https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10392
The court held that EACC’s mandate under ACECA and its enabling statute does not extend to investigating private entities for corruption unrelated to bribery, public officers, public officials, public funds or public property. The only clear basis for EACC to investigate a purely private entity is bribery under the...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2026] KEHC 10392 (KLR)
- Parties
- 1st Applicant: Kenya Tea Development Agency Management Services Limited; 2nd Applicant: Kenya Tea Development Agency Holdings Limited; 3rd Applicant: Eng. Francis Miano; Respondent: Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
- Court
- High Court
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Judicial Review E120 of 2026
- Procedural Posture
- Judicial Review / Judgment on Motion After Leave Granted
- Outcome
- Motion allowed
- Judges
- ["WM Musyoka"]
- Legal Topics
- Mandate of EACC, Private Entities and Corruption Investigations, Bribery Versus Other Corruption Offences, Certiorari and Prohibition, Ultra Vires Exercise of Statutory Power, Section 27 ACECA Notice to Provide Information
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Kenya Tea Development Agency Management Services Limited
1st Applicant
Kenya Tea Development Agency Holdings Limited
2nd Applicant
Eng. Francis Miano
3rd Applicant
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Judicial Review / Judgment on Motion After Leave Granted
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission has jurisdiction to investigate private entities on allegations of corruption unrelated to bribery or public resources
- 2 Whether the notice to provide information issued under section 27(3) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act was ultra vires
- 3 Whether the applicants were entitled to certiorari and prohibition
Ratio Decidendi
The court held that EACC’s mandate under ACECA and its enabling statute does not extend to investigating private entities for corruption unrelated to bribery, public officers, public officials, public funds or public property. The only clear basis for EACC to investigate a purely private entity is bribery under the Anti-Bribery Act. Because the impugned notices and intended inquiry concerned commodity-loan corruption allegations against private tea factories and did not identify bribery, the notice to provide information and related enforcement action were ultra vires and unlawful.
Court Disposition
Motion allowed
Orders
- Certiorari issued to quash the respondent’s notice to provide information dated 31st March 2026.
- Prohibition issued restraining the respondent from threatening, intimidating, harassing, prosecuting, investigating, demanding information or documents from the applicants’ factories, or enforcing the impugned notices, except in relation to bribery within its lawful mandate.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
Kenya Tea Development Agency Management Services Limited & 2 others v Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Judicial Review E120 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 10392 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (13 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10392 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Judicial Review Judicial Review E120 of 2026 WM Musyoka, J July 13, 2026 Between Kenya Tea Development Agency Management Services Limited 1st Applicant Kenya Tea Development Agency Holdings Limited 2nd Applicant Eng. Francis Miano 3rd Applicant and Ethics And Anti-Corruption Commission Respondent Judgment 1.These Judicial Review proceedings were initiated under certificate of urgency, by way of an ex parte chamber summons, dated 23rd April 2026, for leave to commence a Motion for certiorari and prohibition orders, directed at the respondent, with respect to a notice to provide information letter, dated 31st March 2026. The ex parte chamber application was placed before me, on 23rd April 2026, and I granted the leave sought. The Motion was filed herein, following the grant of leave, dated 29th April 2026. It is based on the supporting affidavit, sworn on 29th April 2026, by Mr. Mathews Odero. 2.The orders sought are a certiorari and a prohibition. The certiorari is for the purpose of quashing a decision of the respondent, contained in a notice to provide information, dated 31st March 2026; to be enforced against the applicants, should they fail to provide the information. The prohibition order is for prohibiting the respondent from threatening, intimidating, harassing, prosecuting, investigating and demanding information or documents from any of their factories, including, but not limited to, Michimikuru Tea Factory and Litein Tea Factory, or enforcing or implementing the notices served upon them. 3.The factual background and the grounds are set out on the face of the application, the statutory statement and the affidavits. The respondent is said to have had requested for original documents from the applicants, relating to commodity loans by the 2 factories, to facilitate investigations. The requests were in a letter, dated 9th February 2026, informing them of corrupt operations by Michimikiru Tea Factory, in Meru, for the financial years 2022/2023 and 2024/2025. The applicants declined to provide the information, by a letter, dated 19th February 2026, on grounds of jurisdiction to be investigated by the respondent. The respondent wrote again on 16th March 2026, insisting that the information be availed by 19th March 2026. On 18th March 2026, the respondent wrote another letter seeking information, about Litein Tea Factory in Kericho County, for the years 2022/2023 and 2024/2025. On 31st March 2026, the respondent issued a notice to the applicant, to provide information relating to the Michimikuru and Litein Tea Factories. The said notices were issued under section 27(3) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, Cap. 65, Laws of Kenya, and stipulated penal consequences for failure to provide the information sought. 4.It is asserted, by the applicants, that the 1st applicant, and the Michimikuru and Litein Tea Factories, are private limited liability companies, incorporated under the Companies Act, Cap. 486, Laws of Kenya, and, therefore, they cannot be investigated by the respondent. The intended investigations are said to target loan agreements or arrangements, and, therefore, private commercial transactions, which do not involve public funds. It is also asserted that the 1st applicant is not a State Corporation or a government agency, under the current organisation of government framework, including the Executive Order No. 1 of 2025. It is averred that the 1st applicant operates independently of ministerial control, and is not funded through public appropriations, hence it is beyond the reach of the respondent. It is argued that, if there is suspected corruption in the said commodity loan arrangements, the best way to handle the matter should be through the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, and, as such, there is an active inquiry, by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, through file number DCI/IB/ECCU/SEC/4/4/1/GB/VOL.XVI/1. It is asserted that the Directorate of Criminal Investigations is a competent investigative authority, which should be allowed to discharge its obligations without undue interference from the respondent. 5.The affidavit, in support, was sworn by Mr. Odero, the Company Secretary for the 1st and 2nd applicants, on 29th April 2026. It merely regurgitates the averments made in the grounds on the face of the application, word for word. Several documents are attached. There is a letter from the respondent, dated 9th February 2026, addressed to the Kenya Tea Development Agency, requesting for certain documents and information, relating to commodity loans by the Michimikuru Tea Factory in Meru County. There is a letter, from the 2nd respondent, dated 19th February 2026, addressed to the respondent, in response to the letter, dated 9th February 2026, essentially informing that the respondent did not have mandate, for the 1st and 2nd applicants are private entities. There is a letter, dated 16th March 2026, from the respondent, addressed to the Kenya Tea Development Agency, in response to the letter of 9th February 2026, arguing that the allegations disclosed economic crimes and offences, under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, and the jurisdiction of the respondent had not been ousted. The letter, dated 18th March 2026, is in similar terms to that of 9th February 2026, but relating to the Litein Tea Factory. The letter, dated 31st March 2026, is addressed to the 3rd applicant, by the respondent, and it is framed as a notice to provide information, under section 27(3) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, pointing out that there would be penal consequences, under section 27(4) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, in the event of default. There is a copy of a certificate of incorporation of KTDA Management Services Limited, and a copy of a certificate of change of name of the Kenya Tea Development Agency Limited to Kenya Tea Development Agency Holdings Limited. 6.There is a reply to the application, vide a replying affidavit, sworn on 11th May 2026, by Mr. Ishmael Nyamache, an investigator with the respondent. He avers that the respondent is mandated to investigate allegations of bribery and fraud, as defined in section 2 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act. It is further averred that the mandate of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act is not limited to public entities and public officers, or situations where public resources are involved, but it extends to private entities. It is argued that the legislative intent, in enacting the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, was not to limit the mandate of the respondent to investigating fraud touching on public officers and public entities only. It is asserted that the case of the applicants is on fraud, perpetrated by them, hence it falls under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act. It is averred that there was concurrence of mandate, between the respondent and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, and either of them can investigate, and make appropriate recommendations to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions. It is pointed out that the applicants have not provided any material to support their allegation that the matter is being investigated by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. It is further argued that the issuance of the impugned notice was under section 27(3) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, and it has not been demonstrated that the same was done ultra vires the statutory mandate of the respondent, or was done in an unprocedural manner, or the respondent has acted unreasonably in issuing it. 7.Directions were given, on 12th May 2026, for canvassing of the application, by way of written submissions. I have, before me, written submissions placed on record by the applicants, dated 8th June 2026, and by the respondent, dated 19th June 2026. 8.The written submissions, by the applicants, identify 2 issues for determination, and that is whether the respondent has the mandate to investigate private bodies, and whether the applicants deserve the reliefs sought. It is submitted that the mandate of the respondent is limited, by section 11 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, to investigation of corruption, economic crimes, unethical conduct and misuse of public office. Mutuma vs. Chief Officer Health Services County Government of Meru & another [1997] KEELRC 54 (KLR) and Directorate of Criminal Investigations vs. Tom Ojienda t/a Prof Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates & 3 others [2019] eKLR, are cited in support of that contention. Kenya National Examinations Council; GGN & 9 others (Ex parte) vs. Republic [1997] eKLR [1997] KECA 58 (KLR), Municipal Council of Mombasa vs. Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd [2002] eKLR, Zachariah Wagunza & another vs. Office of the Registrar, Academic Affairs, Kenyatta University & 2 others [2013] eKLR, Pastoli vs. Kabale District Local Government Council & others [2008] 2 EA 300, Commissioner of Lands vs. Kunste Hotel Limited [1997] eKLR, Onyango Oloo vs. Attorney General [1989] EA and Republic vs. Office of the Attorney General and Department of Justice (Business Registration Services) & another: Calling Safaris Limited (Ex parte applicant) [2024] KEHC 12857 (KLR) are cited, to support the argument that the applicants are entitled to the orders sought. 9.The written submissions, by the respondent, turn on the 2 issues identified by the applicants. It is asserted that the mandate of the respondent is not limited to public offices or situations where public funds or resources are lost; and that the applicants have not demonstrated that the impugned notice was issued in excess of the statutory mandate of the respondent, or that the decision to issue the notice was unreasonable. Municipal Council of Mombasa vs. Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd [2002] eKLR and Republic vs. Kenya Revenue Authority Exparte Yaya Towers Limited [2008] KEHC 489 (KLR) are relied upon. 10.I would be required to determine whether the mandate of the respondent extends to cover private entities accused of corruption, and whether the applicants are entitled to the orders sought herein. 11.It is common ground, that the respondent has initiated investigations into allegations of corruption, with respect to the applicants and 2 tea factories, and, in furtherance of that investigation, has written to the applicants calling for certain documentation and information, and issued a notice to the 3rd applicant, to the effect that in default of compliance with availing the documents and information requested for, the respondent shall invoke section 27(4) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act. It is also common ground that the applicants have written to the respondent, acknowledging receipt of the requests, but pointing out that the respondent has no mandate to investigate them, over any corruption allegations, under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, for its jurisdiction extends only to public officers, public entities and public funds, but not over private entities and commercial transactions. 12.The issue, therefore, is over the mandate of the respondent. The question arising is whether the respondent has a mandate or jurisdiction to carry out corruption investigations made against the 1st and 2nd applicants, regarding private commercial transactions, in this case loan arrangements relating to Michimikuru and Litein Tea Factories, which do not involve public funds. 13.I believe that the starting point ought to be with the status of the respondent. The respondent is a constitutional commission, established under Article 79, in Chapter Six of the Constitution, for the purpose of enforcing the objectives of that Chapter, revolving around leadership and integrity of State and public officers. Article 79 provides, “Parliament shall enact legislation to establish an independent ethics and anti-corruption commission, which shall be and have the status and powers of a commission under Chapter Fifteen, for purposes of ensuring compliance with, and enforcement of, the provisions of this Chapter.” The core function of the respondent, therefore, from the above, is to investigate corruption involving State Officers and public officials, and the misuse of public resources, and it would appear that in cases where no public officer, public entity or public funds are involved, the respondent would have no mandate. 14.There has been compliance with Article 79 of the Constitution, in that the legislation, contemplated there, was enacted, in 2011, being the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, Cap. 7H, Laws of Kenya. The preamble, to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act, states that it establishes the respondent “pursuant to Article 79 of the Constitution, to provide for,” among others, “the functions and powers of the respondent.” The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act states what it describes as “additional” “powers” and “functions” of the respondent, at sections 3 and 11, that is in “addition” to those stated in Article 79 of the Constitution. The “additional functions,” that may be of relevance to these proceedings, are those stated in section 11(1)(d) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, to “investigate and recommend to the Director of Public Prosecutions the prosecution of any acts of corruption, bribery or economic crimes or violation of codes of ethics or other matter prescribed under this Act or any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution.” 15.It would appear, from the wording of section 11(1)(d) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, that the investigations, that the respondent could engage in, relate to “any acts of corruption, bribery or economic crimes or violation of codes of ethics,” or “other matter prescribed under this Act or any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution.” “… any acts of corruption, bribery or economic crimes or violation of codes of ethics,” would appear to be fairly expansive, and to suggest that it is not limited to State officers and public officials. 16.However, section 11(1)(d) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act should not be read in isolation of the other provisions of section 11. “… any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution” would appear to be geared to meet the objectives of Chapter Six of the Constitution, and, therefore, limiting the investigations, envisaged to be conducted under section 11(1)(d) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, to actions or activities of State Officers and public officials, and public funds and resources. “... any acts of corruption, bribery or economic crimes …,” going by Chapter Six of the Constitution, and in particular Article 79 thereof, can only relate to acts committed by the State officers and public officers, the subject of Chapter Six of the Constitution, for the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act was enacted “pursuant to Article 79” or “pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution,” specifically to provide a framework for enforcement of Chapter Six of the Constitution. Section 11 of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, itself, as a whole, specifically carries provisions relating to State officers, public officers, State organs and State agencies. “… violation of codes of ethics …” refers to section 11(1)(a)(c)(f) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, which provides for development of “a code of ethics” for “State officers,” receipt of “complaints on the breach of code of ethics by public officers” and “enforcement of codes of ethics prescribed for public officers.” 17.The whole clause, in section 11(1)(d) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, ends with the phrase “any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution.” The closing phrase summarises the scope and extent of section 11(1)(d), and that is that the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act was “enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution,” and, therefore, the categories of offences, to be investigated under it, that is to say that “any acts of corruption, bribery or economic crimes or violation of codes of ethics or other matter prescribed under this Act,” are to be understood from the context of the purpose of the enactment of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, which is a statute enacted “pursuant to Article 79 of the Constitution” and “enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution,” to meet the objectives of Chapter Six of the Constitution, with respect to State officers, public officials and public resources. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act is a law enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution, and it confers a mandate, to the respondent, for the purposes of Chapter Six of the Constitution. “… any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution,” confers the respondent with mandate to investigate crimes, so long as the statute creating the offences is enacted specifically to give effect to Chapter Six of the Constitution. The mandate of the respondent, to investigate the offences created under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, must be gathered from the provisions of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act and Chapter Six of the Constitution. 18.The Anti-Bribery Act, Cap. 79B, Laws of Kenya, was legislated in 2016, and commenced on 13th January 2017, long after the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act had become operational in 2011. Its preamble does not link it to Article 79 of the Constitution, and it would not be clear, therefore, whether it, the Anti-Bribery Act, forms part of “any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution,” contemplated in section 11(1)(d) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act. However, section 18(8) of the Anti-Bribery Act links it to the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, the Public Officer Ethics Act, Cap. 185B, Laws of Kenya, and the Leadership and Integrity Act, Cap 185C, Laws of Kenya. 19.Nevertheless, the Anti-Bribery Act states, at section 4, that it “shall apply to the public, public officers, public entity and private entities.” Section 2 of the Act interprets “partnership,” “private entity” and “private sector,” in addition to “public entity,” “public office,” “public officer,” and “State officer.” There is also an interpretation of “senior officer,” with respect to “body corporate” and “partnership.” The respondent is defined in section 2 of the Anti-Bribery Act, and section 3 provides that the respondent “shall be responsible for the enforcement of this Act.” The intent of section 3 is evident, in sections 12, 14 and 22 of the Anti-Bribery Act, that the respondent is the primary driving force behind the enforcement of the Anti-Bribery Act. Indeed, it would appear, so far as the Anti-Bribery Act is concerned, that there would be no room for involvement of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, with respect to the offences defined in the Anti-Bribery Act. 20.From the language of the Anti-Bribery Act, the offences defined in it are capable of being committed by both public officials and private persons, and with respect to public and private activities and functions. Given that section 3 of the Anti-Bribery Act confers exclusive jurisdiction or mandate over the respondent, with respect to offences created under the Act, that is the Anti-Bribery Act, and as the said Act, the Anti-Bribery Act, targets criminal activity, relating to bribes, in both the public and private sector, it would appear that the mandate and function of the respondent has been expanded, by the Anti-Bribery Act, beyond that envisaged under Article 79 of the Constitution and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act. The paradigm, of the legal landscape, has shifted, upon the enactment of the Anti-Bribery Act, to empower the respondent to investigate bribery, and related corrupt conduct, within the private sector. The issue, of the constitutionality of shifting that paradigm, in view of Article 79 and Chapter Six of the Constitution, is not before me, but it could be something worth pondering about. 21.The Anti-Bribery Act complements the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, by specifically empowering the respondent to investigate bribery within the private sector, regardless of whether a public official is involved, or whether public resources are affected. It must be underscored that ordinarily the respondent, under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, has jurisdiction to investigate a private entity, where an enquiry relates to loss of public funds and resources. See Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission vs. King Group Company Limited & 5 others [2025] KEHC 17022 (KLR). However, it would appear that, whereas the respondent has exclusive mandate, under the Anti-Bribery Act, to investigate the offence of bribery, as defined under that Act, the investigative mandate, under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, for the offences defined under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, is shared, between the respondent and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, except where the offences relate exclusively to State officers and public officers, and touch on public funds and resources. 22.The central question herein, therefore, is whether the action, taken by the respondent, with respect to the applicants, of initiating investigations into alleged corruption, relating to commodity loans by the 2 tea factories, is within the legal mandate given to the respondent by the applicable law. I have discussed the applicable law above, being Chapter Six of the Constitution, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act and the Anti-Bribery Act. Under Chapter Six of the Constitution, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, the respondent is mandated to conduct investigations into corruption activity by State officers and public officials, which relates to public funds, public assets and public activities. Such investigations may touch on private individuals and private companies, where the corrupt activities, by State officers and public officials, or public resources, have a bearing on them. See Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission vs. Dennis Njau Kimani & another [2019] KEHC 273 (KLR), Opondo & another vs. Republic [2020] KEHC 2540 (KLR) and Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission vs. King Group Company Limited & 5 others [2025] KEHC 17022 (KLR). The Anti-Bribery Act mandates the respondent to investigate bribery across the board, that is both in the public and private sectors. 23.The 1st and 2nd applicants are not entities in the public sector, but private corporations, while the 3rd applicant is neither a State Officer nor a public official. It is on account of that that the applicants are protesting that the respondent is engaging in investigations with respect to matters that it has no mandate, hence the argument that the conduct by the respondent is either illegal or unlawful, or in excess of its mandate. The respondent argues that there is mandate, under the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, to conduct investigations into corruption activity by private entities, such as the 1st and 2nd applicants herein. 24.My review of the law, above, points to the respondent having exclusive jurisdiction to conduct investigations into allegations of bribery, as defined under the Anti-Bribery Act, whether in the public or private sector. That would then mean that the respondent would have jurisdiction, to conduct investigations on allegations of bribery relating to the operation of the commodity loans by the 2 tea factories. However, if the allegations of corruption do not relate to bribery, but to other forms of corruption, then the respondent would have no mandate to conduct an investigation into such, as that would fall under the mandate of the police, specifically the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. 25.I have gone through the documents placed on record by both sides. All of them refer to “investigating allegations of corruption in the operation of commodity loans” and “economic crimes and offences.” None of them make reference to bribery. 26.Whereas the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act mandate the respondent to investigate corruption and economic crime, that mandate is limited to cases where State Officers, public officials and public resources are involved. To that extent, the respondent can only probe State Officers and public officials. Non-State officers and non-public officials, and private entities, can only be investigated by the respondent where there is a bearing, in terms of there being a public interest at stake, such as where a private entity handles or benefits from public funds or resources. See Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission vs. Dennis Njau Kimani & another [2019] KEHC 273 (KLR), Opondo & another vs. Republic [2020] KEHC 2540 (KLR) and Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission vs. King Group Company Limited & 5 others [2025] KEHC 17022 (KLR). It would only be with respect to bribery that the respondent would be mandated to investigate a private entity, where no issue of State officers, public officials or public resources come up. 27.The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act was passed specifically “to provide for the prevention, investigation and punishment of corruption, economic crime and related offences,” according to the preamble to that Act. 28.“Corruption” is defined in section 2 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, to mean, “(a) an offence under any of the provisions of sections 39, 44, 46 and 47; (b) bribery; (c) fraud; (d) embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds; (e) abuse of office; (f) breach of trust; or (g) an offence involving dishonesty— (i) in connection with any tax, rate or impost levied under any Act; or (ii) under any written law relating to the elections of persons to public office.” The offence defined in section 39 was deleted in 2016. The offence under section 44 relates to offences around bid rigging; while section 46 creates the offence of abuse of office; and section 47 is about offences relating to dealing with suspect property. The said offences, under sections 44, 46 and 47, are not tied to State officers, public officials, public office or public property. They can, therefore, apply across the board. However, the respondent would have mandate, going by the provisions of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, to conduct investigations relating to those offences, where the suspects are State officers or public officials, or the offences relate to public office and public resources, but there would be no mandate where the offences relate to private individuals and private entities, and private property and transactions. Where the offences relate to private individuals and private entities, and private property and private transactions, the mandate to investigate would lie with the police, specifically the Directorate of Criminal Investigations. 29.Bribery is a category or subset of corruption, going by the definition in section 2 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, besides that, does not define bribery. The same is defined in the Anti-Bribery Act, at Part II, in relation to bribery in the public sector. It defines the elements of giving a bribe, receing a bribe, functions or activities to which a bribe relates, and bribery of foreign public officials. Part III of the Anti-Bribery Act, deals with requirements for procedures for prevention of bribery, inclusive of preventive measures by private entities. However, some offences are created, under sections 10 and 13, with relation to bribery by and involving private entities. Part IV of the Anti-Bribery Act creates and defines other offences relating to bribery, at sections 14, 16 and 17 of the Anti-Bribery Act. Section 14 applies to both the private and public sectors, and it imposes a duty to report any knowledge or suspicion of bribery, and failure to report is criminalised. Section 16 makes giving and receiving of a bribe by a private entity or partnership an offence. Section 17 of the Anti-Bribery Act extends the offences created under sections 10 and 13 of the Anti-Bribery Act to partnerships. 30.Section 20 of the Anti-Bribery Act applies the provisions of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act to the Anti-Bribery Act, on investigations and prosecution. That would mean Part IV of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, which covers who would be qualified to conduct investigations, identifications of investigators, and conduct of investigations. 31.“Economic crime” is defined in section 2 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, to mean “(a) an offence under section 45; or (b) an offence involving dishonesty under any written law providing for the maintenance or protection of the public revenue; and (c) an offence involving the laundering of the proceeds of corruption.” 32.Section 45 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act creates offences designed to protect public property, revenues and the like. In its own words, the provision states as follows:“45.Protection of public property and revenue, etc.(1)A person is guilty of an offence if the person fraudulently or otherwise unlawfully—(a)acquires public property or a public service or benefit;(b)mortgages, charges or disposes of any public property;(c)damages public property, including causing a computer or any other electronic machinery to perform any function that directly or indirectly results in a loss or adversely affects any public revenue or service; or(d)fails to pay any taxes or any fees, levies or charges payable to any public body or effects or obtains any exemption, remission, reduction or abatement from payment of any such taxes, fees, levies or charges.(2)An officer or person whose functions concern the administration, custody, management, receipt or use of any part of the public revenue or public property is guilty of an offence if the person—(a)fraudulently makes payment or excessive payment from public revenues for—(i)sub-standard or defective goods;(ii)goods not supplied or not supplied in full; or(iii)services not rendered or not adequately rendered,(b)wilfully or carelessly fails to comply with any law or applicable procedures and guidelines relating to the procurement, allocation, sale or disposal of property, tendering of contracts, management of funds or incurring of expenditures; or(c)engages in a project without prior planning.(3)In this section, "public property" means real or personal property, including money, of a public body or under the control of, or consigned or due to, a public body.” 33.The offences, defined in section 45 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, relate to public property and public revenue. Going by section 11(1)(d) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, there is mandate to investigate economic crimes, and that would appear to be exclusive to the respondent, to the extent that it relates to Article 79 of the Constitution, given that the respondent is established through a statute enacted “pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution,” and in obedience to the command in Article 79. The establishment of the respondent, under a statute envisaged under Article 79, would mean that the respondent was set up for the purposes and objectives of Chapter Six of the Constitution, and its mandate and function can only be limited to what is envisaged under Chapter Six of the Constitution. The offence, relating to laundering the proceeds of corruption, appears to cut across the board, meaning it can be committed by a private person as well as a public official. However, going by section 11(1)(d) of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, the respondent would only be mandated to investigate that offence, to the extent that it is committed by State officers and public officials, or it involves public property or resources. 34.My understanding, of the provisions of Chapter Six of the Constitution, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act and the Anti-Bribery Act, would be that only the Anti-Bribery Act gives a clear mandate to the respondent, to conduct investigations into alleged corruption by private entities, which is unrelated to public officials, public offices, public resources and public transactions. Even then, the said alleged corruption, by private entities, would only relate to bribery. 35.The applicants are private entities. There has been no demonstration that the alleged corruption, which the respondent desires to investigate, relates to bribery, over which the respondent would have exclusive mandate, under section 3 of the Anti-Bribery Act, to investigate. In view of that, the respondent would have no mandate to investigate any other aspect of alleged corruption, by the applicants, besides bribery. That mandate can only be exercised by other State entities with investigative mandate. Any purported investigations, by the respondents, of the applicants, on anything that has nothing to do with bribery, would be ultra vires and in excess of mandate. Any steps taken in that direction, would be available for quashing, by way of a certiorari order, and restraint, by way of a prohibition order. 36.In view of everything said here above, I find and hold that there is merit in the Motion, dated 26th April 2026. The same is hereby allowed, in terms of prayers 1 and 2 thereof. Orders accordingly. DELIVERED, VIA CTS, DATED AND SIGNED IN CHAMBERS, AT MILIMANI, NAIROBI, ON THIS 13TH DAY OF JULY 2026.W MUSYOKAJUDGEMr. Abdirahman, Court Assistant.AdvocatesMs. Oduru, instructed by Momanyi & Associates, Advocates for the applicants.Mr. Oira Moturi, Advocate, for the respondent.