https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/7329

Njiru & 11 others v Kenya Kwanza Coalition & another (Petition E202 of 2023) [2026] KEHC 7329 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (29 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7329 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Constitutional and Human Rights Petition E202 of 2023 J Ngaah, JM Chigiti & LN Mugambi, JJ May 29, 2026 Between Kenneth Njagi Njiru & 11 others Applicant and Kenya Kwanza Coalition & 18 others Respondent and Azimio La Umoja One- Kenya Coalition & 11 others Interested Party Ruling Introduction 1.In the Notice of Motion Application dated 22nd February 2025, the Applicants seek the following reliefs:i.Spent.ii.Spent.iii.The Court be pleased to find and hold that the Communication/Ruling of the 3rd Respondent delivered on 12th February, 2025 on Majority Party and Minority Party in the National Assembly is inconsistent with and violates the Judgement and orders of this Court dated 7th February, 2025.iv.The Court be pleased to find and hold that the Communication/Ruling of the 3rd Respondent delivered on 12th February, 2025 on Majority Party and Minority Party in the National Assembly constitutes contempt of the Judgement and orders of this Court made on 7th January, 2025.v.The Court be pleased to set aside or otherwise quash the Communication/Ruling of the 3rd Respondent delivered on 12th February, 2025 on Majority Party and Minority Party in the National Assembly.vi.The Court be pleased to find and hold that subsequent to the delivery of the Judgement dated 7th February, 2025, the 4th Respondent could not lawfully discharge his duties as Speaker of the National Assembly so long as he remained a political leader in Ford-Kenya and in Kenya Kwanza Coalition - the 19th and 1st Respondents herein respectively.vii.The Court do issue summons to Hon. Moses Masika Wetangula, the 4th Respondent herein, to attend to and appear before the Court on a date to be determined to show cause why he should not be committed to jail or penalized for contempt of court.viii.The Court be pleased to commit the 4th Respondent, Hon. Moses Masika Wetangula, to jail for six months or penalized on such terms as the Court may determine, for contempt of court for having willfully, recklessly and nonchalantly disobeyed the orders of this Court contained in the Judgement delivered on 7th February, 2025.ix.The Judgement delivered on 7th February, 2025 be amended at paragraph 508 to include two orders or reliefs to be numbered (v) and (vi) providing as follows:x.A declaration be issued to declare that the 4th Respondent - Hon. Moses Masika Wetangula - cannot continue to serve as Speaker of the National Assembly unless and until he resigns as the political leader of Ford-Kenya and as leader in the Kenya Kwanza Coalition - the 19th and 1st Respondents herein.xi.An Order of Prohibition be issued to prohibit the 4th Respondent - Hon. Moses Masika Wetangula - from serving as the Speaker of the National Assembly so long as he remains a political leader in Ford-Kenya and the Kenya Kwanza Coalition - the 19th and 1st Respondents herein respectively.xii.The Court be pleased to find and hold that Parliamentary Proceedings in the National Assembly presided over by the 4th Respondent as long as he remains the leader of Ford-Kenya Party and a principal of Kenya Kwanza Coalition, shall be deemed as unlawful, null and void ab initio.xiii.The Court be pleased to issue any other or further orders to protect the Rule of Law, the dignity and authority of the Court and to prevent further acts of impropriety on the part of the 3rd Respondent.xiv.Costs of this application be borne by the 4th Respondent personally. Applicant’s Case 2.The Application is supported by the 1st Applicant’s affidavit, sworn on even date. 3.The Applicants reiterate that on 7th February 2025, this Court quashed the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling dated 6th October 2022.Dissatisfied with the pronouncement, the Respondents filed their respective Notices of Appeal on 7th, 11th and 13th February 2025.Subsequently, the 2nd, 6th ,7th, 8th and 9th Respondent filed an application for stay of execution of this Court’s Judgment. Similarly, the 3rd Respondent filed his application for stay on 14th February 2025. 4.The 1st Applicant depones that on 7th February 2025, the Deputy Speaker of the 2nd Respondent, Hon. Gladys Shollei on behalf of the 3rd Respondent wrote to the 5th Respondent seeking information on membership of the 21 parties represented in the House, including coalition political parties and the dates relevant to the membership. Additionally, information on any variations in the membership of the coalitions and coalition political parties, and the dates of the variations and certified copies of pre-election and post-election coalition agreements relating to the parties and the status of the agreements. 5.According to the Applicant, the 5th Respondent in a response dated 11th February 2025 responded as follows:i.That 5 parties had exited the Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition Party, namely:a.People's Liberation Party (formerly the National Rainbow Coalition Kenya) on 6th December 2024.b.Maendeleo Chap Chap Party on 25th January, 2024.c.Devolution Empowerment Party on 11th April, 2023.d.United Demoratic Movement on 22nd November, 2023.e.Pamoja African Alliance on 27th February, 2023.ii.That the Amani National Congress (ANC) was in the process of dissolving the party to collaborate with the United Democratic Alliance.iii.That the Movement for Development and Growth (MDG) had initiated a process of exiting the Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition but was yet to finalize its exit from the Coalition Political Party.iv.That as at 11th February, 2025, the Pamoja African Alliance (PAA), Maendeleo Chap Chap Party (MCCP), United Democratic Movement (UDM) and the National Ordinary People Empowerment Union (NOPEU) are not members of any registered coalition or coalition political party. 6.The Applicant depones that in light of this correspondence, the members of the 2nd Respondent convened at Parliament on the same day at 2:30 P.M. He contends that on account of reversal of the Ruling dated 6th October 2022, the 3rd Respondent was enjoined to inform the 2nd Respondent that the Court had determined that the 1st Interested Party was the majority party while the 1st Respondent the minority party. In the session, the House sought to approve the appointment of Members of the House Business Committee. 7.The Applicant further claims that during the live proceedings, the 3rd Respondent failed to communicate the re-organization of the leadership of the 2nd Respondent to allow the 1st Interested Party to assume the status of Majority Party in accordance with this Court’s Judgment, a matter that was also raised by Hon.Millie Odhiambo during the proceedings. 8.The Applicant contends that in protest vide a letter dated 12th February 2025, he informed the 3rd Respondent that he had once again arrogated upon himself the power to determine the question on the majority and minority party notwithstanding this Court’s Judgment. He contends as such that the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling dated 12th February 2025 constitutes a gross contempt of court and violates the principles of natural justice. 9.Further to this, the 1st Applicant pleaded that if at all the 3rd Respondent and Hon. Gladys Shollei, had discovered new evidence showing that the 1st Respondent is the majority party, then the proper recourse ought to have been to the Court of Appeal. In light of the foregoing, it is asserted that the 3rd Respondent usurped the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in considering the new evidence obtained from the 5th Respondent hence the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling dated 12th February 2025 is unlawful, null and void ab-initio. 10.Furthermore, the 1st Applicant postulates that it is necessary that an express declaration is made that the 3rd Respondent cannot serve as Speaker of the National Assembly as long as he remains a political leader in the 1st and 19th Respondent. Additionally, he argues that the impugned Ruling is a threat to constitutional democracy and public interest occasioned by the dual roles of the 3rd Respondent. In view of the foregoing, it is the Applicants case that the Court allows the Application and grant the reliefs sought. 2nd Respondent’s Case 11.In rebuttal to the Application, the 2nd Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection to the Application dated 3rd April 2025 on the grounds that:i.The Application is an attempt to litigate a new cause of action in the present proceedings and seeks orders challenging the Communication by the Rt. Hon Speaker of the National Assembly dated 12th February, 2025 delivered after the Judgement of this Court, which cause of action can only be litigated through the institution of new proceedings.ii.This Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the orders sought, as the present Application invites the Court to sit on appeal, review, reopen and/or reconsider its Judgment delivered on 7th February 2025, which rendered this Court functus officio.iii.The 3rd and 4th Respondents enjoy Parliamentary immunity from contempt proceedings and contempt proceedings cannot issue against him in his individual capacity in respect of any actions carried out by him in the exercise of the official functions of his office under Article 117 of the Constitution and Section 12 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act, 2017.iv.In any event, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review its Judgement because the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th Respondents, the 8th and 9th Interested Parties have filed and served all parties with Civil Appeal Nos. E096, E098, E103, E105 and E109 all of 2025, on the very issues that the Applicants' Application seeks to reopen. 12.Further to this, the 2nd Respondent filed a Replying Affidavit by the Clerk, Samuel Njoroge sworn on 11th July 2025. On the outset, he challenges this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the matter as the Application raises new issues which were not addressed by the Court. He underscores that the contents of the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling dated 12th February 2025 were not the subject of this Court’s Judgment dated 7th February 2025. He contends that the Applicants ought to have instituted new proceedings challenging the Ruling to address the same. 13.Further, the 2nd Respondent contends that, the Applicants are effectively inviting this Court to sit on appeal over its own decision and to review the same. He contends that this Court became functus officio when it pronounced itself in its judgment. He further depones that, although the Applicants now seek additional orders through the Application, the Court should note that the Applicants in the Amended Petition had, among other reliefs, sought an order to quash the election of the 3rd Respondent. However, the Court only granted five orders and declined to issue the other orders. 14.The 2nd Respondent depones that there are currently five pending appeals against the cited Judgment, being: Nairobi Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. E096 of 2015, E098 of 2015, E103 of 2015, E105 of 2015 and E109 of 2015. Considering this, he argues that the Applicant’s recourse lies to the Court of Appeal. 15.The 2nd Respondent further depones that on 11th February 2025, the 2nd Respondent convened the fourth session at 2:30 P.M. The agenda of the meeting was reconstitution of the House Business Committee (HBC), which comprises of members from the majority and minority party. He contends that the function of the HBC is to prepare the agenda for the House. He notes however that following this Court’s Judgment, confusion arose as to which party is the majority party as well as sitting arrangements. At this juncture, Hon. Millie Odhiambo raised a Point of Order noting that the 1st Interested Party was pronounced as the Majority Party in the cited Judgment. 16.The 2nd Respondent swears that following this, the House discussed whether the Court, in its findings, designated any party as the Majority Party or any party as the Minority Party in the House, the implications of the Judgment to the continuity of the Business of the House, whether the Judgment rendered the Constitution of the HBC, which is the core business at the first sitting of the House in a new Session, impossible, whether the Judgment rendered the transaction of the Business of the House impracticable and whether the Judgment affects other facets of the House that are determined by the relative majorities and coalition arrangements, such as Deputy Party Leaders, Whips, Chairing and membership of all House Committees, membership of the Parliamentary Service Commission; nominations to the IEBC Selection Panel and to the Commission on Revenue Allocation. 17.In the foregoing, the 3rd Respondent rendered his Ruling on 12th February 2025 guiding that the 1st Respondent is the Majority party and the 1st Interested Party is the minority party in the House. To this end, Hon. Kimani Ichung’wah moved a motion for the approval of appointment of the members of the HBC. 18.According to the 2nd Respondent, this Court in its Judgment did not decide the question of which party is the majority and minority Party. He underscores that this created a lacuna which resulted in a standoff between the two parties. Consequently, in order to facilitate continuity of the business of the House which was at a standstill, the 3rd Respondent issued guidance on the issues raised by the House the previous day, in accordance with his oath and mandate under Article 107 of the Constitution and Standing Order 1(1) of the National Assembly Standing Orders. On this premise, the 2nd Respondent contends that the 3rd Respondent cannot be deemed to have been in contempt of this Court’s orders as advanced by the Applicants. 19.That notwithstanding, the 2nd Respondent emphasizes that the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling dated 12th February 2025, was issued in the course of discharge of his constitutional mandate. As such, he stresses that under Article 117 of the Constitution as read with Section 12(2) of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act, the 3rd Respondent is immune from legal proceedings for acts done in the conduct of his mandate. 20.To this end, the 2nd Respondent depones that the Application is a non-starter, incompetent and an abuse of the Court process hence ought to be dismissed. 3rd and 4th Respondent’s Case 21.In opposition to the Application, the 3rd and 4th Respondents filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 3rd April 2025 on the following grounds:i.Prior to the institution of the contempt proceedings, the Applicants neither extracted nor served a decree/order of the Court. There is, therefore, no Decree extracted and served by the Applicants on the 3rd and 4th Respondents to constitute the contempt proceedings.ii.The contempt proceedings are muddled up with other causes of action, thereby rendering the contempt application incurably defective and a breach of the 3rd and 4th Respondents' right to a fair hearing.iii.This Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court is limited to disobedience of its orders or decrees. There exists no order or decree arising from the judgment of this Court which is capable of enforcement through contempt proceedings.iv.There is no dispositive order that was made by this Court capable of being violated by the 3rd and 4th Respondents or enforcement by this Court in the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction.v.There is no order of the Court that required the 3rd and 4th Respondents to do or refrain from doing anything capable of being enforced through contempt proceedings.vi.The application for contempt against the 3rd and 4th Respondent in discharging his official duties is in direct violation of Article 117 of the Constitution and Section 12 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act, 2017. 22.Furthermore, the 4th Respondent filed his Replying Affidavit sworn on 14th July 2025. As a preliminary point, he denies disobeying this Court’s Orders hence not guilty of contempt. He swears that the Applicants did not serve him personally with this Court’s decree and neither is a copy of the decree attached to the instant Application. Equally, he points out that the Application does not particularize the specific order allegedly deemed to be breached. On this ground, he argues that the Application is defective and bad in law. 23.Referring to this Court’s Judgment and highlighting the background of the case, the 4th Respondent outlines that this Court granted prayers d, e, j, k, l and m in the Amended Petition. He emphasizes that the Court under order iv, in the Judgment, declined to grant the other orders sought by the Applicants. 24.Further to this, the 4th Respondent asserts that in quashing his Ruling dated 6th October 2022 on leadership of the 2nd Respondent, the Court contrary to the Applicants claim did not declare any party or coalition of parties as the majority or minority party and neither did it declare any Member of the House as the Leader of the Majority Party or the Leader of the Minority Party.He equally contends that the Court did not issue any orders requiring him to resign as Speaker or from any leadership position in his political parties. On that basis, he maintains that a finding of contempt cannot arise in the absence of a specific order directing such action. 25.He depones that, dissatisfied with the Judgment, the Respondents lodged appeals which are currently pending determination before the Court of Appeal. In his opinion, the instant Application seeks to circumvent these appeals hence is an abuse of the Court process. 26.Recapping the chronology of events in the 2nd Respondent on 11th February 2025, he depones that he delivered his Ruling the following day on the issues raised by the House. He depones that his decision was guided by information received from the 5th Respondent. Ultimately, he resolved that the 1st Respondent is the majority party and the 1st Interested Party the minority party, therefore the leadership existing at the end of the last Session remained the leadership of the House. 27.The 4th Respondent depones that, on the same day, his counsel received a letter from the Applicants demanding his resignation and urging him to enforce this Court’s Judgment, failure to which they would institute contempt of court proceedings. In his opinion, that was a misinterpretation of this Court’s Judgment. 28.The 4th Respondent stresses that he was mandated by the law to issue guidance following the issues raised by the House, so as to enable the continuity of the 2nd Respondent functions. Accordingly, he maintains that he acted in good faith. He reiterates that he did not disobey or disregard this Court’s orders. 29.Further to this, the 4th Respondent contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this matter as a court cannot sit on appeal of its own decision. He points out that such a review can only be done within the confines of Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Act. On this ground, he emphasizes that this Court became functus officio when it rendered its Judgment. 30.In view of the foregoing the 4th Respondent prays that the Application be dismissed. 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th Interested Party’s Case 31.In opposition to the Application, the 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th Interested parties rely on the Replying Affidavit sworn by the 6th Interested Party on 14th April 2025. 32.The 6th Interested Party depones that the 1st Interested Party has not yet convened a delegates’ conference or invoked its internal procedures for nominating, appointing, and selecting its leadership, namely the Leader of Majority, Deputy Leader of Majority, Majority Chief Whip, and Deputy Majority Chief Whip, as required to comply with this Court’s orders. He notes that the effect of the Court’s orders was to recognize the 1st Interested Party as the majority party in the 2nd Respondent. 33.The 6th Interested Party further deposes that this Court’s judgment is not self-executing, as certain procedural steps must first be undertaken to give it effect, chiefly in light of the fact that the 1st Interested Party comprises of multiple political parties. In this regard, he contends that it is premature for the Applicants to allege that the 3rd Respondent is in contempt of the Court’s orders. 34.Additionally, the 6th Interested Party challenges the Application on the basis that any communication made by a member within the Chambers of the 2nd Respondent is privileged. On this ground, he argues that the 3rd Respondent cannot be held in contempt for statements made while the House is in session. Applicants’ Submissions 35.The Applicants through Kinoti and Company Advocates filed submissions dated 16th July 2025. Counsel identified the issues for determination as: whether the Ruling of the 3rd Respondent dated 12th February, 2025 violates the Judgement delivered on 7th February, 2024, whether the 3rd Respondent had jurisdiction to issue the Ruling, whether the 3rd Respondent's Ruling amounts to usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal, whether the 4th Respondent is guilty of contempt of Court, whether the 3rd Respondent's Ruling should be set aside, whether this Court’s Judgment dated 7th February 2025 should be amended and whether this Court should declare that its Judgement pronounced the 1st Interested Party as the Majority Party. 36.On the first issue, Counsel answered in the affirmative. Counsel argued that it is evident that this Court in its pronouncement dated 7th February 2025 determined that the 1st Interested Party is the Majority Party. Counsel therefore asserted that the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling dated 12th February 2025 was in breach of this pronouncement. Counsel submitted that the 3rd Respondent was instead required to implement the Court’s Judgment not substitute it with his own Ruling. Counsel added that the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling was anchored on the 5th Respondent’s correspondence on the status of the parties, which was new information, that had not been availed to the Court during the hearing. Accordingly, Counsel submitted that the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling amounts to a brazen violation of this Court’s finding in its Judgment. 37.On the second issue, the learned Counsel argued that the 3rd Respondent did not have jurisdiction to issue the impugned Ruling and for this reason violated Article 108 of the Constitution. Counsel pointed out that the 3rd Respondent had lodged an appeal against this Court’s Judgment yet he proceeded to issue his own Ruling before the matter was determined. Counsel stressed that by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the 3rd Respondent had no jurisdiction to resolve a dispute that by its very nature required adjudication by a judicial body.Further to this, Counsel argued that in making the impugned Ruling, the 3rd Respondent violated the principles of natural justice, as he is not supposed to be the complainant, prosecutor and judge in own case. 38.Reliance was placed on Liyanange vs. The Queen (P.C.) [1967] 1 A.C. 259 where it was held as follows:“As has been indicated already, legislation ad hominem which is thus directed to the course of particular proceedings may not always amount to an interference with the functions of the judiciary. But in the present case their Lordships have no doubt that there was such inte1ference; that it was not only the likely but the intended effect of the impugned enactments; and that it is fatal to their validity. The true nature and purpose of these enactments are revealed by their conjoint impact on the speciific proceedings in respect of which they were designed, and they take their colour, in particular, from the alterations they purported to make as to their ultimate objective, the punishment of those convicted. These alterations constituted a grave and deliberate incursion into the judicial sphere. Quite bluntly, their aim was to ensure that the judges in dealing with these particular persons on these particular charges were deprived of their normal discretion as respects appropriate sentences. They were compelled to sentence each offender on conviction to not less than ten years' imprisonment, and compelled to order confiscation of his possessions, even though his part in the conspiracy might have been trivial.” 39.Moving on to the third issue, Counsel submitted that the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling amounts to usurpation of the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction. This is so because the basis of the impugned Ruling flowed from this Court’s Judgment dated 7th February 2025. Essentially, the 3rd Respondent is claimed to be seeking to interpret the said decision with regard to the question which is the majority party and introducing new evidence to come up with his own decision. According to Counsel, the issues raised and new evidence ought to have been presented before the Court of Appeal. 40.In light of foregoing, Counsel argued that the 3rd Respondent is in contempt of this Court’s order. This is because in spite of this Court’s Judgement, the 3rd Respondent determined that the 1st Respondent is the majority party. To buttress this point reliance was placed on Shimmers Plaza Ltd vs. National Bank of Kenya Ltd (2015) eKLR where it was held that:“We reiterate here that court orders must be obeyed. Parties against whom such orders are made cannot be allowed to trash them with impunity. Obedience of Court orders is not optional, rather, it is mandatory and a person does not choose whether to obey a court order or not… No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's permission to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not as a favour". 41.Further reliance was placed on Johnson Vs Grant (1923) SC 789, Republic v Kenya School of Law & 2 Others ex-parte Juliet Wanjiru Njoroge & 5 Others [2015] eKLR,Cabinet Secretary for Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government Vs Miguna Miguna & 4 others [2018] eKLR and Teachers Service Commission vs. Kenya National Union of Teachers & 2 Others [2013] eKLR. 42.On the fifth issue, it was contended that the 3rd Respondent’s impugned Ruling ought to be set aside as it was made in contravention of the law. Reliance was placed on Kenya Tea Growers Association Vs Francis Atwoli and 5 Others [2012] eKLR where it was held that:“I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high importance that orders of the courts should be obeyed, willful disobedience to an order of the court is punishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may properly be described as being illegal .... even if the Defendants thought that the injunction was improperly obtained or too wide in its terms, that provides no excuse for disobeying it. The remedy is to vary or discharge it.” 43.Similar reliance was placed on Kenya Pipeline Company Limited v Glencore Energy (U.K.) Limited [2015] eKLR and Kelvin Roy Omondi & Boniface Mwangi vs. Attorney General and Others HCCHR Pet E269 of 2025. 44.Moreover, Counsel contended that this Court’s Judgment ought to be amended so as to reflect and address the issues raised in the instant Application. He underscored that Court decisions ought to be clear to the parties and further opined that by the 3rd Respondent in holding that the 1st Respondent’s is the majority party made a mockery of this Court’s Judgment which found that the 1st Interested Party is the majority party. 45.He relied on Stanley Munga Githunguri v Republic 1986 KEHC 44 (KLR) where it was held that:“These proceedings have put our Constitution on the anvil. They are the subject of considerable notoriety. They will become a milestone in the legal history of Kenya. The country is watching us. Africa is watching us. Other countries outside, some with their own peculiar systems of administering justice, they are all waiting to see how we will decide this case.We speak in the knowledge that rights cannot be absolute. They must be balanced against other rights and freedoms and the general welfare of the community. We believe we are speaking correctly and not for the sake of being self-laudatory when we say the Republic of Kenya is praised and admired by other peoples and other systems for the independent manner in which justice is dispensed by the Courts of this country.We also speak knowing that it is our duty to ask ourselves what is the use of having a Constitution if it is not honoured and respected by the people. The people will lose faith in the Constitution if it fails to give effective protection to their fundamental rights. The people know and believe that destroy the rule of law and you destroy justice, thereby also destroying the society. Justice of any other kind would be as shocking as the crime itself. The ideals of justice keep the people buoyant. The Courts of justice must reflect the opinion of the people.” 2nd Respondent’s Submissions 46.The 2nd Respondent through their advocate Sandra Nganyi filed submissions dated 14th July 2025. According to the learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent the only issues for determination are whether this Court has jurisdiction to determine the application and whether the Applicants are entitled to the orders sought in the application. 47.On the first issue, the learned submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the matter for the reason that once a court issues its final judgment in a matter, it becomesfunctus officio. In this argument, the learned Counsel relied on Telkom Kenya Limited v John Ochanda (Suing On His Own Behalf and on Behalf Of 996 Former Employees of Telkom Kenya Limited) [2014] KECA 600 (KLR) which was cited in support:“A court is functus when it has performed all its duties in a particular case. The doctrine does not prevent the court from correcting clerical errors nor does it prevent a judicial change of mind even when a decision has been communicated to the parties. Proceedings are only fully concluded, and the court functus, when its judgment or order has been perfected. The purpose of the doctrine is to provide finality. Once proceedings are finally concluded, the court cannot review or alter its decision; any challenge to its ruling or adjudication must be taken to a higher court if that right is available.” 48.Counsel further submitted that it is not in dispute that this Court delivered its judgment on 7th February 2025 and a decree extracted soon thereafter. Considering this, Counsel contended that this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the orders sought, as the Application invites this Court to sit on appeal so as to re-consider its judgment. Counsel further submitted that this Court cannot review its own decision where a record of appeal exists such as in this case. Counsel observed that the Applicants would not be prejudiced if this Application is dismissed as they already have recourse to the Court of Appeal in the context of the pending appeals. 49.Reliance was placed on Wandaba & 11 others v County Government of Bungoma [2022] KEELRC 13051 (KLR) where it was held that:“Applying the binding decision of the Court of Appeal interpreting the provisions order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules in Multichoice (Kenya) Ltd v Wananchi Group (Kenya) Limited & 2 others [2020] eKLR to extent that where a substantive appeal has been filed orders of review are not applicable, the court then finds there is appeal against the judgment of trial court pending before the court of appeal at Kisumu hence this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for review.” 50.Counsel also relied on Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General & another [2019] KESC 16 (KLR) in support of the same argument. 51.On the second issue, Counsel submitted that the instant Application was filed under Section 5 of the Judicature Act, Rule 39 of the High Court (Organization and Administration) (General) Rules, 2016 and Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 99 of the Civil Procedure Act and Articles 23, 27, 50 and 165(3)(d) of the Constitution. Counsel faulting this approach submitted that a Court must be moved in line with the correct legal provisions for it to exercise its jurisdiction. Counsel submitted that the application is a non-starter and incompetent since it was not instituted pursuant to the correct provisions of the law in relation to contempt of Court. For this argument, the learned Counsel relied on the case of Nguruman Limited v Shompole Group Ranch & Another [2014] KECA 358 (KLR) where it was held that:“It is now trite that the inherent power of the Court exists in the Court’s Jurisdiction as a safety valve to enable the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of Justice or to prevent the abuse of the power of the Court. It cannot be cited where there is an appropriate Section, order or rule to cover the relief sought.” 52.She also cited Rafiki Enterprises Limited versus Kings Way Tyres & Automart Limited Civil Application No. Nai 375 of 1995 (UR) and Musembi & 13 others (Suing on their own behalf and on behalf of 15 residents of Upendo City Cotton village at South C Ward, Nairobi) v Moi Educational Centre Co. Ltd & 3 others [2022] KESC 19 (KLR) (Civ) in support of that argument. 53.Counsel further argued that the amendments sought by the Applicants in the Application are not obvious clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the judgment or decrees or errors arising from any accidental slip or omissions, as provided in law. In the Counsel’s view, the amendments sought by the Applicants seek to confer upon the Court jurisdiction to sit on appeal over its own judgment and substantially alter it. To buttress this point reliance was placed on Anders Bruel T/A Queencrosss Aviation v Kenya Civil Aviation Authority & another [2013] eKLR where it was held that:“To consider them in an application for review would, in my view, amount to a re-opening of the [APPLICANTs’] case and admitting evidence that was not before the court at the hearing of the petition. At any rate, these matters do not constitute an error ‘apparent on the face of the record.’ To take them into account would amount to permitting these matters to be adduced as additional evidence and a re-consideration of the facts presented before the court. What the court is being asked to do is not to review its decision because there are errors apparent on the face of the record, but to allow the introduction of new matters by the APPLICANT.” 3rd and 4th Respondents’ Submissions 54.On her part, Ms J.A. Guserwa , the learned Counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents filed submissions dated 14th July 2025 and identified the issues for determination whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Application and whether the Rt. Hon. Speaker is in contempt of the orders of this Court. 55.Counsel reiterated the grounds cited in their preliminary objection and referred to the principles articulated in Owners of the Motor Vessel Lilian S" v Caltex Oil [Kenya] Ltd [1989)1 KLR and Re the Interim Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission [2011]eKLR and thus submitted that this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this matter. 56.She further submitted that the threshold for a contempt application was set out in Getecha v Hydro Developers Limited [2025] KEELC 721 (KLR) as follows:“The English law that is applicable is Part 81 of the English Civil Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2020. PART 81 is on-Applications and Proceedings in Relation to Contempt of Court. Its material parts set out the following requirements for a contempt application:Requirements of a contempt application81.41.Unless and to the extent that the court directs otherwise, every contempt application must be supported by written evidence given by affidavit or affirmation.2.A contempt application must include statements of all the following, unless (in the case of (b) to (g)) wholly inapplicable –a.the nature of the alleged contempt (for example, breach of an order or undertaking or contempt in the face of the court);b.the date and terms of an11 order allegedly breached or disobeyed;(c)confirmation that any such order was personally served, and the date it was served, unless the court or the parties dispensed with personal service;(d)if the court dispensed with personal service, the terms and date of the court's order dispensing with personal service;(e)whether a penal notice had been added to the front of any order allegedly breached or disobeyed;(f)the date and terms of any undertaking allegedly breached;(g)confirmation of the claimant's belief that the person who gave any undertaking understood its terms and the consequences of failure to comply with it;(h)a brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute the contempt, set out numerically in chronological order ... " 57.Counsel submitted that the Applicants had not satisfied these requirements for this Court to make a finding of contempt as the Court can only exercise contempt jurisdiction to enforce orders emanating from its judgment. Counsel submitted that this Court, in its judgment, neither declared any party as the majority party nor granted the other prayers sought in the Petition, having expressly declined to do so under Order iv. Counsel therefore maintained that no finding of contempt can arise in respect of an order that was neither issued nor contemplated by the Court. 58.Further, Counsel underscored that the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling dated 12th February 2025 was not covered in the Court judgement. In this regard, Counsel submitted that the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling dated 12th February 2025 did not fall within the scope of, nor was it contemplated in this Court’s Judgment. 59.Moving to the next issue, Counsel submitted that for a contempt application to succeed, an Applicant must show that the person or party sought to be committed was personally served with a copy of the order alleged to have been breached, which order was duly endorsed with a notice of penal consequences as affirmed in Ochino & another v Okombo & 4 others [1989] KLR 165. 60.Counsel submitted that the Applicants had failed to show that the decree on which the contempt application is predicated, was served on the 4th Respondent. Correspondingly, it was submitted that the Applicants did not also demonstrate that leave was granted by the Court to dispense with personal service. Counsel emphasized that in the context of contempt proceedings where the liberty of the subject is at stake, the Court must insist on strict compliance with all the procedural safeguards. To buttress this point reliance was placed on Githiga & 5 others v Kiru Tea Factory Company Ltd [2023] KESC 41 (KLR) where it was held that:“Due to the quasi-criminal nature of contempt proceedings and the gravity of the consequences that flow from these proceedings, courts are required to adhere to the principles of natural justice, procedural fairness, and the right to a fair hearing. This is because, in contempt proceedings, the liberty of the subject is usually at stake, therefore, if a party alleges breaches of his fundamental rights and freedoms as envisaged under the Constitution albeit, at the Court of Appeal, this court cannot afford to shut its… to such serious legal issues that call for settling as the apex court." 61.Additional reliance was placed on Samuel MN Mweru & others v National Land Commission & 2 others [2020] KEHC 9233 (KLR). 62.In light of the foregoing, Counsel submitted that the Applicants had failed to satisfy all the elements for a contempt application, and as such, the Application is defective, bad in law and incompetent. Reliance was placed on Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v Attorney General & 2 others [2012] eKLR where it was held that:“The concept of "abuse of the process of the Court" bears no fixed meaning, but has to do with the motives behind the guilty party's actions; and with a perceived attempt to maneuver the Court's jurisdiction in a manner incompatible with the goals of justice. The bottom line in a case of abuse of Court process is that, it "appears so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and is so weak to be beyond redemption ... " Beyond that threshold, lies an unlimited range of conduct by a party that may more clearly point to an instance of abuse of Court process." 63.Counsel further relied on Muchanga Investments Ltd v Safaris Africa (unlimited) Ltd [2009) eKLR and Satya Bhanna v Director of Public Prosecution [2019) eKLR in support of the above submissions. 12th Respondent’s Submissions 64.The 12th Respondent filed submissions through the learned Counsel Ms. Wanjiru Wanja dated 14th July 2025. She submitted that in order to find one to be in contempt of court there has to be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of a clear and unambiguous court order; that he willfully disobeyed it; and, that the disobedience of the court order interferes with the administration of justice. 65.Furthermore, Counsel stressed that the court must have issued a clear and unambiguous order that is binding on the alleged contemnor. Counsel submitted in order for the 3rd Respondent to be held to be in contempt of the Court order, it must be proved that the 3rd Respondent was aware of the order; that he must have been personally served with the order endorsed with the Penal Notice stating the breach and consequences; and, finally that the 3rd Respondent deliberately violated the terms of the order. 66.In view of this argument, Counsel submitted that the Court ought to approach contempt proceedings with caution, appreciating the potential impact on an individual's liberty. She relied on Ochino (supra) where the Court held that:“As a general rule, no court order requiring a person to do or abstain from doing any act may be enforced by committing him for contempt unless a copy of the order has been served personally on the person required to do or abstain from doing it.” 67.For the same argument, she further relied on Republic v Mohammed & another [2019] KESC 47 (KLR), Samuel M.N. Maweu & others v National Land Commission [2020] eKLR, Koilel & 2 others v Koilel & another [2022] KEHC 10288 (KLR) and Gatharia K. Mutikika – vs Baharini Farm Ltd [1985] KLR 227 Analysis and Determination 68.Having considered the pleadings and the submissions herein, this Honourable Court finds the following to be the issues for determination in this Application:1.Whether this Honourable Court possesses the jurisdiction to amend the judgment it delivered on 7/2/2025 or whether it is now functus officio.2.Whether the 3rd Respondent’s Ruling of 12/2/2025 was issued in deliberate and wilful disobedience of the clear terms and directions set out in this Honourable Court’s judgment of 7/2/2025, thereby constituting contempt of Court.3.Whether, based on the findings of issue no. 1 & 2 above, the Applicants are entitled to the orders sought. Whether this Honourable Court possesses the jurisdiction to amend the judgment it delivered on 7/2/2025 or whether it is now functus officio. 69.In their Application, the Applicants urged this Honourable Court to amend its judgement of 7/2/2025 by incorporating additional orders proposed in the Application and listed as ix-xiv, specifically to state as follows:ix)The Judgement delivered on 7th February, 2025 be amended at paragraph 508 to include two orders or reliefs to be numbered (v) and (vi) providing as follows:x)A declaration be issued to declare that the 4th Respondent - Hon. Moses Masika Wetangula - cannot continue to serve as Speaker of the National Assembly unless and until he resigns as the political leader of Ford-Kenya and as leader in the Kenya Kwanza Coalition - the 19th and 1st Respondents herein.xi)An Order of Prohibition be issued to prohibit the 4th Respondent - Hon. Moses Masika Wetangula - from serving as the Speaker of the National Assembly so long as he remains a political leader in Ford-Kenya and the Kenya Kwanza Coalition - the 19th and 1st Respondents herein respectively.xii)The Court be pleased to find and hold that Parliamentary Proceedings in the National Assembly presided over by the 4th Respondent as long as he remains the leader of Ford-Kenya Party and a principal of Kenya Kwanza Coalition, shall be deemed as unlawful, null and void ab initio.xiii)The Court be pleased to issue any other or further orders to protect the Rule of Law, the dignity and authority of the Court and to prevent further acts of impropriety on the part of the 3rd Respondent.xiv)Costs of this application be borne by the 4th Respondent personally. 70.Generally, judgements of the Courts on merits are governed by the principle of finality commonly known as the functus officio doctrine. The doctrine precludes Courts from revising their own judgments with a view to varying or incorporating changes in them save for exceptionally limited circumstances that are strictly governed by the law. 71.The Court of Appeal discussed this principle in Telcom Kenya LTD v Ochanda (suing on behalf of 996 others) (2014) eKLR. It held as follows:“...The general rule that a final decision of a court cannot be re-opened derives from the decision of the English Court of Appeal In re St. Nazaire Co., (1879), 12 Ch. D. 88. The basis for it was that the power to rehear was transferred by the Judicature Acts to the appellate division. The rule applied only after the formal judgment had been drawn up, issued and entered, and was subject to two exceptions:23.Where there had been a slip in drawing it up, and, where there was an error in expressing the manifest intention of the court. See Paper Machinery Ltd. vs. J.O. Rose Engineering Corp., [1934] S.C.R. 186”The Supreme Court in Raila Odinga v IEBC cited with approval an excerpt from an article by Daniel Malan Pretorius entitled, “The Origins of the Functus Officio Doctrine, with Special Reference to its Application in Administrative Law” (2005) 122 SALJ 832 in which the learned author stated;“The functus officio doctrine is one of the mechanisms by means of which the law gives expression to the principle of finality. According to this doctrine, a person who is vested with adjudicative or decision-making powers may, as a general rule, exercise those powers only once in relation to the same matter...The [principle] is that once such a decision has been given, it is (subject to any right of appeal to superior body or functionary) final and conclusive. Such a decision cannot be reviewed or varied by the decision maker.”24.The doctrine is not to be understood to bar any engagement by a court with a case that it has already decided or pronounced itself on. What it does bar is a merit-based decisional re-engagement with the case once final judgment has been entered and a decree thereon issued. There do therefore exist certain exceptions and these have been captured thus in Jersey Evening Post Ltd Vs Ai Thani [2002] JLR 542 at 550, also cited and applied by the Supreme Court;25.A court is functus when it has performed all its duties in a particular case. The doctrine does not prevent the court from correcting clerical errors nor does it prevent a judicial change of mind even when a decision has been communicated to the parties. Proceedings are only fully concluded, and the court functus, when its judgment or order has been perfected. The purpose of the doctrine is to provide finality. Once proceedings are finally concluded, the court cannot review or alter its decision; any challenge to its ruling or adjudication must be taken to a higher court if that right is available.” 72.In the instant case, the Applicants cited Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 99 of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21 upon which this Application is grounded. It is necessary to consider the extent of applicability of Section 99 of the Civil procedure Act Cap 21. It states:“99. Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders, or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission, may at any time be corrected by the court either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties." 73.It is manifest from the reading of Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Act that, indeed, corrections can be made in judgments, decrees or orders. However, this is confined to minor errors such as wrong dates, misspelt names, wrong figures for instance, where the amount in figures differs with what is stated in words, wrong additions and related matters. That provision cannot be cited as the basis for introducing significant new attributes into a judgment or order. In the instant case, the changes that the Applicants seek are neither arithmetical or clerical but substantial. 74.The lawful route through which the Court may be moved to re-examine its own judgment is through the review. Even though review is not expressly provided for under the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013; the Court of Appeal has held that in the absence of specific provisions in the rules, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act can be resorted to. In Karl Wehner Claasen vs Commissioner of Lands & 4 others (2019) eKLR the Court stated:“…in the absence of express provisions in the Practice Procedure Rules, an application for substitution may be based on the applicable Civil Procedure Rules. However, we add that Rule 3(8) of the Practice and Procedure Rules gives the court inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice and that Article 159(2) (d) and (e) respectively obliges a court to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities and to protect and promote the purpose and principles of the Constitution.” 75.In the Civil Procedure Act, the relevant section would be Section 80 of the Act as read with Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Section 80 provides:“80.Any person who considers himself aggrieved—a.by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Act, but from which no appeal has been preferred;b)by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Act, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.” 76.Further, Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules provide:Order 45 Rule 1Any person considering himself aggrieved—by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; or by a decree or order from which no appeal is hereby allowed, and who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree or order, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order without unreasonable delay. 77.In the light of the statutory and procedural restriction outlined above, it is crystal clear that a review of the judgment of the Court delivered on 7/2/2025 cannot thus be undertaken by this Honourable Court because the Respondents, confirmed through their disposition that various appeals against the judgement have already been preferred and that position has not been controverted. The existence appeals against the judgment deprives this Honourable Court the jurisdiction to entertain a review application in view of the limitation in Section 80 (a) as read with Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 78.The Applicants also relied on the inherent jurisdiction of this Court as the source of authority of empowering it to grant the proposed amendment to the judgment. The Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, Rule 3 (8) provides:“Nothing in these rules shall limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court” 79.This is the equivalent of Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act which states:“Nothing in this Act shall limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.” 80.However, these overriding provisions do not apply willy-nilly, they are subject to established legal principles and limitation. They confer special jurisdiction that has to be invoked with extreme circumspection, and are not to be used as substitute for specific legal provisions governing a particular circumstance. This jurisdiction is exercised exclusively and sparingly where the law is silent and failure to act would lead to manifest miscarriage of justice. This is unlike the present case where the appeal process is ongoing. The Supreme Court, in Narok County Government & another v Ntutu & 4 others (Petition 3 of 2015) [2018] KESC 11 (KLR) (11 December 2018) (Judgment) restated the position as follows:“… Back home, the Court of Appeal in addressing the point at hand in Kenya Power & Lighting Company v Njumbi Residents Association& another [2015] eKLR cited Ouko J (as he then was) In the matter of the Estate of George M’Mboroki, Meru HCSC No. 357 of 2004 and aptly put it that;“… the Court retains certain intrinsic authority in the absence of specific or alternative remedy, a residual source of power, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular, to ensure the observance of the due process of the law, to prevent abuse of process to do justice between the parties”. 99 .Further in Benjoh Amalgamated Limited & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited [2014] eKLR the Court of Appeal set out the principles to guide the Court in exercising inherent jurisdiction in these words; “The jurisprudence that emerges from the case-law from the aforementioned jurisdictions shows that where the Court is of final resort, and notwithstanding that it has not explicitly been statutorily conferred with the jurisdiction to reopen a decided matter, it has residual jurisdiction to do so in cases of fraud, bias, or other injustice with a view to correct the same and in doing so the principles to be had regard to are, on the one hand, the finality principle that hinges on public interest and the need to have conclusiveness to litigation and on the other hand, the justice principle that is pegged on the need to do justice to the parties and to boost the confidence of the public in the system of justice. As shown in the various authorities, this is jurisdiction that should be invoked with circumspection…” (Emphasis added.) 100. The conclusion drawn from the above citations is that this Court, indeed any other appellate Court, even where there are no specific provisions to do an act, has inherent and/or residual powers to act in a fair or equitable manner in the interest of justice and/or to ensure the observance of the due process of the law. Therein also lies the power for the Court to act to prevent abuse of the Court process by one party so that fairness is maintained between all parties.” 81.In our view, going by the outlined principles, it is obvious that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to re-examine this matter with a view to the incorporating the proposed additional orders. First, the nature of the orders sought are neither arithmetical nor clerical. Secondly, the Applicants seek to enlarge the extent of the orders to accommodate fresh factual circumstances that emerged after the judgment was delivered. 82.Further, even assuming that a re-evaluation is possible through review, it would be subject to stringent legal conditions which must be met, one of which is that no appeal should have been filed. Already, there are multiple appeals that have been preferred, namely; Civil Appeal E096 of 2025, of E098 of 2025, E103 of 2025 and E105 of 2025 which would make an application for review untenable. 83.Moreover, listening carefully to the Applicants, it is apparent that they are dissatisfied with the extent of the orders granted by this Court. They thus propose amendments to bar the 4th Respondent from continuing to discharge his duties as the Speaker of the National Assembly, declaration that the proceedings that have been presided by the 4th Respondent subsequent to the judgment of 7/2/25 are unlawful, illegal, null and void and an order that the 3rd Respondent should personally bear for the costs of the Application. In our view, if the Applicant is unhappy with the scope of the orders, the remedy lies in lodging an appeal. Whether the 3rd Respondent Ruling of 12/2/2025 was issued in deliberate and wilful disobedience of the clear terms and directions set out in this Honourable Court’s judgment of 7/2/2025, thereby constituting contempt of Court. 84.It is trite law that contempt of Court connotes any act that defies or is disrespectful to the Court and may be manifested in different ways. This included deliberate refusal to obey a court order, showing disrespect towards the Court during judicial proceedings (Contempt in the face of the Court) or scandalizing the Court with misinformation. 85.The law governing contempt of Court proceedings in Kenya was explained in the case of Alfred Mutua v Boniface Mwangi (2022) eKLR as follows:“13.Before the enactment of the nullified Contempt of Court Act which deleted section 5 of the Judicature Act Cap 8 Laws of Kenya, the first port of call with respect to the procedure for institution contempt of Court proceedings in this country was and therefore is section 5 of the Judicature Act Cap 8 Laws of Kenya. That section provides:The High Court and the Court of Appeal shall have the same power to punish for contempt of court as is for the time being possessed by the High Court of Justice in England, and that power shall extend to upholding the authority and dignity of subordinate courts.An order of the High Court made by way of punishment for contempt of court shall be appealable as if it were a conviction and sentence made in the exercise of the ordinary original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court.14.Therefore, the law that governs contempt of court proceedings is the English law applicable in England at the time the contempt was committed. The procedure in the High Court of Justice in England was considered in detail by the Court of Appeal in Christine Wangari Gachege vs. Elizabeth Wanjiru Evans & 11 Others [2014] eKLR. In that case the Court recognised that the only statutory basis for contempt of court law in so far as the Court of Appeal and the High Court are concerned is section 5 of the Judicature Act.15.Under Rule 81.4 of the English Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No. 3) Rules, 2020 provides for the requirements of a contempt application and provides that:1.Unless and to the extent that the court directs otherwise, every contempt application must be supported by written evidence given by affidavit or affirmation.2.A contempt application must include statements of all the following, unless (in the case of (b) to (g)) wholly inapplicable—a.the nature of the alleged contempt (for example, breach of an order or undertaking or contempt in the face of the court);b.the date and terms of any order allegedly breached or disobeyed;c.confirmation that any such order was personally served, and the date it was served, unless the court or the parties dispensed with personal service;d.if the court dispensed with personal service, the terms and date of the court's order dispensing with personal service.e.confirmation that any order allegedly breached or disobeyed included a penal notice;f.the date and terms of any undertaking allegedly breached;g.confirmation of the claimant's belief that the person who gave any undertaking understood its terms and the consequences of failure to comply with it;h.a brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute the contempt, set out numerically in chronological order;i.that the defendant has the right to be legally represented in the contempt proceedings;j.that the defendant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal representation and to apply for legal aid which may be available without any means test;k.that the defendant may be entitled to the services of an interpreter;l.that the defendant is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for the hearing;m.that the defendant is entitled but not obliged to give written and oral evidence in their defence;n.that the defendant has the right to remain silent and to decline to answer any question the answer to which may incriminate the defendant;o.that the court may proceed in the defendant's absence if they do not attend but (whether or not they attend) will only find the defendant in contempt if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the facts constituting contempt and that they do constitute contempt;p.that if the court is satisfied that the defendant has committed a contempt, the court may punish the defendant by a fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets or other punishment under the law;q.that if the defendant admits the contempt and wishes to apologise to the court, that is likely to reduce the seriousness of any punishment by the court;r.that the court's findings will be provided in writing as soon as practicable after the hearing; ands.that the court will sit in public, unless and to the extent that the court orders otherwise, and that its findings will be made public.” 86.The Court in Republic v Kenya School of Law & 2 others Ex parte Juliet Wanjiru Njoroge & 5 others (2015) eKLR underscored the significance of the contempt proceedings as tool for the observance of the rule of law as follows:“23.In my considered view, Court orders are not made in vain and are meant to be complied with. If for any reason a party has difficulty in complying with court orders the honourable thing to do is to come back to court and explain the difficulties faced by the need to comply with the order. Once a Court order is made in a suit the same is valid unless set aside on review or on appeal. In Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd vs. Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & Another [2005] 1 KLR 828 Ibrahim, J (as he then was) stated:“It is essential for the maintenance of the rule of law and order that the authority and the dignity of our Courts are upheld at all times. The Court will not condone deliberate disobedience of its orders and will not shy away from its responsibility to deal firmly with proved contemnors. It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom, an order is made by a Court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or void”. 87.Nevertheless, a Party that moves the Court in an application for contempt must satisfy the requisite threshold as laid down in Samuel M. N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 others [2020] eKLR where the Court held as follows:“40.It is an established principle of law that in order to succeed in civil contempt proceedings, the Applicant has to provei.the terms of the order,(ii)Knowledge of these terms by the Respondent,(iii)Failure by the Respondent to comply with the terms of the order. Upon proof of these requirements the presence of willfulness and bad faith on the part of the Respondent would normally be inferred, but the Respondent could rebut this inference by contrary proof on a balance of probabilities. Perhaps the most comprehensive of the elements of civil contempt was stated by the learned authors of the book Contempt in Modern New Zealand who succinctly stated:-"There are essentially four elements that must be proved to make the case for civil contempt. The Applicant must prove to the required standard (in civil contempt cases which is higher than civil cases) that:-1.the terms of the order (or injunction or undertaking) were clear and unambiguous and were binding on the defendant;2.the defendant had knowledge of or proper notice of the terms of the order;3.the defendant has acted in breach of the terms of the order; and4.the defendant's conduct was deliberate.” 88.The specific orders read out in open Court in presence of the 3rd Respondent’s Counsel were as follows:i.It is hereby declared that the question as to which party or coalition of parties is the majority in the National Assembly in the 13th Parliament was determined by the sovereign will of the Kenyan voters during the 9 August 2022 General Elections.ii.It is hereby declared that the Honourable Speaker’s ruling or determination contained in his communication from the chair made on 6 October, 2022 on the Majority and Minority in the National Assembly violated article 108 of the Constitution and, therefore, it is null and void.iii.It is hereby declared that the Honourable Speaker’s ruling or determination from the chair on 6 October 2022 with respect to leadership of the National Assembly on account of his determination of the Majority Party and Minority Party in the National Assembly is contrary to and violated Article 108 of the Constitution and, to that extent, it is null and void.iv.An order of certiorari is hereby issued quashing the Honourable Speaker’s ruling or determination contained in his communication from the chair made on 6 October, 2022 on the Majority and Minority in the National Assembly.v.Subject to the foregoing orders, the rest of the prayers in the Petition are declined.vi.Parties will bear their respective costs. 89.These orders are explicit. They are mainly in form of declarations and an order of Certiorari that quashed the specific decision made by the Speaker (3rd Respondent) on the 6th October, 2022. 90.Declarations in their nature do not require a Party to take any specific action or refrain from doing anything, they simply declare the legal position as it is. If that position is contravened, the Party offended can then, based on the declaration seek a remedy founded on the declaration. This position is buttressed by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Bala (Civil Appeal 223 of 2017) [2023] KECA 117 (KLR) (3 February 2023) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2023] KECA 117 (KLR)“In any event, had the appellant properly understood the final decree, he would have appreciated that the learned judge simply issued declarations clarifying the law. A declaratory order means a ruling that is explanatory in purpose; it is designed to clarify what before was uncertain or doubtful. A declaratory order constitutes a declaration of rights between parties to a dispute and is binding as to both present and future rights. Declaratory judgments are typically sought as a means of preventing a dispute by removing ‘legal uncertainty’ as to the applicable law and the rights and obligations of the parties. HWR Wade in “Administrative Law” 5th Edition at page 523 stated as follows in reference to a declaratory judgment:“A declaratory judgment by itself merely states some existing legal situation. It requires no one to do anything and to disregard it will not be contempt of court. By enabling a party to discover what his legal position is, it opens the way to the use of other remedies to give effect to it, if that should be necessary.”20.It is clear from the above definition that a declaratory judgment is very limited in its powers. All it can do is clarify a legal relationship or state of affairs by stating the court’s opinion of it. In other words, it states the court's authoritative opinion regarding the exact nature of the legal matter without requiring the parties to do anything…” 91.We therefore find no proof of deliberate and wilful disobedience by the 3rd Respondent of the specific terms of the orders we issued on 7/2/2025 hence it is our finding that contempt of this Court has not established. 92.The Application lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. 93.Each Party to bear its own costs. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED IN OPEN COURT AT NAIROBI THIS 29TH MAY, 2026.NGAAH JAIRUSJUDGEJ. CHIGITI (S.C)JUDGEL N MUGAMBIJUDGE