https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/11417

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT AT MERU** **HIGH COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO 40 OF 2023** **KENYA WILDLIFE SERVICE……………………………...APPELLANT** **-VERUS-** **BONFACE MBAE KINYUA** (Suing as the legal Representative of the Estate **of Pius Kinyua Gichunki………………………………………RESPONDENT** **(Being an Appeal against the Judgement of the Chief Magistrate Court at Maua by Hon Tito Gesora (Chief Magistrate) delivered on 16th February 2022 in Civil Case No E185 of 2021)** **JUDGEMENT** 1. This appeal arises from the Judgement of the Chief Magistrates court at Maua by the Learned Magistrate Hon Tito Gesora (CM) delivered on 16th February 2022. The genesis of the underlying dispute was a human-wildlife conflict incident that occurred on or about 24th June 2021 at Land Parcel No. Kiengu/Kanjoo/1143 registered in the name of Pius Kinyua Gichunki (deceased). 2. The plaintiff, now the Appellant, Boniface Mbae Kinyua (suing as the legal representative of the estate of Pius Kinyua Gichunki), averred that he was carrying out farming activities on the said parcel of land, where he had extensively developed the farm by fencing it, planting tomatoes, sweet bananas, onions, sweet potatoes and cassava, and employing casual workers. 3. In his Plaint dated 9th September 2021, the Appellant averred that on or about 24th June 2021, as a direct consequence of the Respondent’s negligence in carrying out its statutory duties, elephants from Meru National Park invaded his farm and destroyed the farm produce therein, causing him substantial loss and damage. The Appellant further stated that the Respondent’s negligence occasioned the destruction of his crops, including tomatoes, sweet bananas, sweet potatoes, onions and cassava, valued at Kshs. 5,467,150/=, together with special damages amounting to Kshs. 50,380/=. 4. The Respondent robustly defended the suit via a Statement of Defence dated 20th January 2022, wherein it denied all allegations of negligence and liability, and alternatively sought to attribute the alleged loss and damage to the Appellant’s own negligence, including failure to erect a strong fence around his farm and planting crops within a wildlife migratory route. 5. During the trial, the Appellant testified and also called one witness in support of his case, namely Nicodemus K. Mbui, an Agricultural Officer, who produced an Agricultural Officer’s Report dated 28th June 2021 detailing the assessment of the destroyed crops. The Appellant also produced documentary evidence, including a Limited Grant, copy of title, OB extract, KWS compensation claim form, KWS damage verification report, demand notice and receipts for the pleaded special damages. The Respondent subsequently called one witness, DW1, and produced an OB extract and compensation register in support of its defence. 6. In evaluating the matter, the learned trial Magistrate delivered judgment wherein he found that the damage to the Appellant’s crops had occurred and that the defence had conceded as much. The learned Magistrate held that it was the Respondent’s duty under statute to ensure that animals were contained within the control area so that they did not harm people and their property. 7. The presiding judicial officer went on to hold as follows: ***"I have no doubt that the damage took place and the defence concedes as much. It is clear from statute and evidence that it is the defendant's duty to ensure that animals are contained within the control area so that they do not harm the people. Indeed, the KWS Act anticipates such a situation as this and provides for compensation."*** 1. In so holding, the trial court found that the Appellant had done what he was required to do and that there was nothing more he could have done. The learned Magistrate was satisfied that the Respondent was 100% liable. On the issue of quantum, the learned Magistrate held that the damages claimed were specifically pleaded and prayed for, and consequently awarded the damages prayed for, entering judgment in favour of the Appellant in the sum of Kshs. 5,517,531/= together with costs of the suit and interest. Dissatisfied with the said judgment, the Appellant lodged the present appeal. 2. The Appellant’s case on appeal is anchored on six grounds articulated in its Memorandum of Appeal dated 14th March 2023 and expanded upon in its written submissions dated 22nd May 2026 are as follows: (i) That the Learned trial Magistrate erred in both fact and in law by holding the Appellant wholly liable which finding was against the weight of evidence tendered. (ii) That the Learned trial Magistrate erred in both fact and in law by failing to appreciate that the Respondent was substantially to blame for destruction of crops as revealed by the evidence tendered and as such should have been held to have been contributorily negligent. (iii) That the Learned trial Magistrate erred in both fact and in law by failing to hold that the Respondent's claim was one for special damages. (iv) That the Learned trial Magistrate erred in both fact and in law by awarding for loss of crops noting that the amount was not strictly proved (v) That the Learned trial Magistrate erred in both fact and in law by holding that the Respondent had locus standi to bring the suit on behalf of the Deceased's estate against the Appellant. (vi) That the Learned trial Magistrate erred in both fact and in law by ignoring the Appellant's written submissions and authorities cited therein in determining liability and assessing special damages for loss of crops **Appellant’s Submissions** 1. The Appellant strenuously contends that the learned trial Magistrate erred both in law and fact by entertaining and determining the Respondent’s suit despite lacking original jurisdiction to do so. It is submitted that claims arising from damage caused by wildlife are governed by the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013, which establishes a statutory mechanism through the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee for verification and determination of such claims. 2. To reinforce this argument, the Appellant relies on Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013, and submits that although the provision uses the word “may”, once a claimant elects to pursue compensation for damage caused by wildlife, the statutory procedure must be strictly followed. The Appellant places reliance on the Court of Appeal decisions in ***Kenya Wildlife Service v Kanini (Suing as the Next Friend to Edward Koome) (Civil Appeal No. 30 of 2020) [2024] KECA 1127 (KLR) and Peter Muturi Njuguna v Kenya Wildlife Service [2017] KECA 42 (KLR)***, where the Court held that claims arising from wildlife-related damage fall within the mandate of the relevant statutory committees and that parties must exhaust the mechanisms provided by law before approaching court. 3. The Appellant further contends that the Respondent ought to have exhausted the statutory compensation process before instituting proceedings before the Chief Magistrate’s Court, and that filing the suit directly before court offended the doctrine of exhaustion. Reliance is placed on the ***Supreme Court decision in Mumba & 7 Others v Munyao & 148 Others (Petition No. 3 of 2016) [2019] KESC 83 (KLR)***, which emphasized that where a statute provides a dispute resolution mechanism, the first opportunity should be given to the relevant statutory body to determine the dispute. 4. The Appellant also challenges the finding on locus standi, arguing that the Respondent lacked the requisite legal capacity to institute the suit on behalf of the deceased’s estate. It is submitted that although the Respondent had obtained a limited grant ad litem, the suit was incompetent as it was founded on the deceased’s land and interests. The Appellant relies on the ***Court of Appeal decision in Trouistik Union International & Another v Mbeyu & Another [1993] KECA 89***, where the court held that an administrator cannot institute proceedings on behalf of an estate before obtaining the necessary grant of representation. 5. On liability, the Appellant contends that the learned trial Magistrate erred in holding it wholly liable for the destruction of crops. It is submitted that the Respondent failed to take reasonable measures to protect his crops from wildlife invasion despite the proximity of the farm to Meru National Park. The Appellant argues that under Section 25(5) of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013, compensation is unavailable where an owner fails to take reasonable measures to protect crops or property from wildlife damage. 6. The Appellant further relies on Kenya Wildlife Service v Rift Valley Agricultural Contractors Limited [2018] KESC 48 (KLR), where the Supreme Court recognized that persons whose land is adjacent to wildlife areas have a duty to take reasonable precautions, including insurance against possible losses, and that failure to do so may justify apportionment of liability. 7. With regard to quantum, the Appellant submits that the learned trial Magistrate erred in awarding Kshs. 5,467,151/= for loss of crops since the same constituted special damages which were required to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. It is argued that the Respondent failed to produce receipts, invoices, or other documentary evidence to support the alleged expenses incurred in farming activities, including purchase of seeds, fertilizers, chemicals and other inputs. 8. The Appellant places reliance on the principle that a party claiming special damages must prove the same strictly, citing Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v James M. Tuli Kyalo & Another [2020] KEHC 659 (KLR) and Bonham Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Limited [1948] 64 TLR 177. The Appellant therefore submits that the award for loss of crops was unsupported by evidence and ought not to have been granted. 9. Ultimately, the Appellant urges this Honourable Court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Magistrate, and substitute the same with an order dismissing the Respondent’s suit with costs. The Appellant further prays for costs of both the appeal and the proceedings before the trial court. **Respondent’s Submissions** 1. The Respondent’s case in opposition to the appeal is that the appeal is devoid of merit and ought to be dismissed. The Respondent submits that the learned trial Magistrate properly exercised jurisdiction, having determined a civil claim founded on negligence and breach of duty rather than a mere statutory compensation claim under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013. 2. The Respondent contends that although Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act provides a statutory compensation mechanism, it does not oust the jurisdiction of ordinary courts to determine common law claims founded on negligence. Reliance is placed on the Court of Appeal decision in ***Kenya Wildlife Service v Joseph Musyoki Kalonzo [2017] KECA 234 (KLR)***, where the court held that the statutory mechanism under the Act does not bar a claimant from pursuing a remedy before court for a wrong or injury suffered. 3. The Respondent further submits that the decision in ***Kenya Wildlife Service v Kanini (Suing as the Next Friend to Edward Koome) (Civil Appeal No. 30 of 2020) [2024] KECA 1127 (KLR)***, relied upon by the Appellant, is distinguishable from the present case. It is argued that in Kanini, the claimant had invoked the statutory process but failed to exhaust it, whereas in the present matter, no claim was ever lodged before the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee. The Respondent contends that the mere issuance of a compensation form did not amount to commencement of statutory proceedings capable of triggering the doctrine of exhaustion. 4. The Respondent further argues that the two Court of Appeal decisions must be reconciled in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis and that Kanini did not expressly overrule Musyoki Kalonzo. The Respondent submits that the proper interpretation is that statutory compensation mechanisms ought to ordinarily be pursued where applicable, but they do not entirely remove the jurisdiction of courts to determine claims founded on negligence and resultant loss. 5. On liability, the Respondent maintains that the learned trial Magistrate correctly found the Appellant 100% liable for the destruction of crops. It is submitted that the Respondent proved that elephants from Meru National Park invaded his farm and destroyed his crops, while the Appellant’s own witness admitted the occurrence of the incident and confirmed that the only issue was that the compensation form had not been returned. 6. The Respondent further submits that the trial court’s findings were supported by documentary evidence, including the KWS compensation claim form, damage verification report and Agricultural Officer’s report, as well as the oral evidence tendered. It is argued that the Appellant failed to demonstrate any error warranting interference with the trial court’s findings. 7. With regard to locus standi, the Respondent contends that he had the requisite capacity to institute proceedings on behalf of the deceased’s estate by virtue of the Limited Grant of Letters of Administration Ad Litem issued to him. The Respondent submits that the alleged discrepancy in names was a minor clerical issue that did not affect his authority to represent the estate. 8. On quantum, the Respondent submits that the award of Kshs. 5,467,151/= for destroyed crops was properly proved through the Agricultural Officer’s report, which assessed the value of the damaged crops. It is argued that the claim was not merely based on estimates but was supported by expert evidence and documentary material produced before the trial court. 9. The Respondent therefore urges this Honourable Court, as a first appellate court, to uphold the findings of the learned trial Magistrate, noting that the trial court considered the evidence presented and arrived at a conclusion that was supported by the record. The Respondent consequently prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs. **Analysis and Determination** 1. I have considered the Record of Appeal, the grounds set out in the Memorandum of Appeal, and the respective submissions by the parties. I now proceed to consider the issues arising from the appeal. 2. This being a first appeal it is the duty of this court to re-assess and re-analyse the evidence that was adduced before the trial court and come to its own Judgment. This is in line with the decision in the case of **Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd. & others [1968] EA 123** in the following terms:- “I accept counsel for the respondent’s proposition that this court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below. An appeal to this court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular, this court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally (*Abdul Hammed Saif v Ali Mohamed Sholan* (1955), 22 EACA 270).” 1. Before addressing the merits of the appeal, it is imperative to determine the question of jurisdiction, as jurisdiction is the foundation upon which the authority of a court rests. A court may only exercise power where such jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or statute. Jurisdiction encompasses several dimensions, including jurisdiction *ratione personae* (personal jurisdiction), *ratione materiae* (subject-matter jurisdiction), and *ratione temporis* (temporal jurisdiction). See ***Nyanaro v Kanyankabaria (Civil Appeal E52 of 2022) [2024] KEHC 2960 (KLR).*** In the present appeal, there is no dispute regarding the trial court's jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione temporis. The sole issue is whether the trial court possessed jurisdiction *ratione materiae* to entertain the Respondent's claim arising from damage allegedly caused by wildlife. 2. The centrality of jurisdiction was underscored in ***Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR***, where Nyarangi JA famously stated that "Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step." The Court further held that where a court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, it must immediately "down its tools." It therefore falls upon this Court, as a threshold issue, to determine whether the trial court possessed the requisite jurisdiction before considering the substantive issues raised in the appeal. 3. The Appellant’s argument is that the trial court lacked original jurisdiction to determine the Respondent’s claim because the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013 establishes a specialised statutory mechanism for claims arising from loss or damage caused by wildlife. It is submitted that such claims ought first to be presented before the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee established under the Act, and that parties must exhaust the statutory procedure before approaching the ordinary courts. 4. The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the suit was not a mere statutory compensation claim but a common law action founded on negligence and breach of statutory duty. It is contended that Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act does not oust the jurisdiction of ordinary courts and that the Respondent was entitled to seek a remedy in negligence. 5. Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act provides: (1) Where any person suffers any bodily injury or is killed by any wildlife listed under the Third Schedule, the person injured, or in the case of a deceased person, the personal representative or successor or assign, may launch a claim to the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee within the jurisdiction established under this Act. (2) The County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee established under section 18 shall verify a claim made under subsection (1) and upon verification, submit the claim to the Cabinet Secretary together with its recommendations thereon. (3) The Cabinet Secretary shall consider the recommendations made under subsection (2) and where appropriate, pay compensation to the claimant as follows— (a) in the case of death, five million shillings; (b) in the case of injury occasioning permanent disability, three million shillings; (c) in the case of any other injury, a maximum of two million shillings, depending on the extent of injury. (4) Any person who suffers loss or damage to crops, livestock or other property from wildlife specified in the Seventh Schedule hereof and subject to the rules made by the Cabinet Secretary, may submit a claim to the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee who shall verify the claim and make recommendations as appropriate and submit it to the Service for due consideration. (5) The County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee shall review the claim and award and pay a compensation valued at the ruling market rates: Provided that no compensation shall be paid where the owner of the livestock, crops or other property failed to take reasonable measures to protect such crops, livestock or property from damage by wildlife or his land use practices are incompatible with the ecosystem-based management plan for the area. (6) A person who is dissatisfied with the award of compensation by either the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee or the Service may within thirty days after being notified of the decision and award, file an appeal to the National Environment Tribunal and on a second appeal to the Environment and Land Court. (7) The Cabinet Secretary may, by notice in the Gazette, prescribe such regulations and guidelines as are necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.” 1. The interpretation of Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013 has generated divergent judicial approaches. In ***Kenya Wildlife Service v Joseph Musyoki Kalonzo [2017] KECA 234 (KLR)***, the Court of Appeal held that the Act did not contain an express ouster clause preventing a claimant from pursuing a remedy before the ordinary courts. The Court observed that Section 25 provided an alternative avenue for compensation and did not specifically bar a claimant from pursuing a common law claim. However, subsequent decisions have adopted a different approach, placing greater emphasis on the statutory framework created by Parliament and the doctrine of exhaustion of alternative remedies. 2. However, a different approach was adopted in ***Peter Muturi Njuguna v Kenya Wildlife Service [2017] KECA 42 (KLR),*** where the Court held that although the word “may” ordinarily denotes a permissive provision, the context and intention of Parliament required exhaustion of the statutory procedure once a claimant elected to pursue compensation under the Act. The Court recognised that the specialised statutory forum was the appropriate first avenue for determination of such claims. 3. The use of the word “may” in Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013 requires consideration within the context and purpose of the entire statutory framework. While the word ordinarily conveys a permissive meaning, its interpretation cannot be divorced from the legislative intention behind the provision. Section 25 must be read together with Sections 18, 19 and 24 of the Act, which establish a specialised mechanism for verification, assessment, and compensation of claims arising from human-wildlife conflict. In that context, the provision does not confer an unfettered discretion upon a claimant to bypass the statutory mechanism and proceed directly to court. Rather, it establishes the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee as the first forum for consideration of such claims before the jurisdiction of ordinary courts may properly be invoked. 4. The position has since been further developed in ***Kenya Wildlife Service v Purity Kanini (Suing as Next Friend to Edward Koome) (Civil Appeal No. 30 of 2020) [2024] KECA 1127 (KLR)***, where the Court of Appeal emphasised the doctrine of exhaustion and held that claims arising from wildlife-related injuries belonged to the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee. The Court observed that the statutory mechanism was designed to provide a less cumbersome process and to benefit from specialised knowledge relating to human-wildlife conflict. 5. The composition and functions of the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee demonstrate the intention of Parliament that such claims be initially considered through the statutory framework. Under Section 18 of the Act, the Committee comprises persons with specialised knowledge, including officers capable of assessing agricultural, livestock, and other forms of wildlife-related loss. Further, Section 19 mandates the Committee to review and recommend payment of compensation for claims arising from loss or damage caused by wildlife. 6. Similarly, Section 24 establishes the wildlife compensation scheme, whose purpose includes financing compensation claims arising from human death, injury, crop damage, and property loss caused by wildlife. To permit claimants to bypass this mechanism and proceed directly to court would undermine the statutory framework and render the role of the Committee unnecessary. 7. The divergence in judicial interpretation of Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act is evident and cannot be ignored. Different benches of the Court of Appeal have adopted differing approaches in interpreting the same statutory provision. Having considered the competing authorities, the statutory framework, and the principles underlying the doctrine of exhaustion, this Court is persuaded that the more appropriate interpretation is that claims of this nature ought, in the first instance, to be presented before the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee before the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts may properly be invoked. 8. The requirement that parties first pursue a statutory dispute resolution mechanism before approaching the courts is a well-established principle in Kenyan jurisprudence. The Court of Appeal in ***Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others [2015] KECA 304 (KLR)*** expressed the doctrine as follows: "It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts can be invoked. Courts ought to be fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution." 1. Further guidance is found in the recent decision of ***Kenya Wildlife Service v Murimi [2026] KEHC 9337 (KLR)***, where the High Court at Chuka considered a similar issue involving a claim for compensation arising from a wildlife attack. The Court examined the competing interpretations of Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013, and held that claims arising from wildlife-related injuries ought, in the first instance, to be presented before the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee. The Court emphasised that the statutory framework established under the Act must be exhausted before a party may properly invoke the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The Court further held that the mere framing of a claim as one founded on negligence does not permit a claimant to bypass the specialised statutory mechanism created by Parliament. I find the reasoning in the said decision persuasive and consistent with the statutory scheme and the doctrine of exhaustion. 2. Although the Respondent pleaded the suit as a common law claim founded on negligence, the substance of the dispute is compensation for crop damage allegedly occasioned by wildlife. Such claims fall squarely within the statutory framework established under Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013. The mere characterization of the claim as one in negligence does not circumvent the statutory dispute resolution mechanism or confer original jurisdiction upon the trial court where the prescribed procedure has not first been invoked and exhausted. 3. Indeed, the learned trial Magistrate acknowledged that “the KWS Act anticipates such a situation as this and provides for compensation.” This finding demonstrates that the dispute fell within the statutory framework governing compensation for human-wildlife conflict. Having reached that conclusion, the trial court ought first to have determined whether the statutory mechanism under the Act had been invoked and exhausted before assuming original jurisdiction. 4. A holistic reading of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013 reinforces this conclusion. The Act establishes County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committees, provides for their functions, creates a Wildlife Compensation Scheme, and establishes an appellate mechanism. These provisions demonstrate Parliament’s intention to create a comprehensive framework for resolving claims arising from human-wildlife conflict. Allowing claimants to bypass that framework and institute proceedings directly before ordinary courts would undermine the statutory scheme and render the elaborate compensation mechanism ineffective. 5. In the present case, the trial court proceeded to hear and determine the dispute without first satisfying itself that the statutory process had been invoked and exhausted. That omission goes to the root of the proceedings. Jurisdiction is the source of a court's authority, and any proceedings undertaken without jurisdiction are void ab initio. A determination rendered without jurisdiction is therefore a nullity and cannot be sustained. 6. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, acquiescence, or by the manner in which parties plead their cases. Proceedings undertaken without jurisdiction are void ab initio, and any decision arising from such proceedings cannot stand in law. 7. Accordingly, I find that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent's claim in the first instance. The proceedings before the trial court and the judgment arising therefrom are therefore a nullity. It follows that the appeal succeeds on the issue of jurisdiction. 8. Having found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s claim in the first instance, it is unnecessary for this Court to consider the remaining grounds of appeal relating to liability, quantum of damages, and the other substantive issues arising from the trial court’s determination. Jurisdiction is a threshold issue, and once a court determines that it lacks the requisite jurisdiction, it must down its tools. As held by the ***Court of Appeal in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR***, “Jurisdiction is everything,” and a court acting without jurisdiction has no power to make any further step. Consequently, any proceedings undertaken without jurisdiction are a nullity and no valid determination can arise from them. **Disposition** **Accordingly, I make the following orders:** i. The appeal is allowed on the issue of jurisdiction. ii. The judgment and decree of the trial court are hereby set aside for want of jurisdiction. iii. The proceedings before the trial court are declared a nullity and are accordingly struck out. iv. The Respondent remains at liberty to pursue compensation before the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee in accordance with the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013. v. Each party shall bear their own costs of the appeal and the proceedings before the trial court. Orders Accordingly. Right of appeal 28 days DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 24TH DAY OF JULY 2026. ………………… **R. A. OGANYO** **JUDGE.** **In the Presence of; -** Court Assistant…E, Sana Mr. Mutai for the Appellant Mr. Ngunjiri for the Respondent