https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4788

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT GARISSA** **ELC CASE NO. E010 OF 2017** **KENYA POWER & LIGHTING COMPANY PLC........................CLIENT/APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **C.P. ONONO & COMPANY ADVOCATES........................ADVOCATE/RESPONDENT** **(Being a Reference under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order from the ruling of the Deputy Registrar delivered on 3 October 2025 on the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 19 October 2024)** **RULING** **I. INTRODUCTION** 1. This Reference arises from the taxation of an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs and calls upon the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. By a Chamber Summons dated 9 October 2025, the Client, Kenya Power & Lighting Company PLC (the Applicant), challenges the ruling of the Deputy Registrar delivered on 3 October 2025, by which the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 19 October 2024 was taxed at Kshs. 7,899,885.00, including instruction fees assessed at Kshs. 6,000,000.00. The Applicant principally seeks an order setting aside the impugned taxation and remitting the Bill for fresh taxation before a different Deputy Registrar. 2. The Reference stems from legal services rendered by the Respondent Advocate in proceedings formerly instituted as **High Court Civil Suit No. 1034 of 2005** and subsequently transferred to the Environment and Land Court as **Garissa ELC Case No. 10 of 2017**. Following the conclusion of those proceedings, a dispute arose regarding the remuneration payable to the Advocate, culminating in the taxation now impugned. 3. Although the parties disagree on the propriety of the taxation, the question before the Court is a narrow one. This Reference is not concerned with whether the instruction fees allowed by the Deputy Registrar were, viewed in isolation, either excessive or inadequate. Nor is the Court called upon to undertake a fresh taxation of the Bill of Costs or to determine the amount that ought properly to have been awarded. Those matters lie, in the first instance, within the statutory jurisdiction of the taxing officer. 4. Rather, the Court is required to determine whether the impugned taxation was undertaken in accordance with the principles governing the exercise of the discretion conferred upon a taxing officer under the Advocates Remuneration Order. In particular, the Court must determine whether, having concluded that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable from the pleadings or the judgment, the Deputy Registrar exercised that discretion upon recognised legal principles and disclosed, through the reasons given, the analytical process by which the instruction fees ultimately awarded were reached. 5. The distinction is important. A reference under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order is not an appeal on quantum. It is a supervisory proceeding directed at the legality of the taxation process. Accordingly, the Court's intervention does not depend upon whether it would itself have reached a different assessment, but upon whether the taxation demonstrates a proper application of the applicable legal principles and a reasoned exercise of the statutory discretion vested in the taxing officer. 6. The Court has considered the pleadings, the affidavits, the rival submissions, the impugned ruling on taxation, and the authorities relied upon by the parties. Having done so, it is convenient to begin with the factual and procedural background giving rise to the present Reference before considering the parties' respective positions, the applicable legal principles and their application to the facts of this case. **II. BACKGROUND** 1. Following the establishment of the Environment and Land Court pursuant to Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and the Environment and Land Court Act, this suit, initially instituted before the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi as **High Court Civil Suit No. 1034 of 2005** was transferred to the Environment and Land Court at Garissa, where it was registered as **ELC Case No. 10 of 2017**. 2. In the primary suit, the Plaintiffs sought various reliefs against the Kenya Electricity Generating Company PLC (KenGen), as the first defendant, and the Kenya Power & Lighting Company PLC, as the second defendant. The Respondent Advocate represented the Applicant throughout the proceedings. The litigation was protracted, spanning approximately nineteen years from its commencement in 2005 until the delivery of judgment in 2024. 3. Following the conclusion of the suit, the Respondent Advocate presented an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 19 October 2024 for taxation under the Advocates Remuneration Order, seeking remuneration for professional services rendered to the Applicant in the conduct of the litigation. The Bill included claims for instruction fees together with the consequential items provided for under the applicable Schedule to the Advocates Remuneration Order. 4. The Bill was placed before the Deputy Registrar of this Court for taxation. After hearing the parties, the Deputy Registrar delivered a ruling on 3 October 2025, taxing the Bill at Kshs. 7,899,885.00. The largest component of that assessment comprised instruction fees taxed at Kshs. 6,000,000.00, from which the consequential items were computed. 5. In the course of the taxation, the Deputy Registrar considered whether the value of the subject matter could be ascertained from the pleadings, the judgment or any other recognized source for purposes of assessing instruction fees. The Deputy Registrar concluded that no ascertainable value could properly be derived and consequently proceeded to assess instruction fees in the exercise of the discretion conferred by the Advocates Remuneration Order. 6. The Applicant was dissatisfied with the taxation and, by a Chamber Summons dated 9 October 2025, instituted the present Reference under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. In the application, the Applicant seeks orders that the ruling on taxation and the resultant Certificate of Taxation be set aside, that the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs be remitted for taxation afresh before a different Deputy Registrar, and that the Court grant such further or other relief as it may deem just. 7. The Respondent opposes the Reference and maintains that the taxation was undertaken in accordance with the applicable principles governing the assessment of Advocate–Client costs. The Respondent therefore urges the Court to uphold the impugned taxation and dismiss the Reference with costs. 8. Against that factual and procedural background, the Court now turns to the parties' respective positions before identifying the issues that fall for determination. **III. THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE CASES** **(a) The Applicant's Case** 1. The Applicant's case is contained in the Chamber Summons dated 9 October 2025, the supporting affidavit sworn in support thereof, the grounds set out in the Notice of Objection to taxation dated 8 October 2025, and the written submissions dated 22 March 2026 filed in support of the Reference. The Applicant challenges the taxation principally on the ground that the assessment of instruction fees was affected by errors of principle which materially influenced the taxation of the entire Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. 2. The Applicant contends that the Deputy Registrar correctly found that the value of the subject matter could not be ascertained from the pleadings or the judgment but thereafter misdirected himself in the exercise of the discretion conferred by the Advocates Remuneration Order. According to the Applicant, the assessment of instruction fees was not based on the recognized principles governing taxation and was instead influenced by considerations that were neither supported by the record nor contemplated by applicable law. 3. It is further the Applicant's case that the ruling on taxation does not sufficiently explain how the relevant considerations, including the nature of the litigation, the responsibility assumed by counsel, the complexity of the proceedings, the time expended and the interests involved, were evaluated and translated into the instruction fees ultimately awarded. Consequently, the Applicant maintains that the taxation discloses an error of principle warranting the intervention of this Court under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. 4. On that basis, the Applicant prays that the ruling delivered on 3 October 2025 together with the resultant Certificate of Taxation be set aside and that the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 19 October 2024 be remitted for taxation *de novo* before a different Deputy Registrar. The Applicant further prays that the costs of the present Reference be provided for by the Court. **(b) The Respondent's Case** 1. The Respondent opposes the Reference through the replying affidavit sworn by **C.P. Onono** on 1 December 2025 and the written submissions dated 23 April 2026 filed in response. The Respondent maintains that the taxation was undertaken in accordance with the Advocates Remuneration Order and the applicable jurisprudence governing Advocate–Client costs. 2. The Respondent contends that the Deputy Registrar properly appreciated the nature of the litigation, its duration, the professional responsibility undertaken by counsel, and the attendant circumstances of the proceedings before arriving at the instruction fees awarded. It is submitted that those were relevant considerations and that the discretion vested in the taxing officer was exercised judiciously. 3. The Respondent further argues that the Applicant has failed to identify any error of principle capable of justifying interference by this Court. In the Respondent's view, the Reference is founded principally upon dissatisfaction with the quantum of instruction fees rather than upon any demonstrable misdirection in law. It is therefore urged that the Court should decline the invitation to interfere with the taxation merely because another assessment might also have been open on the material before the Deputy Registrar. 4. The Respondent accordingly prays that the Reference be dismissed with costs and that the taxation undertaken by the Deputy Registrar be upheld. **IV. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION** 1. The Court has carefully considered the Reference, the affidavits filed by the parties, the rival written submissions and the authorities cited in support of their respective positions. Although numerous grounds have been advanced both in support of and in opposition to the Reference, the Court is of the considered view that they ultimately converge into one principal legal question. 2. The principal issue for determination is: **Whether the taxation undertaken by the Deputy Registrar was affected by an error of principle warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order.** 1. The determination of that issue necessarily requires the Court to consider, among other matters: 2. whether the Deputy Registrar correctly determined that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable from the pleadings, the judgment or any settlement between the parties; 3. whether, having reached that conclusion, the Deputy Registrar exercised the discretion conferred by the Advocates Remuneration Order upon recognised legal principles; 4. whether the reasons contained in the impugned ruling sufficiently disclose the analytical process by which the recognised considerations governing taxation informed the assessment of instruction fees; and 5. whether any identified error warrants the setting aside of the taxation and the remittal of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs for fresh taxation. 6. The Court emphasizes that the foregoing matters do not constitute separate issues for independent determination. Rather, they represent the analytical steps by which the Court will answer the principal issue before it. Whether the Reference ultimately succeeds depends on the legality of the taxation process rather than on whether the Court might itself have reached a different assessment of instruction fees. 7. The Court will therefore first identify the legal principles governing references from taxation before applying those principles to the facts and circumstances of the present case. **V. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES** 1. The present Reference is brought under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The jurisdiction thereby conferred upon this Court as I have indicated is supervisory in nature. It is not an appeal against the quantum of costs as such, nor does it authorize the Court to undertake a fresh taxation merely because it might have arrived at a different assessment. Rather, the Court is concerned with the legality of the taxation process and the manner in which the discretion vested in the taxing officer has been exercised. 2. It is now firmly settled that a Judge will interfere with a taxation only where the taxing officer acted upon a wrong principle, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to take into account relevant considerations, misapprehended the applicable law, or where the award is so manifestly excessive or so manifestly low as to justify the inference that the taxation proceeded upon an error of principle. Equally, where the taxing officer has exercised the discretion entrusted by law upon the proper principles, the Court will not interfere merely because another judicial officer might reasonably have reached a different assessment. That approach has been consistently affirmed in Kenyan jurisprudence, including **First American Bank of Kenya Ltd v Shah & Others, Kipkorir, Titoo & Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board, and most recently by the Supreme Court in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates.** **(a) Ascertainment of the Value of the Subject Matter** 1. The assessment of instruction fees ordinarily begins with the ascertainment of the value of the subject matter. As a general rule, that value is to be derived from the pleadings, the judgment or a lawful settlement between the parties. Those sources provide the objective basis upon which instruction fees are ordinarily calculated under the applicable Schedule to the Advocates Remuneration Order. The Court of Appeal in **Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates** **[2002] KECA 153 (KLR)** settled this principle, which has since been consistently applied by the superior courts. 2. However, not every dispute admits of an ascertainable monetary value. Where the pleadings, the judgment, or a settlement do not disclose a value capable of objective ascertainment, the law does not permit the taxation process to come to an end. Instead, the taxing officer must proceed to assess instruction fees through the exercise of the discretion conferred by the Advocates Remuneration Order. **(b) The Nature of Judicial Discretion in Taxation** 1. The discretion exercised by a taxing officer is a judicial discretion. It is neither absolute nor unstructured. Although the law recognizes that different taxing officers may legitimately reach different assessments in comparable cases, that latitude exists only because taxation is an evaluative exercise that requires the application of legal principle to the circumstances of the particular litigation. 2. Judicial discretion is therefore distinguishable from subjective preference or intuitive estimation. It requires the taxing officer to identify the legally relevant considerations, evaluate their significance in the context of the case, and explain, with sufficient clarity, how those considerations inform the assessment ultimately reached. The exercise of discretion is thus disciplined by principle rather than by personal impression. 3. The recognized considerations include, among others, the nature and importance of the cause, the interests of the parties, the complexity of the issues involved, the responsibility undertaken by counsel, the amount of work reasonably required, the conduct and duration of the proceedings and any other circumstance recognized by the Advocates Remuneration Order and the applicable jurisprudence. Those considerations are neither exhaustive nor mechanically applicable. Their relevance and weight necessarily depend upon the facts of each individual case. 4. In **Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W'Njuguna & 6 Others**, the High Court emphasized that the discretion vested in a taxing officer is not an invitation to arrive at what the Court described as "mystical figures of taxed costs". Rather, the taxation must demonstrate a rational connection between the applicable legal considerations and the assessment ultimately made. The significance of that decision lies not in prescribing any mathematical formula, but in affirming that judicial discretion must remain transparent, principled and capable of rational explanation. **(c) The Constitutional Dimension of Taxation** 1. The Supreme Court in **Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates [2024] KESC 44 (KLR)** reaffirmed that taxation of costs is an integral aspect of the administration of justice. Although undertaken pursuant to the Advocates Remuneration Order, taxation is nevertheless an exercise of judicial power affecting the proprietary rights of litigants and the entitlement of advocates to fair remuneration. Consequently, the constitutional values of fairness, transparency, accountability and rationality permeate the taxation process. 2. It follows that the legitimacy of a taxation does not depend solely upon the amount ultimately awarded. Rather, it depends upon whether the ruling demonstrates that the discretion entrusted to the taxing officer was exercised upon recognised legal principles through a transparent reasoning process. Where that process is apparent, the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court is not engaged merely because another judicial officer might have reached a different assessment. Conversely, where the reasoning process cannot reasonably be discerned, or where the assessment is materially influenced by considerations not recognized by law, the Court is entitled to intervene in order to preserve the integrity and consistency of the taxation process. **(d) The Appropriate Remedy** 1. It is well settled that where a court hearing a reference concludes that a taxation has been affected by an error of principle, its function is not ordinarily to undertake the taxation afresh. As was recognized by the former East African Court of Appeal in **Arthur v Nyeri Electricity Undertaking [1961] EA 492**, and consistently affirmed by the Court of Appeal in **First American Bank of Kenya Ltd v Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 64** and **Kipkorir, Titoo & Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR**, taxation remains, in the first instance, the statutory responsibility of the taxing officer. Accordingly, save in exceptional circumstances, the proper course is to set aside the impugned taxation and remit the Bill of Costs for fresh taxation in accordance with the applicable legal principles. 2. Whether the fresh taxation should be undertaken by the same or a different taxing officer depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. Where the error identified concerns the legal methodology employed in exercising the statutory discretion, it will ordinarily be appropriate to direct that the Bill be placed before a different Deputy Registrar. Such an order does not imply bias, impropriety, or incompetence on the part of the judicial officer whose decision has been set aside. Rather, it reflects the desirability of ensuring that the statutory discretion is exercised afresh, independently and uninfluenced by the reasoning contained in the impugned ruling. 3. It is against the foregoing principles that the Court proceeds to determine whether the taxation undertaken by the Deputy Registrar in the present case discloses an error of principle warranting interference under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. **VI. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION** 1. The sole issue for determination is whether the taxation undertaken by the learned Deputy Registrar was affected by an error of principle warranting interference by this Court under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. In resolving that issue, the Court remains mindful that its jurisdiction is supervisory rather than appellate. The question is not whether this Court would itself have reached a different assessment of instruction fees, but whether the impugned taxation demonstrates that the statutory discretion vested in the taxing officer was exercised in accordance with the applicable legal principles. **(a) Whether the Deputy Registrar correctly determined that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable** 1. The Court begins with the foundation upon which the taxation proceeded. The impugned ruling demonstrates that the Deputy Registrar first considered whether the value of the subject matter could be ascertained from the pleadings, the judgment, or any settlement between the parties. Having undertaken that inquiry, the Deputy Registrar concluded that no ascertainable value could properly be derived for purposes of assessing instruction fees. 2. Having reviewed both the pleadings and the judgment in the primary suit, this Court is satisfied that the Deputy Registrar adopted the correct legal approach. Although the Plaintiffs pleaded monetary claims against the defendants, the judgment did not determine the Applicant's liability by reference to an ascertainable monetary decree from which instruction fees could properly be calculated. Nor was there any settlement fixing the value of the subject matter. In those circumstances, the Deputy Registrar correctly concluded that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable within the meaning of the applicable jurisprudence. 3. The Court therefore rejects the suggestion that the taxation was vitiated merely because the Deputy Registrar declined to adopt the pleaded value or the decretal sum as the basis for assessing instruction fees. On the material before the Court, that conclusion represented a proper application of the principles governing the ascertainment of the value of the subject matter. **(b) Whether the Deputy Registrar thereafter exercised the statutory discretion upon recognized legal principles** 1. The inquiry does not end there. Once the Deputy Registrar concluded that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable, the Advocates Remuneration Order required the assessment of instruction fees to proceed through the exercise of judicial discretion. That discretion was required to be exercised upon the recognized considerations governing taxation and in a manner capable of demonstrating the reasoning process by which the assessment was reached. 2. The impugned ruling reveals that the Deputy Registrar took into account several matters that were plainly relevant to the exercise. These included the duration of the litigation, the nature of the dispute, the responsibility assumed by counsel, and the history of the proceedings. Those were all proper considerations which the Deputy Registrar was entitled, and indeed required, to evaluate in determining an appropriate instruction fee. 3. However, the Court's concern lies not with the identification of those considerations but with the reasoning process by which they culminated in the assessment ultimately made. 4. The ruling records that, in assessing instruction fees, the Deputy Registrar surmised that had counsel been retained at a monthly fee of Kshs.50,000 over a substantial period, the remuneration payable would have approximated Kshs.7,800,000 before concluding that instruction fees of Kshs.6,000,000 were reasonable. 5. The Court has given anxious consideration to that aspect of the ruling. It does not accept the proposition that every hypothetical illustration employed by a taxing officer necessarily constitutes an error of principle. Judicial reasoning frequently employs analogies or illustrations to explain a conclusion. Whether such a reference is permissible depends upon the purpose for which it is employed and the extent to which it influences the assessment ultimately reached. 6. In the present case, however, the assumed monthly retainer was neither supported by the evidence nor founded upon any agreement between the parties. More importantly, it formed part of the reasoning immediately preceding the assessment of instruction fees. Viewed in context, the Court is unable to regard it as a merely incidental observation. Rather, it became one of the considerations informing the exercise of the statutory discretion. 7. Since the taxation before the Deputy Registrar proceeded under the Advocates Remuneration Order precisely because there was no agreed remuneration between the Advocate and the Client, the introduction of an assumed monthly retainer lacked both an evidential and legal foundation. To that extent, the Court is satisfied that the Deputy Registrar took into account a consideration that was not properly available in the exercise of the statutory discretion. **(c) Whether the taxation discloses a transparent and legally recognizable methodology** 1. That finding, however, is not by itself determinative of the present Reference. Even if the Court were to disregard altogether the reference to the assumed monthly retainer, a more fundamental difficulty remains. 2. Once the value of the subject matter was found to be unascertainable, the assessment of instruction fees necessarily became an evaluative exercise requiring the Deputy Registrar to weigh the recognized considerations and to explain, with sufficient clarity, how those considerations informed the assessment ultimately reached. The Court accepts that such an exercise is incapable of mathematical precision. The Advocates Remuneration Order deliberately leaves room for judicial evaluation because litigation varies in complexity, responsibility, and importance. 3. That flexibility, however, does not diminish the obligation to demonstrate that the discretion has been exercised judiciously. A taxation ruling need not contain an elaborate exposition of every consideration taken into account, but it should disclose, with reasonable clarity, the analytical pathway by which the relevant considerations produced the instruction fee ultimately awarded. The adequacy of the reasons is to be assessed in context, having regard to the nature of the dispute and the issues that arose before the taxing officer. 4. In the present case, although the Deputy Registrar referred to several relevant considerations, the ruling does not sufficiently explain how those considerations were evaluated or why they justified instruction fees of Kshs.6,000,000 as opposed to some other amount within the permissible range. The Court is left unable to discern the analytical process by which the recognized considerations informed the assessment ultimately reached. The Deputy Registrar plucked the sum of Kshs 50,000/- from the air and employed it in computing the instruction fees. 5. The Court emphasizes that this conclusion should not be understood as suggesting that instruction fees of Kshs.6,000,000 were necessarily excessive, inadequate or otherwise incapable of justification. That question does not arise for determination in this Reference. Different taxing officers, acting judiciously upon the same material, may legitimately arrive at different assessments. What the law requires is that the reasons given should demonstrate that the assessment resulted from the disciplined application of recognized legal principles rather than from an unexplained evaluative choice. 6. The Court therefore concludes that the taxation was affected by an error of principle. That conclusion rests not upon disagreement with the amount awarded but upon the Court's inability to discern from the impugned ruling the legal methodology by which the recognized considerations governing instruction fees were applied to produce the assessment ultimately reached. It is the reasoning process, rather than the quantum itself, that attracts the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. **(d) Appropriate relief** 1. Having found that the taxation was affected by an error of principle, the Court must determine the appropriate relief. The Applicant urged the Court to interfere with the taxation, while the Respondent invited the Court to uphold it. 2. This Court is not persuaded that the appropriate course would be to substitute its own assessment of instruction fees. Such an approach would effectively require the Court to undertake the very taxation which the Advocates Remuneration Order entrusts, in the first instance, to the taxing officer. Save in exceptional circumstances, that is not the function of a Judge hearing a reference under Rule 11. 3. The ordinary consequence of establishing an error of principle is that the impugned taxation should be set aside and the Bill of Costs remitted for fresh taxation. In the present case, the identified error concerns the methodology employed in exercising the statutory discretion. The Court therefore considers it appropriate that the fresh taxation be undertaken by a Deputy Registrar other than the judicial officer who delivered the impugned ruling. That order is made solely to ensure a fresh and independent exercise of the statutory mandate. It should not be understood as reflecting adversely upon the integrity, impartiality, or competence of the learned Deputy Registrar. 4. The principal issue for determination is therefore answered in the affirmative. The Reference succeeds, and the appropriate orders are those set out in the disposition of this ruling. **VII. DISPOSITION** 1. Having carefully considered the Reference, the affidavits on record, the rival submissions of counsel, the impugned ruling on taxation and the applicable law, the Court is satisfied that the Reference is meritorious. 2. The Court has found that the learned Deputy Registrar correctly concluded that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable from the pleadings, the judgment or any settlement between the parties. The Court has, however, equally found that the subsequent assessment of instruction fees was affected by an error of principle. While the Deputy Registrar identified several relevant considerations, the impugned ruling does not sufficiently disclose the analytical process by which those considerations informed the instruction fees ultimately awarded. Further, the reasoning was materially influenced by a consideration lacking evidential and legal foundation. 3. Taxation of costs is an important incident of the administration of justice. It serves the dual purpose of securing fair remuneration for advocates while protecting litigants against costs that are not demonstrated to have been assessed upon recognized legal principles. 4. In the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the appropriate remedy is to set aside the impugned taxation and remit the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs for taxation afresh before a different Deputy Registrar. Such an order is necessary to ensure that the statutory discretion is exercised afresh, independently and exclusively upon the applicable legal principles. **Orders** 1. Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders: 2. The Chamber Summons dated 9 October 2025 is hereby allowed. 3. The ruling of the Deputy Registrar delivered on 3 October 2025, together with the resultant Certificate of Taxation, is hereby set aside. 4. The Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 19 October 2024 is remitted to a different Deputy Registrar of the Environment and Land Court at Garissa other than the judicial officer who delivered the ruling dated 3 October 2025, for taxation *de novo* in accordance with the Advocates Remuneration Order and the principles set out in this ruling. 5. The costs of this Reference shall abide the outcome of the fresh taxation. It is so ordered. **DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT GARISSA THIS 16TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.** **DR. OMONDI R. OWINO, FCIArb** **JUDGE** **ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT** **DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON THE TEAMS PLATFORM** **IN THE PRESENCE OF:** Mr Dabar Mohamed Court Assistant