[2002] KEHC 255 (KLR)
The court held that an ex-parte stay order granted in judicial review proceedings under Order 53 is fundamentally different from an injunction and cannot be discharged or reviewed under Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The stay order in judicial review is directed at the decision-making process of a public...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2002] KEHC 255 (KLR)
- Parties
- Applicant: Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd; Applicant: Thomas M. Mutuse; Applicant: Samuel N. Muindi; Applicant: Joseph M. Mateu; Applicant: Benjamin Munywoki Mukula; Respondent: County Council of Makueni
- Court
- High Court
- Court Station
- High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts)
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Children Miscellaneous Application 491 of 2002
- Procedural Posture
- Miscellaneous Application / Ruling on Preliminary Objection Regarding Discharge of Ex Parte Stay Order and Procedural Propriety
- Outcome
- Preliminary objection upheld; application to discharge ex-parte stay order dismissed; costs to the objector/applicant.
- Legal Topics
- Judicial Review Procedure, Ex Parte Orders, Stay of Proceedings, Review of Orders
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry Ltd
Applicant
Thomas M. Mutuse
Applicant
Samuel N. Muindi
Applicant
Joseph M. Mateu
Applicant
Benjamin Munywoki Mukula
Applicant
County Council of Makueni
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Miscellaneous Application / Ruling on Preliminary Objection Regarding Discharge of Ex Parte Stay Order and Procedural Propriety
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether an ex-parte stay order granted in judicial review proceedings can be discharged under Order 39 rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules by a judge other than the one who issued it.
- 2 Whether the application to discharge the ex-parte stay order should be by chamber summons or notice of motion.
- 3 Whether orders made under Order 53 (Judicial Review) can be set aside or reviewed under Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
Ratio Decidendi
The court held that an ex-parte stay order granted in judicial review proceedings under Order 53 is fundamentally different from an injunction and cannot be discharged or reviewed under Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The stay order in judicial review is directed at the decision-making process of a public body, not at a party to the litigation, and is not enforceable in the same manner as an injunction. Furthermore, review of such orders must be expressly sought under Order 44 and, generally, by the judge who made the order. The application before the court was not properly brought under the relevant provisions for review or discharge of the order, and the preliminary objection was...
Court Disposition
Preliminary objection upheld; application to discharge ex-parte stay order dismissed; costs to the objector/applicant.
Orders
- Preliminary objection is allowed.
- Application to discharge ex-parte stay order is dismissed.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
34 paragraphs
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI
MISC APPL. NO.491 OF 2002
KENYA NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY LTD ……………………………..1ST APPLICANT
THOMAS M. MUTUSE ……………………2ND APPLICANT
SAMUEL N. MUINDI ………………………3RD APPLICANT
JOSEPH M. MATEU ……………………….4TH APPLICANT
BENJAMIN MUNYWOKI MUKULA ……..5TH APPLICANT & OTHERS
V E R S U S
COUNTY COUNCIL OF MAKUENI ……….RESPONDENT
R U L I N G
The respondent / applicant filed a Notice of Motion here dated 19th July 2002 asking that the matter be placed before the Honourable the Chief Justice for directions for orders to have this file transferred to Machakos High Court, that the Ex-parte stay granted on 22nd May 2002 be vacated / set aside or discharged forthwith. It was expressed that the respondent obtained an ex-parte order of leave to operate as a stay before Hon. Mbito J. without full material disclosure that the said order had been refused by another Judge. They wanted it discharged because it was oppressive and they claimed it gave unfair advantage to the applicant.
On 22nd July 2002 the court gave orders to stay all the matters until 26th July 2002 when the matter of transfer of the case was to be mentioned.
On 26th July 2002 the respondent herein filed an application requesting the court to review its said order of 22nd July 2002 and I ordered that the two applications be heard together on 30th July 2002 and that stay order to remain in place until 30/7/02 but on the hearing day on 30th July 2002 Mr. Annan for the respondent argued a preliminary point against the first Notice of Motion of 19th July 2002 saying that orders of Mbito J. of 22nd May 2002 cannot be discharged under order 39 rule 4 of Civil Procedure Rules by another Judge other than Justice Mbito because it is like reviewing Judge Mbito`s orders outside of Order 44 rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules which requires same to be done by same Judge.
Secondly that the application for discharge ought to be by chamber summons under order 39 rule 4 and not by notice of motion. That the orders were made under Judicial Review Application Order 53 and ought to remain in force until the notice of motion is heard and that orders given under Order 53 cannot be set aside or reviewed under Order 39.
However Mr. Musili opposed the preliminary objection saying that they are not in fact asking for review and that the order of stay in Judicial Review can be discharged like an injunction under Order 39 rule 4, of the Civil Procedure.
I have heard both counsel in this matter and the undisputed fact is that the main case here is really an application for Judicial Review filed on 7th May 2002 and the order which was given by Mbito J. was one of stay at the time of giving leave under Order 53 rule 4 and not injunction. Under Judicial Review in this jurisdiction injunction remains private law remedy and not Public Law one under Order 53. I can do no better than quote the judgment of an English Court of Appeal Judge in the case of Rv SEC. OF STATE FOR EDUCATION AND SCIENCE, EXP. AVON COUNTY COUNCIL [1997] IQB 558 per LJ.Glidewell discussing the difference between Stay and injunction in Judicial Review Proceedings. He said in part:-
“Proceedings for judicial review in the field of Public Law, are not a dispute between two parties, each with an interest to protect, for which an injunction may be appropriate. Judicial review, by way of an application for certiorari is a challenge to the way in which a decision has been arrived at. The decision - maker may take part in the proceedings to argue that his, or its decision was reached by an appropriate procedure. But the decision – maker is not in any true sense an opposing party, any more than an inferior court whose decision is challenged is an opposing party”.
Thus the distinction between an injunction and a stay arises out of the difference between the positions of the persons or bodies concerned.
An order that a decision of a person or body whose decisions are open to challenge by judicial review shall not take effect until the challenge has finally been determined is, in my view, correctly described as a stay. For these reasons I am of the opinion that a decision made by an officer of Government Ministry, tribunal or Local authority can, in principle, be stayed by an order of the court like injunction.
If I am correct in my view that essential question is whether the phrase a stay of proceedings is apt to include decisions and the process of arriving at it. I believe that where the applicant wants to challenge an order given at the Leave stage he can apply to set aside the leave or direction given ex-parte at that forum for leave or stay. According to English Practice this ought to be done promptly, but order 39 cannot be used to set aside the ex-parte Judicial Review Order of stay because in Judicial Review the Order of Stay differs from injunction as I have stated above and because it is an order directed not at a party to the litigation but at the decision making process of the court, tribunal or other decision maker.
It may not be an order capable of being breached by a party to the proceedings or any one else and may not be enforced by contempt.
It is therefore evident that it cannot be obtained or reviewed as though it was an injunction.
The second issue whether application is or is not a review and should be heard by the Judge who issued it is not pertinent in view of what I have said above but surfice to say that Review is a jurisdiction the court exercises not by its inherent jurisdiction but through statutory liberty which in our case is Section 80 of Cap. 21 and under Order 44 Rr (2) and (4) only the Judge who made the order or passed the decree is the one with the right to review it and no one else except if that Judge who made the order is outside the jurisdiction. (See Order 44 Rule 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules) but where the Review is upon some ground OTHER than the discovery of such new and important matter or evidence as is referred to in paragraph / of Order 44 r2 or the existence of a clerical or mathematical mistake or error apparent on the face of the decree then such application must be made to the Judge who passed the decree.
That is the procedural law applicable, but it cannot be said that this was an application for review as review must be expressly under Order 44 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
For all these reasons I agree with what Mr. Annan has submitted and I allow the objection but the question of transfer of this case to Machakos is pertinent and is not affected by this order. The respondent be at liberty to apply.
Main application be set down for hearing. Cost to the objector / applicant.
A. I. HAYANGA
J U D G E
11/9/02
Read to Mr. Annan
For applicant
Read to Miss Muteti