https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/9337

Kenya Wildlife Service v Murimi (Civil Appeal E015 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 9337 (KLR) (29 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 9337 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Chuka Civil Appeal E015 of 2025 RL Korir, J June 29, 2026 Between Kenya Wildlife Service Appellant and Jacob Murimi Respondent (Being an Appeal against the judgement and decree of Hon. Mbayaki Wafula (PM) in Marimanti SPMCC. No. E026 OF 2022 delivered on 27th February, 2025.) Judgment 1.This Appeal emanates from the judgment and decree of Hon. Mbayaki Wafula (PM) in Marimanti SPMCC No. E026 of 2022.The Plaintiff (Respondent) sued the Defendant (Appellant) for damages and compensation arising from a wildlife attack. 2.The Plaintiff’s case was that on or about 22nd December 2019 while fetching water on river Ura he was viciously attacked by a crocodile causing him the injuries including open mid shaft tibial fibula fracture, multiple abrasions and laceration injuries on both legs, knees, elbows, both forearms and dorsum of both hands resulting to 10% partial permanent disability. 3.The Plaintiff blamed the Defendant for the occurrence of the accident being the custodian of human-wildlife conflict and ought to have kept the crocodile in a designated area away from situations that would cause death, injury or harm to humans and/or destruction of property. 4.The Plaintiff pleaded that the trial court had jurisdiction. 5.The Defendant filed a statement of defence denying the Plaintiff’s assertions and averred that if indeed the Plaintiff was attacked it was as a result of his negligence in the manner in which he conducted himself. The Defendant also pleaded that the Plaintiff had not exhausted the legally laid down procedures and denied the jurisdiction of the court. 6.The matter proceeded for hearing with two witnesses testifying for the Plaintiff and one witness for the Defendant. Judgment was then entered in favour of the Plaintiff in the following terms: -i.Liability 50:50ii.General damages Kshs. 800,000iii.Special damages Kshs. 42,225iv.Future medical costs Kshs. 100,000v.Loss of amenities Kshs. 200,000vi.Loss of earning capacity Kshs. 300,000vii.Costs and interests. 7.Aggrieved with the decision, the Appellant lodged its Appeal on the following grounds as set out in the Memorandum of Appeal dated 25th March 2025: -i.That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in proceeding to adjudicate a matter in which the said court lacked the original jurisdiction to hear and determine.ii.That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in awarding damages of Ksh. 1,400,000 which sum is inordinately excessive.iii.That the learned magistrate erred in law in failing to consider all the relevant factors and circumstances of the case in arriving at the decision, judgment and award.iv.That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the written submissions tendered by the Appellant’s counsel and in failing to consider the legal authorities tendered therewith. 8.The Appellant prayed that the Appeal be allowed, judgment of the trial court be set aside and costs of the appeal. 9.As a first appellate court, this Court is duty bound to revisit, reassess, and analyse the entire body of evidence on record and draw its own independent conclusions. In undertaking that exercise, the Court must remain cognisant of the fact that it did not have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses testify, while carefully examining the record to ascertain whether the trial court’s findings were grounded in the evidence presented. This duty was restated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Imanyara & 2 others v Attorney General [2016] KECA 557 (KLR) as thus: -“This being a first appeal, it is trite law, that this Court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below and that an appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put, they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowances in this respect.” 10.The Appeal was disposed of by way of written submissions. The Appellant filed written submissions dated 20th January 2026 raising the following issues for determination: -i.Whether the trial court had original jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit arising from loss and bodily injury suffered by Respondent caused by wildlife.ii.Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Appellant is liable for negligence.iii.Whether the damages awarded to the Respondent were justified.iv.Who should bear the costs of Appeal. 11.The Respondent filed written submissions dated 10th February 2026 raising the following issues for determination: -i.Whether the trial court has original jurisdiction to entertain a claim in tort seeking compensation for injury arising from wildlife.ii.Whether the quantum of damages awarded the Respondent was justified.iii.Which party ought to bear cost of the Appeal. 12.I have considered the grounds raised in the Memorandum of Appeal as well as the parties’ submissions and I find the following issues for determination: -i.Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for compensation for personal injury arising from wildlife.ii.Whether the trial court misdirected itself in holding the Defendant liable for negligence.iii.Whether the award for general damages for pain and suffering was excessive.iv.Costs. 13.This appeal turns on the issue of jurisdiction. The Appellant's position is that the trial court lacked the competence to entertain this matter from the outset, on the ground that a claim for personal injury caused by wildlife falls exclusively within the purview of the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee constituted under Section 18 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013. 14.In support of this position, the Appellant relied on Kenya Wildlife Service v Kanini (Suing as the Next Friend to Edward Koome) [2024] KECA 1127 (KLR), in which the Court of Appeal examined Section 25 of the Act and took the view that its proper construction directs wildlife injury claimants to the statutory mechanism created by the Act, rather than opening the doors of the ordinary courts to them immediately. The Appellant also drew on Peter Muturi Njuguna v Kenya Wildlife Services [2017] KECA 42 (KLR), in which it was held that a claimant who opts to seek compensation must do so before the forum designated by the Act, that being the District Committee. 15.The question of whether the magistrates' courts are stripped of original jurisdiction in human-wildlife conflict claims is one that has persisted. As the authorities cited by the parties demonstrate, the Court of Appeal has not spoken with one voice on the proper construction and interpretation of Section 25 of the Act. 16.In the matter at hand, the question of jurisdiction was put in issue at the pleadings stage and was fully ventilated in the course of the trial. The trial court, guided by the authorities before it, concluded that jurisdiction vested in it and proceeded to determine the suit. 17.The Appellant further anchored the jurisdictional objection in the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. In support of its argument, the Appellant relied on Albert Chaurembo Mumba & 7 Others v Maurice Munyao & 148 Others [2019] eKLR, in which the Supreme Court held that a party may not dress up a dispute in pleadings designed to attract the jurisdiction of a superior court as a stratagem for circumventing known legal procedures, and that even a court possessed of jurisdiction over weighty legal questions must yield the first opportunity to the statutory body, tribunal, or quasi-judicial authority designated by the parent statute to resolve that category of dispute. 18.The Appellant additionally invoked NGOs Coordination Board v E.G & 4 Others; Katiba Institute (Amicus Curiae) [2023] KESC 17 (KLR), in which the Supreme Court affirmed that the exhaustion doctrine advances the values of administrative autonomy, maintenance of the separation of powers, judicial economy, and the efficient management of administrative processes. 19.The Respondent countered that the word "may" appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act is permissive in character and preserves to an injured party a free election between the statutory route and direct recourse to the courts. In support of that reading, the Respondent relied on Kenya Wildlife Services v Joseph Musyoki Kalonzo [2017] eKLR, Rose Ndinda Mutuku v Kenya Wildlife Services [2018] eKLR, and Galsaracho Teteya & 5 Others v Kenya Wildlife Services [2021] eKLR, each of which construed the word "may" as leaving intact the claimant's freedom to litigate in the ordinary courts. 20.This Court is satisfied that the statutory framework established by Section 25, read alongside the constitutional command in Article 159(2)(c) and informed by the doctrine of exhaustion, resolves the jurisdictional question. Claims of this nature must first travel through the Committee before a party may legitimately invoke the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ or superior courts. 21.The doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies is by now firmly embedded in Kenya's legal landscape. As far back as Speaker of the National Assembly v Njenga Karume [1992] KECA 42 (KLR), the Court of Appeal laid down the foundational proposition in these terms:“In our view, there is considerable merit in the submission that where there is a clear procedure for the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed. We observed without expressing a concluded view that Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules cannot oust clear constitutional and statutory provisions." 22.The same principle was restated in Secretary, County Public Service Board & Another v Hulbhai Gedi Abdille [2017] eKLR, where the court put it thus: -“Time and again it has been said that where there exists other sufficient and adequate avenue or forum to resolve a dispute, a party ought to pursue that avenue or forum and not invoke the court process if the dispute could very well and effectively be dealt with in that other forum. Such party ought to seek redress under the other regime." 23.The Supreme Court gave the doctrine its most authoritative modern articulation in Albert Chaurembo Mumba & 7 Others v Maurice Munyao & 148 Others [2019] eKLR, [2019] KESC 83 (KLR), stating: -“In the pursuit of such sound legal principles, it is our disposition that disputes disguised and pleaded with the erroneous intention of attracting the jurisdiction of superior courts is not a substitute for known legal procedures. Even where superior courts had jurisdiction to determine profound questions of law, first opportunity had to be given to relevant persons, bodies, tribunals or any other quasi-judicial authorities and organs to deal with the disputes as provided for in the relevant parent statute." 24.I am guided by the above authorities to make a firm finding that for wildlife related injury, trial courts ought to decline, and are infact divested of jurisdiction in the first instance; for jurisdiction lies in the first instance with the wildlife conservation and compensation committee. It is only when the committee fails to act that the magistrates’ jurisdiction kicks in. 25.A court that embarks on proceedings in the absence of jurisdiction renders everything it does a nullity. It is trite that where jurisdiction is absent, no further step is open to the court and the only proper recourse is to down tools. The trial court in this case entertained and determined this matter without the foundational precondition of jurisdiction being satisfied. Its proceedings cannot therefore be permitted to stand. Subsequently, an appeal cannot be erected on a foundation that is itself void, and no valid order can emerge from proceedings that were incompetent at their inception. 26.Having made a finding on the jurisdictional issue, the rest of the issues are rendered moot. 27.This court is however alive to the judicial imperative of facilitating access to justice for persons affected by human-wildlife conflict. To that end therefore where the body established under Sections 18 and 25 of The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013 fails to act or frustrates the Claimant such a Claimant has the right to access justice in the court. They must however, demonstrate to the court that they have exhausted the statutory mechanism. For it is only then, that the magistrates’ jurisdiction kicks in. 28.In the end, it is my finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit in the first instance. Without jurisdiction, the entire suit and judgement of the trial court was a nullity and is struck out. The Respondent is at liberty to prosecute his claim before the Compensation Committee. 29.The Appeal is allowed. Though successful, the Appellant being the body charged with the responsibility of compensating claimants, is denied the costs of the Appeal for reason that such an award would prejudice the Respondent.Orders accordingly. JUDGEMENT DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT CHUKA THIS 29TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026...........................R. LAGAT-KORIRJUDGEJudgement delivered in the presence of Mr. Mutai for the Appellant; Ms. Mwiti holding brief for Mr. Kirimi for the Respondent; Muriuki (Court Assistant.)