https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12714
The Sports Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because Kiambu Club Limited was not shown to be a sports organization registered under section 46 of the Sports Act, had not transitioned under section 49, had no rules specifically allowing appeals to the Tribunal, had not agreed to refer the dispute to the Tribunal, and the...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2026] KEHC 12714 (KLR)
- Parties
- Applicant: Kiambu Club Limited; Respondent: The Sports Tribunal; 1st Interested Party: Elizabeth Wanjiru Kamau Karume; 2nd Interested Party: The Hon. Attorney General
- Court
- High Court
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Judicial Review E148 of 2026
- Procedural Posture
- Judicial Review / Post Judgment Determination on Motion for Certiorari and Prohibition
- Outcome
- Application allowed in terms of prayer 1; certiorari granted; prohibition declined as misconceived and unnecessary; each party to bear own costs.
- Judges
- ["WM Musyoka"]
- Legal Topics
- Jurisdiction of Sports Tribunal, Certiorari, Prohibition, Sports Act Section 46, Sports Act Section 58, Access to Justice, Disciplinary Dispute in Sports Club
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Kiambu Club Limited
Applicant
The Sports Tribunal
Respondent
Elizabeth Wanjiru Kamau Karume
1st Interested Party
The Hon. Attorney General
2nd Interested Party
Procedural Posture
Judicial Review / Post Judgment Determination on Motion for Certiorari and Prohibition
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the Sports Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear SSTSC Appeal No. E086 of 2025
- 2 Whether the Tribunal acted ultra vires in dismissing the preliminary objection
- 3 Whether the orders of certiorari and prohibition should issue
Ratio Decidendi
The Sports Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because Kiambu Club Limited was not shown to be a sports organization registered under section 46 of the Sports Act, had not transitioned under section 49, had no rules specifically allowing appeals to the Tribunal, had not agreed to refer the dispute to the Tribunal, and the matter was not an appeal from the Registrar. The Tribunal therefore acted ultra vires, and its ruling and proceedings were liable to be quashed by certiorari.
Court Disposition
Application allowed in terms of prayer 1; certiorari granted; prohibition declined as misconceived and unnecessary; each party to bear own costs.
Orders
- The proceedings in SSTSC Appeal No. E086 of 2025 are quashed.
- The ruling of 17th February 2026 in SSTSC Appeal No. E086 of 2025 is quashed.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **MILIMANI LAW COURTS** **JUDICIAL REVIEW NO. E148 OF 2026** **KIAMBU CLUB LIMITED…………………………………….….....……..….APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **THE SPORTS TRIBUNAL………………………………….………………RESPONDENT** **AND** **ELIZABETH WANJIRU KAMAU KARUME………...…1ST INTERESTED PARTY** **THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL…………………..….2ND INTERESTED PARTY** **JUDGEMENT** 1. The applicant moved this court by way of a motion, dated 13th May 2026, supported by an affidavit, sworn on 6th May 2026, by Ms. Nancy Karanu, its Secretary. The application seeks an order of *certiorari*, to quash the proceedings and ruling of the respondent, in SSTSC Appeal No. E086 of 2025, delivered on 17th February 2026; and an order of prohibition, to prohibit the respondent from any other or further proceedings in respect of the decision of the applicant of 18th October 2025. 2. The application is predicated on the grounds set out in the statutory statement, dated 13th March 2026, and the verifying affidavit of 12th March, 2026, sworn by Ms. Karanu. The case, by the applicant, is that it sent out a letter to the 1st interested party, inviting her to a disciplinary hearing, before its legal and security committee, concerning an incident on the golf course, on 20th September, 2025. It is averred that the 1st interested party appeared before the said committee, where proceedings commenced, and the 1st interested party was informed of the complaint, and given a chance to defend herself. It is stated that, on 18th October 2025, the applicant communicated the decision of the disciplinary committee, where the 1st interested party was found guilty of misconduct, and suspended for 3 months. It is further stated that the interested party challenged the said decision, by filing an appeal, being SSTSC Appeal No. E086 of 2025, with the respondent. It is averred that the applicant raised a preliminary objection, to the jurisdiction of the respondent to hear the appeal, and the preliminary objection was dismissed. It is averred that the decision of the respondent is *ultra vires*, and it is sought that the said ruling of the respondent, dated 17th February 2026, be quashed. 3. The application was served, on the respondent and the interested parties, going by the affidavits of service on record, sworn on 13th May 2026 and 7th July 2026. The respondent and the interested parties have not filed any responses to the application. 4. Directions were given on 8th July 2026, for canvassing of the application, by way of written submissions. From the record before me, only the applicant has filed written submissions, dated 26th July 2026. 5. In the said submissions, it is argued that the respondent is established under section 55 of the Sports Act, Cap. 223, Laws of Kenya, and that section 46(1) of the said Act provides that no body shall operate as a sports organization, unless it is registered as such under the Act. It is submitted that the applicant is not a sports organization, but a limited liability company, incorporated under the Companies Act, Cap. 486, Laws of Kenya, and regulated by its own memorandum and articles of association, and by its by-laws, hence the respondent has no jurisdiction over the applicant. *Board of Limuru Country Club vs. Sports Disputes Tribunal & 2 others* [2015] KEHC 6425 (KLR) and *Republic vs. SPT & 3 others ex parte Moses Adapala & 2 others (suing as officials of the Muhoroni Youth Football Club* [2018] eKLR, are cited. 6. It is further submitted that section 58(b) of the Sports Act, that, with respect to other sports-related disputes, all the parties ought to agree to refer the matter to the respondent, and the respondent ought to agree to hear the matter. *Ndung’u vs. AFC Leopards Sports Club* KESDT 671 eKLR and *Denis Kahto vs. Sofapaka* FC SDT Appeal No. 23 of 2016, are cited. It is submitted that jurisdiction cannot be implied or inferred or assumed, and a court or tribunal cannot allocate itself jurisdiction it does not possess. It is argued that the dispute placed before the respondent, by the 1st interested party, relates to membership rights, and further that disputes around matters relating to internal governance, administration of sports and recreational activities are of a private nature, falling within the administration of the applicant, which has its own mechanisms for resolving them. *Gor Mahia FC vs. SDT & another* KEELRC 3224 (KLR) is cited. 7. It is submitted that the respondent acted *ultra vires*, in overruling the preliminary objection, dated 19th November 2025. 8. Having considered the application and the written submissions, the issue for determination is whether the application is merited. 9. There is a single issue for determination, to resolve the matter, and that is whether the respondent acted *ultra vires*, in assuming jurisdiction over the dispute in SSTTC No. E086 of 2025. 10. Jurisdiction is central, to exercise of power and mandate by a court or tribunal, and the principle on it was stated in *Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘Lilian S’’ vs. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd*[1989] KLR 1, and affirmed in *Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another vs. Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 others* [2012] eKLR. In *Owners of the Motor Vessel ‘Lilian S’’ vs. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd*[1989] KLR 1 it was stated: “A *court’s jurisdiction flows from either the constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law.”* 1. Section 58 of the Sports Act sets out the jurisdiction of the respondent, and it states as follows: “*58. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal* *The Tribunal shall determine—* *(a)appeals against decisions made by national sports organizations or umbrella national sports organizations, whose rules specifically allow for appeals to be made to the Tribunal in relation to that issue including —* *(i)appeals against disciplinary decisions;* *(ii)appeals against not being selected for a Kenyan team or squad;* *(b)other sports-related disputes that all parties to the dispute agree to refer to the Tribunal and that the Tribunal agrees to hear; and* *(c)appeals from decisions of the Registrar under this Act*.” 1. Before I can rule one way or the other, let me first look at the proceedings where the impugned decision was made. Judicial review proceedings, brought under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, are premised on the statutory statement and the verifying affidavit, filed at the leave stage. There is provision for amendment of the statutory statement, under rule 4(2), which is the principal pleading in the process, according to rule (4)(1); and for filing of further affidavits, with leave, under rule 4(2). The statement herein is dated 12th March 2026, and the verifying affidavit was sworn on 12th March 2026. There is a supporting affidavit, sworn on 6th May 2026, but it was filed without leave, and the applicant has not asked to use that affidavit for the purpose of these proceedings. I shall, accordingly, confine myself to what is contained in the statement and the verifying affidavit. 2. There is only 1 annexture to the verifying affidavit, and that is the impugned ruling of 17th February 2026. The pleadings that were placed before the respondent have not been placed before me, and I am not able to evaluate the nature of the claims that were before the respondent. What I can gauge, from the analysis in the ruling, is that the dispute was sports-related. It was about an incident, on 20th September 2025, at the golf course of the applicant, when a golf ball, belonging to the 1st interested party, nearly hit players on the course, on 2 occasions. The 1st interested party was suspended from the applicant, on that account. Whereupon, she moved the respondent, in SSTSC Appeal No. E086 of 2025, for redress, and the applicant filed a preliminary objection on jurisdiction. In the end, the respondent ruled that it had jurisdiction. 3. In arriving at that conclusion, the respondent considered sections 46, 49 and 58 of the Sports Act. Section 46 states that a body shall not operate as a sports organization, unless it is registered under the Sports Act. The respondent ruled that the failure by the applicant to register as such ought not be used, by the applicant, to deny its members access to justice, with respect to disciplinary proceedings arising from sporting activities. Section 49 provides for a transition of sporting organizations registered under the Societies Act, Cap. 108, Laws of Kenya, to register under the Sports Act. The argument, by the applicant, was that that provision did not apply to it, as it was not registered under the Societies Act, but the Companies Act. The respondent ruled that section 49 applied to the applicant, upon considering the historical context of the Sports Act, and its objectives. Section 58 is the provision on the jurisdiction of the respondent, and the applicant had argued that its activities were not subject to that jurisdiction, as it was not an organization registered under the Sports Act, while the applicant argued that the dispute was sports-related, hence there was jurisdiction. The court ruled that the challenge presented by that, that is the non-registration of the applicant as a sports organization under the Sports Act, was created by the failure of the applicant to register under section 46, and that should not be used to disadvantage the 1st interested party, for to look at it otherwise would be to leave her without access to justice, for there would be no other forum for her to present her case. 4. What emerges, from these provisions of the Sports Act, is that the respondent would have jurisdiction over appeals from decisions made by national sports organizations or umbrella organizations, whose rules specifically allow for appeals to the respondent, in relation to disciplinary proceedings or not being selected for a Kenyan team or squad; other sports-related disputes where all the parties agree for referral to the respondent, and the respondent concedes to jurisdiction; and appeals from decisions of the Registrar of Sports. 5. It would appear that the applicant is not a national sports organization or an umbrella organization, within the meaning of section 46 of the Sports Act. It has not taken advantage of section 49, to transition from a limited liability company, under the Companies Act, to a sports organization, under the Sports Act. Even if it were, hypothetically, so registered as a sports organisation, it was not demonstrated, before the respondent, that its rules specifically allow for appeals to the respondent. Hence, the respondent would not exercise jurisdiction over its activities and decisions. Secondly, regarding the dispute over the disciplinary proceedings relating to the 1st interested party, the applicant, by raising a preliminary objection, in SSTTC No. E086 of 2025, demonstrated that it was not agreeable to the dispute being handled by the respondent. The matter before the respondent is, obviously, not an appeal against a decision of the Registrar of Sports. 6. As the applicant is not an organization registered under section 46 of the Sports Act, has no rules specifically allowing for appeals to the respondent, and as it has not agreed to have the dispute handled by the respondent, there is no jurisdiction for the respondent to handle the matter. Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or statute. In this case, the Constitution does not come in, for it does not establish the respondent nor confer it with jurisdiction. The respondent is established by statute, and its jurisdiction flows from that statute, specifically section 58 of the Sports Act. That provision does not cover the applicant, to the extent that the applicant is yet to be registered under section 46, in obedience to section 49. It could be that that situation is inconvenient to the 1st interested party. However, that alone would not justify assumption of jurisdiction by the respondent. The respondent is bound by the red, or black and white, letter of the law, in this case the Sports Act. It cannot craft a jurisdiction for itself, outside of that vested by section 58, to enable access to justice for a party, disadvantaged by the failure of the applicant to comply with sections 46 and 49 of the Sports Act, and the omission, by the Registrar of Sports, to enforce that law against the applicant, to bring it to compliance. There is no jurisdiction, on the part of the respondent, going by those provisions of the Sports Act, and the facts of the case, to entertain SSTTC No. E086 of 2025, and to make the decision it made on 17th February 2026. 7. Does that then mean that the 1st interested party would be without a remedy, or would be denied access to justice? I do not think so. The applicant is an entity registered under the Companies Act, with a constitution in the memorandum and articles of incorporation, and governed by its own by-laws. It would be open to the 1st interested party to seek redress, in accordance with the instruments of governance of the applicant. I am not persuaded that the 1st interested party is precluded from moving the court directly, without passing through the respondent, for relief, either by way of judicial review, constitutional petition or ordinary civil suit. 8. Should I, then, allow the application herein? That would depend on the prayers that are sought. 9. The first prayer is for *certiorari*, to remove and quash the decision of the respondent, in SSTTC No. E086 of 2025. The principal ground, upon which that prayer is sought, is that the respondent has no jurisdiction, to entertain disputes relating to disciplinary action taken by the applicant against the 1st interested party, in view of section 46(1) of the Sports Act. I have discussed this provision above. The non-registration of the applicant, as a sports organisation under the said Act, is a decisive factor herein, for, without it, the respondent would have no basis for exercising the jurisdiction, granted by section 58, over the applicant. Secondly, the dispute does not fall under section 58(b)(c) of the Sports Act, to the extent that the applicant has not agreed to the dispute being handled by the respondent, and the matter herein not being an appeal from the Registrar. The respondent has no jurisdiction over the matter, in SSTTC No. E086 of 2025, whatsoever, and it should not have entertained it, and its decision, of 17th February 2026, is amenable to judicial review, vide the order of *certiorari*. 10. The second prayer is for the judicial review order of prohibition, to bar the respondent from handling any other or further proceedings arising from the decision of the applicant, of 18th October 2025, that is other than in SSTTC No. E086 of 2025. This prayer is both misconceived and superfluous. Prohibition can only be with respect to a process before the respondent. That process is that in SSTTC No. E086 of 2025, and not any other, whether real or prospective. Secondly, once the order for *certiorari* is made, with respect to the proceedings and the impugned decision, in SSTTC No. E086 of 2025, pronouncing that the respondent has no jurisdiction, there would be no point of going further, to prohibit the respondent, from conducting the same proceedings. It would be an order in vain, and the court does not act in vain, for there would be nothing to prohibit by the making of the prohibition order. 11. In view of everything said above, I do find and hold that the motion herein, dated 13th May 2026, is merited, and it is hereby allowed, in terms of prayer 1 thereof. The effect of it shall be that the proceedings, in SSTTC No. E086 of 2025, and the ruling of 17th February 2026 therein, are hereby quashed. Each party shall bear its own costs. Orders accordingly. **DELIVERED, VIA CTS, DATED AND SIGNED IN CHAMBERS, AT MILIMANI, NAIROBI, ON THIS 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026.** **W MUSYOKA** **JUDGE** **Mr. Abdirahman, Court Assistant.** **Ms. L Wafula, Legal Researcher.** **Advocates** **Mr. Ondabu, instructed by Ondabu & Company, Advocates for the applicant.**