https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2117

Keter & 2 others v Registrar of Trade Unions & 3 others (Employment and Labour Relations Appeal E024 of 2026) [2026] KEELRC 2117 (KLR) (19 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 2117 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Eldoret Employment and Labour Relations Appeal E024 of 2026 MA Onyango, J June 19, 2026 Between Magdaline Cheptoo Keter 1st Appellant Irene Sitati 2nd Appellant Timothy Kiplagat Kigen 3rd Appellant and Registrar of Trade Unions 1st Respondent The Hon. Attorney General 2nd Respondent and Banking Insurance & Finanace Union(Kenya 1st Interested Party Isaiah Munoru Mucheke 2nd Interested Party Judgment 1.The 1st Interested Party is a trade union registered under the Labour Relations Act to represent employees delineated in the membership clause of its constitution. 2.The Appellants are members and elected officials of the 1st Interested Party. 3.The 1st Respondent is the Officer responsible for the registration and regulation of trade unions, employer’s organizations and federations as designated under section 31 of the Labour Institutions Act. 4.The 2nd Respondent is the principal legal advisor to the Government and in the context of this appeal is the legal representative of the 1st Respondent. 5.The 2nd Interested Party was enjoined to this appeal upon his application. In the application he describes himself as the current/incumbent National Organizing Secretary of the 1st Interested Party. 6.The 1st Interested Party held its Annual Delegates Conference on 20th March, 2026 at which the delegates elected the national officers and national executive committee in accordance with Rule 7H of its Constitution and as provided under section 34 of the Labour Relations Act. 7.The 1st Respondent however, declined to register the elected officials upon submission of Form Q as required under section 35(2) of the Labour Relations Act. The reasons given by the 1st Respondent for declining to register the elected officials was that there were fundamental procedural defects in the national elections held on 20th March, 2026 as the same did not comply with her circular dated 25th September, 2025, the judgment in ELRC Appeal No. 056 of 2026 and Rule 9H of the union’s constitution all of which required that branch elections be held before national election; and secondly, that the exclusion of branches whose elections were invalidated by court in ELRC Appeal No. E094 of 2026 from participation in the national elections. 8.The Appellants herein, being dissatisfied with the decision of the 1st Respondent to decline/refuse to register Form Q seeking registration of the elected officials of the Interested Party, filed the appeal herein through a Memorandum of Appeal dated 31st March 2026 on the following grounds: -i.The 1st Respondent erred in law and fact in declining registration of national elections following a lawfully conducted Annual Delegates Conference and quinquennial elections of the union officials in accordance with Union's Constitution, court orders and the law.ii.The 1st Respondent erred in fact and law in failing to recognize that the elections held on the 20th March 2026 was sanctioned by this Honourable Court through its decision in Nairobi ELRCA No. EO56 of 2026 Isaiah Munoru Mucheke & 12 Others vs. Registrar of Trade Unions and 6 Others.iii.The 1st Respondent erred in law when they refused to register lawfully elected union officials after the Interested Parties quinquennial elections held on 20th March 2026 contrary to section 34 of the Labour Relations Act, 2007.iv.The 1st Respondent erred in law in applying statutory powers conferred under section 35 of the Labour Relations Act, 2007 on registration of elected officials after the lapse of 5 years office termv.The 1st Respondent erred in fact in using the powers conferred under Section 34 and 35 of the Labour Relations Act, 2007 well aware that the former applied to Election of Officials and latter applied to notification of changes during the term of elected officials.vi.The 1st Respondent in exercising administrative powers unlawfully assumed quasi -judicial authority and by her decision dated 27th March 2026 acted ultra vires by:-a.Directing that court orders must be complied with sequentially in strict order of issuance.b.That National elections should have been conducted after repeat branch elections as ordered by court and therefore proceeding with national elections was improper.vii.The 1st Respondent erred in law in reviewing the court orders of a superior court and arriving at a finding that contravenes the decision of very court of law given that they were parties to the Nairobi ELRCA E056 of 2026viii.The 1st Respondent misapprehended the facts when assuming that the national elections were held before conclusion of the branch elections when it in fact effected registrations of Mt. Kenya region branch, Coast region branch, western branch and Rift Valley region branch on the 22nd January, 2026, 27th January, 2026, 7th February, 2025 and 21st February, 2026 respectively.ix.The 1st Respondent in errored in law by clearly disregarded the orders of this Honourable Court directing the Interested Party and its National Secretary General to proceed and conduct elections but with branch delegates in office prior to the January and February 2026 impugned branch elections.x.The 1st Respondent's decision prejudices the Appellants as:-a.Declines to recognize and respect union members democratic choices by registering their national officials as presented in form Q.b.Declining registration breaches union members right to participate in union activities in accordance with Article 41(2) (a) of the Constitution.c.Declining registration of national officials interferes with members rights to negotiate collective bargaining and association respectivelyxi.The 1st Respondents action to decline to register an election that was free, fair and verifiable is unreasonable and in violation of very court order and the law.xii.The decision to deny registration flies in the face of the Appellants' legitimate expectation to fair, reasonable and lawful administrative action.xiii.Further, the decision to deny registration of the elected union officials in election that was sanctioned by court was unreasonable, in bad faith and amounts to unfair refusal to exercise statutory power: 9.Consequently, the Appellants prayed for: -i.The Appeal be allowedii.The decision of the 1st Respondent conveyed through a letter dated 27th March, 2026 be quashed and set aside.iii.The 1st Respondent be ordered to register national officials as set out in form Q dated 23rd March, 2026 within seven days.iv.Costs of this appeal be granted 10.Contemporaneously with the Memorandum of Appeal, the Appellants filed a Notice of Motion dated 31st March 2026 seeking, inter alia, orders that this Court suspend, stay or set aside the 1st Respondent's letter dated 27th March 2026 communicating the decision declining registration of Form Q pending the hearing and determination of the application. The Appellants also prayed for costs of the application. 11.In opposition to both the Memorandum of Appeal and the Notice of Motion, the 1st and 2nd Respondents filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 14th April 2026 by Ann Kanake, the Acting Registrar of Trade Unions. She deposed that in Isaiah Munoru Mucheke & 12 Others v Registrar of Trade Unions & 6 Others, ELRC Appeal No. E056 of 2026, the Court directed that branch elections be conducted within sixty days and in strict compliance with the Registrar's election circular, timelines and the Union Constitution. 12.The Respondents further averred that the said judgment invalidated elections conducted in the Mount Kenya, Coast and Western Regional Branches. They also relied on the decision in Isaiah Munoru Mucheke v Registrar of Trade Unions, ELRC Appeal No. E094 of 2026, in which the Court found the Rift Valley Regional Branch elections to be unlawful and issued orders restraining the elected officials from assuming office pending the hearing and determination of the appeal, which remains pending. 13.According to the Respondents, members from the affected branches were not represented during the National Elections contrary to Rule 14(c) of the Union Constitution, which entitles each branch to send one delegate for every fifty members to the Annual Delegates Conference. 14.The Respondents further contended that under the Registrar's circular dated 25th September 2023, branch elections were required to precede national elections. 15.It is therefore the Respondents’ case that the national elections conducted on 20th March 2026 were undertaken in disregard of the Court's judgment, the Union Constitution and the Registrar's election guidelines. 16.The Respondents further maintained that, pursuant to section 35(4) of the Labour Relations Act, the Registrar was entitled to examine the validity of the elections and, being dissatisfied with the process leading to the election of the officials presented for registration, lawfully declined to register them. 17.The Respondents consequently asserted that the Registrar acted within her statutory mandate and in accordance with the law in declining registration of the officials contained in Form Q. 18.The Respondents further deposed that the reasons for the refusal were duly communicated to the Union through the Registrar's letter dated 27th March 2026. 19.On its part, the 2nd Interested party in opposition to the Memorandum of Appeal and the Notice of Motion dated 31st March 2026 filed a Preliminary Objection dated 17th April 2026 on the following grounds: -i.The court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit as the Appellants are engaged in forum shopping and all they are asking this Honourable Court to do is to countermand and circumvent a judgment of a court of coordinate jurisdiction, which objective can only be achieved on appeal.ii.The Applicants/Appellants lacks locus standi to institute this suit as they are strangers to the decision of the 1st Respondent. The 1st Interested Party, whose officials were not registered, is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal with the capacity in its own name to sue and be sued as provided for under Section 21 of the Labour Relations Act.iii.The Application dated 1st April 2026 is fatally and incurably defective for the reason that the Supporting affidavits of all the Applicants/Appellants exhibiting the documents/exhibits annexed to the Application dated 1st April 2026 are neither securely sealed under the seal of the Commissioner for Oaths nor are they marked with serial letters for identification in total defiance of Rule 9 of the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Rules. They have not been identified as to who are the deponents/affiants/declarants. The affidavits are therefore inadmissible and have no evidentiary valueiv.The application, Memorandum of Appeal and the Record of Appeal is lodged in complete violation of Section 2(a) and Section 73(3) of the Labour Relations Act, Section 2(a) of the Labour Relations Act provides that the authorized representatives the National General Secretary or any person appointed in writing by an authorized representative to perform the functions of the authorized representative. The Applicants/Appellants in the entire suit dated 31st March 2026 have not demonstrated In their suit that they have met this threshold to bring this suit to suspend, stay or set aside the decision of the 1st Respondent refusal to register Form-Q duly executed by the National General Secretary (NGS). The NGS of the 1st interested party is comfortable with the decision of the 1st Respondent and the Applicants have no bass to purport to challenge it.v.The Application, Memorandum of Appeal and the Record of Appeal is lodged in complete violation of Rule 8(1) (a) of the ELRC (Procedure) Rules 2024.vi.The upshot of the violations and failure to adhere to the legal and lawful provisions renders the entire suit frivolous, vexatious, and devoid of merit and the same ought to be dismissed with costs to the 2nd Interested Party. 20.On 31st April 2026, the Court directed the parties to file and exchange written submissions on the preliminary objection, the Memorandum of Appeal and the Notice of Motion dated 31st March 2026. 21.Pursuant to those directions, the Appellants filed their submissions dated 23rd April 2026, while the 1st and 2nd Respondents filed their submissions dated 8th May 2026. The 1st Interested Party filed two sets of submissions dated 29th April 2026 and 18th May 2026 respectively. Similarly, the 2nd Interested Party filed submissions dated 27th April 2026 and further submissions dated 15th May 2026. The Appellants’ submissions 22.In their submissions, the Appellants identified the issues for determination to be: -i.Whether the preliminary objection is meritedii.Whether union's national elections were conducted in compliance with the court order, union's constitution and the law.iii.Whether the Registrar of Trade Unions decision to refuse registration of Form Q dated 23rd March 2026 was within her statutory mandate.iv.Whether remedies sought are available to the Appellants.v.Costs of the Appeal. 23.On the first issue, the Appellants submitted that the objection did not satisfy the threshold of a proper preliminary objection as established in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, where the Court held that a preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law capable of disposing of the suit without recourse to evidence. They also relied on Sella Rose Anyango v Attorney General & 2 Others [2021] eKLR and Omondi v National Bank of Kenya Ltd & Others, where the courts reiterated the principles governing preliminary objections. 24.The Appellants argued that the issues raised by the 2nd Interested Party, including locus standi, forum shopping and the alleged incompetence of the appeal, would require examination of evidence and factual inquiry and therefore could not properly be raised by way of a preliminary objection. 25.With regard to locus standi, the Appellants submitted that they are members and officials of the Union whose rights and interests are directly affected by the decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions declining to register the elected officials. They contended that they are therefore entitled to challenge that decision before the Court. 26.The Appellants further submitted that sections 2(a) and 73(3) of the Labour Relations Act are inapplicable to the present proceedings as the appeal does not involve the reporting of a trade dispute and has not been instituted by the Union in its corporate capacity. Similarly, they argued that Rule 8(1)(a) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024, concerns disputes referred to Court after conciliation and is therefore irrelevant to the present appeal. 27.They further submitted that whether the appeal is frivolous, vexatious or devoid of merit are matters that require evaluation of evidence and cannot constitute pure points of law. In support of this proposition, they relied on Oraro v Mbaja [2005] eKLR, where the Court held that any matter requiring factual ascertainment or evidentiary interrogation cannot properly found a preliminary objection. 28.On jurisdiction, the Appellants submitted that this Court derives its jurisdiction from Article 162(2)(a) of the Constitution as read together with section 30 of the Labour Relations Act. They relied on the decision in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, where the Court emphasized that jurisdiction is everything and that a court must down its tools the moment it finds it lacks jurisdiction. 29.Consequently, the Appellants urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection with costs. 30.On the second issue, the Appellants submitted that the national elections conducted on 20th March 2026 complied with the Union Constitution, the Labour Relations Act and the orders issued by the Court in Nairobi ELRCA No. E056 of 2026. They argued that the National Executive Council lawfully resolved to convene the Annual Delegates Conference and quinquennial elections and that the requisite notices were issued in accordance with the Union Constitution. 31.It was their case that although the Court invalidated elections conducted in the Mount Kenya, Coast and Western Regional Branches, it expressly permitted the national elections to proceed using delegates who held office prior to the impugned branch elections. According to the Appellants, the Union faithfully implemented those directions. 32.In support of the obligation to comply with court orders, the Appellants relied on Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Cabinet Secretary for Devolution and Planning & Another, Petition No. 351 of 2015, where the Court observed that parties bound by a court order must make every effort to implement it and are not at liberty to choose whether or not to comply. 33.The Appellants faulted the Registrar's interpretation that the Court's orders required sequential implementation and maintained that the national elections were neither suspended nor prohibited by the judgment. 34.They further submitted that the affected branches were represented through delegates who held office before the impugned branch elections and that attendance records confirmed compliance with the Court's directions. According to the Appellants, the requisite quorum was attained and the elections were therefore validly conducted. 35.The Appellants also relied on Noah Rotich & 6 Others v Union of Kenya Civil Servants & Another [2018] KEELRC 2333 (KLR), where the Court held that the essence of secret balloting lies in the anonymity of the voter's choice rather than the physical arrangement of the voting process. They argued that the electoral process met the constitutional and statutory requirements of a free and fair election. Further reliance was placed on Raila Odinga & Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, where the Supreme Court emphasized the principles of transparency, openness and verifiability in the conduct of elections. The Appellants submitted that the elections satisfied those standards. 36.On the issue whether the Registrar acted within her statutory mandate in declining registration of Form Q, the Appellants submitted that the Registrar acted ultra vires in declining to register Form Q submitted on 23rd March 2026. They argued that the elections in question were quinquennial elections conducted upon expiry of the term of office of officials and therefore fell within the ambit of section 34 of the Labour Relations Act. 37.According to the Appellants, once Form Q and the Returning Officer's report were submitted pursuant to section 34(3) of the Act, the Registrar's role was limited to registration of the elected officials. Any challenge to the validity of the election, they argued, could only be pursued before this Court under section 34(4) of the Act. 38.The Appellants contended that the Registrar erroneously invoked powers available under section 35 of the Labour Relations Act, which governs changes in office occurring during the tenure of elected officials. In their view, section 35 was inapplicable to elections conducted after expiry of the term of office of officials. In support of that position, the Appellants relied on Kenya Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and Dentists Union (KMPDU) & 2 Others v Registrar of Trade Unions & 2 Others; Benjamin (Applicant); Registrar of Trade Unions & 4 Others (Interested Parties) [2023] KEELRC 424 (KLR), which explained the distinction between the Registrar's powers under sections 34 and 35 of the Labour Relations Act. 39.The Appellants therefore maintained that the Registrar exceeded her statutory mandate and unlawfully declined to register the elected officials. 40.The Appellants submitted that by refusing to register the elected officials, the Registrar violated the Union members' rights under Articles 36 and 41(4) of the Constitution by interfering with their freedom of association and the Union's right to organize and determine its own affairs. 41.They further contended that the decision was unreasonable, unsupported by the facts and inconsistent with the Court's judgment in Nairobi ELRCA No. E056 of 2026. It was their position that the impugned decision amounted to unfair administrative action contrary to Article 47 of the Constitution. 42.In this regard, the Appellants relied on Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR and submitted that they had sufficiently demonstrated the constitutional violations complained of. 43.On the fourth issue, the Appellants submitted that having demonstrated that the elections were conducted lawfully and that the Registrar acted outside her statutory mandate, they are entitled to the orders sought in the Memorandum of Appeal. 44.The Appellants therefore urged the Court to quash the Registrar's decision contained in the letter dated 27th March 2026 and to compel the registration of Form Q. 45.On costs, the Appellants relied on Rai & 3 Others v Rai & 4 Others [2014] eKLR and submitted that costs follow the event and should therefore be awarded to the successful party. They consequently prayed that the appeal be allowed with costs. The Respondents’ submissions 46.The Respondents on their part identified the issues for determination to be:-i.Whether the Appellants have capacity or locus standi to institute the instant appealii.Whether the Registrar erred in declining to register Form Qiii.Whether the Appellants are entitled to the remedies soughtiv.Who bears costs of the Appeal 47.On the first issue, the Respondents submitted that the Appellants lack the requisite locus standi to institute and maintain the present appeal. They argued that although the appeal challenges the Registrar's decision refusing to register Form Q submitted by the 1st Interested Party, the Appellants have not demonstrated the capacity in which they have approached the Court. Relying on the decision in Alfred Njau & 5 Others v City Council of Nairobi [1983] eKLR, the Respondents submitted that locus standi denotes the right of a person to appear before a court or tribunal and to be heard in a particular proceeding. They further submitted that Section 30 of the Labour Relations Act limits the right of appeal to a person aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar. 48.The Respondents argued that an aggrieved party is one whose rights or interests have been directly and adversely affected by the impugned decision. In support of this position, they relied on the decision in Garissa Mattresses Limited v Margaret Walegwa Warmwandu [2020] KECA 756 (KLR). 49.It was the Respondents’ submission that although an aggrieved person may include a trade union, an employers' organization or an individual member whose rights or interests are directly affected by a decision of the Registrar, the Appellants had not pleaded the capacity in which they instituted the appeal. According to the Respondents, the Appellants had not demonstrated whether they were members of the Union, elected officials or authorized representatives acting on behalf of the Union. 50.The Respondents further submitted that under Section 2 of the Labour Relations Act, a trade union is a legal entity capable of suing and being sued in its own name and may act through an authorized representative. They contended that the Appellants had not demonstrated that they fall within any of the categories of authorized representatives recognized under the Act, nor had they shown how they were personally aggrieved by the Registrar's decision. 51.Consequently, the Respondents urged the Court to find that the Appellants lack the requisite locus standi and capacity to prosecute the appeal on behalf of the Union. 52.On the issue whether the Registrar erred in declining to register Form Q, the Respondents submitted that the Registrar acted within the law in declining to register Form Q. They relied on Section 34(1) of the Labour Relations Act, which requires trade union elections to be conducted in accordance with the union's registered constitution, and Sections 35(3) and 35(4) of the Act, which empower the Registrar to call for relevant documents, conduct inquiries and decline registration where not satisfied as to the validity of the appointments presented for registration. 53.According to the Respondents, the Registrar declined to register the Union's national officials after receiving objections from the 2nd Interested Party challenging the validity of the elections. They submitted that the objection was based on allegations that the Union had failed to comply with the directions issued by the Court in Nairobi ELRCA No. E056 of 2026 and with its own Constitution. 54.The Respondents submitted that elections in the three branches of the Union had been nullified by the Court and they argued that the Court had directed the Union to conduct fresh branch elections in strict compliance with the Labour Relations Act and the Union Constitution before proceeding with the national elections. Referring to Articles 6(F), 9(A), 14(B) and 14(C) of the Union’s Constitution, the Respondents submitted that the election of national officials is undertaken through the Annual Delegates Conference, whose membership includes delegates elected from branches. They submitted that branch elections form the foundation upon which the election of national officials is anchored because branch delegates are the persons entitled to participate in the Annual Delegates Conference. 55.The Respondents contended that despite the nullification of elections in the three branches, fresh branch elections were never conducted before the national elections were held. In their view, the Union Constitution required all branch elections to be concluded before delegates could validly participate in the Annual Delegates Conference. They therefore argued that the national elections were conducted contrary to the Union’s Constitution. 56.The Respondents further submitted that the Union failed to comply with other mandatory constitutional requirements relating to the convening of the Annual Delegates Conference. In particular, they asserted that Article 14(A) requires at least six weeks' notice to be issued to branches and members entitled to attend the conference. The Respondents argued that the Union issued only a 24 hour notice, contrary to the express provisions of the Constitution. 57.The Respondents further submitted that Article 14(D) requires branch secretaries to submit the names of delegates to the National General Secretary at least three weeks before the conference. According to the Respondents, there was no evidence that this requirement had been complied with. 58.The Respondents therefore maintained that the Union failed to comply with several mandatory provisions of its Constitution and that the election process culminating in the election of national officials was fundamentally flawed. 59.Consequently, the Respondents submitted that the Registrar was justified in declining to register Form Q and could not be faulted for refusing to register officials elected through a process that was allegedly inconsistent with both the Union Constitution and the Court's directions. 60.Lastly, on the issue whether the Appellants are entitled to the remedies sought, the Respondents submitted that having demonstrated that the Appellants lacked the requisite locus standi and that the impugned elections were conducted contrary to the Union Constitution and the directions issued by the Court in ELRCA No. E056 of 2026, the Appellants were not entitled to any of the remedies sought in the appeal. 61.The Respondents therefore prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs. The 1st Interested Party submissions 62.In its submissions dated 29th April 2026, the 1st Interested Party associated itself with and adopted the Appellants' submissions in their entirety and further opposed the Preliminary Objection raised by the 2nd Interested Party, contending that the objection did not raise pure points of law but instead invited the Court to ascertain and determine contested facts. Relying on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, the 1st Interested Party submitted that the Preliminary Objection failed to meet the threshold of a valid preliminary objection and ought to be dismissed. 63.The 1st Interested Party submitted that the national elections conducted during the Annual Delegates Conference (ADC) held on 20th March 2026 were undertaken in full compliance with the Court’s judgment in Nairobi ELRCA No. E056 of 2026, the Union Constitution and the Labour Relations Act. 64.In response to the averment that the National General Secretary failed to convene a Management Consultative Committee meeting and failed to issue the requisite notices before the elections, the 1st Interested Party submitted that such allegations were factually incorrect and intended to mislead the Court. It argued that Rule 18B of the Union Constitution establishes the Management Consultative Committee as a body responsible for administrative and financial matters subject to the authority of the National Executive Council and that the Constitution does not confer upon the Committee any role in the conduct or planning of elections. 65.According to the 1st Interested Party, the challenge founded on the alleged failure to convene the Committee was therefore legally unsustainable. 66.The 1st Interested Party further submitted that the National Executive Council met on 30th January 2026 and fixed the date for the Annual Delegates Conference and national elections in accordance with Rule 14A of the Union Constitution. It contended that a notice dated 5th February 2026 was subsequently issued, giving delegates at least forty-two days' notice of the Conference, which exceeded the minimum notice period prescribed by the Constitution. The 1st Interested Party denied the allegation that the Conference was convened on 24 hours’ notice. 67.The 1st Interested Party submitted that following the judgment delivered on 18th March 2026 in Nairobi ELRCA No. E056 of 2026, the Court directed the Union to proceed with the national elections in accordance with the Constitution while ordering that the affected Mt. Kenya, Coast and Western regional branches be represented by delegates who were in office prior to the impugned branch elections. 68.It argued that the Court neither suspended nor postponed the national elections and that compliance with the judgment required the Union to proceed with the elections using the delegates who were in office before the nullified branch elections. 69.According to the 1st Interested Party, branch secretaries from the affected regions accordingly forwarded the names of delegates who had been in office prior to the nullified elections, prompting the issuance of reminder notices on 18th March 2026. 70.The 1st Interested Party maintained that those actions were undertaken strictly in obedience to the Court's orders and relied on Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd v Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & Another [2005] KLR 828 and Teachers Service Commission v Kenya National Union of Teachers & 2 Others [2013] eKLR for the proposition that court orders must be obeyed unless set aside. 71.The 1st Interested Party further set out the delegates who attended the Annual Delegates Conference from the affected regions and submitted that the Conference was properly constituted and quorate. It stated that 23 out of a possible 27 delegates attended the Conference and that the quorum requirements under Rule 7H of the Union Constitution were therefore satisfied. 72.With respect to the eligibility of certain elected officials, namely William Koileken, Boniface Mwenda Gikunda and Jenipher Neta Murgor, the 1st Interested Party submitted that all three met the qualifications prescribed under the Union Constitution and Section 31(1) of the Labour Relations Act. It contended that William Koileken, though currently employed by the Union, had previously worked in the banking sector and therefore qualified under the constitutional provisions governing eligibility for national office. It similarly submitted that Boniface Mwenda Gikunda had worked in the banking sector and served in various union leadership positions prior to his retirement. As regards Jenipher Neta Murgor, the 1st Interested Party submitted that she was the incumbent National Assistant Treasurer and a lawful delegate from the Western Kenya Region pursuant to the Court’s judgment and the Union’s records. 73.The 1st Interested Party therefore maintained that the election of the three officials was lawful, that the Annual Delegates Conference was properly convened and constituted, and that the elections conducted on 20th March 2026 complied with the Court's orders, the Union Constitution and the law. 74.On this issue, the 1st Interested Party submitted that the Court ought to exercise restraint in interfering with the internal affairs of a trade union, particularly where the dispute concerns the outcome of elections conducted pursuant to the Union Constitution. It argued that judicial intervention is only warranted where there is a clear violation of the Union Constitution or the law. The 1st Interested Party relied on Francis Wanderi & Others v Albert Njeru & Registrar of Trade Unions [2017] eKLR and Jophinus Musundi & Others v Kenya National Union of Nurses & Another [2016] eKLR to submit that courts should be slow to interfere with internal union processes where elections have been conducted in accordance with the applicable constitutional framework. 75.It further cited George Ondiege & Others v Albert Obed Njeru/KUDHEIHA Workers & Others [2017] eKLR and George Okoth & Others v Kenya Petroleum Workers Union & Registrar of Trade Unions [2016] eKLR for the proposition that courts should not reopen elections that have already been conducted unless there is a demonstrated breach of the law or the union constitution. According to the 1st Interested Party, the complaints raised against the elections were merely technical objections which did not warrant the Court’s intervention. 76.The 1st Interested Party additionally submitted that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo and allowing the elected officials to continue serving in office. In support of that position, it relied on Joseph Muthusi & 2 Others v William Gathogo & 2 Others [1988] eKLR. 77.Accordingly, the 1st Interested Party urged the Court to find that no violation of the Court's orders, the Union Constitution or the law had been established and to allow the appeal so as to facilitate registration of the elected officials in accordance with Section 34(3) of the Labour Relations Act. 78.In its further submissions dated 18th May 2026, the 1st Interested Party in response to the 2nd Interested Party's submission that its submissions dated 29th April 2026 be struck out for having been signed by the 1st Deputy National General Secretary rather than the General Secretary argued that section 2 of the Labour Relations Act merely defines an "authorised representative" and does not create any substantive requirement regarding who may sign submissions filed in court. The 1st Interested Party maintained that, as an interested party, it had not instituted the proceedings and had not filed any pleadings requiring formal authorisation from the General Secretary. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision in Meme v Republic [2004] 1 EA 124 on the role and nature of interested parties in proceedings. 79.The 1st Interested Party further submitted that it neither filed a cross-appeal nor a replying affidavit in the appeal and therefore no question of authority to institute proceedings arose. It added that the substantive General Secretary had since retired pursuant to the Union Constitution and that the 1st Deputy National General Secretary, Mr. Tom O’ Odero, was presently serving as the Acting General Secretary pending the election of a substantive office holder. 80.The 1st Interested Party further contended that submissions do not constitute pleadings and that the attempt to strike out its submissions after parties had already exchanged submissions was a technical objection unsupported by law. Reliance was placed on Republic v Chairman, Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & Another ex parte Zapkass Consulting and Training Limited & Another [2014] eKLR, where the Court observed that submissions are not pleadings and cannot substitute evidence. 81.It is also submitted that the 2nd Interested Party had improperly introduced matters and documents drawn from separate proceedings before the Court of Appeal, which were not part of the record before this Court. According to the 1st Interested Party, such matters amounted to introducing new issues and evidence through submissions contrary to established principles that parties are bound by their pleadings. In support of that proposition, the 1st Interested Party relied on Daniel Otieno Migore v South Nyanza Sugar Co. Ltd [2018] eKLR, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Another v Stephen Mutinda Mule & 3 Others [2014] eKLR and Raila Amolo Odinga & Another v IEBC & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, wherein the courts emphasized that parties are bound by their pleadings and that issues not arising from the pleadings ought not to be considered by the court. 82.Consequently, the 1st Interested Party urged the Court to disregard the 2nd Interested Party's further submissions as an afterthought, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process, and to consider the 1st Interested Party's submissions dated 29th April 2026 in determining the appeal. The 2nd Interested Party submissions 83.The 2nd Interested Party crystallized the issues for determination to be:-i.Whether the Preliminary Objection is meritedii.Whether the union's national elections were conducted in compliance the Court orders, union's constitution and the law.iii.Whether the decision of the 1st Respondent declining registration of Form Q dated 23rd March 2026 was within her statutory mandate.iv.Whether the remedies sought are available to the Appellants.v.Who bears the costs of the appeal. 84.On the issue whether the preliminary objection is merited, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that the Appellants lacked locus standi to institute the appeal as they were not parties before the Registrar of Trade Unions and were therefore not “aggrieved persons” within the meaning of section 30 of the Labour Relations Act. It was argued that the decision declining registration of Form Q directly affected the 1st Interested Party and not the Appellants personally. 85.According to the 2nd Interested Party, the 1st Interested Party, being a registered trade union and a body corporate capable of suing and being sued in its own name under section 21 of the Labour Relations Act, was the proper party to challenge the Registrar's decision if aggrieved. The 2nd Respondent submitted that the Appellants had not demonstrated any personal or legal interest adversely affected by the impugned decision. Reliance was placed on the decision in Law Society of Kenya v Communications Authority of Kenya & 10 Others (2023) KESC 27 (KLR), where the Supreme Court held that the right of appeal is confined to parties aggrieved by the impugned decision and does not extend to persons who were not parties to the proceedings. 86.On that basis, the Court was urged to uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 87.On the issue whether the Union's National Elections were conducted in compliance with the Court Orders, Union Constitution, and the Law, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that the national elections conducted on 20th March 2026 were carried out in blatant violation of both the judgment in Mucheke & 12 Others v Registrar of Trade Unions & 6 Others and the provisions of the Union Constitution. It was contended that the judgment required the elections to be conducted strictly in accordance with the Union Constitution and under the supervision of branch officials who held office before the impugned branch elections. 88.It was argued that the delegates who had been invited to participate in the Annual Delegates Conference had already been nullified by the Court and therefore the national election process ought to have commenced afresh. According to the 2nd Interested Party, the Union could not lawfully proceed with national elections within twenty-four hours of the judgment without first complying with the constitutional requirements relating to nominations, notices, convening of meetings and election of delegates. 89.The 2nd Interested Party cited Rule 9A, 9B, 9E, 9H(ii) and (iii), 14A, 14C, 14D, 7A,7L, 18B, 18D and 10C, of the Union’s Constitution and submitted that the mandatory timelines and procedures set out in those provisions were completely disregarded. 90.The 2nd Interested Party further contended that certain persons elected as national officials, namely William Koileken, Boniface Mwenda Gikunda and Jenipher Neta Murgor, were ineligible for election because they were no longer employed within the sector represented by the Union and were therefore not eligible members under Rule 9B of the Union Constitution. Reliance was placed on the Court’s earlier findings in Mucheke & 12 Others v Registrar of Trade Unions & 6 Others (2026) KEELRC 774(KLR) (18th March 2026) (Judgment) and other authorities to support the proposition that elections involving ineligible candidates are incapable of standing. 91.The Court was accordingly urged to find that the elections of 20th March 2026 were unlawful, unconstitutional and nullity ab initio. 92.On the issue whether the decision of the 1st Respondent declining registration of Form Q dated 23rd March 2026 was within her statutory mandate, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that the Registrar was under a statutory obligation, pursuant to sections 34 and 35 of the Labour Relations Act, to satisfy herself that the elections had been conducted in accordance with the Union Constitution before registering any changes of officials. 93.It is argued that the Registrar's role is not merely administrative but includes making inquiries and considering objections lodged against proposed changes. 94.It is the 2nd Interested Party’s submission that the Registrar received formal objections challenging the validity of the elections and properly considered those objections before declining registration. According to the 2nd Interested Party, the Registrar's decision was consistent with the judgment in ELRCA/E056/2026 and with established principles of fair administrative action. Reliance was placed on the case of Kenya County Government Workers Union v Registrar of Trade Unions and Wasilwa v Judicial Service Commission, for the proposition that an administrative decision-maker is required to consider objections and hear affected parties before arriving at a determination. 95.The Court was therefore urged to uphold the Registrar's decision declining registration of Form Q. 96.On the issue whether the Appellants are entitled to the reliefs sought, the 2nd Interested Party submitted that having failed to demonstrate that the elections were conducted in compliance with the law and the Union Constitution, the Appellants were not entitled to any of the reliefs sought. The Court was urged to dismiss the appeal in its entirety. 97.Lastly on the issue of costs, the 2nd Interested Party relied on the Supreme Court decision in Rai & 3 Others v Rai & 4 Others and submitted that costs ordinarily follow the event. 98.The 2nd Interested Party therefore prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs to it. 99.In its further submissions dated 15th May 2026, the 2nd Interested Party urged the Court to strike out the 1st Interested Party's submissions, list of authorities and bundle of authorities dated 29th April 2026 on the ground that they were not signed by an authorised representative as required under section 2 of the Labour Relations Act and Rule 8 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024. 100.The 2nd Interested Party submitted that a trade union may only appear through its General Secretary or a person duly authorised in writing by the General Secretary. He argued that Mr. Tom O. Odero, who purportedly signed the submissions, had not demonstrated any authority to act on behalf of the Union and had, in separate Court of Appeal proceedings, described himself merely as the Deputy General Secretary acting under the authority of the substantive General Secretary. 101.The Court was consequently urged to strike out the 1st Interested Party's submissions and accompanying documents from the record. Determination 102.From the Memorandum of Appeal, the Preliminary Objection and the parties' respective submissions, the following issues arise for determination:-i.Whether the Preliminary Objection dated 17th April 2026 is merited.ii.Whether the Appellants have the requisite locus standi and capacity to institute and maintain this appeal.iii.Whether the national elections conducted on 20th March 2026 were undertaken in compliance with the judgment in Isaiah Munoru Mucheke & 12 Others v Registrar of Trade Unions & 6 Others, ELRCA No. E056 of 2026, the Union Constitution and the Labour Relations Act.iv.Whether the Registrar of Trade Unions acted within her statutory mandate in declining to register Form Q dated 23rd March 2026.v.Whether the Appellants are entitled to the reliefs sought.vi.Who should bear the costs of the appeal. Whether the Preliminary Objection is merited and whether the Appellants have the requisite locus standi to institute and maintain this appeal 103.I shall first determine the Preliminary Objection dated 17th April 2026 together with the issue of locus standi, as both issues go to the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 104.The 2nd Interested Party contends that the Appellants lack the requisite locus standi to institute and maintain this appeal because they were not parties before the Registrar of Trade Unions and are therefore not "aggrieved persons" within the meaning of section 30 of the Labour Relations Act. It is further argued that the decision declining registration of Form Q directly affected the 1st Interested Party, a registered trade union capable of suing and being sued in its own name, and not the Appellants personally. 105.It is averred that the Appellants have not disclosed the capacity in which they have instituted the instant appeal or demonstrated how they were personally aggrieved by the Registrar’s decision. 106.The Appellants, on their part, argued that they are members and officials of the Union whose rights and interests are directly affected by the Registrar's refusal to register the elected national officials. They further submit that the issues raised in the Preliminary Objection require interrogation of facts and evidence and therefore do not meet the threshold of a valid preliminary objection as set out in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. 107.The law on what constitutes a proper preliminary objection is now settled. In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, Law JA stated that a preliminary objection consists of a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all facts pleaded by the opposite party are correct and which, if successful, is capable of disposing of the suit. A preliminary objection cannot be founded on disputed facts or matters requiring the exercise of judicial discretion. 108.Having considered the grounds upon which the objection is premised, I find that several of them, including allegations of forum shopping, lack of authority, incompetence of affidavits and whether the Appellants have demonstrated sufficient interest in the dispute, inevitably call for an examination of facts and the evidentiary record. Secondly, they are matters on which parties do not agree. Such matters fall outside the ambit of a preliminary objection as contemplated in Mukisa Biscuit. 109.On the issue whether the Appellants have the locus standi to file this appeal, it is necessary to determine whether the Apellants qualify as persons entitled to lodge an appeal under section 30 of the Labour Relations Act. Section 30(1) of the Labour Relations Act provides that: -“Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Registrar may appeal to the Court against that decision.” 110.From a literal reading of the above provision of the law, it is clear that it does not restrict the right of appeal to trade unions alone. Rather, Parliament deliberately employed the broader expression “any person aggrieved”. The task before the Court is therefore to determine whether the Appellants fall within that category. 111.In Garissa Mattresses Limited v Margaret Walegwa Warmwandu [2020] KECA 756 (KLR), the Court of Appeal dealing with the issue of locus standi held as follows:-“11.With that in mind, the main issue for determination herein is whether the 7th respondent had the locus standi to merit her joinder in the pending proceedings. Alongside that is the peripheral issue of whether, the learned Judge erred in consolidating and determining the applications dated 7th and 9th September, 2015 together without the consent of the parties.According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition at page 1026 Locus standi is defined as-‘The right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum’Further, this Court in the case of Alfred Njau & 5 others vs. City Council of Nairobi [1983] eKLR defined it thus;‘The term locus standi means a right to appear in Court and, conversely, as is stated in Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, to say that a person has no locus standi means that he has no right to appear or be heard in such and such a proceeding.’According to the appellant, the 7th respondent lacked locus standi for she was neither a party to the concluded proceedings nor to the pending suit. In addition, that having failed to prove her interest in the suit land, her contentions were mere allegations of a busy body. In light of this, the appellant argued, the learned Judge erred in holding that the 7th respondent had been in occupation for over 30 years and consequently allowing her joinder to the suit.12.Under Order 1 rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, upon which the 7th respondent’s application was premised, a non party to a suit may apply to be joined in a suit. In particular, sub rule 3 thereof provides that:‘Any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit a suit is instituted or defended under sub rule (1) may apply to the court to be made party to such suit’As stated earlier, the 7th respondent’s initial attempt was to be enjoined in the concluded suit, in which the rest of the respondents purported to act on her behalf. This much is apparent from two applications one dated 19th March. 2013 seeking joinder and another dated 16th September, 2013 seeking the court’s directions on the status of registrations made pursuant to the judgment. There is no dispute that both applications though filed, were never heard. It is also common ground that pursuant to that judgment, the suit land was subsequently transferred in favour of the appellant. In light of the 7th respondent’s claim that she was one of the uncompensated residents and that she was likely to be rendered homeless; and in light of her failure to be heard, the trial court rightly found that she was entitled to be joined in the proceedings as a co defendant. Barring her from the approaching the seat of justice even when it was evident that she was not a busy body in the matter negated the cardinal rules of natural justice. There was no injustice in our view which would have been occasioned to the other parties had the 7th respondent been heard. All the parties would have had an opportunity to ventilate their claim and leave it to the court to determine whether the 7th respondent’s claim could succeed or not.” 112.The record before Court shows that the Appellants challenge a decision declining registration of officials elected during the Union’s quinquennial elections. They contend that they are members and officials of the Union and that the impugned decision affects their rights as members to participate in the governance and administration of their Union. In fact, the main complaint advanced in the appeal is that the refusal to register the elected officials undermines the members’ choices and interferes with their rights under Articles 36 and 41 of the Constitution. 113.It is not true as alleged by the 2nd Interested Party that the Appellants have not disclosed the capacity in which they have instituted the instant appeal or demonstrated how they were personally aggrieved by the Registrar's decision. 114.It would be unduly restrictive to interpret the phrase "any person aggrieved" as referring only to the trade union as a corporate entity. Trade unions are membership organisations and decisions relating to the election and registration of their officials invariably affect not only the union as a legal person but also its members whose democratic choices are implicated by such decisions. 115.Whether the Appellants will ultimately succeed in demonstrating that the Registrar acted unlawfully is a separate question. However, for purposes of standing, it is sufficient that they have demonstrated a direct and identifiable interest in the subject matter of the appeal and have challenged a decision which they contend adversely affects their rights and interests as members of the Union. 116.I therefore find that the Appellants have established sufficient standing to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under section 30 of the Labour Relations Act. 117.Consequently, the Preliminary Objection dated 17th April 2026 is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. I further find that the Appellants possess the requisite locus standi and capacity to institute and maintain the present appeal. 118.The 2nd Interested Party further raised objection to the signing of documents filed by the 1st Interested Party, arguing that Tom Odero who signed the submissions has no authority as provided under section 2 of the Labour Relations Act and Rule 8 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (Procedure) Rules, 2024. 119.Section 2 of the Labour Relations Act defines “authorised representative” to mean –(a)the general secretary of a trade union;(b)an employer or the chief executive officer of an employer;(c)the secretary of a group of employers;(d)the chief executive or association secretary of an employers’ organisation; or(e)any person appointed in writing by an authorised representative to perform the functions of the authorised representative. 120.Section 2 further defines “official” when used with reference to a trade union or employers’ organization to mean a duly elected official of a trade union or employers’ organisation including a member of the executive and a branch official; 121.Further, section 62(1) of the Labour Relations Act provides that:Reporting of trade disputes to the Minister.62.(1)A trade dispute may be reported to the Minister in the prescribed form and manner –(a)by or on behalf of a trade union, employer or employers' organisation that is a party to the dispute; and(b)by the authorised representative of an employer, employers' organisation or trade union on whose behalf the trade dispute is reported. 122.In the instant case, the 1st Interested Party explained that Tom Odero is the Acting general secretary of the 1st Interested Party having been appointed as such following the retirement of the general secretary. 123.Sections 43, 44, and 45 of the Interpretation and General Provisions state:43.Where a written law confers a power or imposes a duty on the holder of an office as such, then, unless a contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed by the person for the time being holding that office.44.Where the President, a Minister, a public officer or a public body is empowered by a written law to appoint a person to perform any functions or hold any office, he or it may either appoint a person by name or appoint the holder of a named office to perform the functions or hold the office in question.45.In this Act and in any other written law, instrument, warrant or process of any kind, a reference to a person holding an office shall include a reference to any person for the time being lawfully discharging the functions of that office. 124.Tom Odero being an official of the 1st Interested Party and the acting general secretary, he is an authorized officer and has capacity to sign documents and appear on behalf of the 1st Respondent. 125.I therefore find the objection to his representation and appearance on behalf of the 1st Interested Party by the 2nd Interested Party to be without merit. Whether the National Elections Conducted on 20th March 2026 Were Undertaken in Compliance with the Judgment in ELRCA No. E056 of 2026, the Union Constitution and the Labour Relations Act 126.The Appellants and the 1st Interested Party maintain that the national elections conducted on 20th March 2026 were undertaken in strict compliance with the judgment of this Court in Isaiah Munoru Mucheke & 12 Others v Registrar of Trade Unions & 6 Others, ELRCA No. E056 of 2026, the Union Constitution and the Labour Relations Act. They contend that the Court expressly permitted the national elections to proceed and directed that delegates who held office prior to the impugned branch elections participate in the Annual Delegates Conference. They further submit that the requisite notices had been issued before the judgment and that the elections were lawfully conducted. 127.The Respondents and the 2nd Interested Party take a contrary view. They argue that the judgment invalidated elections conducted in several branches and that compliance with the judgment required fresh branch elections to be conducted before any national elections could take place. They further contend that the 1st Interested Party failed to comply with several mandatory provisions of its Constitution relating to nominations, delegates, notices and the convening of the Annual Delegates Conference. 128.The starting point is the judgment delivered in ELRCA No. E056 of 2026. While parties have advanced competing interpretations of that decision, the Court must ascertain the true import of the orders issued therein. From the decree at page 13 of the Record of Appeal, Justice D.K.N Marete issued the following orders:-i.A declaration be and is hereby issued that the 1st Respondent violated the Appellants’ right to fair administrative action under Article 47(1) and (2) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and Section 4(3) the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 by registering the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents as officials of BIFU(K) without affording the Appellants a hearing, without engaging with their specific and sworn objections and without providing written reasons for the registration decisions.ii.The decision of the 1st Respondent in registering the officials of the Mount Kenya Region Branch, the Coast Region Branch and the Western Region Branch of BIFU(K) as evidenced by the Extracts from the Register of Trade Unions dated 9th February 2026 and 10th February, 2026 respectively be and is hereby quashed.iii.The branch elections held on 22nd January, 2026 for the Mount Kenya Region Branch, 24th January, 2026 for the Coast Region Branch and 7th February, 2026 for the Western Region Branch be and are hereby declared, irregular, invalid and unlawful.iv.The 4th , 5th and 6th Respondents are therefore not regularly in office and as such should vacate such office now so irregularly assumed.v.The 2nd and 3rd Respondents are hereby directed to conduct fresh branch elections for the Mount Kenya Region Branch, the Coast Region Branch and the Western Region Branch strictly in full compliance with the Union's Constitution and the Labour Relations Act, 2007 forthwith but in any event within sixty (60) days from the date of delivery of this judgment of courtvi.These repeat elections should in so far as is possible comply with the 1st Respondent's circular dated 25th September, 2025 on timelines.vii.The 2nd and 3rd Respondents are hereby ordered and directed to proceed and conduct the national elections strictly in full compliance with the Union's constitution.viii.The National elections shall be conducted and overseen by the branch officials who held office immediately before the impugned elections of January and February 2026.ix.The 1st Respondent shall bear their costs of this appealx.The 2nd to 6th Respondents shall bear their costs of this appeal 129.From the above excerpt of the decree, it is clear that the Court invalidated elections conducted in the Mount Kenya, Coast and Western Regional Branches. It is equally clear that the Court directed that national elections proceed in accordance with the Union Constitution and that the national elections be overseen by branch officials who held office immediately before the impugned branch elections. 130.The Respondents and the 2nd Interested Party have urged the Court to construe those orders as requiring fresh branch elections to be concluded before the national elections could lawfully proceed. With respect, I am unable to agree with that interpretation. 131.Had the Court intended to suspend or postpone the national elections pending the conduct of fresh branch elections, nothing would have been easier than to expressly state so. Instead, the Court directed that the national elections proceed while simultaneously prescribing the category of persons who were to oversee and participate in the process. The order of the court that the branch officials who held office before the impugned elections should participate and oversee the elections was clearly intended as a transitional mechanism to ensure continuity in the electoral process while preserving compliance with the Union Constitution. 132.I therefore find that the judgment did not prohibit the holding of national elections pending the conduct of fresh branch elections. Rather, it contemplated that the national elections would proceed using the branch officials who held office immediately prior to the nullified elections. 133.The next question is whether the Union complied with its Constitution in conducting the Annual Delegates Conference and the national elections. 134.The Respondents and the 2nd Interested Party argued that the Union failed to comply with Rule 14A of the Constitution which requires at least six weeks' notice before the Annual Delegates Conference. They further contended that the Conference was convened on 24 hours' notice following delivery of the judgment on 18th March 2026. 135.The evidence on record, however, indicates that the National Executive Council had fixed the date of the Annual Delegates Conference and national elections on 30th January 2026 and that a notice dated 5th February 2026 was issued convening the Conference scheduled for 20th March 2026. If that position is correct, delegates had more than six weeks' notice of the Conference. The reminder notices issued after the judgment of 18th March 2026 did not create a new conference or a fresh election process but merely operationalised the Court's directions regarding representation from the affected branches. 136.Similarly, while the Respondents argue that fresh nominations ought to have commenced afresh after the judgment, the judgment itself did not invalidate the national election process, the nomination process or the convening of the Annual Delegates Conference. The invalidation was limited to specific branch elections. In the Judgment the court went further and directed that national elections be held using the branch officials who were in office immediately before the impugned elections held in January and February. I find no legal basis for requiring the Union to recommence the entire electoral process from the beginning. 137.The 2nd Interested Party also challenged the eligibility of certain officials elected during the Conference, namely William Koileken, Boniface Mwenda Gikunda and Jenipher Neta Murgor. 138.Rule 9H of the 1st Interested Party’s Constitution provides:Any person not actually engaged or employed in the Banking, Insurance, Credit & Savings Society, Building Society, Financial Institution industry or occupation may contest any full-time National Office provided that:i.Such person must be a Kenyan citizen. He/she must have demonstrated positive qualities of leadership and must be at least 30 years of age.ii.Such a person wishing to contest any office of the Union shall have made an application in writing to the National General Secretary within one calendar month after date of announcement for nominations and such application shall have been signed by one tenth (1/10) of the paid up union members equally and proportionally spread in not less than half (1/2) of the established branches and firms employing this union’s paid up members. In addition he/she shall have been endorsed by not less than half (1/2) of the established branches committees.iii.Immediately at the close of nominations, the National Executive Council shall fix the date and venue for delegates meeting and the National General Secretary shall inform in writing all the delegates and properly nominated candidates.iv.No person who has been convicted to any crime involving fraud, treason matters involving moral turpitude, or dishonesty shall be an official of the Union.v.Such a person shall have paid a sum of K.Shs.100,000/= to the Union non-refundable amount in respect of office of National General Secretary and K.Shs.50,000/= for any other full time National Office.vi.Employees and persons engaged in the industry other than the incumbents shall also be governed by these Rules save for Rule 9H(i) and (v) only.vii.Applications to the Registrar of Trade Unions for sanction of officials/officers of this Union in accordance with Section 31 (4) (c) of the Labour Relations Act shall be made once by National General Secretary after conclusion of union's quinniquinal elections. 139.Further, section 31(1) of the Labour Relations Act provides:31.(1)The officials of a trade union or employers’ organisation shall be persons who are, or have been, engaged or employed in the sector for which the trade union or employers’ organisation is registered.[Emphasis added] 140.From the foregoing both the Constitution of the Respondent at Rule 9H and section 31 of the Labour Relations Act permit persons who have previously worked in the sector to vie for office in the union. The 2nd Interested Party has not denied that William Koileken, Boniface Mwenda Gikunda and Jenipher Neta Murgor have not worked within the sectors covered by the Constitution of the 1st Interested Party. 141.Furthermore, the court notes that the issue in dispute in the appeal as set out in the Memorandum of Appeal revolve around the refusal of the 1st Respondent to register Form Q for reasons stated in the letter dated 27th March, 2026. The issue of eligibility of the William Koileken, Boniface Mwenda Gikunda and Jenipher Neta Murgor is therefore not an issue for determination in the appeal. There is no cross appeal in this appeal in which new issues have been raised for determination by this court. 142.The Court is mindful that election disputes must be determined on the basis of evidence and not speculation. The burden lay upon those challenging the eligibility of the candidates to place before the Court sufficient material demonstrating the alleged disqualifications. In my view, that burden has not been discharged in this case. 143.Having reviewed the material placed before the Court, I am satisfied that the Union complied with the judgment in ELRCA No. E056 of 2026 and implemented the directions issued therein regarding representation from the affected branches. 144.Accordingly, I find that the national elections conducted on 20th March 2026 were undertaken in substantial compliance with the judgment in ELRCA No. E056 of 2026, the Union Constitution and the Labour Relations Act. Whether the Registrar of Trade Unions acted within her statutory mandate in declining to register Form Q dated 23rd March 2026. 145.The Appellants contend that the Registrar acted ultra vires her statutory mandate in declining to register Form Q submitted following the national elections conducted on 20th March 2026. They asserted that the elections in question were quinquennial elections conducted pursuant to section 34 of the Labour Relations Act and that once Form Q and the Returning Officer's report were submitted, the Registrar's role was limited to registering the elected officials. It is the Appellants’ argument that any challenge to the validity of the elections could only be ventilated before this Court and not determined administratively by the Registrar. 146.The Respondents and the 2nd Interested Party, on the other hand, submit that the Registrar was under a statutory obligation to satisfy herself that the elections had been conducted in accordance with the Union Constitution and the Labour Relations Act before effecting any registration. They maintain that the Registrar was entitled to consider objections lodged against the elections and to decline registration where not satisfied as to the legality of the process. 147.The resolution of this issue turns on the scope of the powers conferred upon the Registrar under sections 34 and 35 of the Labour Relations Act. 148.Section 34 provides:34.(1)The election of officials of a trade union, employers’ organisation or federation shall be conducted in accordance with their registered constitutions.(2)The constitution of a trade union, employers’ organisation or federation shall-(a)not contain a provision that discriminates unfairly between incumbents and other candidates in elections; and(b)provide for the election, by secret ballot, of all officials of a trade union at least once every five years;(3)Notice of the election of officials under this section shall be given to the Registrar in the prescribed form within fourteen days of the completion of the election.(4)Disputes arising from, or connected directly or indirectly to, elections held under this section may be referred to the Industrial Court.(5)The Registrar may issue directions to a trade union, employers’ organisation or federation to ensure that elections are conducted in accordance with this section and their respective constitutions. 149.Section 34(1) of the Labour Relations Act requires every registered trade union to conduct elections in accordance with its registered constitution. Section 34(3) obligates a trade union to notify the Registrar of the election results in the prescribed form. Section 35, on the other hand, empowers the Registrar to call for relevant documents, make inquiries and satisfy herself regarding the validity of appointments or elections before effecting registration. Section 34(4) provides that disputes relating to the elections be referred to court. 150.Further, section 35 provides:35.(1)A trade union, employers’ organisation or federation shall exhibit prominently―(a)in its registered office, a notice giving the names of all officials and their titles;(b)in every branch office the notice specified in paragraph (a) and in addition, a notice giving the names and titles of the officials of the branch.(2)Notice of any changes of officials or of the title of any officials shall be submitted to the Registrar in Form Q set out in the Second Schedule, within fourteen days after the change, together with prescribed fee, and the Registrar shall register the change, subject to subsection (4) and subsection (5).(3)Before registering any change of officials or correcting any register, the Registrar may require the production of any relevant evidence of the change.(4)If, after inquiry, the Registrar is not satisfied as to the validity of any appointment or the propriety of any proposed correction, the Registrar may refuse to register the change of officials or to correct the register.(5)No change of officials shall have effect until it is registered by the Registrar.(6)No person who is not registered by the Registrar in accordance with this section shall act or purport to act as an official of a trade union, employers’ organisation, or federation or of any branch. 151.I do not agree with the Appellants' submission that the Registrar's role is purely mechanical or administrative once Form Q is presented. Such an interpretation would render the statutory safeguards established under the Labour Relations Act meaningless and reduce the Registrar to a mere receiving office. 152.The Labour Relations Act vests in the Registrar an important supervisory role intended to safeguard the democratic governance within trade unions. That mandate necessarily includes verifying that results of elections presented for registration have been conducted in accordance with the union constitution and the law. 153.However, while the Registrar possesses investigative and supervisory powers, those powers must be exercised within the confines of the law and on the basis of objective material placed before her. The Registrar cannot purport to review, vary or reinterpret orders issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. 154.In this case, the primary reason upon which the Registrar declined registration was her conclusion that the national elections should not have proceeded before the completion of fresh branch elections and that the Court's judgment required a sequential implementation of the orders issued therein. 155.As already found by this Court, the judgment in ELRCA No. E056 of 2026 did not suspend the national elections nor require the Union to await the conclusion of fresh branch elections before proceeding with the Annual Delegates Conference. The judgment expressly contemplated the participation of branch officials who were in office prior to the impugned elections and thereby provided a mechanism through which the national elections could proceed. 156.To the extent that the Registrar interpreted the judgment as requiring the completion of fresh branch elections before the national elections could be conducted, she fell into error. In effect, the Registrar adopted an interpretation of the Court's judgment that is not borne out by the terms of the decision itself. 157.While the Registrar was entitled to inquire into compliance with the Union Constitution and to consider objections lodged by interested parties, she was not entitled to decline registration on the basis of an erroneous interpretation of the Court's orders. 158.Moreover, having found that the national elections substantially complied with both the Court's judgment and the Union Constitution, the foundation upon which the Registrar declined registration cannot stand. 159.I therefore find that although the Registrar possessed the statutory authority to examine the legality of the electoral process and to consider objections before registration, she misdirected herself in the exercise of that mandate by concluding that the elections were conducted contrary to the Court's judgment. 160.Consequently, the decision communicated through the Registrar's letter dated 27th March 2026 declining registration of Form Q was founded on an erroneous interpretation of the Court's orders and cannot be sustained. 161.I accordingly find that the Registrar improperly exercised her statutory mandate in declining to register Form Q dated 23rd March 2026. Whether the Appellants are entitled to the reliefs sought 162.Having found that the Appellants possess the requisite locus standi to institute the appeal, that the national elections conducted on 20th March 2026 complied with the judgment of this Court, the Union Constitution and the Labour Relations Act, and further that the Registrar improperly declined registration of Form Q, it follows that the appeal is merited. 163.I am therefore satisfied that the Appellants have established a basis for interference with the decision of the Registrar communicated through the letter dated 27th March 2026. 164.Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and the Court grants the following orders: -i.The appeal is hereby allowed.ii.The decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions contained in the letter dated 27th March 2026 declining registration of Form Q is hereby quashed and set aside.iii.The Registrar of Trade Unions shall register the national officials elected during the Annual Delegates Conference held on 20th March 2026 as contained in Form Q dated 23rd March 2026 immediately upon receipt of this court’s orders and in any event not later than 7 days of this judgment.iv.Each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED ON THIS 19TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026MAUREEN ONYANGOJUDGE