https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10562

Kihuyu & 13 others v Home Africa Communities Limited & 3 others (Civil Case E020 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 10562 (KLR) (26 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10562 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Kiambu Civil Case E020 of 2026 MN Mwangi, J June 26, 2026 Between Mungai Kihuyu 1st Applicant Samuel Kariuki 2nd Applicant Nicholas Wambugu 3rd Applicant Anthony Kiuna 4th Applicant Jamleck Mwangi 5th Applicant Emmanuel Maranga 6th Applicant Kang’E Nzeza 7th Applicant Diana Mumbua Makau 8th Applicant Sarah Naomi Njoki Wamae 9th Applicant Leonard Kabugi Kareko 10th Applicant Osman Mulanya Mumbia 11th Applicant Martin Mwarangu 12th Applicant David Maina Thuita 13th Applicant Dolly Wawira Kubuta 14th Applicant and Home Africa Communities Limited 1st Respondent Migaa Management Company Limited 2nd Respondent The County Executive Committee Member, Department Of Lands, Physical Planning & Municipal Administration And Urban Development At Kiambu County Government 3rd Respondent Kiambu County Government 4th Respondent Ruling 1.The plaintiffs filed a Plaint and a Chamber Summons application both dated 23rd April 2026. The plaintiffs seek various orders, including injunctive orders by way of interim measures of protection, restraining the defendants from any interference or dealings with the amendments of the Master Plan for Migaa Integrated Golf Estate Master Plan No. L.R. 29059 pending the hearing and determination of the application, the suit and the intended arbitral tribunal proceedings. 2.The 1st and 2nd defendants opposed the application through a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2026 on the grounds that this Court is not vested with jurisdiction to hear the application and suit by virtue of Articles 159(2)(e), 162(2)(b) and 165(5)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act (Cap. 8D Laws of Kenya), Sections 61(3), 61(4), 72, 78 and 93 of Physical and Land Use Planning Act (Cap. 303 Laws of Kenya). The 1st & 2nd defendants urged this Court to strike out the application and the entire suit with costs to them. 3.The plaintiffs opposed the application through Grounds of Opposition dated 1st June 2026. They argued that the suit and application are not land disputes but arise from an Arbitration Agreement between the parties. They stated that the reliefs sought are interim measures of protection pending arbitral proceedings, and that Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, expressly vests jurisdiction in the High Court to grant such orders. Additionally, they stated that Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution establishes the Environment and Land Court, which hears issues of environment, use and occupation of land and title to land. They asserted that a Preliminary Objection must be raised on points of law capable of disposing of the suit without reference to facts. 4.The plaintiffs contended that the instant Preliminary Objection requires the Court to inquire into the nature of the Arbitration Agreement, and if it is upheld, it will deny them the constitutional right to access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 5.This Court directed that the Notice of Preliminary Objection would be canvassed first and by way of written submissions. The 1st and 2nd defendants filed submissions dated 28th May 2026 through the law firm of Kivuva, Omuga & Co. Advocates, whereas the plaintiffs filed submissions dated 1st June 2026 through the law firm of O.M.A Advocates. The 3rd & 4th defendants’ Counsel made oral representations. 6.Mr. Kivuva, learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants, submitted that jurisdiction is everything and relied on the case of the Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KECA 48 (KLR), to support the said position. He stated that jurisdiction flows from the Constitution or the law or both, as was held in the case of Samuel Kamau Macharia vs KCB and 2 others [2012] eKLR. He further stated that jurisdiction is the soul, source, breath and life of judicial authority and relied on the case of Hon. Mohamed Abdi Mohamud -v- Ahmed Abdllahi Mohamed & 3 others (2018) EACA 677 (KLR), to bolster his submissions on the issue of jurisdiction. 7.Counsel submitted that in order to determine whether a dispute as to title is commercial or a land dispute in nature, the Predominant Purpose Test has to be considered, pursuant to the decision in Butler & 4 others v Redhill Heights Investments Limited & another [2016] KEHC 1313 (KLR) and Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee & another v Gikomba Business Centre Limited [2025] KECA 1257 (KLR), which explained the said concept. He stated that where orders are issued by a Court without jurisdiction, they are nullities. He relied on the Court of Appeal case of Mohamed Abdi Mahamud v Ahmed Abdullahi Mohamad & 3 others (supra), to support his assertion. 8.In analyzing the Plaint and the Chamber Summons application, Mr. Kivuva stated that the prayers therein relate to land use and planning of the parcel of land known as LR No. 29059, in which the plaintiffs allegedly hold registered leases for the portions they occupy. He submitted that a Preliminary Objection should raise pure points of law as was held in the case of Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, the Supreme Court decision in Hassan Nyanje Charo vs. Khatib Mwashetani & 3 others Civil Application No. 23 of 2014 and in Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya vs. Kenya Airways Ltd & 3 others (Application 50 of 2014) [2015] KESC 23 KLR (6th May 2015) (Ruling). He argued that a Court without jurisdiction cannot issue any orders even interim ones, as was stated in the case of Samuel Kamau Macharia vs KCB and 2 others (supra). 9.Mr. Kivuva submitted that the Constitution under Article 162(2) and (3) established the Environment and Land Court with jurisdiction to handle disputes of environment and the use and occupation of, and title to land. He relied on the case of Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Patrick Kangethe Njuguna & 5 others [2017] KECA 79 (KLR), which defined ‘use of land’ to mean utilization of land on the surface, above it and below it. He stated that this case is challenging the amendment of the Master Plan, which will interfere with the use of the land. He described the powers of the Environment and Land Court as stated in the case of Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee & another v Gikomba Business Centre Limited (supra), to include all interest in land, which was also defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition, to mean ‘the pleasure, comfort, and advantage that a person may derive from the occupancy of land. The term includes not only the interests that a person may have for residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and other purposes, but also interests in having the present-use value of land un-impaired by changes in its physical conditions.” 10.Counsel argued that in cases where there is a challenge between the Environment and Land Court and High Court, the Supreme Court holding in the case of Republic v Chengo & 2 others (Petition 5 of 2015) 7 [2017] KESC 15 (KLR) (26 May 2017) (Judgment), to the effect that though of equal status, each Court should only exercise jurisdiction limited to the statutes regulating the specialized Courts, comes to the fore. 11.He refuted the claim by the plaintiffs that the main suit is about commerce, and relied on the definition of the said term in the Cambridge Dictionary which means ‘related to making money by buying and selling things for profit’, which is not the case herein. 12.He stated that the jurisdiction of this Court is questioned in respect to the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, Cap. 303, which is an Act of Parliament whose preamble states that it is to make provision for the planning, use, regulation and development of land and for connected purposes. He further stated that Sections 73 and 77 of the said Act establish liaison committees for determination of all disputes relating to physical and land use. 13.Counsel urged this Court to exercise judicial restraint where there exists other adjudicatory bodies with primary jurisdiction in line with the position discussed in the case of Adega & 2 others v Kibos Distillers Limited & 5 others [2020] KESC 36 (KLR) and Susan Wanjiku Maina v Director, Physical and Land Use Planning Kiambu County Government & another [2022] KEELC 938 (KLR). He submitted that there is need to interpret the Constitution in a holistic manner as was held In the Matter of the National Land Commission, Sup. Ct. Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2014; [2015] eKLR. He submitted that this holistic interpretation should be used in Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, which even though it talks of the High Court, can be interpreted to mean Courts of equal status, as the High Court cannot deal with issues of specialized Courts. He cited the Supreme Court case in Republic v Chengo & 2 others (supra), which stated that Courts can have equal status but exercise different jurisdictions. 14.Counsel stated that the Environment and Land Court Act and the Constitution of Kenya have not expressly indicated that the Environment and Land Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine arbitration matters which is promoted under Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution on alternative forms of dispute resolution. 15.He stated that Section 7 of the Arbitration Act cannot be applied to defeat Article 165(5)(e) of the Constitution as read with Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, on the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court. 16.Mr. Kivuva relied on the case of Synergy Industrial Credit Ltd v Cape Holdings Ltd [2019] KESC 12 (KLR), which held that in interpreting arbitration law, one should never lose sight of the purpose of the enactment of the Act. He maintained that the Environment and Land Court has jurisdiction on issues relating to land use and planning, even when the same has a commercial underpinning to it. He also relied on the case of Pepe Limited v Kenya Railways Corporation & 3 others; Kenya Revenue Protection Services & another (Interested Parties) [2019] KEELC 4817 (KLR), to support his submissions. 17.Counsel stated that this matter is properly within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court under the Constitution and the Environment and Land Court Act. He added that the orders sought in the Plaint cannot be granted by this Court. He reiterated the need for purposive interpretation of the Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, which implies that the word High Court is used loosely to refer to Courts with the status of the High Court, inclusive of the Environment and Land Court. He relied on the case of Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee & another v Gikomba Business Centre Limited (supra), to urge this Court to strike out the entire suit and the application. 18.Mr. Ong’uti, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, submitted that the plaintiffs entered into individual contracts with the 1st defendant which contained an arbitration clause under Clause 4.4. He stated that a dispute arose following the unilateral amendments that the 1st defendant made to the Master Plan for the Migaa Integrated Golf Estate without notice to, consultation with or the consent of the pre-2021 applicants, resulting in a revised Master Plan. He stated that the 1st defendant has proposed further and more extensive revision/amendments to the Master Plan, which it has submitted to the 3rd and 4th defendants for consideration and approval without the knowledge, participation or consent of any of the plaintiffs herein. He stated that the plaintiffs were forced to move this Court for interim measures of protection, which are essential to preserve the integrity of the arbitral process. 19.Counsel submitted that High Court is vested with the jurisdiction to entertain and grant the interim measures of protection sought under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. In stating that the Court’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both, he cited the case of Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others (supra). He argued that the Chamber Summons application dated 23rd April 2026 was filed under the provisions of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, which provides for interim measures of protection to be filed to the High Court. He reiterated that Section 7 of the Arbitration Act expressly and unambiguously vests jurisdiction in the High Court to grant interim measures of protection before or during arbitral proceedings, and that the said provisions are clear, specific, and unqualified. 20.Mr. Ong’uti relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 others [2010] KECA 346 (KLR), which held that the Arbitration Act allows the High Court to give interim measures of protection under Section 7. He contended that the Environment and Land Court is not vested with jurisdiction to issue interim orders of protection under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, as jurisdiction of the Court cannot be expanded through judicial craft. He once again referenced the case of Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others (supra), to buttress his position. 21.Counsel argued that it is not every matter with a connection to land that falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court. He cited the case of Coast Apparel Epz Limited v Mtwapa Epz Limited & another [2017] KEHC 4025 (KLR), where the Court was of the same view. He contended that questions of environment, use of land, occupation of land or title to land have not arisen in this matter. He asserted that this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear the application for interim measures of protection pending arbitration. 22.Mr. Ong’uti submitted that Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution establishes the Environment and Land Court, with the status of the High Court and with jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes "relating to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land”. He disputed that the issues herein are in respect to title to any land, the use of or occupation of land, or any environmental matter, as they are on interim measures of protection to preserve the subject matter of a dispute, pending resolution by an arbitral tribunal. 23.Counsel stated that there is a clear distinction between the subject matter of the arbitration and the interim protection sought from the Court as stated by the Court in the case of Infocard Holdings Limited v Attorney General & 2 others [2014] KEHC 1984 (KLR). He argued that the applicants have not invited this Honourable Court to adjudicate upon the substantive dispute between the parties, but to only issue interim measures of protection pending arbitration, as otherwise the Court will be usurping the powers of the arbitral tribunal as its role is only a supportive one. 24.Counsel also stated that Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act (ELC Act) confers jurisdiction on the Environment and Land Court over disputes "relating to or arising from land”, but this case does not relate to a land dispute, but to an Arbitration Agreement between the parties under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. He relied on the maxim “generalia specialibus non derogant”, which means that general provisions do not derogate from specific ones. He relied on the said maxim in submitting that Section 13 of the ELC Act, which is a provision of general application to land disputes cannot override Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, which is a specific provision conferring jurisdiction on the High Court, over arbitration-related interim relief applications. He asserted that the specific must prevail over the general. 25.Mr. Ong’uti submitted that Sections 61(3), 61(4), 72, 78 and 93 of the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, relied on by the 1st and 2nd defendants are irrelevant to this case since the dispute is not a planning appeal, a challenge to planning permission, or an enforcement matter under the Act, but an application for interim measures of protection in aid of an Arbitration Agreement. 26.He submitted that the Preliminary Objection is procedurally defective because it does not meet the criteria set out in Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (supra), that it must raise a pure point of law; must be capable of disposing of the suit without reference to facts; and must be taken upon the facts as they appear on the pleadings. He stated that a Preliminary Objection cannot be raised where there are matters of fact or mixed questions of law and fact. He stated the instant Preliminary Objection requires investigation of facts, and it is an abuse of the procedure of the Court. 27.He submitted that the Preliminary Objection has failed the validity test, as this Court is required to consider the terms and scope of the Arbitration Agreement between the parties; the nature of the reliefs sought in the Chamber Summons application; the subject matter of the intended or pending arbitral proceedings; and the relationship between the application and the Arbitration Agreement. He argued that all those are factual inquiries that cannot be resolved on the pleadings alone, as the Court needs to look into the facts of the case. 28.Counsel submitted that this Honourable Court has clear and unambiguous jurisdiction over the suit and the Chamber Summons application by virtue of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, as the suit does not address a land dispute or a planning matter, the plaintiffs seek arbitration support and the High Court is the Court designated to hear such applications. 29.He urged this Court not to uphold the Preliminary Objection as it has the effect of rendering the right to seek interim protection in support of arbitration unenforceable. He urged this Court to dismiss the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2026 with costs to the plaintiffs and proceed to hear and determine their Chamber Summons application dated 23rd April 2026, on its merits. Analysis And Determination. 30.I have read the Chamber Summons application and the Notice of Preliminary Objection. I have also read the Grounds of Opposition and the written submissions by the parties’ Advocates. I have considered the representations made by Mr. Odere, learned Counsel for the 3rd and 4th defendants, who stated that he is in support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection and the submissions filed by the 1st and 2nd defendants. The main issue for determination is whether this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the Chamber Summons application and Plaint before it. 31.In the case of Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd –vs- West End Distributors Ltd (supra), the Court defined what a valid Notice of Preliminary Objection is, and stated as follows-“---a preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court or a plea of limitation or a submission xthat the parties are bound by a contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration”.In the same case Sir Charles Newbold, P. stated thus:-“a preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion. The improper raising of preliminary objections does nothing but unnecessarily increase costs and on occasion, confuse the issue, and this improper practice should stop”. 32.The contestation herein is on the issue of jurisdiction, which is critical, since without it, this Court will have to down its tools, as was held in the case of the Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” vs Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd (supra), where Nyarangi J.A., held as follows-'I think that it is reasonably plain that a question of jurisdiction ought to be raised at the earliest opportunity and the Court seized of the matter is then obliged to decide the issue right away on the material before it. Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a Court has no power to make one more step. Where a Court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A Court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.' 33.The Supreme Court of Kenya in the case of Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited (supra), held that Courts derive their jurisdiction either from the Constitution or Statute or both. The apex Court stated thus-“A Court's jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or Legislation or both. Thus a Court of Law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by Law” 34.In their Notice of Preliminary Objection, the 1st and 2nd defendants claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the main suit and the Chamber Summons application, as the subject matter falls under the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court. The plaintiffs on their part maintain that the High Court is vested with the requisite jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, to issue interim measures of protection pending arbitration of the dispute. It is the duty of this Court to establish whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application and the main suit. 35.As per the pleadings in the Plaint, the dispute herein arises from the Master Plan No. L.R. 29059 for Migaa Integrated Golf Estate. The plaintiffs allege that the 1st and 2nd defendants unilaterally sought to amend the said Master Plan subject to approval of the 3rd and 4th defendants. This Court notes that some of the amendments sought include conversion of some green area into saleable plots, amalgamation of some plots into private plots, expansion of medium density residential areas from 77.7 acres to 141.8 acres, removal of wastewater treatment infrastructure, water tower and telecommunications infrastructure and omission of some plots from the Master Plan creating ambiguity to their planning status and use. This Court notes that the plaintiffs’ claim is that the proposed amendments to the Master Plan will lead to diminution in property values, loss of green space and environmental amenity, removal of educational institutions, removal of security and emergency response infrastructure, removal of wastewater treatment, reduction in recreational amenities, encroachment upon riparian land and environmental degradation, which will have cumulative and irreversible effect on investment value. 36.The plaintiffs have invoked the Arbitration Clause contained in their leases. They issued a formal dispute notice and referral of the matter to arbitral. They have invoked the provisions of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act for interim measures of protection, pending the determination of the arbitral process. 37.The provisions for interim measures by the Court are provided for under Section 7(1) of Arbitration Act, 1995, which states as follows-“It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request from the High Court, before or during arbitral proceedings, an interim measure of protection and for the High Court to grant that measure.” 38.The above provisions are aimed at preserving the subject matter of the dispute, pending arbitral proceedings. See the case of Alison Jean Louis v Rama Homes Ltd [2020] eKLR, where the Court stated as follows-“1.It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request from the High Court, before or during arbitral proceedings, an interim measure of protection and for the High Court to grant that measure. The Law grants an Applicant an opportunity to apply to the Court to grant interim orders to preserve the subject matter and/or maintain status quo so as to ensure that there is a dispute for hearing and determination before the Arbitrator. The interim orders envisaged are in form of injunctions, deposit and/or holding of funds and any other relevant and legal interim order to freeze/stop/ remain as is situation so as to enable parties pursue Arbitration proceedings. In fact, once Arbitration proceedings commence, the Arbitrator on hearing the dispute may amend, set aside and/or enforce and maintain the interim order.” 39.It is not disputed that Section 7 of the Arbitration Act expressly refers to the High Court and not any other Court. It should however be noted that the said Act was enacted in 1995, way before the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which created other Courts of equal status, being the Employment and Labour Relations Court as well as the Environment and Land Court, under Article 162 (2) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 40.Although the Chamber Summons application dated 23rd April 2026 seeks interim measures of protection, the nature of the dispute is on amendments of the Master Plan No. L.R. 29059 for Migaa Integrated Golf Estate. That in itself is indicative that the dispute is on the use of land, management and physical planning of the said Golf Estate. It therefore follows that the appropriate Court to determine such a dispute is the Environment and Land Court, under Section 13(2)(a), (c) and (e) of the Environment and Land Court Act. 41.I am persuaded by the holding in the case of Gurvir Bhabra & another v John Malogo Ndiritu [2021] eKLR, which dealt with the issue of the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court under Section 7 of Arbitration Act. The Court therein held as hereunder:-“It is apparent that the said provision of the Law only speaks to the High Court and not otherwise and in this regard the question then arises, whether the Environment and Land Court, is seized of similar powers and/or mandate, as pertains to matters that fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the said court, in line of article 162 (2) (b) of the Constitution, 2010. It is imperative to note that the Arbitration Act 1995, was enacted prior to and/or before the Promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and at the time of the enactment of the said Act, the Superior court that had original and unlimited jurisdiction was the High Court. For clarity, the High court was vested with powers to handle and/or adjudicate upon all Civil Disputes, Environment and land matters, not excepted. However, upon the enactment of the Constitution 2010, there was created the Environment and Land Court and same was conferred with specific and delineated jurisdiction in line with article 162 (2) (b) of the Constitution, 2010, which provides as hereunder; System of courts. 162.(1)The superior courts are the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the courts referred to in clause (2). (2)Parliament shall establish courts with the status of the High Court to hear and determine disputes relating to—(a)employment and labour relations; and(b)the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land. It is worthy to note that the subject Dispute touches on and/or concerns a Tenancy Relationship and/or ownership rights over and in respect of the property known as LR No 209/7153/42, hereinafter referred to as the suit property. Being a matter that touches on and/or concerns a claim over and in respect of title to, occupation of and use of land, the subject matter therefore falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Environment and Land court. See section 13(7) of the Environment and Land Court Act , 2011.” 42.Applying the Predominant Purpose Test to the main suit and the Chamber Summons by the plaintiffs,, it is this Court’s considered view that the subject matter of the dispute relates to land use, management and planning of Migaa Integrated Golf Estate Master Plan No. L.R. 29059, which is a matter within the confines of the Environment and Land Court. The competent Court to address the issues raised in the main suit and the Chamber Summons herein, is therefore the said Court, which will also have the jurisdiction to address any resultant enforcement or setting aside applications from the arbitral proceedings that may be eventually instituted. 43.This Court finds that the Notice of Preliminary Objection is merited. The upshot is that due to lack of jurisdiction by this Court, the Plaint and the Chamber Summons application both dated 23rd April 2026 are hereby struck out. Costs are awarded to the 1st and 2nd defendants.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT KIAMBU ON THIS 26TH DAY OF JUNE 2026. RULING DELIVERED THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAMS ONLINE PLATFORM.NJOKI MWANGIJUDGEIn the presence of:-Mr. Kivuva for the 1st & 2nd defendants (applicants in the PO)Mr. Ong’uti for the plaintiffs (respondents in the PO)Ms Julia – Court Assistant.NJOKI MWANGI, J.**