https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12704

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MILIMANI** **CIVIL APPELLATE DIVISION** **MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO. E121 OF 2026** **KENYA ORIENT LIFE ASSURANCE LIMITED..........................APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **THE INSURANCE REGULATORY AUTHORITY.................RESPONDENT** **AND** **ALPHA BRANDS LIMITED..............................................1ST INTERESTED PARTY** **ROBERT NJOROGE NGARI.............................2ND INTERESTED PARTY** **FAMILY BANK LIMITED...................................3RD INTERESTED PARTY** **RULING** **Background** 1. The 1st Interested Party herein, **Alpha Brands Limited**, obtained financial accommodation from Family Bank Limited (the 3rd Interested Party) amounting to approximately Kshs.12 million. It was a mandatory condition of the loan facility that the directors of Alpha Brands Limited, namely; **Robert Njoroge Ngari** and the late **Biko Ngari Njoroge**, would be insured under a Group Credit Life Policy issued by the Applicant. 2. Following the death of Biko Ngari Njoroge on 23rd November 2023, the Interested Parties lodged a claim under the policy which the Applicant declined to settle in full. 3. The dispute was referred to the Insurance Regulatory Authority under section 204A of the Insurance Act. 4. After investigating the claim and hearing the parties, the Commissioner rendered a determination on 3rd July 2025 directing the Applicant to settle the claim in full. 5. The Applicant unsuccessfully challenged the said determination before the Insurance Appeals Tribunal in **Appeal No. 8 of 2025**. The Tribunal however struck out the appeal on 13th February 2026 after finding that it had been lodged outside the statutory period prescribed by the Insurance Act. The Tribunal thereafter declined to entertain an application for enlargement of time on the basis that it had become *functus officio* thereby prompting the Applicant to invoke this Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution. 6. During the pendency of those proceedings, this Court granted an interim conditional stay of execution on 4th May 2026 upon deposit of Kshs.2,000,000 as security. 7. The above sequence of events gave rise to the applications that are the subject of this ruling. **The Applications** 1. This ruling is in respect to three interrelated applications arising from the determination of the Commissioner of Insurance rendered on 3rd July 2025 under section 204A of the Insurance Act directing the Applicant herein, **Kenya Orient Life Assurance Limited**, to satisfy an insurance claim relating to a Group Credit Life Policy issued in favour of the 3rd Interested Party, **Family Bank Limited**, for the benefit of the 1st and 2nd Interested Parties. 2. The Interested Parties, on their part, filed an application seeking to review, discharge or vary the stay orders issued by this court, and simultaneously raised a Preliminary Objection challenging the Court's jurisdiction. **The Applications** 1. The Court is called upon to determine the following applications: 2. The Applicant's Notice of Motion dated 10th March 2026 wherein the applicant principally seeks enlargement of time, leave to pursue its intended appeal, supervisory intervention against the Tribunal's refusal to entertain the application for extension of time and stay of execution of the Commissioner's determination pending hearing of the intended appeal. 3. Notice of Motion dated 7th May 2026 filed by the 1st and 2nd Interested Parties seeking discharge of the conditional stay granted on 4 May 2026 or alternatively variation of the stay by requiring deposit of the entire decretal amount of approximately Kshs.11,791,958 as security. 4. Preliminary Objection dated 17 April 2026 where the interested parties contend that: 5. ***This Court lacks jurisdiction;*** 6. ***The application is incompetent;*** 7. ***The matter is res judicata;*** 8. ***The Applicant is improperly invoking supervisory jurisdiction instead of appellate jurisdiction;*** 9. ***The Court cannot enlarge time where the statute has prescribed a mandatory appeal period.*** **Summary of the Pleadings** **(i) Notice of Motion Dated 10th March 2026** 1. The Applicant's Motion is premised upon the grounds that its appeal before the Tribunal was struck out purely on procedural grounds and that the Tribunal declined jurisdiction to entertain an application for extension of time. It states that unless this Court intervenes, the Applicant will forever lose its statutory right of appeal. 2. The Applicant urges the Court to invoke Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution to supervise the Tribunal as the the intended appeal raises arguable issues and that unless stay is granted, execution shall render the intended appeal nugatory. It further states that the delay was short, satisfactorily explained and that no prejudice would be suffered by the Respondent or Interested Parties. 3. The Applicant therefore seeks enlargement of time together with stay of execution. **(ii) Applicant's Supporting Affidavit** 1. The Application is supported by the affidavit the Applicant’s Legal Officer, **Marian Killu**, who reiterates the grounds contained in the body of the application and sets out the chronology of events leading to the Tribunal proceedings and the outcome thereof. 2. In response to the Interested Parties' application for review, the Applicant’s deponent avers that the the Applicant duly complied with the conditional stay by depositing Kshs.2 million as security and that there is no basis for disturbing the Court's exercise of discretion. She further states that no new evidence has emerged and no error apparent exists so as to justify the prayer for review. 3. In its supplementary affidavit, the Applicant further explains the brief delay before the Tribunal, that the Tribunal wrongly declined jurisdiction, that enlargement ought to be granted and that security already deposited remains adequate. **Respondent's Response** 1. The Commissioner of Insurance (Respondent) opposes the application and maintains that the Commissioner acted lawfully in arriving at the the determination under section 204A was properly made. It adds that the Applicant failed to appeal within time and that the Tribunal correctly struck out the appeal. 2. It is the Respondent’s case that the Interested Parties have demonstrated sufficient grounds for discharge or review of stay. **The Interested Parties’ Response** 1. The Interested Parties' filed an extensive replying affidavit where they contend that this court lacks jurisdiction, that the matter is res judicata and that the Tribunal correctly declined jurisdiction. They state that the Applicant has consistently delayed settlement, has failed to demonstrate substantial loss and that the intended appeal is hopeless. The add that Family Bank is capable of refunding monies should the appeal ultimately succeed and that security of Kshs.2 million is grossly inadequate compared to the decretal sum which exceeds Kshs.11 million. 2. The Interested Parties urge the court to discharge the stay orders or alternatively direct the deposit of the entire decretal amount as security. 3. Through several supplementary affidavits and grounds of opposition, the Interested Parties introduce additional material including the Group Credit Life Policy, CR12 documents showing corporate relationship between the Applicant and Family Bank, loan documentation, policy wording. 4. They contend that payment would merely be made to the insured bank and add that Family Bank is financially capable of refunding any monies should the Applicant ultimately succeed. **Preliminary Objection** 1. The Preliminary Objection raises four principal legal objections namely; want of jurisdiction, res judicata, abuse of court process and incompetence of the Motion. 2. The Interested Parties argue that Article 165 cannot be used to circumvent the statutory appellate framework established under the Insurance Act. 3. Having reviewed all the affidavits, grounds of opposition, rebuttals, supplementary rebuttals and written submissions, I note that the pleadings substantially crystallise the dispute into three broad questions, namely; 4. ***Whether this Court has jurisdiction to intervene under Article 165(6) and (7) notwithstanding the provisions of the Insurance Act.*** 5. ***Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds for enlargement of time and preservation of the intended appeal.*** 6. ***Whether the interim stay granted on 4th May 2026 should remain, be varied, or be discharged.*** 7. The three applications were canvassed through affidavits, supplementary affidavits, rebuttals, written submissions and authorities filed by all parties. Although each application sought distinct reliefs, the submissions substantially overlapped. The Court has therefore considered them together. 8. The Applicant urged the Court to exercise its constitutional supervisory jurisdiction under Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution so as to preserve its statutory right of appeal before the Insurance Appeals Tribunal. Conversely, the Respondent and the 1st and 2nd Interested Parties maintained that the Court lacks jurisdiction to intervene, that the Applicant's application is incompetent, and that the interim stay should be discharged or substantially varied. **The Applicant's Submissions** 1. On the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, the Applicant submitted that this Court is not sitting as an appellate court against either the Commissioner or the Insurance Appeals Tribunal but rather, it invoked the Court's original constitutional supervisory jurisdiction under Article 165(6) and (7) over subordinate courts and tribunals. 2. The Applicant submitted that the Tribunal erroneously declined jurisdiction upon holding that it was *functus officio* after striking out the Applicant's appeal. According to the Applicant, the Tribunal thereafter improperly declined to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by statute, effectively denying the Applicant access to the appellate process. 3. The Applicant argued that the present Motion is therefore directed at correcting a jurisdictional error committed by the Tribunal and is not at inviting the Court to determine the merits of the insurance dispute. 4. The Applicant distinguished supervisory jurisdiction from appellate jurisdiction, submitting that the former exists independently of statute and is constitutionally entrenched under Article 165(6) and (7). It consequently maintained that section 173 of the Insurance Act does not oust that constitutional jurisdiction. 5. For this argument, reliance was placed on ***Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another vs. Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others* [2012] eKLR**, for the proposition that jurisdiction flows from the Constitution or statute and ***Judicial Service Commission vs. Mbalu Mutava & Another* [2015] eKLR**, for the distinction between supervisory jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. 6. According to the Applicant, the above cited authorities affirm that Article 165(6) empowers the High Court to supervise tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. 7. On the doctrine of functus officio, the Applicant argued that the Tribunal wrongly concluded that once it struck out Appeal No. 8 of 2025 it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an application for enlargement of time. According to the Applicant, striking out an appeal does not extinguish the Tribunal's statutory powers as the the Tribunal retained residual jurisdiction over procedural matters. 8. It was the Applicant’s case that the refusal to entertain the enlargement application effectively extinguished the Applicant's statutory right of appeal without hearing it on merit. 9. The Applicant therefore submitted that supervisory intervention is necessary to ensure access to justice and observance of Articles 48 and 50 of the Constitution. 10. On enlargement of time, the Applicant submitted that the delay was short and fully explained. It argued that the appeal was filed only a few days outside the statutory period, that there was no deliberate indolence, that the delay occasioned no prejudice and that the intended appeal raises arguable questions deserving consideration. 11. The Applicant emphasized that courts increasingly favour substantive justice over procedural technicalities, particularly where no irreparable prejudice is demonstrated. 12. Reference was made to Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and authorities governing extension of time, including the principles restated in ***Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat vs. IEBC & 7 Others* [2014] eKLR**, namely; that extension of time is discretionary, that the applicant must explain the delay, that prejudice to the respondent must be considered and that each case depends on its own circumstances. 13. It was the Applicant’s position that although this application concerns supervisory jurisdiction rather than a conventional appeal, those equitable principles remain instructive. 14. On stay of execution, the Applicant submitted that unless stay remains in force, execution of the Commissioner's determination will proceed thereby rendering the intended appeal nugatory and resulting in substantial loss. 15. It was submitted that the Applicant has already complied with the Court's conditional stay by depositing Kshs.2,000,000 within the stipulated time. 16. The Applicant therefore contended that there is no justification for disturbing a discretionary order already granted after considering the competing interests of the parties. 17. Reliance was placed upon the well-known principles governing stay of execution under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, namely; substantial loss, prompt filing of the application and provision of security. 18. It was submitted that all three requirements have been satisfied. 19. In opposition to the application for review of the stay order, the Applicant submitted that the Interested Parties have failed to satisfy the legal threshold for review or discharge of interlocutory orders. 20. It was submitted that no discovery of new evidence has been demonstrated, there is no error apparent on the face of the record and there has been no change in circumstances as the Interested Parties merely disagree with the Court's exercise of discretion. 21. The Applicant urged the court to preserve the status quo pending determination of the intended appeal. **The Respondent's Submissions** 1. The Respondent substantially aligns itself with the position taken by the Interested Parties and submitted that the Applicant is merely attempting to circumvent the appellate framework established by the Insurance Act. 2. The Respondent emphasized that the Commissioner's determination was lawfully made under section 204A after which the Applicant exercised its right of appeal and that the Tribunal determined that the appeal was incompetent because it had been filed outside time. 3. It was the Respondent’s case that no appeal on a point of law has been preferred against that Tribunal decision under section 173(3) of the Insurance Act and that accordingly, the Applicant cannot invoke Article 165 to reopen matters already determined by the Tribunal. 4. The Respondent argued that the Insurance Act provides a complete dispute resolution mechanism under sections 173, 204A and the Insurance Appeals Tribunal Rules. 5. It was submitted that Parliament deliberately created an initial appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter a limited appeal to the High Court on questions of law. The Respondent maintained that the Applicant instead seeks to bypass the statutory process through an application disguised as supervisory proceedings. 6. It was submitted that once the Tribunal struck out the appeal it became functus officio in respect to those proceedings and that consequently, there was no pending appeal capable of revival, the the Tribunal correctly declined jurisdiction and no constitutional violation occurred. 7. The Respondent supportted the Interested Parties' application to discharge or vary the stay orders on the basis that the the Applicant has delayed settlement for a considerable period, that the continued stay undermines the Commissioner's lawful determination and that public confidence in insurance regulation requires prompt compliance with regulatory decisions. 8. The Respondent therefore asked the Court to dismiss the Applicant's Motion and allow the Interested Parties' application. **The 1st and 2nd Interested Parties’ Submissions** 1. The Interested Parties filed the most extensive submissions, supported by replying affidavits, supplementary affidavits, rebuttals, supplementary rebuttals and authorities. 2. Their submissions may be summarised under six principal heads, namely; want of jurisdiction, supervisory jurisdiction, res judicata, enlargement of time, substantial loss and adequacy of security. 3. On jurisdiction, reference was made to ***Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" vs. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd* [1989] KLR 1**, for the argument that once jurisdiction is absent the Court must immediately down its tools. According to the Interested Parties, section 173 of the Insurance Act expressly prescribes the appellate route thus confining the High Court's jurisdiction to appeals on points of law arising from decisions of the Tribunal which the Applicant has neither filed nor are there any pending judicial review proceedings. 4. It was submitted that the present Motion is therefore legally incompetent. 5. On supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, the Interested Parties contended that Article 165 cannot be invoked to defeat statutory limitations. 6. It was submitted that the Applicant lost before the Tribunal and instead of appealing that decision as prescribed by section 173(3), it now seeks supervisory relief to indirectly achieve what statute prohibits directly. It was argued that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be employed as an alternative appellate mechanism. 7. On res judicata, the Interested Parties submitted that the issues presently raised were conclusively determined by the Tribunal. Reliance is placed upon section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act. 8. According to the Interested Parties, the parties are identical, the Tribunal possessed competent jurisdiction, the issue of timeliness has already been determined and that the determination remains binding unless overturned on appeal. 9. On enlargement of time, the Interested Parties argued that no satisfactory explanation has been offered for the delay. It was submitted that statutory timelines are mandatory and that the Applicant was fully aware of the Commissioner's determination. According to them, no exceptional circumstances prevented timely filing and that extension of time remains an equitable remedy unavailable to an indolent litigant. They cited authorities on extension of time emphasizing that even short delays require credible explanation. 10. They argued that the Applicant has failed to establish the substantial loss contemplated under Order 42 Rule 6. Particular reliance was placed upon the fact that Family Bank is a regulated commercial bank which is capable of refunding the decretal amount if required and that the Applicant and Family Bank share corporate links. 11. The Interested Parties noted that the debt remains secured, that payment under the policy is contractually payable directly to Family Bank as the Assured and that continued stay merely allows interest to accumulate. According to the Interested Parties, the Applicant faces no real risk of irrecoverable loss. 12. On security for the due performance of the decree, the Interested Parties proposed that should the stay remain in force, the Court should order for the deposit of the entire decretal sum of approximately Kshs.11.8 million as there are concerns regarding the Applicant's financial position. They urged the court to discharge the stay or, in the alternative, substitute the existing security with the full decretal amount. **Issues for Determination** 1. Having carefully considered all the pleadings and submissions, the Court finds that the following issues arise for determination: 2. ***Whether the Preliminary Objection on jurisdiction and competence is merited.*** 3. ***Whether the High Court may invoke Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution to supervise the Insurance Appeals Tribunal in the circumstances of this case.*** 4. ***Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds for enlargement of time.*** 5. ***Whether the interim stay granted on 4th May 2026 ought to be discharged, varied or maintained.*** 6. ***Who should bear the costs of the three applications.*** **Analysis and Determination** **Preliminary Objection** 1. The Interested Parties contended that this Court lacks jurisdiction by virtue of section 173(3) of the Insurance Act, arguing that the Applicant ought to have appealed the decision of the Insurance Appeals Tribunal instead of invoking this Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 165 of the Constitution. 2. The Applicant maintains that these proceedings are not an appeal. Its complaint is that the Tribunal wrongly declined jurisdiction after holding that it had become *functus officio*, thereby inviting this Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution. 3. I have considered the rival arguments. Section 173 of the Insurance Act establishes a statutory appellate mechanism under which an aggrieved party first appeals to the Insurance Appeals Tribunal, with a further appeal lying to the High Court only on a question of law. Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution, on the other hand, vests this Court with supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not disputed that the Insurance Appeals Tribunal is one such body. 4. I note that nothing in the Insurance Act expressly ousts the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the Constitution. It is also noteworthy that in the present application, the Applicant does not challenge the merits of the Commissioner's decision or seek a determination of the insurance dispute. Rather, the sole issue raised is whether the Tribunal correctly appreciated the extent of its own jurisdiction when it declined to entertain the application for enlargement of time upon holding that it had become *functus officio*. I find that the issue at hand is a jurisdictional question properly falling within this Court's supervisory mandate. 5. I therefore find that these proceedings are not a disguised appeal but invoke this Court's constitutional supervisory jurisdiction, which exists independently of the appellate mechanism established under section 173 of the Insurance Act. Consequently, I find that the Preliminary Objection on jurisdiction is without merit. 6. The scope of the jurisdiction invoked is, however, limited. Article 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution provides as follows: ***(6) The High court has supervisory jurisdiction over the subordinate courts and over any person, body or authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, but not over a superior court.*** ***(7) For purposes of clause (6) the High Court may call for the record of any proceedings before any subordinate court or person, body or authority referred to in clause (6), and make any order or give any direction it considers appropriate to ensure the fair administration of justice.*** 1. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution is distinct from appellate jurisdiction. It is concerned with the legality of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is exercisable only where the impugned decision is tainted by illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety or jurisdictional error. This principle was settled in ***Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service*****[1985] AC 374** (the *GCHQ* case) and has consistently been applied by Kenyan courts, including ***Republic vs. Chief Magistrates Court – Milimani & 3 Others* [2014] KEHC 6870 (KLR)**. Likewise, supervisory jurisdiction does not convert the High Court into another appellate forum. See ***Republic vs. Chief Magistrate's Court at Milimani Law Courts; Ex parte Pravin Galot* [2020] KEHC 7529 (KLR)** and ***Republic v Chief Magistrate, Mombasa & 3 Others; Sega Ventures Limited & Another (Interested Parties);*** Kirima (Ex parte) [2023] KEELC 180 (KLR). 2. In this case, the Tribunal struck out the Applicant's appeal on the basis that it had been filed out of time and subsequently declined to entertain an application for enlargement of time on the basis that it had become *functus officio*. I find that whether that conclusion was legally correct turns on the proper interpretation of the Tribunal's constitutive statute and the extent of its jurisdiction after disposing of the appeal. 3. The doctrine of *functus officio* is now well settled. In ***Raila Odinga & Others vs. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 Others* [2013] eKLR**, the Supreme Court observed that once a court has rendered a final decision, it cannot ordinarily revisit that decision except as permitted by law. Similarly, in ***Telkom Kenya Limited vs. John Ochanda (Suing on his own behalf and on behalf of 996 former employees of Telkom Kenya Limited)* [2014] eKLR**, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine promotes finality in litigation but does not prevent a court or tribunal from exercising powers expressly preserved by statute. 4. It follows that whether the Tribunal retained jurisdiction to entertain the application for enlargement of time is itself a question of statutory interpretation. There is respectable jurisprudence supporting both the view that a tribunal becomes *functus officio* upon finally determining proceedings and the contrary view that it retains a limited residual jurisdiction where such power is expressly or impliedly preserved by statute. 5. In my view, the Applicant has raised an arguable jurisdictional question. The complaint cannot therefore be dismissed as frivolous or an abuse of process. Supervisory intervention is justified only to determine whether the Tribunal misapprehended the scope of its jurisdiction. This Court is not sitting on appeal and will not reconsider the merits of the insurance dispute. 6. The Interested Parties also invoked section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act on the doctrine of *res judicata*. I am unable to agree with that contention. The Tribunal only determined that the appeal had been filed out of time. It did not determine whether this Court could exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 165 of the Constitution or whether it had wrongly declined jurisdiction by holding that it was *functus officio*. Those issues were neither raised nor determined before the Tribunal and the plea of *res judicata* therefore fails. 7. Accordingly, I find that the Preliminary Objection is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. **Enlargement of Time** 1. The Applicant explained that the delay was minimal, the appeal had already been prepared and that no prejudice would result. 2. The Interested Parties, on their part, responded that statutory timelines are mandatory and that no sufficient explanation exists for the delay in filing the appeal. 3. This Court accepts that statutory timelines promote certainty and finality. However, it cannot be gainsaid that courts increasingly lean towards substantive determination where delay is short, explanation is reasonable and no irremediable prejudice arises. 4. Whether the Tribunal ultimately possesses jurisdiction to enlarge time under the Insurance Act is itself a legal question that falls for determination by that Tribunal in the first instance. 5. In the present case, the Tribunal declined to consider that question altogether on the assumption that its jurisdiction had automatically ceased upon striking out the appeal. 6. In this Court's respectful view, the Tribunal ought first to have determined whether the statutory framework vested it with jurisdiction to enlarge time before invoking the doctrine of *functus officio*. I find that by declining to interrogate its own jurisdiction, the Tribunal effectively denied itself the opportunity to exercise, or decline to exercise, whatever jurisdiction Parliament had conferred upon it. 7. As I have already found in this ruling, that was an error going to jurisdiction and therefore properly attracts this Court's supervisory power. 8. On whether this court should itself enlarge time, the Applicant urged this Court to enlarge time for filing the appeal before the Tribunal. 9. With respect, this Court declines to assume that role as the supervisory jurisdiction conferred under Article 165(6) is intended to ensure that subordinate courts and tribunals exercise their lawful authority correctly. It is not ordinarily exercised by substituting the High Court for the statutory tribunal whenever an error is identified. 10. The statutory responsibility of determining whether time should be enlarged belongs, in the first instance, to the Insurance Appeals Tribunal. 11. This Court therefore considers it more consistent with both the Constitution and the Insurance Act to remit that question to the Tribunal for determination according to law. 12. Such an order preserves the statutory hierarchy while at the same time vindicating the Applicant's constitutional right to have the Tribunal properly consider the question placed before it. **Whether the stay should remain** 1. Turning to the Interested Parties' Motion regarding discharge of the stay orders, I note that the Applicant has already complied with the Court's order by depositing Kshs.2 million as security. 2. The Interested Parties seek either discharge or security equivalent to the entire decretal amount. 3. I have considered the principles under Order 42 Rule 6 and I note that the application was filed promptly. The Applicant has also demonstrated that immediate execution may render the intended proceedings academic. Conversely, the Interested Parties have equally demonstrated that Family Bank is financially stable and that repayment would be possible should the appeal succeed. 4. Accordingly, I find that substantial loss has not been demonstrated to the highest degree asserted by the Applicant. 5. Security is intended to balance both parties' interests. It is trite that security is not intended to be punitive and neither should it amount to premature satisfaction of the entire claim. 6. The Interested Parties urged the court to order security of the entire sum of Kshs.11.79 million. I find that the Interested Parties proposal effectively compels payment before determination of the dispute which order would substantially defeat the very purpose of stay. 7. Conversely, I note that security of Kshs. 2 million is relatively low in comparison to the decretal amount. 8. The Court must therefore determine whether the existing security sufficiently protects the Interested Parties. I find that in the circumstances of this case, it will be appropriate to balance the interests of both parties by enhancing the security to Kshs. 5.5 million. **Costs** 1. Ordinarily, costs follow the event. However, the present proceedings raise novel jurisdictional questions concerning the interaction between Article 165 of the Constitution and the appellate regime established under the Insurance Act. 2. In the present case, each party has succeeded to some extent. The Applicant succeeded in resisting the Preliminary Objection and in obtaining supervisory intervention. The Interested Parties succeeded in persuading the Court not to itself enlarge time. 3. In those circumstances, the interests of justice are best served by directing that costs abide the outcome of the proceedings before the Tribunal. **Disposition** 1. Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders: 2. ***The Preliminary Objection dated 17th April 2026 is dismissed.*** 3. ***The decision of the Insurance Appeals Tribunal declining to entertain the Applicant's application for enlargement of time on the sole ground that it had become functus officio is hereby quashed.*** 4. ***The Applicant's application for enlargement of time is remitted to the Insurance Appeals Tribunal for hearing and determination on its merits before a differently constituted bench of the Tribunal, if practicable, or otherwise in accordance with the Tribunal's administrative arrangements.*** 5. ***For avoidance of doubt, this Court expresses no opinion on whether the Tribunal should ultimately grant or refuse enlargement of time as that determination remains exclusively within the Tribunal's statutory mandate.*** 6. ***Pending the hearing and determination of the Applicant's application for enlargement of time before the Tribunal, the conditional stay of execution granted by this Court on 4th May 2026 shall remain in force upon the terms already ordered by the Court and subject to the enhancement of the deposit sum to Ksh. 5.5 Million within 30 days from the date of this ruling.*** 7. ***The Notice of Motion dated 7th May 2026 seeking discharge or variation of the stay is dismissed.*** 8. ***The security of Kshs.2,000,000 already deposited pursuant to the orders of this Court shall remain in Court pending further orders of the Tribunal or this Court.*** 9. ***Upon determination by the Tribunal of the application for enlargement of time, any party shall be at liberty to apply for such further directions regarding the subsistence or discharge of the stay as may then be appropriate.*** 10. ***Costs of the Preliminary Objection, the Notice of Motion dated 10th March 2026, and the Notice of Motion dated 7th May 2026 shall abide the outcome of the proceedings before the Insurance Appeals Tribunal.*** **It is so ordered.** **DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 30TH DAY OF JULY 2026** **HON W A OKWANY** **JUDGE**