https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1618

Omondi v Republic (Criminal Appeal E091 of 2023) [2026] KECA 1618 (KLR) (31 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1618 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Kisumu Criminal Appeal E091 of 2023 MS Asike-Makhandia, EC Mwita & B Ongaya, JJA July 31, 2026 Between Kelly Brian Omondi Appellant and Republic Respondent (Being an appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Kenya at Siaya (Aburili, J.) dated 22nd March, 2023 in HCCRC No. E003 of 2023 Criminal Case E003 of 2022 ) Judgment 1.The appellant was charged with the offence of murder contrary to Section 203 as read with Section 204 of the Penal Code. The particulars of the offence were that on 15th January, 2022 at Mahaya Sub-Location, West Asembo Location, within Rarieda Sub-County of Siaya County, he, jointly with others not before court, murdered one Nicholas Omondi Ojuodhi. He denied the information. 2.The prosecution called eight witnesses during the trial. Vivian Achieng Otieno (PW1) recalled that on 14th January, 2022, at around 6.30 pm, she had returned home from school when the deceased called and requested her to accompany him to a funeral in the neighborhood at night. The deceased later picked her up with a motorcycle at about 11 pm and they left for the funeral that was 20 minutes away. After five minutes, the deceased stated he wanted to return the motorcycle to its owner, called Sam, whose place was a three-minute ride from the funeral. However, they did not find Sam and they met two boys to whom the deceased then gave the motorcycle to take to Sam. The deceased also instructed the two boys to go to his house, pick up his motorcycle and bring it to where he and PW1 were. When the two boys took time to return, PW1 and the deceased started walking to the funeral place and they then met Sam who informed them that he was going to sleep. Sam had already been given his motorcycle. PW1 recounted that as they walked past Sam, they saw a group of people ahead. It was about 1.00am and there were security lights shining from the marketplace. The deceased told her he could not go where the crowd was and so they used an alternative route, but the said group scattered and surrounded them. PW1’s evidence was that one person came from behind, lit a torch on them and then hit the deceased with a rungu. The deceased fell on his face. Four men then chased PW1 into the shrubs, beat her up and demanded for her phone (Itel) which she gave them. One of the men slapped her head with a panga, and they then led her towards a field where they told her to leave and not return to the area. PW1 further recalled that she walked home and arrived at 6 am. At about 7 am, using her sister’s phone, she called Sam and asked him to check on the deceased. Sam called later to inform her that the deceased had been taken to hospital and was badly injured following an assault. PW1 testified that the following day at 2 pm, the bodaboda people came to her home with the appellant and took them to the police station to explain what happened to the deceased. She later learnt from the bodaboda that the deceased had died. 3.According to PW1, she knew the appellant because he was the one who hit the deceased with a rungu and was with the three other people who were following her and the deceased. The appellant was not wearing a mask and cap, unlike the other three men who were masked and had caps on their heads. She had known the appellant for over one month, used to meet him on her way from school and they had become friends. She had told the police that the appellant was her boyfriend and that they were not talking before the material night. PW1 noted that after the appellant hit the deceased, he tried to hide his face by placing his hand across his eyes, but she had already seen him. She had further recognized the appellant as they walked her for 30 minutes to the field that was lit with electric light. It was PW1’s testimony that she and the appellant had parted ways in December 2021, while the incident took place in January 2022. The deceased had since become her boyfriend. She also recalled that the appellant had demanded that she returns the Itel phone to him after they disagreed, as it belonged to him and he had given it to her after damaging her phone. She had not seen the said phone since the incident. 4.Lucas Otieno Ojuodhi (PW2) recalled that on 14th January, 2022, they removed the body of his late cousin Beckham from the mortuary and arrived at his home at 8.30 pm. They then assisted the family in receiving visitors before the deceased told PW2 that he would rest at his house for a while as he was tired. The deceased was PW2’s brother, and a fence separated their home and the late Beckham’s home. PW2 recounted that the deceased later called him on phone at about midnight and was only groaning. He walked towards the deceased’s house and saw torchlight on the way. He saw and moved near the deceased, lit his torchlight and noticed that the deceased had a swollen head with injuries, a swollen left eye, and blood in his nose. PW2 rushed and got a motorcycle that he used to take the deceased to the hospital for treatment, accompanied by their mother. They were discharged and returned the deceased to his house to rest. PW2 recounted that when he went to check on the deceased at 6 am, the deceased’s wife mentioned he had not slept well and had vomited blood and stopped groaning. PW2 again saw that the deceased’s left eye was very swollen. Accompanied by the deceased’s wife, his mother and sister on two motorcycles, they rushed the deceased to Bondo Hospital, then to Siaya Hospital for a CT scan. The deceased was admitted to the hospital, but his condition never improved. The deceased passed away on Sunday, 16th January, 2022, while the family was clearing the bills to transfer him to Kisumu for further treatment. It was PW2’s testimony that he schooled with PW1 but did not know whether she was the deceased’s lover. He confirmed that the deceased never spoke to him when he found the deceased injured. 5.Maurice Ogogo Aboo (PW3), the deceased’s uncle, testified that he identified the deceased’s body to the doctor who performed the postmortem on 19th January, 2022. The doctor then showed him the results of the postmortem and informed them that the deceased’s head had been hit and there was a blood clot in the brain. 6.PC Benson Ochieng (PW4) testified that on 16th January, 2022 at 10: 30 am, he was on duty at the Wangarot Police Post when a group of bodaboda riders brought in PW1 and her mother. PW4 recorded PW1’s statement to the effect that her boyfriend had been assaulted the previous night, after which he let the two leave. Later, between 6 pm and 7 pm, a mother came to the report office at the station seeking help to rescue her son who was being assaulted, and she was followed by a group of bodaboda riders holding a young man who had been assaulted and had blood on his face. 7.Gladys Akinyi Ochwodhi (PW5), the deceased’s sister, corroborated PW2’s account and confirmed seeing her brother with a swollen, injured head. She similarly noted that the deceased was not talking when they took him to the hospital. 8.IP Tum Manasses (PW6) stated that on 16th January, 2022 at 5 pm, he was called to reinforce the officers at Wangarot Police Post to rescue some suspects being lynched by members of the public. He testified that they rescued the appellant, Collins Omondi and PW1, and then escorted two of the suspects to hospital as they were seriously injured. PW1 was slightly injured as members of the public treated her as a suspect. The suspects were later discharged and escorted to Aram Police Station for further police action. 9.PC Jason Mogaka (PW7) recalled that on 17th January, 2022, he received instructions to take over investigations of the murder of the deceased. He got a court order to hold the three suspects in custody pending investigations. He escorted the three suspects for mental assessment on 18th January, 2022. PW7 testified that PW1 was later treated as a key witness, and Collins was released because no witness linked him to the case. 10.Dr. Juma Gabriel Wekesa (PW8) conducted the postmortem on the body of the deceased on 19th January, 2022. He found a cracked skull on the deceased’s internal head amongst other medical findings, and concluded that the cause of death was blunt head trauma. 11.When put to his defence, the appellant (DW1) gave sworn testimony that on 15th January, 2022, he picked up and took his mother and father home at different times (6 pm and 7 pm respectively) using his motorcycle. They ate dinner and he then watched football replays with his brother (DW2). Thereafter, DW2 left and went to sleep at 10 pm while the appellant watched a movie until midnight when he went to sleep. The appellant recalled that on 16th January, 2022 at about 5 pm, he had just washed his motorcycle at the quarry when a group of 10 people came and said they were looking for him. The group assaulted him, placed him on another motorcycle and took him to PW1’s home, where they also beat up PW1. The group of people then questioned PW1 about the deceased and forced her to say that it was the appellant who had beaten the deceased. The group then proceeded to beat the appellant for about 20 minutes before taking him to the police post. According to the appellant, he lost consciousness and woke up in hospital, where he was later discharged and taken to the police station. He testified that PW1 could have had a grudge against him because she was his ex- girlfriend. 12.K’odera John Kennedy (DW2) confirmed in his testimony that they had dinner as a family and he and the appellant then watched sports. He testified that he went to sleep at around 9.45 pm because he had school the following day. DW2 could not tell the time the appellant joined him in the house where they slept together, as he was asleep and did not have a watch. He, however, had heard their mother speaking to the appellant before the appellant joined him to sleep. DW2 stated that he found the appellant asleep when he woke up and maintained that the appellant never left him in the house. 13.The High Court delivered its judgment in the case on 22nd March, 2023. The learned Judge (Aburili, J.) evaluated the evidence and found that the prosecution had proved the charge of murder against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court found the appellant guilty of the murder of the deceased and convicted him. The appellant was then sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. In the ruling on sentence delivered on 18th April, 2023 the learned trial Judge stated in part as follows:“Albeit, he denied committing the offence, in the presence Report (sic) after conviction, he admits hitting the deceased on the head with a stick on account that he found the deceased in the company of his girlfriend and that the deceased attacked him when he inquired as to who the deceased was. The injury sustained by the deceased leading to his death is consistent with being hit on the head with the stick. The accused knew and ought to have known that that attack could turn out to be fatal because a head is a delicate part of the body. He must bear the consequences of his irresponsible action. He is raising the defence of self defence in further mitigation, which defence he never put for the court to consider in assessing the evidence and circumstances under which the murder was committed….” 14.Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant preferred an appeal to this Court. He prays that the conviction and sentence imposed upon him be quashed and he be set at liberty, or the sentence be substituted with a very least punitive form of punishment. The memorandum of appeal dated 8th October, 2025 and supplementary memorandum of appeal dated 24th May, 2026 set out the grounds of appeal as follows: 1.That the learned Judge erred in law and fact in its finding to both convict and sentence the appellant (sic) in a trial process that was partial and unfair, and from a case that was not proved to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt. 2.That the learned Judge erred in law and facts by imposing a harsh, excessive and inhumane sentence that is both disproportionate and incommensurate to the circumstances of the case. 3.That the learned Judge erred in law and in facts in holding that the circumstances of identification were favourable and free from the possibility of error. 15.In the initial memorandum of appeal dated 23rd May 2023 the appellant had attacked the sentence of imprisonment of 20 years upon the grounds of appeal that the appellant was a first offender who came into conflict with the law for the very first time as a layman; the appellant was not in the right state of mind during the commission of the offence; the long incarceration would inevitably ruin the appellant’s dreams of prosperity; this Court to consider the probation report; and the appellant’s mitigation and defence statement. The appellant prayed that the trial Court’s decision be set aside and substituted with an order reviewing the sentence. 16.At the plenary hearing of the appeal Mr. Okoth, learned counsel appeared for the appellant and who was virtually present from prison. Ms. Mumu, learned prosecution counsel appeared for the respondent. Both counsel relied on their written submissions in supporting and opposing the appeal. 17.Mr. Okoth submitted that the identification of the appellant or attackers to the police was weak and ought not to have been relied on as a basis of conviction, especially in the circumstances of this case. He cited the English case of R vs Turnbull & Others [1976] 3 ALL ER 549, in which the court held as follows on the factors to be considered when the only evidence turns on identification by a single witness, that:“...the Judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made. How long did the witness have with the Accused under observation? At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way...? Had the witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If only occasionally, had he any special reason for remembering the accused? How long elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first seen by them and his actual appearance? …Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; but even when the witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made.” 18.Counsel argued that from the prosecution’s case, only PW1 identified the appellant. That whereas PW1 alleged that there was light from the marketplace when she and the deceased saw a group of people, the alleged attack took place on an alternative route the two took. That it is not in evidence whether or not there was light in this alternative route. That the evidence that a person shone a torch on light from behind the deceased confirms there was no light at this alternative route. Further, counsel contended that the direction of the torch light made it impossible for PW1 to identify the attacker behind shining the light at them. That PW1’s evidence that she asked the attackers who they were and why they were beating her and the deceased shows she never knew who the attackers were. Counsel noted that if indeed PW1 recognized the appellant at the scene of the attack, she never disclosed the appellant’s identity to either her sister or to Sam, the persons she first interacted with the following morning. 19.Further, counsel submitted that PW1 also never described the appellant to the police while recording her statement. He cited the case of Gabriel Kamau Njoroge vs. Republic (1982 1988) 1 KAR 1134, in which this Court observed that a court should only rely on dock identification if the same is preceded by a properly conducted identification parade. He relied on the case of John Mwangi Kamau v Republic [2014] KECA 168 (KLR), in which this Court stated that a witness ought to ideally describe their assailants for purposes of organizing an identification parade, and that failure to give the description did not invalidate the identification parade but affected the weight attached to the identification evidence. It was submitted for the appellant that the circumstances of identification were never favourable without possibilities of errors and therefore, conviction based on such identification was unsafe. 20.In response, Ms. Mumu summarized the issues for determination to be: whether the evidence presented was sufficient to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and whether the trial court properly meted out an appropriate sentence. Counsel urged that the prosecution met the threshold of proof required by law and that the appellant’s assertions to the contrary do not raise any reasonable doubt capable of upsetting the trial court's finding. She maintained that the identification of the appellant was proper and clear in PW1’s evidence and that the doctor’s evidence corroborated the prosecution witnesses’ evidence on injuries sustained by the deceased. 21.On the sentence meted out by the trial court, counsel for the respondent relied on the holding in Arthur Muya Muriuki v Republic [2015] eKLR in submitting that sentencing is an exercise of discretion that the appellate court will ordinarily not interfere with unless whimsically imposed. She asserted that the trial court considered the appellant’s mitigation before sentencing and that both the conviction and the sentence imposed are therefore lawful. She urged that the appeal be dismissed for lack of merit. 22.We have considered the respective submissions and the evidence on record. This being a first appeal, our jurisdiction under Article 164 of the Constitution of Kenya and Section 379 of the Criminal Procedure Code is both fact-finding and legal or a mix of both fact and law. This Court is duty-bound to re-evaluate, re-assess, and re-examine the entirety of the evidence on record independently to arrive at its own conclusions. We must take cognisance of the fact that we did not listen to and see the witnesses testify as the trial court did. In Okeno v Republic [1972] EA 32, the East African Court of Appeal held;“An appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination (Pandya v. R., [1957] E. A. 336) and to the appellate court's own decision on the evidence. The first appellate court must itself weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own conclusions. (Shantilal M. Ruwala v. R., [1957] E.A. 570). It is not the function of a first appellate court merely to scrutinize the evidence to see if there was some evidence to support the lower court's findings and conclusions; it must make its own findings and draw its own conclusions. Only then can it decide whether the magistrate's findings should be supported. In doing so, it should make allowance for the fact that the trial court has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, see Peters v. Sunday Post, [1958] E. A. 424.” 23.The issues for determination in this appeal are: whether the prosecution established the ingredients of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, to sustain the conviction as was arrived at by the trial Court; and whether the sentence imposed was manifestly harsh and excessive in the circumstances. 24.As was correctly stated by the trial Court, to sustain a conviction on a charge of murder under Section 203 of the Penal Code, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following ingredients of the offence: the fact and the cause of death of the deceased; the fact that the death was caused by unlawful act of omission or commission on the part of the accused person - “actus reus” ; the said unlawful act of omission or commission was committed with malice aforethought - “mens rea”. 25.We have reevaluated the evidence on record. The evidence is that the postmortem showed that the deceased died from severe blunt trauma to the head. The doctor who performed an autopsy on the body ruled out self-inflicted injury and there was no evidence that the death could have been accidental. PW1 testified that she was in the company of the deceased when they were attacked by four people wielding weapons including clubs and that one of the attackers hit the deceased on the head upon which the deceased fell on his face and then the attackers chased her from the scene. The death and cause of the death of the deceased was thereby established beyond reasonable doubt. 26.Was the death caused by the appellant’s unlawful act of omission or commission? PW1 testified that she was present at the material time and she saw the appellant hit the deceased and after which the deceased fell down face forward. PW1 knew the appellant who had been her boyfriend in the recent past. The appellant’s face was not covered and PW1 recognised the appellant. PW1’s further testimony was that there was light and the appellant tried to hide his face by placing his hands across his eyes to prevent the PW1 from seeing him but she had seen him even as they walked with PW1 in a field with electric light for about 30 minutes. We are therefore certain that it was a case of recognition and not identification of a stranger in difficult circumstances requiring an identification parade. Further, it wascertainly not a dock identification as was submitted for the appellant. We are satisfied that PW1 positively recognized the appellant as her former boyfriend and saw the appellant hitting the deceased using a club (rungu). The evidence by the doctor (PW8) that the deceased died as a result of injuries sustained following an assault with a blunt object on the head corroborated PW1’s testimony of her observation at the material time. Further corroboration was by PW7, the investigating police officer who testified that he gathered that PW1 was a girlfriend to the deceased who picked her to go to the funeral place, they were accosted on their way to the funeral, PW1 recognized the appellant, and, she could not identify the other assailants because they were wearing masks. 27.The next issue for our determination is whether the appellant was actuated with malice aforethought. Section 206 of the Penal Code states as follows:“206 Malice Aforethought shall be deemed to be established by evidence proving any one or more of the following circumstances –a.An intention to cause the death of or to do grievous harm to any person, whether that person is the person actually killed or not;b.Knowledge that the act or omission causing death will probably cause the death of or grievous harm to some person whether that person is the person actually killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused;c.An intent to commit a felony;d.An intention by the act or omission to facilitate the flight or escape of any person who has committed or attempted to commit a felony.” 28.In finding that malice aforethought had been established under section 206 (a) of the Penal Code, the trial Court considered the holding in Republic v Tubere S/O Ochen [1945] 12 EACA 63 that an inference of malice aforethought can be established by considering the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body targeted, the manner in which the weapon was used and the conduct of the accused before, during and after the attack – and stated as follows:“ 69.The deceased died as a result of the injuries sustained following an assault with a blunt object on the head. The assailant who hit him on the head until the skull cracked leading to bleeding in the brain, no doubt, knew that the head was delicate part of the body to be hit with such force and that the result would ultimately be death. I find that the accused person had the necessary malice aforethought to unlawfully kill the deceased.” 29.We have considered that finding against the material on record. We are satisfied with the trial Court’s findings during the ruling on sentencing that the appellant plainly denied the charge and belatedly raised the defense of self-defense during mitigation prior to the sentencing. While an appellate court can reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter if evidence of provocation or self-defense is urged, belated such defenses raised only during mitigation after pure denial of the charge of murder at the trial will be rejected. Raising such defense belatedly during mitigation must fail because defenses must be part of the trial record or raised during defense hearing to shift or test the burden of proof. 30.It was also submitted for the appellant that the deceased died not from the inflicted injury but from the complications that may have arose in his treatment when he was taken to Bondo Hospital, referred to Siaya Hospital without improvement, and then referred to Kisumu for further treatment per PW2’s testimony. However, we have considered the evidence on causation of death on record and we assert that the delayed deceased’s death that may have resulted from secondary complications (such as septicemia or pneumonia stemming from the initial brutal assault) does not break the chain of causation or reduce the gravity of the offense because the primary wound was targeted and lethal. In particular, we have noted the testimony by the doctor (PW8). He testified that there were no visible external signs of injuries, fractures or bruises or lacerations but internally on the head there was a cracked skull on the left parietal subdural hematoma. PW8 further testified as follows:“Externally we did not find any fractures, bruises or lacerations but on the head we found cracked skull. The two injuries are not contradictory because the skin is elastic while the skull is resistant. The skull is internal not external. I have treated such injuries before. This is considered a high force injury causing a crack on the skull causing bleeding in the brain hence chances of survival depends on how fast the injury involves and how first the treatment administered. I cannot authoritatively say that the cause of death was a delay in receiving medication but I cannot rule out that delay contributes. During the first hours of trauma, the brain goes through a process including swelling (oedema). It is not possible that the injury was self-inflicted, because of the amount of force applied but accidental, yes it can cause such injury.” 31.We have re-evaluated the evidence and all surrounding circumstances. PW8 confirmed that there were no any other physical injuries and all other internal system of the deceased appeared normal. The appellant by evidence on record struck the deceased once at 1.00am. PW8 opinion was that he could not authoritatively confirm that delays in treatment was the cause of the deceased’s death but did not rule out that such delay was contributory. In the circumstances we find PW8’s testimony to cast a doubt in the prosecution case that the appellant’s hitting of the deceased carried the intention to cause the death of or to do grievous harm to the deceased. Indeed, the medical neglect or delay does not absolve the appellant of causing the death, but it creates a reasonable gap in proving mens rea or the guilty mind. However, the evidence of a single blow, the medical delay, and the lack of internal injuries cast doubt on the appellant's intent and vitiated malice aforethought. We are satisfied that the injury was not inherently fatal (as confirmed by the other normal deceased’s internal systems) and it required delayed treatment for the injury to become fatal, thereby heavily casting doubt on whether the appellant possessed the “intention to cause the death of or to do grievous harm” or "knowledge of probable death" required under Section 206 (a) and (b) of the Penal Code, respectively. 32.Section 202 of the penal code provides as follows: “202. Manslaughter 1.Any person who by an unlawful act or omission causes the death of another person is guilty of the felony termed manslaughter. 2.An unlawful omission is an omission amounting to culpable negligence to discharge a duty tending to the preservation of life or health, whether such omission is or is not accompanied by an intention to cause death or bodily harm.” 33.The punishment for the offence of manslaughter is provided for in section 205 of the Penal Code thus,“ 205.Punishment of manslaughterAny person who commits the felony of manslaughter is liable to imprisonment for life.” 34.Accordingly, the appellant’s conviction for the offence of murder contrary to Section 203 as read with Section 204 of the Penal Code is liable to quashing by this Court and substituting therefore a conviction for the offence of manslaughter contrary to Section 202 as read with Section 205 of the Penal Code. 35.On sentence we have taken into account the record which shows that the appellant was at the material time a young person of 32 years old; he was a first offender who was remorseful about the incident at which the deceased died, by his immaturity he may not have been conscious of his indiscretion and he has potential to reform, and, the pre-sentence report showed that the appellant was otherwise a citizen able to learn from his mistakes. We have also considered that that deceased’s family has been subjected to a great loss and suffering having lost a sole breadwinner. The appellant may have been seeking to recover his gift of a cell phone from his former girlfriend PW1 who had jilted the appellant in favour of the deceased. We make it clear that the legal defence of pursuing property one believes to be his, known as the defence of bona fide claim of right, cannot be used as a defense or mitigation to charges of physical assault, murder, or manslaughter if the attempted recovery causes fatal injuries. Further, while the prosecution admitted to a love triangle in the instant case, we view crimes born of jealousy or possessiveness as serious breaches of social order and not as an excuse to injure others. In Gerald Mwangi Mutahi v Republic 2009 KECA 170 (KLR) this Court held as follows:“It is not clear to us that the superior court appreciated that the center of the quarrel between the appellant and the deceased was Shiro whom the appellant regarded as his wife. That, however, is of no moment since the learned Judge correctly surmised that “the accused killed the deceased in a fit of jealousy”. It was inexcusable whatever provocation the appellant may plead. If all jilted lovers and husbands had the license to eliminate their supplanter, it would make a mockery of civilized society and the law. Nor do we think drunkenness, deliberately induced to provide “dutch courage” for commission of an offence is a mitigating factor. It would only become a relevant factor if it fell under section 13 of the Penal Code.” 36.Accordingly, we impose a sentence of 10 years imprisonment against the appellant for the offence of manslaughter. In terms of section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the period the claimant was held in custody from the date of arraignment 24th January, 2022 to the date the ruling on sentence was delivered on 18th April, 2023 by the trial court shall be excluded from computing the sentence period. 37.The upshot is that we allow the appeal, quash the conviction of the appellant for the offence of murder and set aside the imprisonment of 20 years and substitute with a conviction for the offence of manslaughter with a sentence of imprisonment for 10 years effective the date of sentence by the trial court on 18th April, 2023 but less the period prior thereto from arraignment date on 24th January, 2022. DATED AND DELIVERED AT KISUMU THIS 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2026.ASIKE-MAKHANDIA…………………………JUDGE OF APPEALE. C. MWITA…………………………JUDGE OF APPEAL*B. ONGAYA…………………………JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.DEPUTY REGISTRAR