https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/11653

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **MILIMANI LAW COURTS** **CIVIL APPELLATE DIVISION** **CIVIL APPEAL NO. E1308 OF 2024** **KENYA BUREAU OF STANDARDS...............................APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS EAST AFRICA ………...RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** **A. INTRODUCTION** 1. This appeal arises from the judgment of the Standards Tribunal delivered on 26th July 2024 in **Oxford University Press East Africa Limited v Kenya Bureau of Standards, Tribunal Appeal E002 of 2023 [2024] KEST 1633 (KLR)**. 2. The Appellant, Kenya Bureau of Standards (“KEBS”), is a statutory body established under section 3 of the Standards Act, Cap 496 Laws of Kenya. Among its statutory mandates is the administration and collection of Standards Levy payable by manufacturers pursuant to the Standards Act and the Standards Levy Order, 1990. 3. The Respondent, Oxford University Press East Africa Limited (“Oxford”), is engaged in the business of publishing and distribution of educational and literary material. 4. The dispute traces its origin to a letter dated 16th January 2024 by which the Appellant demanded from the Respondent the sum of **Kshs. 52,125,944/=**, stated to comprise unpaid Standards Levy and penalties. 5. Being aggrieved by that demand, the Respondent lodged an appeal before the Standards Tribunal. Its principal contention was that it was not a “manufacturer” within the meaning of section 2 of the Standards Act and was consequently not liable to pay Standards Levy under the Standards Levy Order, 1990. 6. In its judgment delivered on 26th July 2024, the Tribunal accepted the Respondent's contention. It found, inter alia, that the Respondent did not have its own production function or infrastructure and that the Appellant had failed to adduce sufficient evidence demonstrating that the Respondent was a manufacturer within the meaning of the Standards Act. 7. Consequently, the Tribunal annulled and set aside the Appellant's demand contained in its letter dated 16th January 2024. 8. Aggrieved by that determination, the Appellant lodged the present appeal pursuant to section 16G of the Standards Act. **B. GROUNDS OF APPEAL** 1. The Memorandum of Appeal dated 12th November 2024 raises, in substance, the following grounds: 1. ***That the Tribunal erred in law and fact and misdirected itself in finding that the Appellant had not presented evidence demonstrating that the Respondent was a manufacturer;*** 2. ***That the Tribunal erred in law and fact and misdirected itself by failing to appreciate the breadth and scope of the statutory concept of “manufacture” under the Standards Act;*** 3. ***That the Tribunal erred in law and fact by failing to appreciate the Appellant's statutory mandate to demand Standards Levy from the Respondent by virtue of the Respondent being a manufacturer; and*** 4. ***That the Tribunal misdirected itself by failing to find that the Respondent, being a manufacturer, was liable to pay Standards Levy.*** 2. The substance of all the grounds is therefore whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted and applied the statutory definition of “manufacture” and, consequently, whether the Respondent was liable to pay Standards Levy. **C. APPELLANT’S CASE** 1. The Appellant challenges the Standards Tribunal’s finding that Oxford University Press East Africa is not a "manufacturer," arguing that the Tribunal erred by applying a narrow, traditional definition limited to physical machinery and direct handling of raw materials. Relying on principles of statutory interpretation from ***Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps [1899] AC 99***, ***Mjengo Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2013] KEHC 5241 (KLR)***, and ***Mjengo Limited v. Commissioner of Domestic Tax [2016] KECA 66 (KLR)***, KEBS submits that under Section 2 of the Standards Act, "manufacture" uses the expansive term "includes"—encompassing production, operation, and use—which signals Parliament's intention to broaden statutory reach beyond physical fabrication. KEBS further draws on the preamble principles in ***National Social Security Fund Board of Trustees v. Kenya Tea Growers Association [2023] KECA 80 (KLR)*** and ***Otinga v. Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Education [2025] KECA 460 (KLR)*** to argue that the Act is a regulatory quality-assurance statute, reinforced by comparative jurisprudence in ***The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 INSC 306*** and ***Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Casino (Pvt.) Ltd [1973] 91 ITR 289 (KER)***, which establish that welfare and regulatory definitions must be given a liberal, functional construction focused on operational control rather than restrictive excise tests. The Appellant contends that despite outsourcing its printing, the Respondent acts as a manufacturing concern because it exercises total control over content creation, technical layout, binding standards (such as KS ISO specifications), and distribution. Citing ***Kenya Urban Roads Authority & another v. Belgo Holdings Limited [2025] KECA 764 (KLR)***, ***Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi v. Mwangi Stephen Muriithi [2014] eKLR***, and ***Charterhouse Bank Limited v. Frank N. Kamau [2016] eKLR***, KEBS asserts it discharged its burden of proof under Section 109 of the Evidence Act through uncontroverted evidence—including the Respondent's own admissions and contracts. Consequently, KEBS maintains that its statutory demand of Kshs. 52,125,944 for unpaid levies and accrued penalties (2017–2023) is lawful, enforceable, and automatically owed under Orders 3, 4(2), and 8 of the Standards Levy Order regardless of the Respondent's failure to self-declare **D. RESPONDENT’S CASE** 1. In opposing the appeal, the Respondent contends that it is strictly an educational publisher, not a "manufacturer," and is therefore not liable to pay the Standards Levy or penalties under the Standards Act and the Standards Levy Order. Citing the Supreme Court decision in ***Odinga & another v. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others [2017] KESC 42 (KLR)***, the Respondent submits that statutory interpretation requires giving clear and unambiguous terms their primary, plain, and natural meaning. Giving the definition of "manufacturer" under Section 2 of the Standards Act its ordinary meaning, the Respondent maintains that publishing—defined as making information available to the public—does not involve physical fabrication or the transformation of raw materials into finished products. Oxford distinguishes the Appellant’s authorities—including ***Mjengo Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2013] KEHC 5241***, ***The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 INSC 306***, and ***Commissioner of Income Tax v. Casino (Pvt.) Ltd [1973] 91 ITR***—by highlighting that *Mjengo* establishes that each statute's specific definition governs, rendering the foreign and tax- based cases inapplicable. Furthermore, the Respondent asserts that the physical manufacturing functions (supplying paper, printing, and binding) are carried out entirely by contracted third-party printers (such as English Press Limited and Printing Services Limited), who directly remit the mandatory Standards Levy for those production services. Finally, Oxford argues that KEBS’s claim is unconstitutional under Article 47 and unjustified under Order 3 of the Standards Levy Order because, lacking a factory or an ex-factory price, there is no legal basis for calculating the levy, nor has KEBS explained its arbitrary computation of the backdated demand of Kshs. 52,125,944, which vastly exceeds the statutory annual ceiling of Kshs. 400,000. **E. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT** 1. The jurisdiction of this Court is founded upon section 16G of the Standards Act which provides: ***“A party to proceedings before the Tribunal may appeal the decision of the Tribunal to the High Court.”*** 1. Unlike some statutory appellate regimes which expressly restrict appeals from specialized tribunals to questions of law, section 16G does not expressly impose such a limitation. 2. This Court must nevertheless accord appropriate respect to findings of fact made by the specialist Tribunal, while remaining entitled to interfere where such findings are founded upon a misapprehension of the evidence, application of a wrong legal principle, or an erroneous interpretation of the governing statute. 3. The central controversy in this appeal is, in any event, substantially one of statutory interpretation: what constitutes “manufacture” for purposes of the Standards Act and the Standards Levy Order, 1990? **F. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION** 1. Having considered the Memorandum of Appeal, the record before the Tribunal and the parties' respective submissions, the Court considers that the following issues arise for determination: 2. ***What is the proper interpretation of “manufacture” under section 2 of the Standards Act?*** 3. ***Whether, upon the evidence placed before the Tribunal, the Respondent was a manufacturer for purposes of the Standards Levy Order, 1990;*** 4. ***Whether the Tribunal erred in finding that the Appellant failed to establish the Respondent's liability to Standards Levy; and*** 5. ***What orders should*** issue as to the appeal and costs? **G. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK** 1. The starting point is section 2 of the Standards Act. The Act provides that: ***“manufacture” includes produce, process, treat, install, test, operate and use.*** 1. Paragraph 2 of the Standards Levy Order, 1990, as applicable to the dispute before the Tribunal, defined a “manufacturer” as a person who engages in the process of manufacture in terms of section 2 of the Act. 2. Paragraph 3 of the Order provided, in material part, that there was to be paid by each manufacturer a levy recoverable at source at the prescribed percentage of the ex-factory price in respect of manufacture during each month, subject to the stipulated statutory ceilings. 3. Paragraph 4 imposed upon persons who manufacture or intend to manufacture an obligation to notify the Director of KEBS. Significantly, paragraph 4(2) provided that failure to notify the Director did not affect a manufacturer's obligation to pay the levy. 4. The legislative scheme therefore establishes two distinct questions. First, is the person concerned a manufacturer within the meaning of the Act and Order? Secondly, if so, what amount of Standards Levy is payable under paragraph 3? 5. The obligation to pay the levy does not arise merely because KEBS makes a demand. The jurisdictional fact upon which liability is founded must first exist: the person against whom the levy is demanded must be a manufacturer within the statutory meaning. **H. INTERPRETATION OF “MANUFACTURE”** 1. The Appellant's principal complaint is that the Tribunal adopted an unduly restrictive and conventional conception of manufacturing by concentrating on whether the Respondent transformed raw materials into finished products and whether it owned a printing press or production infrastructure. There is some force in the Appellant's criticism of that aspect of the Tribunal's reasoning. 2. Section 2 of the Standards Act does not define manufacture merely as the transformation of raw material into a finished product. Parliament deliberately employed the word “includes” and thereafter enumerated the activities of producing, processing, treating, installing, testing, operating and using. 3. The significance of the legislative use of “includes”, as opposed to “means”, was considered by the Court of Appeal in **Mjengo Limited v Commissioner of Domestic Tax [2016] KECA 66 (KLR)**. The Court recognised that an inclusive definition is ordinarily employed to enlarge the natural meaning of an expression, whereas the word “means” ordinarily supplies an exhaustive definition. 4. The Court of Appeal referred with approval to the classic exposition in **Dilworth v Commissioner of Stamps [1899] AC 99**, where it was explained that the expression “include” is ordinarily employed in interpretation provisions to enlarge the ordinary meaning of the words or expressions being defined.It follows that the statutory meaning of manufacture under the Standards Act is deliberately broader than the ordinary dictionary conception of a factory converting raw material into a finished article. 5. To that limited extent, therefore, the Tribunal ought not to have treated ownership of a factory, printing press or production infrastructure as an indispensable statutory prerequisite. 6. The Standards Act does not say that only a person who owns the machinery or factory in which goods are produced can ever be a manufacturer. 7. That conclusion, however, does not determine this appeal. 8. The wider statutory definition must still be applied to an identifiable activity undertaken by the person upon whom the levy is sought to be imposed. The word “includes” expands the concept of manufacture; it does not dispense with the requirement that the person concerned must actually engage in conduct falling within the statutory conception of manufacture. 9. Put differently, the Appellant was still required to demonstrate that the Respondent produced, processed, treated, installed, tested, operated, used or otherwise engaged in a process properly falling within “manufacture” for purposes of the Act and the Standards Levy Order. **I. THE FISCAL CHARACTER OF THE STANDARDS LEVY** 1. There is another important consideration. Standards Levy is a compulsory statutory monetary exaction. The Court must therefore construe the provision imposing liability in accordance with the established principles applicable to fiscal legislation. 2. The classic rule was stated in ***Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1921] 1 KB 64*** to the effect that in a taxing provision the Court looks at what is clearly stated: there is no room for intendment, implication or equitable construction. A person who comes within the words imposing the charge must pay it, but the State cannot impose the charge by inference.That principle has repeatedly been applied in Kenya. 3. In ***Mount Kenya Bottlers Ltd & 3 others v Attorney General & 3 others [2019] eKLR***, the Court of Appeal reiterated that fiscal legislation must be construed with strictness and that ambiguity in legislation imposing a fiscal burden is not to be enlarged against the person sought to be charged. 4. Similarly, in ***Commissioner of Domestic Taxes (Large Taxpayers Office) v Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd [2020] eKLR***, the Court of Appeal affirmed the settled principle that no tax can be imposed by implication and that the statutory language creating the obligation must clearly bring the taxpayer within the charge. 5. Although Standards Levy is imposed under the Standards Act rather than the Income Tax Act or Tax Procedures Act, the principle is equally relevant. The levy constitutes a compulsory statutory financial burden and its incidence must therefore be ascertainable from the legislation itself. 6. The Court cannot, under the guise of a purposive interpretation, enlarge the class of persons liable beyond that which Parliament has prescribed. **J. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT WAS A MANUFACTURER** 1. It is common ground that the Respondent is engaged in publishing educational and literary material. The evidence before the Tribunal disclosed the commercial arrangement through which that business was undertaken. 2. The Respondent produced a sample Publishing Agreement demonstrating that authors supplied literary works for publication. 3. It also produced a Framework Purchasing Agreement relating to paper, printing and binding services. 4. The Tribunal found from that material that the physical printing and binding of the literary works was undertaken by independent suppliers of print-production services, both locally and abroad. 5. The Tribunal further found that the Respondent did not itself own or operate the production facilities by which the books were physically printed and bound. 6. The Appellant's evidence before the Tribunal principally consisted of an affidavit sworn by its Director of Finance and Strategy and reference to standards which the Appellant considered applicable to the Respondent's activities. 7. The question is whether the mere fact that the Respondent commissioned printing, published the completed works, took commercial responsibility for them and subsequently distributed them was sufficient to make it a manufacturer under the Standards Levy Order. In my view, it was not. 8. There is a distinction between being commercially responsible for bringing a product to market and actually engaging in the statutory process of manufacture. 9. A publisher may undertake several functions including commissioning manuscripts, editing, typesetting, acquiring publishing rights, determining design and format, marketing and distribution. Those activities undoubtedly contribute to the existence of the final commercial product. 10. That does not necessarily mean, however, that every participant in that commercial chain becomes a manufacturer for purposes of a statutory levy imposed specifically upon manufacture. 11. The statutory scheme itself supports that distinction. Paragraph 3 of the Standards Levy Order linked the levy to the **ex-factory price in respect of manufacture**. 12. The reference to ex-factory price reinforces the nexus which Parliament intended to exist between the levy and the actual manufacturing process. 13. The Appellant's construction would potentially detach the levy from that manufacturing nexus and impose it upon entities whose relationship with the product may principally be intellectual, contractual, commercial or distributive. 14. Such an interpretation would require clearer legislative language. **K. THE WORD “PRODUCE”** 1. The Appellant particularly relies upon the word “produce” appearing in section 2. 2. Undoubtedly, “produce” is wider than the physical transformation of raw materials. But statutory words do not exist in isolation. They take their meaning from their context, subject matter and legislative purpose. 3. Section 2 states that manufacture includes “produce, process, treat, install, test, operate and use.” 4. Those words must be read within the statutory context of standards, commodities, specifications, manufacturing processes and the Standards Levy Order. 5. If the word “produce” were interpreted without any contextual limitation, almost every commercial activity culminating in a marketable output could conceivably become manufacture. 6. A law firm “produces” legal opinions; an architect “produces” architectural drawings; an accountant “produces” financial statements; an author “produces” a manuscript; and a university “produces” academic material. 7. It cannot reasonably follow, merely from the ordinary versatility of the verb “produce”, that Parliament intended every such activity automatically to attract Standards Levy. 8. The statutory words must therefore retain a rational nexus to the process of manufacture contemplated by the Standards Act and the Levy Order. 9. That approach gives meaning to the expansive definition without converting Standards Levy into a general levy upon every business that produces an output. **L. THE WORD “USE”** 1. Similar considerations apply to the Appellant's reliance upon the word “use”. 2. Construed literally and in isolation, virtually every commercial enterprise “uses” some commodity, equipment, process or material. 3. If mere use of paper were sufficient to constitute manufacture, every advocate, school, bank, insurance company, government office and ordinary commercial enterprise using paper could potentially fall within the statutory definition. 4. Parliament cannot reasonably be taken to have intended such an indiscriminate result. 5. The words contained in an inclusive definition must be interpreted in the statutory setting in which Parliament has placed them. 6. “Use” under section 2 cannot therefore mean the mere consumption or utilisation of any material in the ordinary course of business. It must bear a sufficient relationship to the manufacturing process regulated by the Act. **N. OUTSOURCING AND MANUFACTURING** 1. I must nevertheless emphasise that I do not endorse the proposition that outsourcing production automatically excludes an entity from ever being regarded as a manufacturer. 2. Modern manufacturing arrangements are diverse. A business may, depending upon the statutory scheme and the evidence, remain the manufacturer notwithstanding that portions of its production process are undertaken through contractors. 3. Ownership of a factory or machinery is therefore neither a universal nor an indispensable test. 4. What must be established is the nature of the person's involvement in the statutory process of manufacture. 5. In the present case, however, the Appellant's difficulty is evidential. 6. It was not sufficient to demonstrate that the Respondent publishes books or that its name appears upon the finished literary works. 7. The Appellant was required to establish the factual activities undertaken by the Respondent which brought it within the statutory process of manufacture and upon which the Standards Levy was computed. 8. The Tribunal found that such evidence was absent. 9. Upon reviewing the record, I am unable to conclude that that finding was unsupported by the evidence. **O. BURDEN OF PROOF** 1. Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act embodies the general principle that whoever desires a court or tribunal to give judgment as to a legal right or liability dependent upon the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. 2. Section 109 further provides: ***“The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.”*** 1. The Appellant asserted that the Respondent was a manufacturer and, on that foundation, demanded Kshs. 52,125,944/=. 2. The evidential burden therefore lay upon the Appellant to establish the factual basis upon which the Respondent fell within the statutory definition. 3. Once the Respondent produced agreements showing that printing and binding were undertaken by third-party print-production suppliers, the Appellant was required to place sufficient evidence before the Tribunal demonstrating why, notwithstanding those arrangements, the Respondent itself engaged in manufacture within section 2. 4. The statutory definition alone could not constitute proof of the underlying facts. 5. A definition tells the Court what factual activities amount to manufacture. It does not prove that a particular person actually performed those activities. 6. In ***Trina Kenya Limited v Kenya Bureau of Standards [2023] KEST 1372 (KLR)****,* the Standards Tribunal similarly emphasized the necessity for KEBS to demonstrate by evidence that the entity against whom Standards Levy is demanded actually falls within the statutory category of manufacturer. 7. Although a decision of the Standards Tribunal is not binding upon this Court as precedent, its distinction between the statutory definition and proof that the particular enterprise falls within it is sound. **P. THE APPELLANT'S STATUTORY MANDATE** 1. The Court accepts without reservation that KEBS performs an important statutory role. 2. Section 4 of the Standards Act entrusts the Bureau with functions including promotion of standardization in industry and commerce, examination and testing of commodities, control of standardization marks and development and implementation of specifications and codes of practice. 3. The Court of Appeal recognized the breadth and importance of that statutory mandate in ***Kenya Bureau of Standards v Powerex Lubricants Limited [2018] KECA 752 (KLR)****.* 4. The Appellant is consequently entitled, and indeed obligated, to enforce the Standards Act and lawfully collect Standards Levy from persons upon whom Parliament has imposed that liability. 5. But the existence of a broad regulatory mandate cannot itself establish liability to a statutory levy. 6. A statutory body's mandate determines what it is authorised to do. It does not dispense with the conditions which Parliament has prescribed for the exercise of that authority. 7. KEBS may therefore demand Standards Levy from a manufacturer. The anterior question remains whether the person against whom the demand is made is legally and factually a manufacturer. 8. The Tribunal answered that question in the negative upon the evidence placed before it. 9. I find no sufficient basis upon which this Court can interfere with that conclusion. **Q. WHETHER THE TRIBUNAL APPLIED AN IMPERMISSIBLY NARROW DEFINITION** 1. As I have already stated, I agree with the Appellant to the limited extent that the Tribunal's reference to the absence of the Respondent's “own production function or infrastructure” could, if regarded as a universal legal test, amount to an unduly restrictive construction of section 2. 2. Section 2 does not prescribe ownership of production infrastructure as an indispensable ingredient of manufacture. 3. However, an appellate court does not interfere with a judgment merely because one aspect of the reasoning could have been differently expressed. 4. The material question is whether the ultimate conclusion is sustainable upon the applicable law and evidence. 5. In ***Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] EA 123****,* the former Court of Appeal for East Africa stated the well-known duty of a first appellate court to reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not have the advantage enjoyed by the trial court of seeing and hearing witnesses where oral evidence was taken. 6. Having independently considered the statutory framework and the material placed before the Tribunal, I reach the same ultimate conclusion, albeit partly for the additional reasons set out in this judgment. 7. The evidence did not sufficiently establish that the Respondent itself engaged in the process of manufacture upon which the Standards Levy demanded by the Appellant could lawfully be founded. **R. THE KSHS. 52,125,944/= DEMAND** 1. The Tribunal's finding that the Respondent was not proved to be a manufacturer necessarily affected the validity of the demand for Kshs. 52,125,944/=. 2. Liability to the monetary demand depended upon the Respondent first falling within the class of persons liable under paragraph 3 of the Standards Levy Order. 3. In the absence of sufficient proof of that foundational fact, the Tribunal was entitled to annul the demand. 4. It is consequently unnecessary for this Court to undertake a detailed examination of the arithmetic by which the figure of Kshs. 52,125,944/= was reached. 5. The computation cannot survive independently of the statutory liability upon which it was founded. **S. CONCLUSION** 1. Ultimately, this appeal presents an important distinction between the **breadth of a statutory definition** and the **proof necessary to bring a particular person within that definition**. 2. I agree with the Appellant that the definition of manufacture under section 2 of the Standards Act is expansive and is not confined to the conventional transformation of raw materials into finished goods in a factory. 3. I further find that ownership of a factory, machinery or production infrastructure is not, by itself, a statutory prerequisite to being a manufacturer under the Standards Act. 4. Nevertheless, the expansive character of the definition does not relieve the Appellant of the obligation to establish that the particular person against whom Standards Levy is demanded actually engages in one or more of the activities constituting manufacture within the statutory context. 5. On the evidence before the Tribunal, the physical printing and binding of the Respondent's literary works was undertaken by third-party print-production suppliers. 6. The evidence relied upon by the Appellant did not sufficiently demonstrate that the Respondent itself engaged in the relevant manufacturing process so as to attract liability under paragraph 3 of the Standards Levy Order, 1990. 7. Further, being a compulsory fiscal impost, Standards Levy cannot be extended by implication to commercial activities which Parliament has not clearly brought within the statutory charge. 8. The Court therefore finds that although portions of the Tribunal's reasoning concerning ownership of production infrastructure were expressed too narrowly, its ultimate determination that the Appellant had failed to establish the Respondent's liability to Standards Levy was correct. 9. Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Memorandum of Appeal therefore fail. **T. DISPOSITION** 1. Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders: 2. ***The appeal contained in the Memorandum of Appeal dated 12th November 2024 is hereby dismissed.*** 3. ***The judgment of the Standards Tribunal delivered on 26th July 2024 in Oxford University Press East Africa Limited v Kenya Bureau of Standards, Tribunal Appeal E002 of 2023 [2024] KEST 1633 (KLR) is hereby upheld.*** 4. ***Consequently, the Appellant's demand contained in the letter dated 16th January 2024 for payment by the Respondent of Kshs. 52,125,944/= in Standards Levy and penalties remains annulled and set aside.*** 5. ***The Respondent shall have the costs of this appeal***. 6. It is so ordered. **DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 28TH DAY OF JULY 2026.** **HON. L. P. KASSAN** **JUDGE**