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Kibera & another v Mwai & 2 others (Civil Appeal 429 of 2019) [2026] KECA 1329 (KLR) (10 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1329 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Appeal 429 of 2019 DK Musinga, M Ngugi & P Nyamweya, JJA July 10, 2026 Between Peter Njonjo Kibera 1st Appellant Agnes Wairimu Njonjo 2nd Appellant and Jackline Mwai Respondent and Stanley Wainaina Njoroge 1st Interested Party City Council Of Nairobi 2nd Interested Party (Being an appeal from the judgment and decree of the Environment and Land Court of Kenya at Nairobi (S. Okong’o, J.) (as he then was) delivered on 20th June 2019 in ELC Suit No. 384 of 2010 Environment & Land Case 384 of 2010 ) Judgment Judgment of Musinga, J.A. 1.This dispute centers on a fundamental challenge to the sanctity of land ownership in this country: the existence of competing claims over the same parcel of land by two parties as purchasers from one seller, each clutching various documents that they claim entitle them to the land in dispute. The core task of the trial court was to determine which interest was first in time, which one was regular, and ultimately, which party held the valid legal interest to the exclusion of the other. 2.In the dispute culminating in this appeal, the Environment and Land Court at Nairobi (S. Okong’o, J.) (as he then was), addressed competing claims to the same parcel of land and found that, although both parties had acquired their respective interests in good faith, for value, and without notice of any competing claim, the party who purchased the parcel of land earlier held a prior equitable interest which prevailed. 3.The dispute before the trial court revolved around the ownership of a parcel of land known as Plot No. 239 Umoja Innercore Sector V (hereinafter referred to as “the suit property”). Peter Njonjo Kibera and Agnes Wairimu Njonjo (the 1st and 2nd appellants respectively), who are husband and wife, vide a Plaint dated 9th August 2010, claimed to be the beneficial owners of the suit property, and that they were therefore entitled to its possession. They contended that they purchased it in February 2010 from one Stanley Wainaina Njoroge (the 1st interested party) for Kshs. 2,200,000/- and were issued with various documents, including a letter of allotment dated 10th February 2001, copies of receipts, a lease, a beacon certificate and a power of attorney. They also contended that they conducted due diligence at the City Council of Nairobi (the 2nd interested party), and upon paying outstanding charges, obtaining a clearance certificate and securing approval for transfer, acquired a lawful interest in the suit property, albeit unregistered. 4.They further pleaded that in or about August 2010, Jackline Mwai (the respondent), wrongfully entered the suit property, took possession, erected a fence and denied them access. On that basis, they sought, inter alia, an order of vacant possession, a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from remaining on or interfering with the suit property, a mandatory injunction to compel removal of structures from the suit property, general damages for trespass, and costs of the suit. 5.Jackline Mwai opposed the suit. She filed a Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 16th June 2011. She denied the trespass claims and contended that she was the lawful owner of the suit property, having purchased it much earlier in September 2002 from the same Stanley Wainaina Njoroge. She pleaded that she paid the full purchase price of Kshs. 360,000/, received all the original ownership documents, and was granted an irrevocable power of attorney enabling her to deal with the property. By way of a counter-claim through which she joined Stanley Wainaina Njoroge and the City Council of Nairobi as the 3rd and 4th defendants respectively, she sought, inter alia, a declaration that she was the lawful and bona fide owner of the suit property; an order compelling facilitation of her registration as proprietor thereof; and an injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd appellants and the 2nd interested party from interfering with her ownership or from processing any transfer in favour of the 1st and 2nd appellants. 6.At the hearing, the appellants’ case was presented through Njuguna Gathacha, the father of the 2nd appellant. In summary, he testified that he was introduced to Stanley Wainaina Njoroge, the 1st interested party, by one John Wainaina Kariuki; that he inspected the suit property and found it vacant; and that he was furnished with documents relating to the suit property, including a letter of allotment dated 10th February 2001 in favour of the 1st interested party, receipts, and a lease. He further testified that he conducted a search at the City Council of Nairobi which confirmed that the suit property was registered in the name of the 1st interested party, whereupon he paid outstanding charges and obtained a clearance certificate. He stated that the appellants paid the full purchase price of Kshs. 2,200,000/- in cash and were issued with a power of attorney dated 9th February 2010 by the 1st interested party. He also testified that the Housing Development Committee of the 2nd interested party approved the transfer of the suit property to the appellants. He denied any fraud and maintained that the appellants were innocent purchasers for value without notice, adding that there was nothing on the ground or in the official records to indicate the respondent’s prior interest in the suit property. 7.On her part, the respondent testified that she purchased the property in 2002 from Stanley Wainaina Njoroge, the 1st interested party, after confirming his ownership with the City Council of Nairobi. She produced original documents, including the letter of allotment dated 16th January 2002, the agreement for sale dated 6th September 2002, original receipts for payments made to the City Council, a written acknowledgment of payment, and an irrevocable power of attorney registered in her favour. She stated that upon completion she took possession, marked out the boundaries, and fenced the property. Her evidence was corroborated by Mercy Wakibui Kamau, the advocate who acted for both her and Stanley Wainaina Njoroge in the 2002 transaction, who confirmed drafting and witnessing the agreement for sale and the power of attorney, and handing over completion documents to the respondent. The respondent maintained that having lawfully purchased the property, Stanley Wainaina Njoroge had no capacity to sell the suit property to the appellants in 2010. 8.Notably, Stanley Wainaina Njoroge and the City Council of Nairobi (the 1st and 2nd interested parties respectively), neither filed a defence to the counterclaim nor tendered any evidence at the hearing before the trial court. 9.The trial court, vide a judgment delivered on 20th June 2019, held that the appellants on the one hand, and the respondent on the other, had each purchased the suit property from the same vendor, Stanley Wainaina Njoroge, in good faith and for valuable consideration, and therefore each acquired an equitable interest in the property. However, the court found, as a matter of fact, and based on the evidence that the respondent was the first purchaser in 2002, having paid the full purchase price, received the original allotment documents and receipts, was granted a power of attorney, and taken possession of the property, had a better interest over the suit property than that of the appellants and therefore entered judgment in her favour. 10.The trial court further held that the lease produced by the appellants, said to be between Stanley Wainaina Njoroge and the City Council of Nairobi, was not registered, with the result that Stanley Wainaina Njoroge was not a registered proprietor of the suit property. Against that backdrop, the court considered the legal effect of the subsequent transaction in favour of the appellants in 2010 and found that, by that time, Stanley Wainaina Njoroge had already divested himself of his beneficial interest in the suit property and therefore had no interest capable of being transferred. While acknowledging that the appellants conducted due diligence and acquired their interest without notice of the earlier sale, the trial court emphasized that what they obtained was merely an equitable interest and not a registered title capable of protection under sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Land Registration Act. 11.In resolving the competing claims between the appellants and the respondent, the trial court characterized the dispute as one involving equal equities, since both parties had acquired equitable interests in good faith, and that neither party held a registered title to the suit property. It then applied the settled equitable maxim that where equities are equal, the first in time prevails. On that basis, it held that the earlier interest acquired by the respondent in 2002 took priority over the later interest acquired by the appellants in 2010. The trial court further observed that the appellants’ remedy lay not against the respondent, but against Stanley Wainaina Njoroge, the vendor, who had fraudulently sold the same property twice. 12.Flowing from the above findings, the trial court concluded that the respondent was lawfully entitled to the suit property and had not trespassed thereon. It accordingly dismissed the appellants’ suit in its entirety and allowed the counterclaim, declaring the respondent the lawful and bona fide owner, directed Stanley Wainaina Njoroge and the City Council of Nairobi to facilitate her registration as proprietor, issued injunctive orders to protect her possession, and awarded costs against Stanley Wainaina Njoroge. 13.Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, the appellants lodged this appeal. In their amended memorandum of appeal, they contend that the learned judge erred in law and in fact by failing to evaluate and analyze the totality of the evidence on record and thereby arriving at an erroneous decision; by failing to enter judgment in their favour, despite finding that they were innocent purchasers for value without notice; by failing to find that the respondent had not discharged the requisite burden of proof; by misapplying the equitable maxim that where equities are equal the first in time prevails; by failing to consider the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent; by determining the suit in favour of the respondent without sufficient evidentiary basis; by making findings on issues not pleaded or placed before the court; by failing to recognize that the trial court and the respondent were bound by the pleadings; and by failing to find that the respondent’s claim was defeated by laches. 14.At the hearing of this appeal, learned counsel Mr. Omwayo appeared for the appellants, while learned counsel Mr. Omondi represented the respondent. Learned counsel Ms. Munyua held brief for Mr. Nyasare for the 1st interested party. Save for Ms. Munyua who elected to rely entirely on her client’s written submissions, the other counsel made brief oral highlights of their respective client’s written submissions. 15.Highlighting the appellants’ written submissions dated 15th October 2024 and 23rd May 2025 respectively, counsel contended that the appeal turns on whether the learned judge erred in failing to enter judgment in favour of the appellants despite expressly finding that they were innocent purchasers for value without notice, whether the trial court misapplied equitable principles in resolving the dispute, and whether the appellants are entitled to the reliefs sought in their plaint. 16.On the first issue, counsel submitted that the appellants discharged their evidentiary burden by demonstrating that they conducted due diligence prior to the purchase. An official search at the City Council of Nairobi confirmed that the suit property was registered in the name of Stanley Wainaina Njoroge and disclosed no cautions, inhibitions or encumbrances. A physical inspection further revealed that the property was vacant, unfenced and undeveloped, thus giving no indication of any competing interest. Relying on the doctrine of caveat emptor, counsel argued that the appellants fulfilled their obligation as purchasers to investigate title and ascertain the status of the property, and that having exercised due diligence both on the records and on the ground, they could not reasonably have discovered the respondent’s alleged prior interest. It was further submitted that the appellants paid valuable consideration and were issued with a complete set of documents, including the letter of allotment, receipts, lease, beacon certificate, clearance certificates and a power of attorney, thereby demonstrating lawful acquisition in accordance with the applicable procedures. 17.Counsel emphasized that the trial court made a definitive and unchallenged finding that the appellants were innocent purchasers for value without notice, a finding that was neither appealed against nor displaced by a cross-appeal. Relying on the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Edition), counsel submitted that such a purchaser is one who acquires property for value in good faith without actual or constructive notice of any prior claim or defect in title, and contended that the appellants squarely met this threshold. In support of this position, counsel cited Tarabana Company Limited v Sehmi & 7 others (Civil Appeal No. 463 of 2019) [2021] eKLR, where this Court held that a purchaser who is not involved in fraud and acquires property for value is entitled to protection notwithstanding defects in prior transactions, and Samuel Kamere v Lands Registrar, (Civil Appeal No. 28 of 2005) [2015] eKLR, which set out the elements of a bona fide purchaser, including proof of valid and legal tittle, due diligence, valuable consideration and absence of notice. Counsel also relied on Gitwany Investment Limited v Tajmal Limited & 3 others [2006] eKLR for the proposition that equitable interests are subject to the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, and that priority rules only apply as between competing equitable interests. 18.It was further submitted that the trial court erred in elevating the equitable maxim that where equities are equal, the first in time prevails above the doctrine of innocent purchaser for value without notice. Counsel contended that once the appellants were found to be innocent purchasers, the respondent’s prior equitable interest could not defeat their claim. In addition, counsel contended that the trial court improperly relied on the said maxim despite it not having been pleaded by the respondent, contrary to the settled principle that parties are bound by their pleadings, thereby occasioning a misdirection in law. 19.On the issue of fraud, counsel submitted that although the respondent’s case before the trial court was anchored on allegations of fraud and misrepresentation, no evidence was led to substantiate those allegations. Reliance was placed on section 107 of the Evidence Act and authorities, including R.G. Patel v Lalji Makanji [1957] EA 314, where it was held that allegations of fraud must be strictly proved to a standard higher than a balance of probabilities; Christopher Ndaru Kagina v Esther Mbandi Kagina & another [2016] eKLR, which reiterated the need for specific pleading and strict proof of fraud; Urmila w/o Mahendra Shah v Barclays Bank International Ltd & another [1979] eKLR, where this Court affirmed that the burden of proving fraud lies on the party alleging it; and Moses Parantai & another (suing as legal representatives of the estate of Sospeter Mukuru Mbeere) v Stephen Njoroge Macharia [2020] eKLR, where this Court emphasized the requirement for credible evidence in proving fraud. Counsel submitted that the respondent failed to meet this threshold, and that the trial court erred in failing to properly address that deficiency. 20.In conclusion, counsel maintained that the trial court’s decision was legally untenable in light of its own finding that the appellants were innocent purchasers for value without notice, and urged this Court to allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial court, and substitute it with orders granting the reliefs sought in the plaint, together with costs. 21.On his part, Mr. Omondi, highlighting the respondent’s written submissions dated 21st October 2024, contended that the appellants do not qualify as innocent purchasers for value without notice in law. Placing reliance on Dina Management Limited v County Government of Mombasa & 5 others (Petition No. 8 of 2010) [2023] KESC 30 (KLR), which adopted the definition in Katende v Haridar & Company Limited [2008] 2 EA 173, counsel emphasized that one of the essential elements of a bona fide purchaser is the holding of a valid certificate of title. He submitted that the appellants did not possess any registered title, and therefore failed to meet a fundamental requirement of the doctrine. It was further contended that a valid certificate of lease or title as issued under the Land Registration Act is what attracts statutory protection, which the appellants lacked. 22.Counsel further submitted that the appellants failed to demonstrate that they acquired the property from a vendor with a valid or registrable title. He pointed out that Stanley Wainaina Njoroge was not a registered proprietor and therefore lacked the capacity to transfer any legal interest to the appellants. Indeed, counsel submitted that even the appellants’ own witness acknowledged that the property had previously been sold to the respondent, thereby negating any suggestion that a valid interest could pass to the appellants. On that basis, it was argued, the appellants’ claim that they were innocent purchasers was untenable, both in fact and in law. 23.On the issue of competing interests, counsel submitted that the trial court correctly applied the equitable principle that where there are competing equitable interests, the first in time prevails. It was contended that the respondent acquired her interest in 2002, well before the appellants’ purported purchase in 2010, and that in the absence of fraud or illegality, her earlier equitable interest took priority. In support of this position, counsel cited Naftali Ruthi Kinyua v Patrick Thuita Gachure & City Council of Nairobi (ELC Case No. 462 of 2011) [2021] KEELC 3539 (KLR), which in turn relied on the decision of this Court in Benja Properties Limited v Syedna Mohammed Burhannudin Sahed & 4 others (Civil Appeal No. 79 of 2007) [2015] KECA 457 (KLR), affirming that where equities are equal, the first in time prevails. 24.Counsel maintained that the respondent acquired an equitable and beneficial interest in the suit property upon purchase in 2002 and that such interest, though unregistered, was enforceable and capable of protection in equity. He contended that the appellants’ later transaction could not defeat that prior interest, particularly in light of the principle that a vendor cannot convey what he does not have. 25.In conclusion, counsel submitted that the trial court properly evaluated the evidence and correctly applied the law in finding that the respondent’s interest prevailed over that of the appellants. He urged this Court to find that the appellants failed to meet the legal threshold of innocent purchasers for value without notice, to uphold the judgment of the trial court, and to dismiss the appeal with costs. 26.On its party, the 1st interested party supports the appeal, albeit in a limited respect, primarily on the issue of costs. In its written submissions, the 1st interested party contends that he was never served with summons to enter appearance or with the counterclaim, despite being named as the 3rd defendant therein, and that he only became aware of the proceedings upon being served with the record of appeal. It is further submitted that there was no affidavit of service on record, nor any evidence that substituted service by advertisement as directed by the trial court was ever effected, thereby denying the 1st interested party an opportunity to participate in the proceedings in violation of his right to a fair hearing under Article 50 of the Constitution. 27.At the hearing, learned counsel, Ms. Mercy Munyua, responding to a question by the Court, clarified that her client did not dispute having received payment from both the respondent and the appellants in respect of the suit property. However, she emphasized that his support of the appeal was confined to challenging the order condemning the 1st interested party to pay costs on the basis that he was not properly served and was therefore not heard before adverse orders were made against him. 28.In the circumstances, counsel urged this Court to allow the appeal, particularly to the extent of setting aside the order on costs made against the 1st interested party, and to find that he ought not to have been condemned without being afforded an opportunity to be heard. 29.I have carefully considered the record of appeal, the impugned judgment, the grounds set out in the amended memorandum of appeal, the submissions by the parties and the law. This being a first appeal, it is well settled that this Court is not bound to accept the findings of fact made by the trial court. A first appeal proceeds by way of a rehearing, and the duty of this Court is to reconsider the evidence on record, evaluate it independently, and draw its own conclusions. In doing so, however, the Court must bear in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify and must therefore make due allowance for that limitation. See Selle and Another v Associated Motor Boat Company Limited and others [1968] EA 123 and Williamson Diamonds Ltd. V. Brown [1970] EA 1. 30.From the record, this appeal turns on three interrelated issues.The first is whether the learned judge properly evaluated the evidence and correctly found that the respondent was the first purchaser of the suit property and thereby acquired a superior equitable interest. The second is whether the learned judge erred in law in holding that the appellants, notwithstanding their status as innocent purchasers for value without notice, could not defeat the respondent’s earlier interest. The third relates to the complaint by the 1st interested party regarding the order on costs. 31.On the first issue, it is not in dispute that both the appellants and the respondent purchased the same property from the same vendor, Stanley Wainaina Njoroge, at different times. The trial court found, and the record so shows, that the respondent purchased the property in 2002, paid the full purchase price, received the original allotment documents and receipts, was granted a power of attorney, and took possession thereof. The appellants’ purchase in 2010 came long after the earlier transaction between the respondent and the 1st interested party. In those circumstances, the trial court was, in my view, entitled to attach significant weight to the documentary evidence produced by the respondent and the corroborative testimony of the advocate who acted for both the respondent and the 1st interested party in the 2002 transaction. Guided by the principles in Mbogo v Shah [1968] EA 93, I am not satisfied that the trial court misdirected itself or reached a plainly wrong conclusion on this issue. I therefore find no basis for interfering with that finding of fact. 32.The second issue goes to the heart of the appeal and concerns the legal effect of the 2002 and the 2010 transactions. The appellants contend that having been found to be innocent purchasers for value without notice, they were entitled to protection. That argument, however, must be considered in light of the nature of the interests held by the parties. It is common ground that neither party held a registered title. Indeed, and as rightly held by the trial court, what both parties acquired were equitable interests. 33.In such a situation, the governing principle, in my view, is that a vendor cannot convey a better interest than he himself possesses. This is the well-known doctrine, nemo dat quod non habet. In Wreck Motors Enterprises v Commissioner of Lands, [1997] eKLR, this Court held that once land has been alienated, it cannot be lawfully allocated again, unless the earlier allocation is lawfully cancelled. Similarly, in Benja Properties Limited vs Syedna Mohammed Burhannudin Sahed & 4 others (supra), this Court, quoting its decision in Wreck Motors Enterprises v Commissioner of Lands (supra) and the case of Faraj Maharus v J.B Martin Glass Industries & 3 Others [2005] KECA 107 (KLR), held as follows:“It is our considered view that the trial court did not err in upholding the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s title to the suit property and cancelling the appellant’s title. The alienation to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ is the grant that takes priority; at the time another grant was being made to the appellant, the suit land had already been alienated, there was nothing for the 5th Respondent to allot and alienate to the original allottee.” 34.The Court further stated in the said decision at paragraph 25 that:“In arriving at our decision, we note that an interest in land cannot be allotted, alienated or transferred when the specific parcel of land allotted is not in existence. Allotment of an interest in land is a transaction in rem attaching to and running with a specific parcel of land. In the instant case, the allotment by the Commissioner of Lands to the original allottees did not attach in rem to any land since there was no parcel upon which the allotment could attach. What the 5th respondent, the appellant and the original allottees did was to engage in paper transactions without a parcel of land upon which any interest in land would attach and vest – it was paper transactions without any parcel of land as its substratum.” 35.While Benja Properties Limited (supra) dealt with competing registered titles, the underlying principle applies with equal force to the present case where neither party held registered title but only equitable interests. Applying that principle, once Stanley Wainaina Njoroge sold the suit property to the respondent in 2002 and thereby divested himself of his beneficial interest, he retained no interest capable of being transferred to the appellants in 2010. The appellants’ diligence and good faith, though not in doubt, could not validate a transaction undertaken by a vendor who lacked capacity to pass any interest. 36.In that context, the appellants’ reliance on the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice is misplaced. As held in Katende v Haridar & Company Limited (supra), an innocent purchaser for value without notice must, among other things, demonstrate acquisition of a valid legal title, good faith, absence of notice of fraud, and payment of valuable consideration. That doctrine, however, is primarily applicable where legal title has passed. In the present case, no registered title was issued to either party; what both parties acquired were equitable interests. 37.This distinction is critical. The Supreme Court in Dina Management Ltd v County Government of Mombasa & 5 others (supra), underscored that the root of the title must be interrogated, and that a party cannot rely on the indefeasibility of title where the process leading to its acquisition is flawed. Although that case dealt with registered interests, the underlying reasoning applies with equal force here. The appellants’ claim, however bona fide, cannot stand if the vendor had no interest left to convey. 38.The trial court correctly characterized the dispute as one involving equal equities. Both parties acted in good faith and paid valuable consideration. In such circumstances, the applicable principle is that where equities are equal, the first in time prevails. This principle has long been recognized in equity and was affirmed by this Court in Benja Properties Limited (supra). 39.I am, therefore, unable to agree with the appellants’ contention that the finding that they were innocent purchasers automatically entitled them to priority. The absence of notice does not elevate a later equitable interest above an earlier one where the vendor had already divested himself of the property. The maxim that equity aids the vigilant cannot operate to defeat a prior lawful interest. I reiterate that equity does not assist a party to acquire what the vendor no longer had capacity to sell, nor does it operate to validate that which is void, or breathe life into an otherwise invalid transaction. 40.I also find no merit in the argument that the trial court relied on an unpleaded issue. The question of priority between competing interests was central to the dispute and flowed directly from the pleadings and evidence. Equally, I am not persuaded that the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proof. The respondent established the earlier transaction, and the transfer of beneficial interest thereby shifted the evidentiary burden to the appellants, who, in my view, were unable to demonstrate a superior claim. 41.On the issue raised by the 1st interested party regarding lack of service and the order on costs, I note at the outset that there is no evidence on record demonstrating that the 1st interested party was served, whether personally or by way of substituted service as directed by the trial court. As such, it would appear that the 1st interested party was condemned unheard, particularly on the issue of costs. However, even accepting that position, the 1st interested party did not file a cross-appeal to challenge the order on costs. The fact that he claims to have only become aware of the proceedings upon being served with the record of appeal did not, in any way, preclude him from filing a notice of cross-appeal pursuant to rule 93 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2010 (now rule 95), or, if out of time, from seeking leave of this Court to file the same out of time. 42.The law is settled that a party who seeks to vary or set aside any part of a judgment must properly invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court through an appeal or cross-appeal. Submissions alone cannot suffice. As was held in Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another v Stephen Mutinda Mule & 3 others [2014] eKLR, parties are bound by their pleadings, and issues not properly raised cannot be introduced through submissions. In the absence of a cross- appeal, I cannot disturb the order on costs made by the trial court against the 1st interested party. 43.In the end, I am satisfied that the learned judge properly evaluated the evidence and correctly applied the law in holding that the respondent’s earlier equitable interest prevailed over that of the appellants. I find this appeal devoid of merit and accordingly dismiss it in its entirety with costs to the respondent. As both Mumbi Ngugi and P. Nyamweya, JJ.A. agree, those shall be the orders of the Court. Concurring Judgment of Mumbi Ngugi, JA 1.I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my brother, D.K Musinga, JA, which I entirely agree with and have nothing useful to add. Concurring Judgment of P. Nyamweya JA 1.I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of D.K Musinga, JA (President). I fully concur with the reasoning and findings of My Lord Justice Musinga, JA and have nothing useful to add. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 10TH DAY OF JULY 2026.D. K. MUSINGA.................................JUDGE OF APPEALMUMBI NGUGI.................................JUDGE OF APPEAL.P. NYAMWEYA.................................JUDGE OF APPEAL.I certify that this is a true copy of the original.SignedDEPUTY REGISTRAR.