponent highlights that operational matters, including assigning VIP security details, remain within the exclusive domain of the Inspector General. in the premises, the 4th Respondent contends that it was improperly joined to the petition and urges this Court to exclude it from the proceedings as the Petitioner failed to provide evidence of the 4th respondent’s involvement in the security detail’s withdrawal. 8. It is deposed further that the Petition and accompanying Application have been overtaken by events and should be dismissed because, during court proceedings on 20th September 2024, counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents confirmed that Justice Mugambi’s security detail had already been reinstated. 9. The deponent swears additionally, that in related proceedings ***Petition No. E436 of 2024,*** the court accepted the 1st Respondent’s genuine apology regarding contempt and the withdrawal of the judge’s security detail, thereby purging the sentence. 10. It is pleaded that with a new Inspector General now in office and the Judge’s security restored, no prejudice will be suffered if the court dismisses the Petition with no orders as to costs. **Submissions** 1. The Petition was canvassed by way of written submissions. **The Petitioner’s Submissions** 1. In its submissions dated 18th June 2025, the Petitioner, Katiba Institute, urges the Court to protect judicial independence by declaring the retaliatory withdrawal of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi’s security detail to be unconstitutional. Grounded in the factual matrix set out in the initial affidavit of Emily Kinama sworn on 17th September 2024 and her further affidavit sworn on 18th November 2024, the Petitioner details how the Inspector General of Police the 1st Respondent arbitrarily disarmed and removed the judge’s security detail after being summoned and convicted for contempt of court. 2. Counsel for the Petitioner isolated the following five issues for determination: 3. ***Whether the Respondents violated the principle of judicial independence?*** 4. ***Whether the Respondents violated the normative value-based system under Article 10 of the Constitution?*** 5. ***Whether the 1st Respondent’s actions constitute an abuse of police powers and office?*** 6. ***Whether the Respondents have violated the right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution? and*** 7. ***Whether the Respondents violated the freedom from non-discrimination under Article 27 of the Constitution*.** 8. The Petitioner’s counsel submits that judicial security is an accrued, constitutionally protected benefit attached to the office of a judge under ***Article 160(4) of the Constitution***, which strictly prohibits the variation or diminution of benefits to a judge’s disadvantage. To support this, the Petitioner references legal principles from the Zambian Constitutional Court in ***Sangwa v Attorney-General & Law Society of Zambia CCZ/0012 [2023] ZMCC 6***, and decisions in the cases of ***Communication Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR***, ***Gachuiri v Attorney General & another [2024] KEHC 5836 (KLR), Sollo Nzuki v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & 2 Others [2019] eKLR,*** and ***Jonathan Munene v Attorney-General & 2 others [2021] eKLR***, all of which are said to establish that accrued judicial benefits serve as a shield against external executive influence. 9. The Petitioner further submits that the Respondents’ actions violated the objective, value-based framework set out in ***Article 10 of the Constitution***, which prohibits the arbitrary exercise of state power and demands strict adherence to the rule of law. 10. Relying on ***Republic v Kombo & 3 Others Ex Parte Waweru [2008] 3 KLR (EP) 478,*** the petitioner’s counsel highlights that all administrative and government authority must remain strictly authorized by law. That in the instant case, the 1st Respondent failed to uphold public trust and constitutional standards as mandated under ***Articles 73(1)(a), 238(2)(b), 244, and 245 of the Constitution***, alongside ***Sections 8A and 49 of the National Police Service Act, Cap. 84,*** and ***Sections 8 and 9 of the Leadership and Integrity Act, Cap. 182***. 11. Reliance was placed on ***Mutuma & another v Inspector General of Police & 4 others [2025] KEHC 212 (KLR)*** to reiterate that judicial intervention is necessary whenever state agencies act capriciously or exceed their statutory mandates. 12. Additionally, the Petitioner argues that withdrawing the judge’s security without notice, procedural fairness, or an opportunity to be heard violated the right to fair administrative action under ***Article 47 of the Constitution*** and ***Sections 4(1) and 7 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, Cap. 7L***. Drawing from the decisions in ***Kenya Human Rights Commission & Community Advocacy & Awareness Trust (Crawn Trust) v NGO Co-ordination Board [2018] KEHC 8915 (KLR)***, ***Republic v Fazul Mahamed & 3 others Ex-Parte Okiya Omtatah Okoiti [2018] eKLR, and Kuto v Kenya Magistrates and Judges Association [2023] KEHC 26157 (KLR),*** the Petitioner reiterated that the rules of natural justice and the duty to give reasons are mandatory safeguards against whimsical public authority. 13. Further submission was that by selectively removing protection from a single judge, the 1st Respondent committed unjustified discrimination in violation of ***Article 27 of the Constitution***, running counter to the standard of equal protection of the law as was defined in ***Gichuru v Package Insurance Brokers Ltd [2021] KESC 12 (KLR)*** and ***Mohamed Aktar Kana v Attorney-General [2010] KEHC 4146 (KLR*** 14. Finally***,*** the Petitioner’s counsel submitted that this Court possesses broad remedial powers under ***Article 23 of the Constitution*** to craft remedies that prevent future constitutional violations, as affirmed in ***Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services Limited [2014], Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Kenya Airports Authority [2021] KESC 34 (KLR),*** and ***Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General & another [2019] KEHC 10881 (KLR).*** 15. The Petitioner prayed for declarations of unconstitutionality and a permanent order prohibiting the Respondents from withdrawing or disarming the security detail of any judge without prior consultation with the Judicial Service Commission, in order to safeguard the judiciary against retaliatory state action. **The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ Submissions** 1. The Attorney General’s written submissions are dated **13th December 2024**, filed on behalf of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents though its Deputy Chief State Counsel Stephen Terrell. The 1st to 3rd Respondents contend that the Petition fails to present a justiciable issue and must be dismissed. 2. They submit that under ***Article 245(b) of the Constitution***, the Inspector General of Police holds independent command over the National Police Service, while ***Article 244*** mandates standards of professionalism, integrity and accountability. That although ***Section 24 of the National Police Service Act, Cap. 84*** outlines the general function of protecting life and property, the Respondents contend that there is no statutory or constitutional duty to assign protective security to judges, nor does security constitute a remuneration benefit protected under ***Article 160(4) of the Constitution***. 3. The three Respondents contend that VIP security is governed administratively by **the Policy on the Provision of Protective Security to VIPs and Other State Officers (2016),** which empowers the police to deploy protective detail to senior officials based on applications and operational needs. They rely on ***paragraphs 1.2, 1.3, and 5.3 of the 2016 VIP Policy***, and argue that officers assigned to VIP protection must undergo periodic training and that Justice Lawrence Mugambi’s original security was recalled specifically to participate in a required three-week refresher course. 4. Further submission was that the Commandant of the Security of Government Buildings and VIP Protection Unit under the Administration Police Service subsequently deployed replacement officers -SGT Reagan Okello and APC Francis Mulei- on 14th September 2024. That when the Judge rejected the replacement officers, the original security detail was reassigned to him without undergoing the refresher course, thereby fully resolving the dispute. 5. In support of their contention that the Petition lacks justiciability and is prematurely brought, the Respondents rely on the Constitutional Avoidance and Ripeness Doctrines as articulated in ***Apollo Mboya v Attorney General and National Employment Authority (Nairobi Constitutional Petition No. E335 of 2023),*** which adopted the three-judge bench holding from ***Kiriro Wa Ngugi & 19 Others v Attorney General & 2 Others [2020] eKLR*** andthe Supreme Court decision in ***Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others [2014] eKLR***. It was submitted that these authorities establish that courts must refrain from deciding hypothetical, premature, or academic constitutional questions when a matter can be resolved through other non-constitutional means. 6. Finally, the 1st to 3rd Respondents submitted that the Petitioner failed to prove any violation of constitutional rights or to demonstrate the real danger required for conservatory relief. They relied on Centre ***for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) & 7 Others v Attorney General [2011] eKLR***. 7. Invoking the *locus classicus* ***Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No. 1) [1979] KLR 154***, which references ***Keshava Menon v State of Bombay [1951] SCR 228 and Republic v El Mann [1969] EA 357***, the 1st to 3rd Respondents argued that any party alleging a constitutional violation must state the specific provisions infringed and the precise manner of infringement rather than relying on abstract arguments regarding the spirit of the Constitution. 8. It was further submitted that the Petitioner failed to tender probative evidence of any constitutional breach and a prayer that the Petition be dismissed with no orders as to costs. **The 4th Respondent’s Submissions** 1. In their submissions filed in 2024, the National Police Service Commission the 4th Respondent herein isolated two issues for determination being: 2. *Whether the 4th Respondent is privy to these proceedings* and 3. *Whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders sought.* 4. Counsel for the 4th Respondent argued that it is not a proper party to the proceedings because its statutory mandate is strictly limited to human resource functions under ***Article 246(3) of the Constitution*** and ***Sections 10 and 11 of the National Police Service Commission Act***. 5. The Commission outlines that these human resource functions such as recruitment, appointments, promotions, discipline and training oversight do not extend to operational police command. Instead, that independent command over the National Police Service and the operational assignment or withdrawal of security detail are statutory duties exclusively vested in the Inspector General of Police pursuant to ***Article 245(2)(b) of the Constitution*** and ***Section 10 of the National Police Service Act***. 6. Counsel for the Commission further contends that the Applicant failed to demonstrate or provide evidence showing how the 4th Respondent contributed to the alleged constitutional violations. He pointed out that the Petitioner completely omitted the 4th Respondent in its Further Affidavit and Submissions dated 18th November 2024, the Commission urges the Court to disregard all allegations made against it. 7. Relying on the principle established in Anarita ***Karimi Njeru v The Republic [1976-1980] KLR 1272***, the Commission highlights that a party alleging a violation of constitutional rights must plead the specific provisions violated and the exact manner of infringement, a standard the Applicant failed to meet regarding the 4th Respondent, similar to the findings in ***Thomas Odero Dullo***. 8. Finally, Counsel for the 4th Respondent submited that the Petitioner is not entitled to the orders sought, noting that several prayers are already spent and that conservatory orders are inappropriate in this instance. Referring to Justice A.C. Mrima’s ruling in ***Katiba Institute vs Judicial Service Commission and 3 others (Constitutional Petition No. E128 of 2022)*,** the 4th respondent emphasizes that courts must exercise caution with interlocutory conservatory orders so as not to determine the main Petition prematurely, given that the office of the 1st Respondent has since changed hands without any indication of repeating the conduct. The 4th Respondent prays that the Application and Petition be dismissed with costs for being meritless and an abuse of the court process. **Analysis and Determination** 1. I have considered the petition, the responses thereto and the respective parties’ submissions all citing statutory, constitutional provisions and judicial authorities. I find the following issues emerging for determination: 2. ***Whether the 4th Respondent (National Police Service Commission) is a proper party to this Petition.*** 3. ***Whether the Petition is moot or non-justiciable under the doctrines of ripeness and constitutional avoidance on account of restoration of security detail for Justice Lawrence Mugambi.*** 4. ***Whether security detail assigned to a Judge constitutes a constitutionally protected benefit under Article 160(4) of the Constitution and whether the withdrawal and disarmament of Justice Lawrence Mugambi’s security detail violated Judicial Independence, the Rule of Law, Chapter Six, and Fair Administrative Action.*** 5. ***What appropriate remedies should issue?*** 6. ***Who should pay costs of the Petition?*** 7. **Whether the 4th Respondent (National Police Service Commission) is a proper party to this Petition** 8. The 4th Respondent argues that it was wrongly joined to this Petition because, its functions are confined to human resource management under **Article 246 of the Constitution**, whereas operational deployment sits squarely with the Inspector General of Police under **Article 245.** 9. **Article 245** sets out the command of the National Police Service through the office of the Inspector General of Police while **Article 246** establishes the National Police Service Commission. Article 246 stipulates: ***246. National Police Service Commission*** 1. ***There is established the National Police Service Commission.*** 2. ***The Commission consists of—*** 3. ***the following persons, each appointed by the President—*** 4. ***a person who is qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge;*** 5. ***two retired senior police officers; and*** 6. ***three persons of integrity who have served the public with distinction;*** 7. ***the Inspector-General of the National Police Service; and*** 8. ***both Deputy Inspectors-Generals of the National Police Service.*** 9. ***The Commission shall—*** 10. ***recruit and appoint persons to hold or act in offices in the service, confirm appointments, and determine promotions and transfers within the National Police Service;*** 11. ***observing due process, exercise disciplinary control over and remove persons holding or acting in offices within the Service; and*** 12. ***perform any other functions prescribed by national legislation.*** 13. ***The composition of the National Police Service shall reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya.*** 14. The constitutional division of authority between the Inspector General of Police and the National Police Service Commission is clear. **Article 245(2)(b)** stipulates that the Inspector-General shall exercise independent command over the National Police Service. Conversely, **Article 246(3)** vests the National Police Service Commission with human resource functions such as recruitment, appointment, promotion and discipline. 15. From this Court’s reading of Article 246, operational assignment and movement of officers in VIP security details fall squarely under the command responsibility of the Inspector General of Police and not under the National Police Service Commission. 16. The law on joinder of parties in Constitutional petitions is set out in the *Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013* referred to as the *Mutunga Rules*. Rule 5 of the Rules, which is also similar to Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 provides: ***5. Addition, joinder, substitution and striking out of parties*** ***The following procedure shall apply with respect to addition, joinder, substitution and striking out of parties—*** ***(a) Where the petitioner is in doubt as to the persons from whom redress should be sought, the petitioner may join two or more respondents in order that the question as to which of the respondent is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between all parties.*** ***(b) A petition shall not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every proceeding deal with the matter in dispute.*** ***(c)..not material*** ***(d) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear just—*** ***(i) order that the name of any party improperly joined, be struck out; and*** ***(ii) that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court adjudicate upon and settle the matter, be added.*** ***(e) Where a respondent is added or substituted, the petition shall unless the court otherwise directs, be amended in such a manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the petition shall be served on the new respondent and, if the court thinks, fit on the original respondents.*** 1. In determining who is the appropriate respondent, the said ***Mutunga Rules*** define who a respondent is in Rule 2 on Interpretation as follows: ***“respondent” means a person who is alleged to have denied, violated or infringed, or threatened to deny, violate or infringe a right or fundamental freedom;*** 1. In **JMK v MWM & another [2015] eKLR** the Court of Appeal, discussing the question of joinder of a party in a constitutional petition proceeding observed that: ***“This Court adopted the same approach in Central Kenya Ltd. V. Trust Bank & 4 Others, CA No. 222 of 1998, when it affirmed that the guiding principle*** ***in amendment of pleadings and joinder of parties is that:*** ***“all amendments should be freely allowed and at any stage of the proceedings, provided that the amendment or joinder as the case may be, will not result in prejudice or injustice to the other party which cannot properly be compensated for in costs.” We would however agree with the respondent that Order 1 Rule (10)(2) contemplates an application for amendment or joinder of parties where proceedings are still pending before the Court...”*** ***17. The Court of Appeal in the case of EG v Attorney General; David Kuria Mbote & 10 others (Interested Parties) [2021] eKLR shedding more light on the application of this principle held as follows:*** ***“[1] The core of the court’s power to join a party to any proceedings including at the appellate stage, as aptly discussed in Hamisi Yawa & 36,000 others vs. Tsangwa Ngala Chome & 19 others [2018] eKLR, is to bring on board a necessary party for purposes of determining the real issue(s) in dispute. Also, a joinder of a party is not an automatic right, but one which is granted upon exercise of the discretion of the court concerned. Nonetheless, the court exercises such discretion under defined parameters, that is, it must be satisfied that: -*** ***a) The intended party has a personal interest or stake in the matter in question; and that interest is clearly identifiable and proximate enough and not merely peripheral.*** ***b) The intended party’s presence would enable court to resolve all the matters in the dispute.*** ***c) The intended party would suffer prejudice in case of non-joinder.*** ***d) The joinder of the intended party will not vex the parties or convolute the proceedings with unnecessary new matters and grounds not contemplated by the parties or envisaged in the pleadings.”*** 1. In view of the definition of who a respondent is under Rule 2 of the ***Mutunga Rules,*** and whereas presence of a party that ought not to be a party to the proceedings does not defeat the suit or petition, especially where there are other relevant and necessary parties, it is not enough for a petitioner to merely mention or describe a person as a respondent and leave it at that. Constitutional litigation, though guided by principles of substantive justice and flexibility of procedure, is still anchored on pleadings. Parties are entitled to know the case facing them. Respondents against whom a petition is brought ought to discern from the petition and supporting affidavit what wrong is alleged against them, what constitutional infraction they are said to have committed and what relief is sought against them. 2. However, Rule 5(a) is emphatic that a petition shall not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties and the Court may in every proceeding deal with the matter in dispute. To correct a misjoinder or non-joinder, the Court is empowered either on application by a party or on its own motion, to order the striking out of a party improperly joined. 3. The Court may also order the addition of any person who ought to have been joined, or whose participation in the matter before it may be necessary in order to enable the court adjudicate upon and settle the matter. 4. The above provision accords with Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities and the hallowed decision in **DT Dobie Company (Kenya) Ltd v Joseph Muchina & Another [1980] eKLR**, where the Court of Appeal emphasized the need to sustain court proceedings rather than terminate them on technicalities, unless the case appears so hopeless that it is beyond redemption, a position that buttresses the need to administer substantive justice. 5. In this case, the Petitioner alleges that the withdrawal of judge Mugambi’s security was arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is not in dispute that the operational act of withdrawal is attributable to the Inspector‑General of Police and not the National Police Service Commission. 6. This Court is not persuaded that whenever the Inspector General is sued then the Commission must be enjoined to those proceedings as a respondent, unless there is a claim made against the Commission. It would be a waste of public resources to drag the Commission in every proceeding where, clearly, the affected party is the office of Inspector General of Police, and where in the circumstances prevailing, the Commission has no constitutional or statutory role to play or control over actions or inaction by the Inspector General of Police. 7. In the instant case, no relief is sought against the Commission and neither is it suggested that the orders that the court may issue will directly or indirectly affect the Commission’s operations. I therefore find that the 4th respondent National Police Service Commission is not a necessary party to these proceedings and it is hereby struck out. However, such striking out in no way defeats this petition as there are other necessary and relevant parties to it whose presence has not been challenged. 8. **Whether the Petition is moot or non-justiciable under the doctrines of ripeness and constitutional avoidance due to restoration of security detail for Justice Lawrence Mugambi** 9. Ripeness is defined by the **Black’s Law Dictionary 10th Edition at page 1524** as: - ***The state of a dispute that has reached, but has not passed, the point when the facts have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.*** 1. The ripeness and justiciability doctrines enable a court to avoid premature adjudication of issues that might become more clearly defined later especially where the dispute is not clearly set out. The Supreme Court in **Attorney-General & 2 others v Ndii & 79 others; Prof. Rosalind Dixon & 7 others (Amicus Curiae) (Petition 12, 11 & 13 of 2021 (Consolidated)) [2022] KESC 8 (KLR) (31 March 2022) (Judgment)** ***(with dissent)*** guided as follows on the issue of ripeness: - ***“61. The doctrine of ripeness focused on when a dispute had matured into an existing substantial controversy deserving of judicial intervention. The doctrine of ripeness prevented a party from approaching a court before that party had been subject to prejudice, or the real threat of prejudice, as a result of the legislation or conduct challenged.*** ***63. Ripeness discouraged a court from deciding an issue too early. It therefore required a litigant to wait until an action was taken against which a judicial decision could be grounded and a court was able to issue a concrete relief. That approach shielded a court from dealing with hypothetical issues that had not crystalized.”*** 1. Alongside the doctrine of ripeness is the doctrine of constitutional avoidance which the Supreme Court again in **Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others (Petition 14, 14A, 14B & 14C of 2014 (Consolidated)) [2014] KESC 53 (KLR) (29 September 2014) (Judgment)** discussed as follows: ***[256] The appellants in this case are seeking to invoke the “principle of avoidance”, also known as “constitutional avoidance”. The principle of avoidance entails that a Court will not determine a constitutional issue, when a matter may properly be decided on another basis. In South Africa, in S v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) the Constitutional Court Kentridge AJ, articulated the principle of avoidance in his minority Judgment as follows [at paragraph 59]:*** ***“I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.”*** 1. In the instant Petition, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents contend and submit that although the security detail for Justice Mugambi was withdrawn for the reasons already stated, the same was restored subsequently after the Judge declined to accept the new security team assigned to him. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents argue that, that being the case, then the Petition has been overtaken by events, that the dispute is resolved and therefore there is no live issue or controversy. 2. They argue that this Court in determining the Petition is merely engaging in an academic exercise because the underlying controversy has been resolved, dissipating the significance of the Petition. 3. It is correct to say that Courts generally avoid or decline to entertain academic or hypothetical questions as was held by Onguto J. (RIP) in **Wanjiru Gikonyo & 2 others v National Assembly of Kenya & 4 others Nairobi Constitutional Petition No. 453 of 2015 [2016] eKLR**, thus: ***“(27) Effectively, the justiciability dogma prohibits the court from entertaining hypothetical or academic interest cases……. The Court is prevented from determining an issue when it is too early or is simply out of apprehension, hence the principle of ripeness. An issue before Court must be ripe, through a factual matrix for determination.”*** 1. However, where the matter raises a live and decisive constitutional question of public interest and importance, that is capable of repetition, the Court must still address itself on those alleged violations in light of its inherent jurisdiction under **Article 165 (3) (d) (ii)** of the Constitution which provides: ***(3) Subject to clause (5), the High Court shall have—*** ***(a) unlimited original jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters; (b) jurisdiction to determine the question whether a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated, infringed or threatened;*** ***(c) jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of a tribunal appointed under this Constitution to consider the removal of a person from office, other than a tribunal appointed under Article 144;*** ***(d) jurisdiction to hear any question respecting the interpretation of this Constitution including the determination of—*** ***(i) the question whether any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of this Constitution;*** ***(ii) the question whether anything said to be done under the authority of this Constitution or of any law is inconsistent with, or in contravention of, this Constitution;*** ***(iii)any matter relating to constitutional powers of State organs in respect of county governments and any matter relating to the constitutional relationship between the levels of government; and*** ***(iv) a question relating to conflict of laws under Article 191; and*** ***(e) any other jurisdiction, original or appellate, conferred on it by legislation.*** 1. This case involves the alleged arbitrary withdrawal of a Judge’s security following an adverse decision rendered in exercise of judicial authority, against the then Acting Inspector General of Police. It is not a private dispute between two individuals. The issues raised hinge on an attack on the institutional integrity and independence of the Judiciary. Restoring the security detail after public outcry and legal proceedings does not erase the alleged initial constitutional violation, nor does it address the alleged institutional threat posed by such conduct of a member of the executive arm of Government who commands so much power in matters security of the people and their property. 2. Additionally, the issues raised in this petition that must be interrogated fully, include, the question of whether security is a protected benefit that accrues to a judge and therefore protected by Article 160(4) of the Constitution. That is a live and not academic question. 3. The Supreme Court in **Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others (Petition 14, 14A, 14B & 14C of 2014 (Consolidated)) [2014] KESC 53 (KLR) (29 September 2014) (Judgment)** held thus: ***“138. In Speaker of the Senate & Another v. Attorney-General & 4 Others, Sup. Ct. Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2013; [2013] eKLR, [paragraph 156], this Court further explicated the relevant principle: The Supreme Court of Kenya, in the exercise of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, has a solemn duty and a clear obligation to provide firm and recognizable reference-points that the lower Courts and other institutions can rely on, when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution. Each matter that comes before the Court must be seized upon as an opportunity to provide high-yielding interpretative guidance on the Constitution; and this must be done in a manner that advances its purposes, gives effect to its intents, and illuminates its contents. The Court must also remain conscious of the fact that constitution-making requires compromise, which can occasionally lead to contradictions; and that the political and social demands of compromise that mark constitutional moments, fertilize vagueness in phraseology and draftsmanship. It is to the Courts that the country turns, in order to resolve these contradictions; clarify draftsmanship gaps; and settle constitutional disputes. In other words, constitution making does not end with its promulgation; it continues with its interpretation. It is the duty of the Court to illuminate legal penumbras that Constitutions borne out of long drawn compromises, such as ours, tend to create. The Constitutional text and letter may not properly [capture] express the minds of the framers, and the minds and hands of the framers may also fail to properly mind the aspirations of the people. It is in this context that the spirit of the Constitution has to be invoked by the Court as the searchlight for the illumination and elimination of these legal penumbras.”* *[****emphasis added]* 1. As stated by the Supreme Court in the above case, constitutional issues that touch on public governance and fundamental rights and freedoms remain justiciable even if the controversy has been settled, especially where an authoritative determination is required to guide state conduct in the future. 2. For these reasons, I find that the Petition is not moot and the issues raised are not unique only to the State officer who is the subject of this petition (Justice Lawrence Mugambi), but that the issues raised apply to all who hold such similar state or public offices. 3. Accordingly, there is need for this Court to address itself on the constitutional questions raised in the next part of this Judgment. I therefore find and hold that the Petition is not moot. It is justiciable and does not offend the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Neither is it moot. 4. **Whether security detail assigned to a Judge constitutes a constitutionally protected benefit under Article 160(4) of the Constitution and whether the withdrawal and disarmament of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi’s security detail was discriminatory, violated Judicial Independence, Article 10 specifically the Rule of Law, Chapter Six of the Constitution on leadership and Integrity and Article 47 on the right to Fair Administrative Action.** 5. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents argue that VIP security is not a ***"remuneration benefit"***but a discretionary administrative deployment under the ***2016 VIP Security Policy*** which requires that officers deployed to provide security to VIPs attend a three weeks’ refresher training. 6. **Article 160 of the Constitution** on Judicial Independence provides as follows: **160. Independence of the Judiciary** 1. ***In the exercise of judicial authority, the Judiciary, as constituted by Article 161, shall be subject only to this Constitution and the law and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority.*** 2. ***The office of a judge of a superior court shall not be abolished while there is a substantive holder of the office.*** 3. ***The remuneration and benefits payable to or in respect of judges shall be a charge on the Consolidated Fund.*** 4. ***Subject to Article 168(6),*** ***the remuneration and benefits payable to, or in respect of, a judge shall not be varied to the disadvantage of that judge, and the retirement benefits of a retired judge shall not be varied to the disadvantage of the retired judge during the lifetime of that retired judge.*** 5. ***A member of the Judiciary is not liable in an action or suit in respect of anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the lawful performance of a judicial function.*** 6. The **Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct of 2002,** reproduced in **Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/65 (Jan. 10, 2003)** provides inter alia: ***Value1: INDEPENDENCE Principle:*** ***Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects. Application: 1.1 A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of the judge's assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.*** ***1.2 A judge shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which the judge has to adjudicate.*** ***1.3 A judge shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to a reasonable observer to be free therefrom.*** ***1.4 In performing judicial duties, a judge shall be independent of judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.*** ***1.5 A judge shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary. 1.6 A judge shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.*** 1. Article 160(4) of the Constitution provides that the remuneration and benefits payable to, ***or in respect of, a judge shall not be varied to the disadvantage of that judge***. The Article does not just end at **remuneration and benefits payable to.** It adds ***or in respect of a judge*.** Security as a benefit cannot be a payable benefit. It can only be ***in respect of***, especially where the employer has not quantified that benefit and has opted to pay to the employee, an allowance equivalent to security. 2. The Constitution at Article 160(4) distinguishes between remunerative benefits (salary, allowances, cash emoluments) and benefits which are remunerative and non-monetary or conditions of service. Both are strictly protected from being varied to a judge’s disadvantage during their tenure. 3. This protection of both monetary/remunerative and non-monetary/non-remunerative benefits, rests on the core doctrine of Judicial Independence. 4. If the executive or legislature could be permitted to arbitrarily withdraw non-cash benefits like security, medical cover or official transport, which benefits as accorded to Judges and which are not remunerative, then the Executive could easily intimidate or punish Judges without ever touching their actual salary. 5. Therefore, a benefit is legally protected if it forms part of the entitlements and conditions of service, necessary to maintain the dignity, safety and decisional as well as institutional independence of a Judge, as contemplated in Article 160(4) of the Constitution. That being the case, ssecurity for judges is an accrued benefit that cannot be withdrawn arbitrarily without justifiable grounds and in accordance with the written law. 6. Decisional independence requires that a judge be free from fear of physical harm, harassment or executive reprisal while discharging judicial duties and in exercising judicial authority, which is derived from the people of Kenya. The Security attached to a judge is therefore an essential institutional guarantee and an accrued benefit inherent to the office, designed to secure the judge’s physical security and integrity and operational freedom. 7. Accordingly, under Article 160 (4) of the Constitution, in as much as security detail cannot fall within the narrow definition of salary or allowances, it falls under benefits which are non-remunerative. This benefit is integrally linked to the broader concept of benefits necessary to safeguard judicial independence and to enable judges discharge their constitutional mandate without fear or intimidation. 8. The relevant principles outlined in this Judgment show that physical and personal security for judges is a vital factor in judicial independence. When judges face threats of violence, intimidation or the arbitrary withdrawal of state-provided security on account of adverse orders made against state agencies, their capacity to render impartial decisions without fear or favor is severely compromised. Such Judges will not live up to their oath of office. 9. As was witnessed in this case, the 1st and 3rd respondents disarmed and stripped the Judge of police protection without alternative, equal security. This action instantly exposes the Judge to risk, effectively diminishing an accrued operational benefit attached to the judicial office. Further, to permit the Executive or Police Service to arbitrarily revoke judicial security at will converts a constitutional shield into an instrument of coercion. 10. Security in this case cannot be a mere discretionary deployment as averred by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents in their responses and submissions, which in essence, trivializes the constitutional significance of this accrued benefit whose purpose is broader than just mere security provision. The impugned action also exposes the Judiciary as a whole, to manipulation and intimidation by the Executive. 11. Accordingly, the withdrawal of a judge’s security following an adverse ruling amount to a variation of benefits accrued, to a Judge’s disadvantage, thereby undermining Article 160(4) of the Constitution. 12. This position finds support in the **Basic Principles on Independence of the Judiciary**, **adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985 as follows:** ***Independence of the judiciary*** ***1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary.*** ***2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.*** ***3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law.*** ***4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.*** ***5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals.*** ***6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the parties are respected.*** ***7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions.*** ### On **Conditions of service and tenure of Judges**, the **Basic Principles** provide that: ***11. The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.*** ***12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where such exists.*** ***13. Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.*** ***14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they belong is an internal matter of judicial administration.*** 1. Kenya is a signatory to these UN instruments which form part of the law of Kenya under the Constitution as stipulated in Article 2(5) and (6). It follows therefore, that even under the guise of administrative policy, the arbitrary withdrawal of a Judge’s security violates **Article 160(4)** and strikes at the heart of constitutional governance. 2. In his Conference Paper titled: **The Independence of the Judiciary in Kenya****,** **Presented at the Conference on the Independence of the Judiciary in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards an Independent and Effective Judiciary in Africa. Entebbe, Uganda, June 24-28, 2008,** ProfessorJustice Jacton B. Ojwang, a revered and now retired Judge of the Supreme Court of Kenya in visualizing the phenomenon, ***law; its place in civilised life; and the role of the judiciary therein, so we may attribute to the judiciary, and demand of it, as a standard expectation, independence,*** had this to say, quoting **Ronald Dworkin in his *locus classicus*, Law’s Empire**, thus remarked: ***“We live in and by law. It makes us what we are: citizens and employees and doctors and spouses and people who own things. It is sword, shield, and menace: we insist on our wage, or refuse to pay our rent, or are forced to forfeit penalties, or are closed up in jail, all in the name of what our abstract and ethereal sovereign, the law, has decreed ...We are subjects of law’s empire, liegemen to its methods and ideals...”*** ***As he made the foregoing remarks, Dworkin whose observations were undoubtedly based on the Western experience of law and legality, was certain (as can be read from his whole work), the continual agent of law-making was the judge. For, nearly two decades earlier, his fellow American scholar, Professor John P. Dawson, had published another classic, The Oracles of the Law2a, in which he expressed agreement with Blackstone, that judges were “the depositaries of the law, the living oracles.”*** 1. The above statement, differently put, is that, we are all under the authority of the law.This is what the Constitution in Article 27 contemplates by providing for equality and freedom from discrimination, in the following terms: ***27. Equality and freedom from discrimination*** ***(1) Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law. (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and fundamental freedoms.*** ***(3) Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres.*** ***(4) The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth. 9 Constitution of Kenya.*** ***(5) A person shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against another person on any of the grounds specified or contemplated in clause (4).*** ***(6) To give full effect to the realisation of the rights guaranteed under this Article, the State shall take legislative and other measures, including affirmative action programmes and policies designed to redress any disadvantage suffered by individuals or groups because of past discrimination.*** ***(7) Any measure taken under clause (6) shall adequately provide for any benefits to be on the basis of genuine need.*** ***(8) In addition to the measures contemplated in clause (6), the State shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender.*** 1. The learned Judge Professor went on to state that: ***“Being thus beleaguered, in the nation’s setting of constitutional organs, how is the Judiciary expected to respond to the problem of abuse of public power? Why should the oppressed citizen repose trust in such a Judiciary, as an institution of safeguard?*** ***Firstly, the citizen has to trust that the court’s judgement has a finality, and is entitled to obedience, as a matter of constitutional obligation. Then the citizen has to trust that the Judiciary shall be guided by rules, principles and discretions not influenced by the very power-wielders who cause oppression, or other harm. That is to say, the citizen expects the Judiciary to be independent, in its decision-making. And lastly, the citizen expects the Judiciary to be fair, in its decision-making. All these attributes underline one theme, independence, as the hallmark of the Judiciary, in a constitutional set-up that protects the citizen, as an individual, even as the nation’s broad social goals are pursued by the relevant public agencies, which are driven by a political-cum-administrative mandate.*** ***As compared, therefore, to the other organs of government, the Judiciary must be well-anchored upon a foundation that does not flinch at pangs inflicted by the public power, nor pander to attractions of things allied to such power; that foundation sits in the stable of law, and legality; it constitutes what Ronald Dworkin call’s “The Law’s Empire.”*** ***The value of judicial independence is not limited to the protection of the citizen from power-abuse; it also feeds into the general quality of governance, and of the interplays of the different organs of government. This principle is expressed in The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct:*** ***“A judiciary of undisputed integrity is the bedrock institution essential for ensuring compliance with democracy and the rule of law. Even when all other protections fail, it provides a bulwark against any encroachments on its rights and freedoms under the law.”*** ***The judiciary addresses the problem of public power, firstly, when the individual challenges a particular exercise of such power, by virtue of constitutional guarantees, or of the provisions of statute law. But, secondly – and more importantly – the judiciary deals with this problem by its procedures of review of administrative action. This is a well-recognized sphere in which the judicial function is defined; and the following passage taken from D.M. Davis’s article entitled “Administrative Justice in a Democratic South Africa”, gives an adequate depiction:*** ***“The classic judicial approach to review is based on the proposition that administrative agencies can be rendered non-threatening to a democratic enterprise provided they are made adequately accountable to the rule of law...”*** ***The judicial review jurisdiction is generously employed, in the common law countries in particular, to subject perceived irregularities in the process of administrative decision-making by public officials or public bodies, to the terms of the law….*** 1. Summative, that even when the judiciary is under pressure or facing difficulties, it still has a duty to stand firm against abuse of power. People should trust the courts because they are meant to be fair, independent and there to protect everyone’s rights. The judiciary is a protector and promoter of fundamental rights and freedoms and is mandated to ensures that those in power do not misuse their authority and that ordinary citizens as justice seekers and consumers of judicial decisions can rely on justice as their shield to defend them, when their rights are violated. 2. Further, citizens need to believe that when a court renders a decision, it has the final say, only challengeable on appeal or review, and those decisions must be respected and enforced in accordance with the law. 3. Additionally, people need to trust that judges will render decisions based on clear rules and established principles, not because of pressure or influence from those in power or commercial strength, who might cause them harm. In other words, citizens expect the judiciary to be independent and able to decide cases before them honestly and fairly, without being influenced by those who might want to manipulate or control the outcome. 4. Writing about the ***“Executive Stall”*** and its Ways, the learned Judge Professor stated as follows: ***“For judicial independence, public power is problematic from two standpoints – the first of which has already been considered. Where public power takes perceptible management and administrative form, its main ramifications, on the negative side, are:*** ***(a) whether it involves a distortion of prescribed procedure, and seeks to benefit a subjective cause; and*** ***(b) whether it oppresses and deprives the individual, in one way or another. Such injuries of public power are precisely the ones the Judiciary has endeavoured to set right.*** ***It is because the lines of propriety have been prescribed, and so the Judiciary can readily hold the power-wielders to account.”*** 1. The above statement highlights the challenges to keeping the judiciary independent and fair. That when the government or public officials use their power in ways that are improper, such as changing rules or the law to serve their own interests or to violate people's rights, this can impede the fairness of the justice system. The courts therefore step in to fix these problems to ensure that the exercise of public power is not abused. Basically, and in reiteration, the judiciary acts as a guardian that ensures that those in power do not misuse their authority and that justice is fairly dispensed. 2. It is for the above same reasons that ***Professor Margaret Sattherthwaite, UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers (supra) had this to say:*** ***Today, independent judges, lawyers and grassroots justice advocates are on the front lines of the rule of law and human rights. Judges play the crucial role of checking executive overreach, protecting against corruption and upholding core human rights, including freedom of speech and assembly, physical integrity and due process and the rights of marginalized communities.*** ***For these reasons, an independent judiciary is essential. We in the human rights field know this, and we intend to stand beside judges, civil society organizations, academics and others who speak out in favour of a judiciary that is independent and acts with the highest integrity. As you know all too well, the recent years have been challenging.*** ***Democratic backsliding and rising authoritarianism are compromising the integrity of legal systems and creating grave risks for judges and lawyers. Powerful actors with a strong interest in capturing and weakening systems that would otherwise provide a check on power are adopting a range of tactics.*** ***This playbook includes overt threats and intimidation, removal from office criminalization and attempts to pay for silence. But the playbook also includes stealth attacks on judicial independence, such as the transfer of independent judges to courts far from their families, amendments to laws and regulations concerning judicial retirement, pensions and salaries, all in efforts to quiet opposition to creeping authoritarian tendencies.*** ***Another trend that is very concerning was recently highlighted by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, which found that companies sometimes use courts, “As avenues either to silence criticism, or to influence political outcomes.” And by bringing so-called SLAPP suits—strategic lawsuits against public participation that aim to intimidate and burden critics of a company in order to silence them and others who might speak up.*** ***The situation is very concerning. Judges are asked to spend time on abusive lawsuits when lawyers and paralegals face possible penalties for the simple act of defending the environment, indigenous communities, or human rights defenders. Stepping back for a moment, let's think about why independent judges are so important, even in settings where autocratization is not underway.*** ***An independent judiciary is vital to the protection of all human rights. It's absolutely essential to resisting undue influence, ensuring equality, and providing remedies for justice problems. It's easy to understand why judicial independence is important.*** ***When you think about the forces that could make a judge unfair, imagine a judge who is required to pledge loyalty to a leader to get their position. Imagine a judge who's not paid a decent salary and becomes vulnerable to bribes. Or think about judges who harbor discriminatory attitudes towards some populations or believe women are inferior.*** ***Would you want to bring your case before this judge? No one would. And yet for some this is not unusual. Guarantees of judicial independence and integrity, structural, legal, and individual are all important for ensuring that all people, no matter their station or their situation, can get a fair hearing***.” 1. In **Jonathan Munene v Attorney General & 2 others; Kenya Judges Welfare Association (Interested Party) [2021] KEHC 12643 (KLR)** where the Respondents argued that “a) That Article 160 of the Constitution does not confer any right to any of the Judges of superior Court to be issued with a diplomatic passport or preferential treatment but ensures independence of the Judiciary. A.Makau held *inter alia* as follows: ***“47. The Constitution is not silent on the ring-fencing of the Judges* on the remuneration and benefits*which aims at ensuring that the Judges render their services and mandate independently and impartially, free from undue influence or wrong albeit any uncertainties, the future may hold. The Judicial independence therefore has everything to do with*remuneration and benefits*of the judges contrary to the assertion by the Respondents herein.”*** 1. With the above analysis, I have no hesitation in finding and holding that security for a judge in Kenya is an accrued benefit that cannot be withdrawn whimsically. To arbitrarily withdraw the security from a Judge undermines the decisional and institutional independence of a Judge and is violative of Article 160(4) of the Constitution. 2. Turning to the second limb of this issue, albeit with some repetitions, I have reviewed the facts and the chronology of events in this case. Justice Lawrence Mugambi, who previously served in this Division of the High Court convicted the Acting Inspector General of Police, Mr. Gilbert Masengeli, for contempt of Court on 9th September 2024 and sentenced him on 13th September 2024 to serve six (6) months imprisonment for being in contempt of court orders, in proceedings relating to *habeus corpus* of individuals whose lives were said to have been in danger, following alleged abduction by state agents. 3. Over the immediate weekend following the sentence, the Judge’s security detail comprising a police driver and police aide, were disarmed and withdrawn, without notice. The 1st Respondent attempted to explain this sequence as a routine operational recall for a *"three-week refresher training course"* under the *2016 VIP Policy*. The 1st Respondent further explained in the sworn affidavit that when the Judge declined to accept the new security detail, they had to recall his former aide and driver from the refresher training and they had therefore to forgo the completion of their three weeks VIP refresher training. 4. The explanation given by the 1st respondent is, in the humble view of this Court, disingenuous and unconvincing. This is so, considering that the timing of the supposed *‘routine refresher training’* theoretically became a necessity and occurred hours after a high-profile sentencing of the Acting head of the National Police Service Command. This is far too convenient to be coincidental. It is a very smart joke, to say the least, as no evidence was placed before the Court to demonstrate that the refresher training of the Judge’s security was planned for, prior to the delivery of the adverse ruling. 5. Under **Article 10** of the Constitution, any person holding a public or state office must exercise such power reasonably, in good faith and for the purpose for which it was conferred. While this Court gives deference to the independence of the Office of the Inspector General of Police under **Article 245 (4),** such independence must be subjected to checks and balances where the said power is wielded in a manner that is against public interest and contrary to the constitutional and statutory dictates. Power that is exercised in a retaliatory manner against a Judge executing their judicial duties, amounts to bullying and it undermines constitutional democracy, which can lead to lawlessness. 6. In **Secretary of State for Environment vs Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firearms [1972] 2 QB. 455,** **Lord** **Denning MR** stated thus: ***“The Courts would be no rubber stamps of the executive. If Parliament gives great powers to the Minister, the Courts must allow them to him, but at the same time, they (the courts) must be vigilant to see that he exercises them in accordance with the law. He must act within lawful authority.”*** 1. **Articles 244 & 245** of the Constitution mandate the National Police Service to foster transparency, comply with constitutional standards of human rights, and act with impartiality. The facts of this case reveal that the 1st and the 3rd Respondents, used their operational police powers to retaliate against a Judge for exercising judicial authority. This action was in violation of the national values and principles of governance set out in **Article 10,** specifically the rule of law, integrity, transparency and accountability. 2. It is also apparent from the conduct of the 1st and 3rd Respondents that the intention to intimidate a sitting judge was to send a chilling signal to all the other Judges and the wider Judiciary, that as long as the Judges issued unfavourable orders against the Executive, then they ran the risk of their security being withdrawn. It is not lost to this Court that the said Respondents averred that an apology was rendered and an explanation for the withdrawal of security given. 3. Moreover, **Article 47** on Fair Administrative Action as implemented by the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, guarantees every personthe right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and if a right or fundamental freedom of a person has been or is likely to be adversely affected by administrative actionthe person has the right to be given written reasons for the action. 4. The decision to disarm and withdraw the Judge’s security detail was procedurally flawed and constitutionally infirm because, Article 47 guarantees every person the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. **Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act** which operationalizes this guarantee require that before any adverse administrative action is taken, the affected person must be given prior notice, clear reasons and an opportunity to be heard. 5. In this case, the Judge was neither notified nor furnished with reasons prior to the disarming and withdrawal of the security officers previously assigned to him. Neither was he accorded a hearing before the withdrawal of his security. Such unilateral action amounts to arbitrary administrative conduct, violating both Article 47 and the statutory safeguards under the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, which are designed to protect individuals against capricious state power. 6. I reiterate that albeit the 1st and 3rd Respondents claim that the withdrawal of the Judge’s security was necessitated by routine administrative reasons to allow the assigned officers to undergo VIP refresher training, the constitutional obligation of procedural fairness still applied. **Section 4 of the Fair Administrative Action Act** on notice still applies. The Judge was entitled to be informed in writing that his security detail would be temporarily withdrawn for the refresher training and to be assured of alternative arrangements during that period, prior to the withdrawal, since the alleged VIP refresher training was not demonstrated to be an emergency situation. 7. Additionally, Section 5 of the Fair Administrative Action Act 2015, provides: - ***“In any case where any proposed administrative action is likely to materially and adversely affect the legal rights or interests of a group of persons or the general public, an administrative shall:*** ***a) Issue a public notice of the proposed administrative action inviting public views in that regard;*** ***b) Consider all views submitted in relation to the matter before taking the administrative action;*** ***c) Consider all relevant and materials facts; and*** ***d) Where the administrator proceeds to take the administrative action proposed in the notice;*** ***i) give reasons for the decision of administrative action as taken;*** ***ii) issue a public notice specifying the internal mechanisms available in the persons directly or indirectly affected by his or her action to appeal; and*** ***iii) specify the manner and period within which such appeal shall be lodged****(Emphasis added)* 1. Section 6 of the Fair Administrative Actions Act, 2015 provides:- ***1) “Every person materially or adversely affected by any administrative action has a right ot be supplied with such information as may be necessary to facilitate his or her application for an appeal or review in accordance with Section 5.*** ***2) The information referred to in subsection (1), may include-*** ***a) The reasons for which the action was taken; and*** ***b) Any relevant documents relating to the matter.*** ***3) The administrator to whom a request is made under subsection (1) shall, within thirty days after receiving the request, furnish the applicant, in writing, the reasons for the administrative action.*** ***4) Subject to subsection (5), if an administrator fails to furnish the applicant with the reasons for the administrative decision or action, the administrative action or decision shall, in any proceedings for review of such action or decision and in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to have been taken without good reasons.*** ***5) An administrator may depart from the requirement to furnish adequate reasons if it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, and shall inform the person making the request of such departure.”*** 1. The failure to notify the Judge of the intended withdrawal of his security detail clearly rendered the action arbitrary and procedurally unfair, underscoring that administrative convenience cannot override constitutional safeguards. It further cemented the suspect nature of the alleged VIP refresher training that allegedly was to be held coincidentally just after the adverse ruling was rendered. 2. In the end, I find and hold that the disarming and withdrawal of the Judge’s security detail was not merely a matter of operational discretion but a constitutional breach, underscoring the imperative that administrative decisions relating to deployment of state resources must adhere to the principles of fairness, transparency and accountability. 3. This Court further finds that the 1st and 3rd Respondents weaponized their deployment powers to punish a judge, which actions were in breach of public trust and amounted to a gross abuse of office. 4. Additionally, it is overtly clear that when the police security of judges who handle cases against the state is withdrawn arbitrarily, this puts pressure and intimidates the Judges, making it harder for them to decide cases fairly and independently. This kind of interference risks undermining their ability to work without fear or influence, ultimately threatening the independence and integrity of the entire judiciary. 5. On whether the withdrawal of the Judge’s security detail in the circumstances amounted to unfair discrimination, the word **“discrimination”** and **“unfair discrimination”** was defined in the case of **Republic v. Kenya School of Law exparte Otene Richard Akomo Judicial Review Application No. 20 of 2020**(unreported), in which the Court defined the terms ***“discrimination”*** and **“unfair discrimination”** as follows: ***“In*Willis vs. The United Kingdom ECHR 2002 – IV the European Court of Human Rights*observed that discrimination means treating differently, without any objective and reasonable justification, person in similar situations …*** **“Unfair discrimination”*is differential treatment that is demeaning. This happens when a law or conduct, for no good reason, treats some people as inferior or less deserving of respect than others. It also occurs when a law or conduct perpetuates or does nothing to remedy existing disadvantages and marginalization.*** ***63. The Court went on to lay down the test to be applied by courts in determining whether a claim based on*“unfair discrimination”*should succeed. It stated:*** **77.The test for determining whether a claim based on unfair discrimination should succeed was laid down by south Africa Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane NO and Others {1997} ZACC 12 as:** **a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate purpose? If it does not then there is a violation of the constitution. Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination.** **b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two-stage analysis:-** **i. Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ‘discrimination’? If it is on a specified ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.** **ii. If the differentiation amounts to ‘discrimination’, does it amount to ‘unfair discrimination’? If it has been found to have been on a specified ground, then the unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focusses primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation…** **c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause (…of the …Constitution).** 1. In ***Kalpana H. Rawal v. Judicial Service Commission & 4 others [2015] eKLR***, the Supreme Court held that: ***“In our understanding, one can only found a claim for discrimination if in the ordinary circumstances, she has been accorded some differential treatment or different standards have been applied to her as opposed to another person in similar circumstances. Such discrimination must be brought within the grounds stipulated under Article 27 (4) of the Constitution. In this regard, the Petitioner has not for instance demonstrated that since the memo, any other judge in a similar situation as herself, has not been issued with a retirement notice; or that there is a judge who is beyond 70 years and still serving, but has not been served with a retirement notice.”*** 1. **In *Sollo Nzuki v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & 2 Others [2019 eKLR*** where Justice Odunga quoting ***Nyarangi & 3 others vs. Attorney General HCCP No. 298 of 2008 [2008] KLR 688***, stated as follows with regard to discrimination: - ***“The law does not prohibit discrimination but rather unfair discrimination. The said Handbook defines unfair discrimination as treating people differently in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal in dignity. Unlawful or unfair discrimination may be direct or subtle. Direct discrimination involves treating someone less favourably because of their possession of an attribute such as race, sex or religion compared with someone without that attribute in the same circumstances. Indirect or subtle discrimination involves setting a condition or requirement which is a smaller proportion of those with the attribute are able to comply with, without reasonable justification…The rights guaranteed in the Constitution are not absolute and their boundaries are set by the rights of others and by the legitimate needs of the society. Generally, it is recognised that public order, safety, health and democratic values justify the imposition of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights. Section 82 (4) and (8) constitute limitations to the right against discrimination. The rights in the Constitution may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom taking into account all relevant factors, including (a) the nature and importance of the limitation (b) the relation between the limitation and its purpose (c) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. The principle of equality and non-discrimination does not mean that all distinctions between people are illegal. Distinctions are legitimate and hence lawful provided they satisfy the following:- (1) Pursue a legitimate aim such as affirmative action to deal with factual inequalities; and (2) Are reasonable in the light of their legitimate aim.”*** 1. Applying the principles espouse din the above decisions to the facts of this Petition, there was no evidence that security detail of any other Judge or VIP was withdrawn and scheduled for VIP refresher training at that same time as the specific Judges’ security detail. 2. The Supreme Court stated as follows in **Gichuru v Package Insurance Brokers Ltd (Petition 36 of 2019) [2021] KESC 12 (KLR)(22 October 2021)(Judgment)** citing [**Nyarangi & others v Attorney General**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2008/2275)**[2008] KLR 688** stated: ***Discrimination was failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction could be found between those favoured and those not favoured. Not all cases of distinction amounted to discrimination.******Discrimination could be said to have occurred where a person was treated differently from other persons who were in similar positions on the basis of one of the prohibited grounds like race, sex disability or due to unfair practice and without any objective and reasonable justification.*** ***Direct discrimination involved treating someone less favourably because of their possession of an attribute such as race, sex, religion compared to someone without that attribute in the same circumstances. Indirect or subtle discrimination involved setting a condition or requirement which was a smaller proportion of those with the attribute were able to comply with, without a reasonable justification.*** ***In considering claims of indirect discrimination, courts were:*** ***to identify the relevant provision, criterion or purpose, which was applicable;*** ***to determine the issue of disparate impacts, which entailed identifying a pool for the purpose of making a comparison of the relevant disadvantage;*** ***to ascertain whether the provision, criterion or practice also disadvantaged the claimant personally; and*** ***to consider whether the policy was objectively justified by a legitimate aim; and to consider (if the above requirements were satisfied) whether that was a proportionate means of achieving such a legitimate aim.*** * 1. ***The salient features of indirect discrimination were that:*** 1. ***in none of the various definitions of indirect discrimination was there any express requirement for an explanation of the reasons why a particular provision, criterion or practice put one group at a disadvantage when compared with others.*** 2. ***The contrast between the definitions of direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination expressly required a causal link between the less favourable treatment and the protected characteristic. Indirect discrimination did not. Instead, it required a causal link between the provision criterion or practice and the particular disadvantage suffered by the group and the individual.*** 3. ***The reasons why one group could find it harder to comply with the provision, criterion or practice than others were many and various.*** 4. ***There was no requirement that the provision, criterion or practice in question should put every member of the group sharing the particular protected characteristic at a disadvantage.*** 5. ***It was commonplace for the disparate impact, or particular disadvantage, to be established on the basis of statistical evidence.*** 6. ***It was always open to the respondent to show that the provision, criterion or practice was justified.*** 1. The above said, this Court is aware that a right can be limited by the law, under Article 24 of the Constitution. The question therefore is *w*hether theactions of the 1st and 3rd respondents can be justified under the limitation clause in Article 24 of the Constitution. The burden of proof lies on the 1st and 3rd Respondents in justifying that the aforesaid unfair discriminating treatment of the Judge is justified under **Article 24 of the Constitution**. They have not demonstrated that the aforesaid discriminatory treatment of the Judge is justified by **Article 24 of the Constitution**. **Article 24(1) of the Constitution** which provides: **“24. Limitation of rights and fundamental freedoms** **(1) A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including—** **a) The nature of the right or fundamental freedom;** **b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;** **c) the nature and extent of the limitation;** **d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and fundamental freedoms of others; and** **e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.”** 1. In the circumstances of this case and from the evidence on record, unfair discrimination did occur against the learned Judge because the Judge was treated differently from other judges who were in similar positions on the basis of the adverse decision rendered against the 1st Respondent, without any objective and reasonable justification, noting that no evidence was adduced to show that other Judges who enjoyed the same benefit, had their security recalled for the VIP refresher Training. 2. In view of the above, this Court finds that the 1st and 3rd Respondent’s actions to terminate the security details assigned to the Honourable Judge, after the Judge had issued adverse orders against the 1st Respondent, bordered on outright victimization and unfair discrimination and in violation of Article 27 of the Constitution which guarantees every person the right not to be discriminated against on any ground. Neither is the discrimination in question positive nor justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, as it was intended to intimidate not only the Judge in question but all other Judges, warning them of dire consequences should they make adverse orders against the executive. **What are the orders the Court should make in the circumstances of the Petition?** 1. Based on the foregoing and to prevent future occurrences where police deployment power is used to undermine judicial authority, this Court ought to grant relief requiring institutional consultation. This is because, the security of judges and the Judiciary as an institution cannot depend on the unrestrained power of the Inspector General of Police. It is for that reason that this Court finds that any decision altering or reducing the security profile of a Judge must involve prior formal consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), being the constitutional body mandated to oversee judicial independence under Article 171. 2. In conclusion, all persons, state and public officers, state organs and agencies are required to respect and obey court orders in recognition of the constitutional entrenchment of the rule of law and democracy as a national value and principle. Respect for the rule of law and the preservation of an independent judiciary are among the most important principles upon which our Republic was founded. These time-honoured principles guide our constitutional democracy. 3. In the end, I find the Petition dated 17th September, 2024 merited and is hereby allowed in the following terms, pursuant to Article 23 of the Constitution: ***the 4th Respondent, national Police Service Commission is hereby struck out of the Petition.*** ***A declaration is hereby issued that the 1st and 3rd Respondents’ actions of disarming and withdrawing the personal security detail of a Judge violates Articles 10, 19, 20, 21, 27, 47, 73, 159, 160, 244 and 245 of the Constitution of Kenya.*** ***A declaration is hereby issued that the 1st and 3rd Respondents’ actions of disarming and withdrawing the security detail of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi violated Articles 10, 19, 20, 21, 27, 47, 73, 159, 160, 244 and 245 of the Constitution of Kenya.*** ***A declaration is hereby issued that the 1st Respondent’s action of withdrawing and disarming the security detail of Hon. Justice Lawrence Mugambi is unconstitutional*** ***prayer (d) is declined as the then Acting Inspector General of Police Mr. Gilbert Masengeli, though found to be in contempt of Court, he purged the contempt by way of a copious apology to the Court and the Court already exercised discretion judiciously in concluding the issue.*** ***prayer (e) is equally declined for the same reasons given in (e) above.*** ***An order of prohibition is hereby issued prohibiting the 1st and 3rd respondents from withdrawing and/or disarming the security detail of a judge without prior consultation with the Judicial Service Commission.*** ***Each party to bear their own costs of the Petition which was filed in the public interest.*** 1. This file is closed. 2. Orders accordingly. **Dated, Signed & Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 20th Day of August, 2026** **R.E. ABURILI** **JUDGE**