Kingsholme Limited v Kedong Ranch Limited (Environment and Land Case E007 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 3123 (KLR) (21 May 2026) (Ruling)

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT NAIVASHA** **ELC LAND CASE NO. E007 OF 2025** **KINGSHOLME LIMITED…………………..……….….……….…………….PLAINTIFF** **VERSUS** **KEDONG RANCH LTD…………………………………………………..….DEFENDANT** **RULING** 1. Before me for determination are three Applications, the first one dated 12th February 2025, the second one dated 18th February 2025 and the third one dated 17th March 2025. For ease of reference, the parties herein shall be referred to as they appeared in the suit. 2. The Application dated 12th February, 2025, is a Notice of Motion Application brought by the Plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of Article 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010; Section 13 of the Environment and Land Act **(sic)**, No. 19 of 2011; Order 40 Rules 1 and 2; and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules; Sections 1A, 1B, 3, 3A and 63 of the Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya; Sections 98 and 100 of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012; Sections 138 and 141 of the Land Act, No. 6 of 2012; and all enabling provisions of the law in which the Plaintiffs sought for an order of temporary injunction restraining the Defendant by itself, agents, servants, employees, assigns, successor in title, or otherwise howsoever from sub-dividing, fencing, occupying, transferring, alienating, or in any way interfering with the Plaintiff’s use, occupation and access to Lake Naivasha, the lagoon, borehole, service roads and all service pipes thereto lying within the easement corridor in all that parcel of land currently known as Land Reference No. 10854/309 (Original No. 10854/308) measuring 21.73 Hectares and situated in the South East of Lake Naivasha, pending the hearing and determination of this suit. That the costs of the Application be borne by the Defendant. 3. The Application is premised on the grounds set out therein and on a Supporting Affidavit of even date, sworn by Audrey Namwakira, the Plaintiff’s Legal Officer, who deposed, by a Certificate of title dated 8th June, 1982, that the Plaintiff was and remains the registered and lawful proprietor of all that property known as Land Reference No. 10854/11 (Original No. 10854/4/7), measuring 80.04 Hectares and adjoining Lake Naivasha, hereinafter referred to as the “original property”. As a renowned grower and exporter of horticultural products and flowers, an activity that requires copious amounts of water, the Plaintiff had lawfully sunk a borehole and constructed a lagoon on the original property for the purposes of extracting and storing water. 4. She admitted that, under an Agreement of Sale dated 21st June, 2018, the Plaintiff had agreed to transfer to the Defendant a total of 44.28 acres of the original property (suit property), which was subsequently excised from the original property and issued with a Certificate of Title dated 21st May, 2019. She reiterated the contents of Clause 9 of the said Agreement to depose that it was an express term that the borehole and lagoon, together with the land under easement thereto, collectively known as the ‘’Excluded Property’’, would not form part of the sale to the Defendant. That, indeed, in strict accordance with the terms of the subject Agreement of Sale, the Plaintiff had not only entered into an easement but had also granted a long-term lease for the Excluded Property to its nominee, Mlasa Limited, and that the easement had duly been registered and recorded as entry number three (3) in the suit property’s Certificate of Title dated 21st May, 2019. 5. That thereafter, by a lease agreement dated 1st August, 2019, the Defendant agreed to lease the suit property to the Plaintiff for a period of 6 years. However, by a letter dated 13th February, 2023, the Defendant informed the Plaintiff of its decision to dispose of the suit property and issued a notice terminating the lease. That the Plaintiff, by its letter dated 4th September, 2024, requested the Defendant for an extension of the lease for a proposed term of 3 months, which request was turned down by the Defendant by its letter dated 13th September 2024, wherein it clarified that the subject lease term would expire on 28th February, 2025. That, in anticipation of the expiry of the lease, the Plaintiff began preparing to hand over the suit property to the Defendant. However, to its utter shock, it learnt that the Defendant was actively partitioning and fencing off the same, together with the excluded property therein. 6. That upon further inquiry, the Plaintiff had realised that the Defendant’s upcoming fence would not only interfere with its duly registered easement but also physically cut it off from the borehole and lagoon, which properties belong to it and not to the Defendant. That, since the Defendant’s fencing activities involve sinking fencing poles, the Plaintiff’s underground water pipes, humidity pipes, powerlines, and other service pipes would burst, be uprooted, and/or interfered with, yet the Plaintiff is totally reliant on the same and the arising easements thereto. That, indeed, it was for that very reason that the Plaintiff had expressly excluded the said properties from sale in the subject Agreement of Sale dated 21st June, 2018, and registered the easement dated 24th June, 2019. 7. She stated that unless the Honourable Court promptly intervenes to stop the Defendant’s ongoing fencing of the Excluded Property, the Plaintiff’s operations will cease, causing all its horticultural products to wilt and dry up, leading to significant losses. The Plaintiff employs over 2000 workers at the site, who rely on the horticultural activities for their livelihoods and depend on the lagoon and borehole for daily water. Therefore, the Defendant’s illegal actions threaten not only the Plaintiff's existence but also the livelihoods of thousands of workers directly dependent on the flower farms. 8. That the clear terms of the Sale Agreement dated 21st June, 2018, had expressly excluded the subject lagoon and borehole from the sale. That the Defendant’s illegal, irregular and unlawful actions herein constitutes a brazen ploy to unlawfully deprive the Plaintiff of its lawful property, to wit, the lagoon, boreholes and easements arising thereto contrary to the express provisions of Article 40 of the Constitution as read together with the relevant land laws of Kenya; the subject Agreement of sale dated 21st June 2018; and easement dated 24th June, 2019. 9. That subsequently, it is only fair, just and in the greater interests of justice that the Application herein should be heard and determined forthwith and the orders sought be granted. 10. The Defendant did not respond to the Plaintiff’s Application dated 12th February 2025. 11. The second Application dated 19th February, 2025 is a Notice of Motion brought by the Defendant pursuant to the provisions of Section 63(e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21 of the Laws of Kenya, Order 40, Rule 7 and Order 51, Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and Section 6 of the Arbitration Act Cap 49 of the Laws of Kenya wherein the Defendant has sought for the status quo order made on 14th February, 2025 be and is hereby set aside, that the proceedings herein be stayed and the Plaintiff directed to refer its claim to arbitration. The Defendants also sought the costs of the Application. 12. The application was supported by the grounds outlined within and the Supporting Affidavits of the same date, sworn by Amos Omondi Otieno and Stanley Kinyanjui, a shareholder, director, and chairman of the Defendant's Board of Directors, who deponed that the Defendant is the registered owner and occupier of Land Reference Number 10854/309 (originally 10854/308, the suit Property). He further noted that on 1st August 2019, the Defendant granted the Plaintiff a lease for the property, with a term ending on 28th February 2025. The Lease Agreement had included clause 7, which stipulated arbitration as the method for resolving all disputes arising from the lease. 13. That, nonetheless, the Plaintiff had requested an extension of the term of the lease for 3 months beyond 28th February, 2025, which request was declined by the Defendant as the parties had agreed that the Plaintiff would hand over vacant possession of the property to the Defendant on 28th February, 2025. That, further, they had also agreed that the Defendant would erect a fence on the suit property pending the Plaintiff’s handover of vacant possession on 28th February, 2025. 14. Accordingly, a meeting to deliberate on the progress made towards the Plaintiff’s handover of vacant possession of the suit property to the Defendant had been scheduled for 20th February, 2025, but was later rescheduled to 21st February, 2025. He argued that the easement alluded to by the Plaintiff is dated 24th June, 2019, and that it was executed between the Plaintiff and Mlasa Limited. 15. That clauses 2.9 to 2.11 of the said Easement provide for arbitration as the forum for the determination of all disputes arising therefrom. That, nonetheless, no dispute under the lease or easement had been declared by the Plaintiff, who filed the instant suit instead, seeking to enforce an easement over the property and falsely alleging a breach thereof by the Defendant. 16. That indeed, simultaneous with the suit, the Plaintiff had filed an application for injunction seeking to restrain the Defendant from alienating or dealing with the suit property, and from curtailing the Plaintiff’s rights in respect to the easement. An order for status quo was issued on 14th February, 2025; the matter was slated for directions on 10th March, 2025. 17. That the state of the property at the time of granting the order for status quo was that there was an agreement granting the Defendant unlimited access to the property for fencing in preparation for the handover scheduled for 28th February, 2025. 18. However, the Plaintiff misinterpreted the order for the status quo as an injunction to restrain the Defendant from entering, remaining on the property, and proceeding with the construction of the fence, where it barred the Defendant from accessing the property. Accordingly, the Defendant is dissatisfied with the order for the status quo to the extent that the Plaintiff relied on it to deny the Defendant entry into the property. The Plaintiff concealed and failed to disclose to the Court the arbitration clauses in the lease and easement that ousted the Court's jurisdiction. 19. That therefore, it is just and lawful that the order for status quo be set aside, the proceedings herein be stayed, and the Plaintiff directed to refer the dispute to arbitration to prevent the Plaintiff from misusing the order to prevent ends of justice, and abusing the process of the Court on a matter where the Court has no jurisdiction. 20. Amos Omondi Otieno, the Defendant’s Ranch Manager in his Supporting Affidavit deposed that on 30th January 2025, he had attended a meeting between the Directors of the Defendant and the Plaintiff in preparation for the handing over of the suit property herein upon the expiry of the Lease Agreement on 28th February 2025 wherein it had mutually been agreed that the Defendant could commence fencing the side of the boundary with the Plaintiff. 21. Subsequently, he had planned and mobilised the fencing by purchasing 1,200 wooden posts and paying for an electrical fence, after which the Defendant commenced fencing the boundary of the property on 5th February 2025. The fencing was undertaken parallel to the Plaintiff’s new fence, which the Plaintiff was also erecting. Indeed, the Plaintiff was 50% done with the fencing work on its side. 22. That on 17th February 2025, at around 4:30 pm, as he was leaving the Plaintiff’s main gate, he was approached by the guard, who informed him that he had been instructed not to allow the Defendant’s team to continue with the fencing work on the suit property from 18th February 2025. The deponent then called the Plaintiff’s manager, one Peter Mwangi, who confirmed this position and stated that a Court Order had been issued against the Defendant. 23. That he then called the Defendant’s Chairman, Stanley Kinyanjui, who directed him to take the team to work as usual on 18th January 2025, since he was not aware of any Court Order restraining the Defendant’s entry into the suit property or fencing the same. 24. That subsequently, the Plaintiff’s guard refused his team entry into the suit property, where they remained locked out. The Plaintiff’s Manager, Peter Mwangi, maintained that, pursuant to a Court order, the Defendant’s team would not be allowed onto the suit property, save for the deponent. They sought that their application be allowed. 25. In response to and in opposition to the Defendant’s Application, the Plaintiff, through its Replying Affidavit, dated 28th February 2025, sworn by its legal officer Audrey Namwakira, deposed that the Defendant’s Application dated 18th February 2025 was premised on a misapprehension of the nature of the issues in dispute before the Honourable Court. The application comprised deliberate misrepresentation and non-disclosure of material facts and was an attempt by the Defendant to muddle the dispute herein and obfuscate the issues in contention between the parties. 26. That, contrary to the Defendant’s allegations, the 6-year lease between the Plaintiff and the Defendant was not in issue in the instant suit, nor did the Plaintiff have any dispute with Mlasa Limited under the Easement Agreement dated 24th June, 2019. The issue before the Honourable Court was the scope of the parties’ respective rights and entitlements as delineated under the Agreement for Sale dated 21st June, 2018, between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. That, as it could be clearly seen in the Plaint dated 12th February, 2024, the issue before the Honourable Court was the extent of the proprietary rights which the Defendant purchased and paid for when it purchased 44.28 acres out of land Reference No. 10854/309. 27. That it was clear from the Plaint filed herein that whereas the said land Reference No. 10854/309 is approximately 53.69 acres (approximately 21.73 Ha.), the Defendant had purchased only 44.28 acres, thus the remaining land measuring approximately 9.41 acres had been excluded from the sale. That prior to the sale, the said portions had been vested in Mlasa Limited and reserved for the Plaintiff’s use under a Long Term Lease and Easement between the Plaintiff and Mlasa Limited, which had clearly been stipulated in the Plaintiff’s title as Entries number 2 and 3. That the said Agreement for Sale dated 21st June, 2018, between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the subject of the dispute herein, did not provide for the resolution of disputes between the parties by way of arbitration, thus the orders sought by the Defendant in its Application dated 18th February, 2025 cannot lawfully issue. 28. That in any event, the Defendant was not a party to the Easement Agreement dated 24th June, 2019, which was between the Plaintiff and its nominee Mlasa Limited, hence it could not purport to invoke the provisions of the said Easement Agreement as the basis for the referral of the dispute herein to Arbitration. Be that as it may, the Court had no reason to set aside the status quo orders that had been issued on 14th February, 2025, as prayed for the reason that clauses 7.1.5 of the Lease Agreement dated 1st August, 2019, between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, upon which the application is premised, provides clearly that: *“Notwithstanding the above provisions of this clause, a party is entitled to seek preliminary injunctive relief or interim or conservatory measures from any court of competent jurisdiction pending the final decision or award of the arbitrator.”* 1. That contrary to the Defendant’s allegations, the Plaintiff did not conceal any material facts from the court. That indeed, the minutes of the meeting to discuss the handover of the leased portion upon the expiry of the lease on 28th February, 2025, formed part of the annexures to the Plaintiff's application for interim relief. That, on the contrary, it is the Defendant who had become threatening and aggressive in the run-up to the handover process by asserting rights it did not have and putting into jeopardy the Plaintiff’s easement rights. That even after the Plaintiff had sought interim relief, it had continued with handover preparations as shown by the fact that when it received a letter dated 17th February, 2025 from the Defendant scheduling a meeting for 20th February, 2025 wherein it had proposed to review the Plaintiff’s preparations for handover of the leased property, the Plaintiff had through its Advocates on record written to the Defendant on 19th February confirming their attendance thereto. 2. That vide a letter dated 19th February, 2025, the Defendant had responded to the Plaintiff’s letter dated 19th February, 2025, with a proposal to postpone the meeting scheduled for 20th February, 2025, to 21st February, 2025. That on the same day, the Plaintiff had responded to the Defendant, informing it that the said meeting of 20th February, 2025 had been scheduled by the Defendant and therefore the Plaintiff had no power to reschedule it. They confirmed that they would attend the meeting as had been planned. 3. That consequently, the Defendant’s averment that the said handing over meeting scheduled by the Defendant for 20th February, 2025 had been postponed and/or rescheduled to 21st February, 2025 was not true because it was the one who had opted not to attend. 4. That it was the Defendant’s illegal actions of commencing to fence off the Plaintiff’s access to Lake Naivasha, its lagoon, borehole, and access roads, without any colour of right, and threatening the Plaintiff’s easement rights to the detriment of the Plaintiff, which had resulted in the application by the Plaintiff seeking the interim relief. That accordingly, should the status quo orders herein be set aside, the Defendant will proceed with its fencing of the suit property, which would not only cut off the Plaintiff from Lake Naivasha but also from its lagoon, borehole and access road thereto, thus depriving the Plaintiff of the much-needed water to run and operate its flower farms. 5. That indeed, the dispute herein would be resolved overnight were the Defendant to stop threatening the continued enjoyment by the Plaintiff of its easement rights and stop claiming what it did not purchase under the Sale Agreement dated 21st June, 2018. They sought the dismissal of the Application. 6. The third Application, dated 17th March, 2025, on the other hand is a Notice of Motion brought by the Plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of Article 40 and 159 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010; Section 3A and 63 of the Civil Procedure Act, CAP.21, Laws of Kenya; and all other enabling statutory provisions in which the Plaintiff has sought for the following orders: * 1. **Spent.** 2. The Honourable Court be pleased to deny the Defendant audience until it purges the contempt herein by removing all its goons and the police deposited in the suit property therein. 3. The Honourable Court be pleased to find the Defendant/ Respondent in contempt of the orders of the court issued on 12th February, 2025, and extended on 10th March, 2025. 4. Stanley Kinyanjui, the Defendant/Respondent’s Chairman, be committed to civil jail for a period of 6 months for deliberately and willingly disobeying the orders and directions of this Honourable Court. 5. The Court orders the Officer in charge of Naivasha Police Station to maintain law and order and prevent a breach of the peace at the suit property. 6. Costs of the Application to be in favour of the Plaintiff/ Applicant. 7. The Application was premised on the grounds set out therein, as well as on the Supporting Affidavit of equal date, sworn by Audrey Namwakira, the Plaintiff’s Legal Officer, who deposed that, pursuant to the grant of status quo orders by the court in its Application under Certificate of Urgency dated 12th February, 2025, to the effect that there should be no adverse interference with the suit property herein, an extension of the said orders had been made on 10th March, 2025. However, on the morning of 17th March, 2025, the Defendant, in the company of hired goons and armed police officers, stormed the suit property in an effort to forcibly evict the Plaintiff from the same. That at around 0850 hours on the said day, a lorry, which they believe to be from the Defendant, had entered the gate, ferrying workers with slashers & pangas, then proceeded directly to the Guest Houses down the Lake to carry out bush clearance from all nine Guest Houses down the Lake. 8. That Mr Stanley Kinyanjui, the Defendant’s director, had personally ferried the goons when they invaded the suit property on the morning of 17th March, 2025 and was overseeing the illegal invasion of the suit property. The Plaintiff’s security manager reported the said invasion of the suit property to the police station and was issued with OB No. 24/17/03/2025. 9. She argued that the Defendant’s foregoing actions were patently illegal and bereft of any colour of right, threatening to cut off the Plaintiff’s use and access to Lake Naivasha as well as its lagoon and borehole, which are located in the suit property herein. 10. That the Defendant’s brazen disobedience of the Honourable Court’s orders was a direct threat not only to the Constitution but also to the administration of justice and the rule of law in the country, for which the Court should not and cannot idly entertain it. That the said actions were willful and calculated to defeat justice, render the Plaintiff’s claim herein otiose, and turn the proceedings herein into a mere academic exercise. She thus deposed that it is only fair, just, and in the greater interests of justice that the subject Application be heard and determined forthwith and that the orders sought herein be granted. 11. In response and opposition to the Plaintiff’s Application dated 17th March 2025, the Defendant vide its Replying Affidavit dated 1st April 2025, sworn by Stanley Kinyanjui, denied having been in contempt of the order made on 14th February 2025, which he was aware of and in the manner claimed by the Plaintiff or at all. 12. He explained that the Defendant had acquired the suit property pursuant to a purchase for valuable consideration from the Plaintiff on 21st June, 2018. That the suit property was acquired subject to a lease and easement dated 24th June, 2019, between the Plaintiff and Mlasa Limited in respect of the borehole and lagoon. 13. That on 1st August, 2019, the Defendant leased the suit property to the Plaintiff for a term ending on 28th February, 2025. That thereafter, the Plaintiff had requested for an extension of the term of the lease for three months beyond 28th February, 2025, which request was declined by the Defendant. That the parties agreed that the Plaintiff would hand over vacant possession of the property to the Defendant on 28th February, 2025. That in the meantime, the Defendant would erect a fence on the suit property pending the Plaintiff’s handover of vacant possession of 9 dwelling houses on the suit property to the Defendant on 28th February, 2025. 14. That there was no, nor is there a dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant in respect to the agreement for sale of the suit property or in respect to the expired lease over the suit property. 15. That the grievances set out in the Plaint dated 12th February, 2025, could be summarised as: * 1. The Defendant partitioned and fenced off the suit property together with the borehole and lagoon in respect of which the Plaintiff has an easement; and 2. The Defendant refused to meet up with the Plaintiff to resolve the issue of partitioning and fencing off the suit property. 16. That the complaint of partitioning and fencing off the suit property without reference to the Plaintiff was sufficiently dealt with in the correspondence and minutes herein. Specifically, the table on page 2 of SK-2, the Plaintiff had expressly covenanted that: * 1. *The lease is amenable to the continuous access provided always that the lessor issues notice of the intended visit to the Lessee’s General Manager (Peter Mwangi) prior to the visit;* 2. *The Lessee is amenable to the development of the Lessor’s security at their access gate on L.R 10854/309 provided always that the Lessor gives prior written notification to the Lessee of the said deployment; and* 3. *The Lessee is amenable to the Lessor including the electric fence on their side of property on the perimeter fence being erected.* 17. That the parties had joint access and security to their respective boundaries of the suit property and the Plaintiff’s property, effective 1st February, 2025, in preparation for the handover scheduled for 28th February, 2025. (As confirmed by the minutes of the meeting of 30th January, 2025) 18. The issue of the Defendant’s failure to meet the Plaintiff had been addressed in the letter at pages 5 to 7 of SK-2. That, however, notwithstanding the filing of the suit, the Defendant had written to the Plaintiff, proposing a meeting on 21st February, 2025, which request had been rejected. 19. That in the letter of 17th February, 2025, the Defendant had scheduled a handover meeting on 20th February, 2025 and by then, the Plaintiff had already filed the suit. He refuted that the Defendant did not enter the suit property on 17th March, 2025, as it had always had access to the suit property and was on it prior to the filing of the instant suit. 20. That indeed, the Defendant had taken full peaceful possession of 9 dwelling houses on the suit property on 28th February, 2025, in terms of the agreement between it and the Plaintiff, which houses were empty and unoccupied. That, in fact, there had been no officer or agent of the Plaintiff on the suit property when the Defendant took vacant possession of the 9 dwelling houses, despite the Plaintiff having been notified to attend and witness the handover. 21. That upon termination of the lease and handover of the 9 dwelling houses on and the suit property, on 28th February, 2025, the joint security arrangement with the Plaintiff had ceased and the Defendant assumed absolute security for the suit property; hence the Plaintiff’s tenancy rights over the suit property, including possession, had been extinguished by operation of law. He asserted that the Defendant had not threatened to evict the Plaintiff from the suit property, which measures 44.22 acres and is adjacent to property Land Reference Number 10854/307 measuring 153.55 acres, which was the Plaintiff’s property. 22. That he had extracted a plan annexed and marked as SK-2 to illustrate the status of the Plaintiff’s property and the suit property. He explained that the red lines demarcate the gate and driveway to the suit property and thereafter the entire boundary of the suit property and the Plaintiff’s property, while the blue lines demarcate the 3 gates from the Plaintiff’s property accessing the borehole, lagoon and the Lake through the suit property. He thus argued that the borehole and lagoon, over which the Plaintiff had an easement, occupy a defined small area of the suit property, clear with roads and gates. 23. That the Defendant had not erected an electric fence on the suit property or on any area within the demarcated part occupied by the borehole, lagoon, gates and access roads to the same, as well as the Lake, but had only installed poles parallel to the Plaintiff’s new electric fence, hence the Plaintiff had unhindered access to the borehole, lagoon, gates and access roads to the same, as well as the Lake. That, indeed, the Plaintiff regularly pumps water to sustain its flower farm and also supplies water to the Defendant’s 9 dwelling houses. 24. That the Defendant had installed its own security guards, including police officers, in terms of the agreement that had been reached with the Plaintiff on 30th January, 2025, to guard all its vast properties, hence their presence on the suit property. The contents of paragraph 12 of Namwakira's Supporting Affidavit were hearsay from an unnamed security manager. That the 2 photographs appearing on pages 4 and 5 of the annexures to the Supporting Affidavit of Namwakira were in respect of the main gate to the suit property, which had always been manned by the Defendant’s security guards, including armed uniformed policemen, and was not the access point to the borehole, lagoon or to the Lake. 25. That he regularly visits the suit property and was there on 17th March, 2025, as authorised by the Defendant's chairman, to supervise the clearing of overgrown bushes near the 9 dwelling houses. Thus, the workers undertaking this task were not and could not be goons. He explained that the increase in the number of workers on the suit property on 17th March, 2025, for the purpose of clearing bushes around the 9 dwelling houses, was not a dispossession of the suit property from the Plaintiff, and therefore not adverse as contemplated in the order of 14th February, 2025. 26. He argued that the claims of goons being used by the Defendant to evict the Plaintiff were false, as the Plaintiff occupied nothing in the suit property. That adverse interference with the suit property must be read in the context of the proceeding recital in the order of 14th February, 2025, regarding the Plaintiff’s claim and asserted rights in respect of the borehole, lagoon and access to the Lake, none of which have been interfered with. That, subsequently, the aforementioned events could not amount to “adverse interference with” the suit property or the Plaintiff’s property, so that he and the Defendant could not be held in contempt of the order of 14th February, 2025. 27. That the Plaintiff had sought to sensationalise the otherwise straightforward matter for a reason that could not be understood. He thus prayed that the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion dated 17th March, 2025, be dismissed with costs. 28. In a rejoinder, the Plaintiff, vide its Further Affidavit dated 2nd February 2026, sworn by Simon Nzili, the security manager of the Plaintiff, a sister company of Mlasa Limited, deposed that, despite being fully aware of the aforesaid interim status quo orders, the Defendant had, on 17th March, 2025, unceremoniously stormed and evicted the Plaintiff from the suit property through the force of hired goons and armed police officers, where they had proceeded to cut down several trees planted on the suit property in brazen contempt of this Honourable Court’s Orders. 29. That further, the Defendant had gone ahead and brought onto the suit property animals, including cows, dogs and sheep, which animals were grazing on the suit property in direct contravention of the status quo order, which had prohibited parties from engaging in any form of adverse interference with the suit property. The aforesaid animals, which were not restricted in any shape or form, were freely wandering around on the suit property, therefore posing a significant risk to the Plaintiff’s horticultural operations. Since the suit property is not fenced, the Defendant’s animals had on numerous occasions intruded into the Plaintiff’s flower farm. That, unless the Honourable Court intervenes by holding the Defendant in contempt of the status quo orders dated 14th February, 2025, it is foreseeable that the said animals will worsen the conflict between the parties herein. 30. That since the Court Orders were sacrosanct and it is the unqualified obligation of any individual and/or entity to comply with the same, it is only fair, just and in the greater interests of justice that the Defendant be held in contempt of the Honourable Court’s order dated 14th February, 2025. 31. The three Applications were canvassed by way of written submissions, herein under summarized. **Plaintiffs’ Submissions.** 1. The Plaintiff, in its written submissions dated 14th March 2024(sic) in opposition to the Defendant’s Application dated 19th February 2025 against staying the court proceedings and referring the matter to arbitration, argued that the core of the legal dispute before the court was an Agreement for Sale dated 21st June 2018, which defines the proprietary rights of the parties. That the said agreement did not contain an arbitration clause. Their contention was that although the other related documents, like the short-term lease and the easement, contained the said clauses, they had either expired, were irrelevant to the current claim, or involved different parties, making the court the only proper forum for resolution. 2. Although the Defendant sought to set aside the status quo orders by alleging that the Plaintiff had concealed material facts, such as the lease expiry and handover meetings, this was not the case, as the Plaintiff had made a full disclosure of all facts, including the 28th February 2025 lease expiry and the correspondence regarding handover meetings, in the original application. In fact, it was the Defendant who misrepresented the facts by falsely claiming that a meeting of 20th February 2025 had been rescheduled. 3. The Plaintiff cited the decision in **Bahadurali Ebrahim Shamji vs Al Noor Jamal & 2 Others Civil Appeal No. 210 of 1997** to outline the principles of full and frank disclosure, where it had been established that only material facts must be disclosed and that not every small omission justifies discharging an injunction. 4. The Plaintiff argued that the dispute could not be referred to arbitration for reasons that first, the 2018 Sale Agreement, which defined the Excluded Properties (borehole, lagoon, etc.), contained no arbitration provision. Second, the short-term leaseback had expired and was not the basis of the current suit. Third, even if it were relevant, its terms allow for court-ordered interim relief. Lastly, while the Easement Agreement contains an arbitration clause, the Defendant was not a party to that agreement because it had been between the Plaintiff and Mlasa Limited. That under the principle of privity, the Defendant could not invoke a contract it did not sign. 5. To buttress its submissions, the Plaintiff relied on the decision in **UAP Provincial Insurance Company Ltd vs. Michael John Beckett [2013] eKLR,** where it was established that a court must evaluate the merits of a dispute to determine whether it falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement before staying proceedings. It also relied on the decision in **Eunice Soko Mlagui v Suresh Parmar & 4 others [2017] KECA 736 (KLR),** where it was affirmed that arbitration clauses apply only to the specific parties and types of disputes defined in the contract. Lastly, it relied on the decision in **Standard Group PLC v Wesley Kiptoo Yegon & another [2019] eKLR,** which reinforced the principle that arbitration depends on consent. If a party, such as the Defendant here regarding the easement, is not a signatory to the arbitral agreement, they cannot be subjected to or benefit from it. 6. In conclusion, the Plaintiff submitted that the court dismiss the Defendant’s application with costs. They maintained that the status quo orders were obtained legally through full disclosure and that the court must retain jurisdiction to protect the Plaintiff’s proprietary rights and easements, as no valid arbitration agreement exists between these two parties regarding the sale of the land. 7. The Plaintiff's submissions dated 26th January 2026, in support of its application for contempt dated 17th March 2025, were that the Defendant willfully and flagrantly disobeyed a court-ordered status quo issued on 14th February 2025 and extended on 10th March 2025. They contended that, although the order prohibited adverse interference with the land, the Defendant used armed police and goons to forcibly take possession of dwelling houses and fell trees. The Plaintiffs maintain that court orders are mandatory, not optional, and that the Defendant’s actions constitute a direct affront to judicial authority. 8. That the Defendant cannot claim ignorance, having been served with the order, having attended court on 10th March 2025, and having had their advocates participate in defining the scope of the status quo. Despite this, on 17th March 2025, the Defendant stormed the property, evicted the Plaintiffs, took over 9 houses, and destroyed trees. This occurred despite the court order freezing the situation on the ground. 9. The Plaintiffs argued that the status quo order suspended the planned handover of the property, initially set for 28th February 2025, and that the Defendant had no right to self-help or to judge the validity of the order. They asserted that the court must punish the Defendant to vindicate its authority and prevent the judiciary from being reduced to anarchy. 10. They relied on the decision in **Samuel M. N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 others [2020] eKLR**, which established that the power of contempt is innate and intrinsic to the existence of a court, where a court that could not enforce its orders was considered as an oxymoron. They also relied on the decision in **Republic v Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammed & another [2019] eKLR,** where the Supreme Court held that the object of contempt proceedings was to vindicate the court’s authority and to sustain the rule of law. Lastly, they relied on the decision in **Shimmers Plaza Ltd vs NBK Ltd (2015) eKLR,** where the Court of Appeal emphasized that obedience to court orders was mandatory, not optional, and that courts must not fold their hands in helplessness while their orders are disobeyed. 11. The Plaintiff defined contempt and willful disobedience by relying on the decision in **Miguna Miguna v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others [2018] eKLR** and the decision in **Christine Wangari Chege vs Elizabeth Wanjiru Evans & Others [2014] eKLR,** which held that disobedience must be deliberate and in mala fides. That mere technical non-compliance was not enough, but must be an intentional violation of the court’s dignity. 12. That there were f**our** Ingredients of Contempt as established in the decision in **Cecil Miller v. Jackson Njeru and Another [2017] eKLR** to prove contempt, which included: 13. The terms of the order were clear and unambiguous. 14. The defendant had knowledge/notice of the order. 15. The defendant acted in breach of those terms. 16. The conduct was deliberate. 17. That the case of **Woburn Estate Limited vs Margaret Bashforth [2016] eKLR**: established that even where a party believed that an order was null or irregular, they must obey it until it is formally discharged or varied by the court. A party could not judge for itself whether to follow a court directive. 18. In conclusion, the Plaintiff submitted that, because the Defendant’s actions met all the criteria for contempt, being knowledge, clarity of the order, and deliberate breach, the court should grant the prayers in the 17th March 2025 application to protect the sanctity of the legal process. **Defendant’s Submissions** 1. The Defendant’s written submissions dated 6th March 2025, in support of their application to stay court proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration, sought three specific judicial interventions, namely that the court should discharge the status quo order issued on 14th February 2025, stay the proceedings in the Environment and Land Court, and refer the entire dispute to arbitration. 2. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s suit was strictly a matter of contract, with the Plaintiff alleging breaches of two specific documents, namely the Lease of 1st August 2019 and the Easement of 24th June 2019, both of which contained clear arbitration clauses. The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff was contractually barred from seeking relief such as declarations of ownership and injunctions in a court of law. 3. The Defendant characterised the Plaintiff’s claim that the suit was based on the 2018 Sale Agreement as false, maintaining that since the alleged interference concerned the leasehold and easement rights, the arbitration clauses in those specific agreements must be honoured. Reliance was placed 4. The Defendants also relied on Section 6 of the Arbitration Act (Cap 49), which mandates that a court must stay proceedings if an arbitration agreement exists and the applicant has not yet filed a defence. They also relied on the decisions in **Adrec Limited v Nation Media Group Limited [2017] eKLR**, where the Court of Appeal held that once a Defendant enters an appearance and applies for a stay before filing a defence, the court is statutorily obliged to refer the parties to arbitration. The right to a stay was lost only if a party submitted to the court's jurisdiction by filing a formal defence. In **Ezeetec Limited v Conco Power Projects Limited (Kenya) [UR],** the High Court discharged the injunction and referred the matter to arbitration. The court held that where the language of an arbitration clause is deliberately broad, the dispute should be handled by an arbitral tribunal, which has the liberty to determine its own jurisdiction. 5. The Defendant concluded that the Plaintiff has neither denied the existence of the arbitration clauses nor proved that they are inoperative. Consequently, the Court should uphold the sanctity of the contracts and allow the Motion in its entirety, thereby shifting the dispute from the courtroom to an arbitral tribunal. 6. In its submissions dated 25th January 2026 in opposition to the Plaintiff’s Application for Contempt dated 17th March 2025, the Defendant contended that there had been no disobedience of the court order issued on 14th February 2025. They argued that the status quo was never breached because the Defendant took possession of the property legally on 28th February 2025, following the natural expiry of a lease. The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff’s allegations of eviction and interference were factually incorrect and based on hearsay. 7. The Defendant asserted that they did not storm the property on 17th March. Instead, they took peaceful possession on 28th February 2025, which was the agreed-upon date for the expiry of the Plaintiff’s 6-year lease. That upon the expiry of the lease, the Plaintiff’s tenancy rights were extinguished by operation of law. The Defendant argued that taking back their own property after the lease ended did not constitute adverse interference as prohibited by the court. 8. It noted that the 9 dwelling houses on the property were empty and unoccupied at the time of handover, where the Plaintiff failed to send a representative to witness the scheduled handover despite being notified. 9. The Defendant argued that the core of the Plaintiff's original suit was the protection of an easement (access to the borehole, lagoon, and Lake Naivasha). It provided photographic evidence and maps showing that the borehole and lagoon areas remained clear, with specific gates and roads left open for the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff continues to pump water regularly through the easement to sustain its flower farm, thereby proving that access has not been cut off. 10. The Defendant clarified that the armed uniformed police officers and security guards on-site were part of a long-standing security arrangement to guard their vast properties, a fact known and previously agreed to by the Plaintiff. That the goons mentioned by the Plaintiff were actually casual workers hired to clear overgrown bushes around the 9 dwelling houses, a routine maintenance task supervised by the Defendant’s Chairman, Stanley Kinyanjui. The Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit, sworn by Audrey Namwakira, was therefore based on hearsay from an unnamed security manager rather than first-hand observation. 11. In conclusion, the Defendant sought from the Court to dismiss the Notice of Motion with costs, reiterating that the status quo order must be interpreted in the context of the easement rights, which had not been disturbed. The Defendant could not be in contempt for exercising their right to possess the property after the Plaintiff's lease expired, and lastly, that Stanley Kinyanjui acted within his authority as Chairman and did not violate any judicial directives. **Determination**. 1. I have considered the Applications before the court, the response, the submissions and authorities as well as the applicable law. For ease of reference, the parties shall be referred to as reflected in the Plaint. 1. A summary of the three competing applications coming up for determination is the Plaintiff’s Application dated the 12th February 2025, wherein it seeks a temporary injunction against the Defendant claiming that as a flower exporter, it had sold land to the Defendant but explicitly excluded a borehole, lagoon, and service roads herein known as the ‘’Excluded Property’’ via a registered easement, to ensure continued water supply for their crops. 2. That subsequently theDefendant began fencing the property in a way that would physically cut off water access and destroy underground pipes, threatening its business and the livelihoods of 2,000 workers. It therefore sought a court order restraining the Defendant from fencing, occupying, or interfering with the water infrastructure until the case is decided. 3. The Defendant filed no response to this application, but instead filed an application dated the 19th February 2025, seeking to stay the proceedings before the court so that the matter could be referredfor arbitration, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction. They argued that the suit as a whole was based on a Lease and an Easement, both of which contained mandatory arbitration clauses. 4. They claimed that the Plaintiff’s lease expired on 28th February 2025, and the interim status quo order herein issued was being misused to prevent the Defendant from taking possession of their own land. They sought that the court discharge the status quo order, stay the proceedings, and compel the parties to resolve the dispute before an arbitrator under Section 6 of the Arbitration Act. 5. In response, the Plaintiff’s position was that the dispute was grounded on the 2018 Agreement for Sale, which contained no arbitration clause. The Defendant was improperly attempting to invoke clauses from the Lease and Easement agreements to muddle the issues, having not been a party to the Easement Agreement (which was between the Plaintiff and Mlasa Limited), and therefore, it could not legally invoke its arbitration clause. 6. The Plaintiff argued that they had disclosed all relevant facts and that a status quo order was necessary because the Defendant’s fencing would cause irreparable loss by wilting crops and cutting off water to 2,000 workers. They also argued that the Lease agreement allowed a party to seek interim conservatory measures from a court, meaning the court could keep the injunction in place even if the rest of the case moved to arbitration. 7. The third Application by the Plaintiff, dated 17th March 2025, was for contempt of the Court order of status quo. The Plaintiff claims that on 17th March 2025, the Defendant, led by its Chairman, Stanley Kinyanjui, ignored the status quo order by storming the property with armed police and hired goons to evict the Plaintiff. They alleged that the Defendant cut down trees and brought livestock, including cows and sheep, onto the land, thereby interfering with the flower farm's operations. They sought that the court find the Defendant in contempt, commit Stanley Kinyanjui to civil jail for 6 months, and bar the Defendant from being heard in court until the contempt is purged. 8. In response to the application for contempt, the Defendant and Stanley Kinyanjui denied having stormed the property, stating that they had only taken peaceful possession of 9 empty houses on 28th February 2025 because the Plaintiff's lease had legally expired by effluxion of time. They further stated that they had not interfered with the easement, as the Plaintiff still had unhindered access to the borehole and lagoon. They argued that they had only installed poles parallel to the boundary and had not blocked any water pipes or access roads. They contended that the goons alluded to were actually casual labourers clearing overgrown bushes, and that the police officers were part of a pre-existing security arrangement previously agreed upon by the Plaintiff. They also argued that the Plaintiff's allegations were based on hearsay from an unnamed security manager rather than on the personal knowledge of the legal officer who swore the affidavit. They reiterated that the 14th February 2026 order was meant to protect the easement, not to grant the Plaintiff a perpetual lease over land they no longer had a right to occupy. 9. I thus find the issues that arise for determination as follows: 10. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter or must refer it to Arbitration. 11. Whether the Defendant is in Contempt of the Status Quo order of 14th February 2025. 12. Whether an injunction order should issue. 13. On the first issue for determination, as to whether this Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit, or whether it must step aside in favor of contractually mandated arbitration, as submitted by the Defendant, where it contends that this Court is ousted of jurisdiction by virtue of mandatory arbitration clauses contained in the Long-Term Lease and the Grant of Easement. 14. Section 6 of the Arbitration Act, 1995, provides as follows: *‘’(1) A court before which proceedings are brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than the time when that party enters appearance or otherwise acknowledges the claim against which the stay of proceedings is sought, stay the proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds: -* *(a) That the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed; or* *(b) That there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with regard to the matters agreed to be referred to arbitration.* *(2) Proceedings before the court shall not be continued after an application under subsection (1) has been made and the matter remains undetermined.* *(3) If the court declines to stay legal proceedings, any provision of the arbitration agreement to the effect that an award is a condition precedent to the bringing of legal proceedings in respect of any matter is of no effect in relation to those proceedings”* 1. The Plaintiff strongly opposed the application, asserting that the primary cause of action was anchored upon the foundational Agreement for Sale dated 21st June 2018, which contains no arbitration clause and therefore by virtue of the *Doctrine of Privity of Contract*, the Defendant cannot enforce an arbitration clause from agreements to which it was not a contracting party. 2. The record reflects a distinct three-tier contractual matrix executed between these entities. The mother document is the Agreement for Sale dated 21st June 2018, executed between Kingsholme Limited, the Vendor herein, and Kedong Ranch Limited, the purchaser. Clause 1(t) of this specific agreement expressly excludes the Borehole and Lagoon from the sale, stating they ‘shall remain the properties of the Vendor.’ 3. Crucially, this Agreement for Sale did not contain an arbitration clause. Instead, Clause 2.1 incorporated the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) Conditions of Sale (2015), which traditionally reserve ultimate dispute resolution over land titles to courts of competent jurisdiction. 4. The arbitration clauses the Defendant seeks to rely upon are housed in two subsequent documents dated 24th June 2019, which were a Long-Term Lease and the Grant of Easement, both agreements having been executed between Kingsholme Limited and Mlasa Limited, which was a third-party legal entity. 5. Arbitration is strictly a creature of consent. It is a fundamental tenet of the law of contract that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute unless they have explicitly agreed in writing to do so. 6. The Court of Appeal in **Eunice Soko Mlagui v Suresh Parmar & 4 others [2017] eKLR** unequivocally held that an arbitration clause contained in an underlying corporate or land instrument cannot bind or be enforced by third parties who are complete non-signatories to that specific agreement. Because the Defendant is not a party to the contractual pact between Kingsholme Limited and Mlasa Limited, it cannot extract a personal covenant to arbitrate and use it as a shield to oust the statutory jurisdiction of this Court. 7. The court had held as follows: *‘’Section 6 of the Arbitration Act is a specific provision of a statute that provides for stay of proceedings and referral of a dispute to arbitration where parties to the dispute have entered into an arbitration agreement. The conditions under which the court can stay proceedings and refer a dispute to arbitration are prescribed by section 6 and in our view, the purpose of that provision is to regulate and facilitate the realisation of the constitutional objective of promoting alternative dispute resolution. We do not therefore find anything in the provision that can be described as derogating or subverting the constitutional edict as regards alternative dispute resolution. The provisions, for example, of section 6 which require parties to make an application for referral of a dispute to arbitration at the earliest opportunity and before taking any other action, or those that require the court not to refer a dispute to arbitration if the arbitration agreement is null and void, or is incapable of being performed, or if there is no dispute capable of being referred to arbitration, cannot be described as inconsistent with the constitutional principle of promoting alternative dispute resolution because the court is also obliged to take into account the equally important constitutional principle that justice shall not be delayed, by for example sending to arbitration a nonexistent dispute, or allowing a party who has otherwise elected to pursue proceedings in the court, to belatedly purport to opt for arbitration. (See also the ruling of the High Court, (Gikonyo, J.) in* ***Diocess of Marsabit Registered Trustees v Technotrade Pavilion Ltd, HCCC No. 204 of 2013****).’’* 1. In **Standard Group PLC v Wesley Kiptoo Yegon & another [2019] eKLR**. The High Court re-emphasised that arbitration clauses are severable, personal covenants that require absolute consensus between the specific parties in conflict. The Court held: *"In the case of;* ***Eunice Soko Mlagui –vs- Suresh Parmar& 4 others (supra)*** *the court held that an arbitral clause in the subject contract applied in the event of; disputes between members and the company and between members per se. That it did not apply to disputes with employees like the 4th and 5th respondents, who were external auditors of the company. To that extent therefore, and as contemplated by Section 6 (1)(b) of the Arbitration Act, there was no dispute between the appellant and the 4th and 5th Respondents, which the parties had agreed to be referred to arbitration.’’* 1. Applying the holdings in the authorities herein above, I find that the Defendant is a complete stranger to the Long-Term Lease and the Grant of Easement executed between Kingsholme and Mlasa Limited. While the Defendant is indeed the owner of the Servient Land, which is burdened by the easement, the personal contract to waive one's right to judicial review and submit to arbitration did not automatically run with the land to benefit a third-party purchaser unless expressly assigned to or agreed to in writing by the Plaintiff. 2. Furthermore, the Sale Agreement contains an ‘’Entire Agreement’’ clause at clause 20.7,which isolated the terms of the sale and the disputed borders of the excluded properties in that single document, and relied on the jurisdiction of the Kenyan Courts at clause 21. 3. The current dispute before this Court is not merely about the usage or maintenance of a water pipe. The Plaintiff’s claim is that the Defendant has physically fenced off 9.41 acres of land under the guise of an expired lease, thereby encroaching on the Excluded Properties which were *never sold* under the 2018 Sale Agreement. To this effect, I find that the dispute touches on land ownership, boundaries, and the constitutional protection of property under Article 40 of the Constitution, wherein under Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act,this Court has exclusive, original jurisdiction and therefore, relying on the above captioned authorites I find that the Defendant cannot hijack or enforce the arbitration clauses buried within ancillary agreements to which it is not a contracting party, consequently, the Defendant’s Notice of Motion dated 19th February 2025 seeking a stay of proceedings and a referral of the matter to arbitration is dismissed in its entirety. 4. On the second Application as to whether the Defendant is in Contempt of the Status Quo order of 14th February 2025. 5. Vide an ex parte order dated 14th February 2025, this court had directed as follows; *“In the meantime, the parties herein shall observe the status quo to the effect that there shall be no adverse interference with the said parcel of land”* 1. On the 10th March 2025, these interim orders were extended. The Plaintiff now brings an application for contempt proceedings against the Defendant dated the 17th March, 2025 on a complaint that, pursunt to the orders of status quo being in place, on 17th March 2025, the Defendant, led by its Chairman, Stanley Kinyanjui, stormed into the property in the company of armed police and hired goons to evict the Plaintiff whereby they cut down trees, physically fenced off a 9.41-acre portion of land housing the excluded properties (Borehole and Lagoon) effectively cutting off water pipelines feeding the Plaintiff's remaining flower farms, and brought livestock, including cows and sheep, onto the land, thereby interfering with the flower farm's operations. 2. The Defendant did not deny entering the land or erecting the fence, but argued that the fence was constructed on the 44.28 acres sold to them under the Agreement for Sale dated 21st June 2018. They argued that because the Plaintiff’s right to occupy the farm under the ‘’Lease-Back’’ clause had lapsed on 28th February 2025, their entry was a lawful exercise of proprietary rights, not contempt. 3. **The Black’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition)** defines contempt of court as:- *“Conduct that defies the authority or dignity of a court. Because such conduct interferes with the administration of justice, it is punishable usually by fine or imprisonment.”* 1. The law guiding the present Application is Order 40 Rule 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which stipulates as follows: - *‘’In cases of disobedience, or of breach of any such terms, the Court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in prison for a term not exceeding six months unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.’’* 1. Section 29 of the Environment and Land Court Act is clear to the effect that; *“Any person who refuses, fails or neglects to obey an order or direction of the Court given under this Act, commits an offence, and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding twenty million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both.”* 1. The Court of Appeal, in its Judgement of 11th April 2025 in the case of **Wekesa & 2 others v Munialo [2025] KECA 679 (KLR),** held as follows; *‘’It is an established principle of law that in order to succeed in civil contempt proceedings, the applicant has to prove (i) the terms of the order, (ii) Knowledge of these terms by the Respondent, (iii). Failure by the Respondent to comply with the terms of the order. Upon proof of these requirements the presence of willfulness and bad faith on the part of the Respondent would normally be inferred, but the Respondent could rebut this inference by contrary proof on a balance of probabilities.* *Perhaps the most comprehensive of the elements of civil contempt was stated by the learned authors of the book* ***Contempt in Modern New Zealand****, who succinctly stated: a. the terms of the order (or injunction or undertaking) were clear and unambiguous and were binding on the defendant;* *b. the defendant had knowledge of or proper notice of the terms of the order;* *(c) the defendant has acted in breach of the terms of the order;* *There are essentially four elements that must be proved to make the case for civil contempt. The applicant must prove to the required standard (in civil contempt cases which is higher than civil cases) that:(d) the defendant's conduct was deliberate.”* 1. Having so found, from the application, the response, the sworn affidavits, submissions by Counsel, the applicable law and the decided authorities, the following issues stand out for determination: 2. Whether there was a valid order of the court issued on 14th February 2025 and extended on 10th March 2025. 3. Whether the Defendant was served with or made aware of these orders. 4. Whether the Defendant herein deliberately and willfully failed to comply with the terms of the order and is guilty of contempt of the said Court orders. 5. On the first issue for determination as to whether there had been a valid order issued by the court on 14th February 2025 and extended on 10th March 2025, the Court of Appeal in the case of **Mugah –v- Kunga [1988] KLR 748**, held that in land matters, status quo orders should always be issued for purposes of preserving the subject matter. The court’s practice directions, vide Gazette Notice No. 3461/2025, Practice Direction No. 23(l), give the court the leeway and discretion to make an order for parties to maintain the status quo until the determination of the case. 6. Going by the court’s proceeding, pursuant to an application dated the 12th February 2025, on the 14th February 2025, the Court issued ex-parte interim orders of injunction to the effect that ‘*’parties herein shall observe the status quo to the effect that there shall be no adverse interference with the said parcel of land”* I find that indeed vide its directions of 14th February 2025 and extended on 10th March 2025, the Court had issued a valid order. 7. On the second issue, namely whether the Defendant had been served with or made aware of the said court order, I have perused the proceedings and noted that, pursuant to the ex parte orders of 14th February 2025, the express ex parte interim orders were served upon the Defendant via their email address, as evidenced by an affidavit of service sworn on the same day, 14th February 2025, by the court process server. The affidavit of service was attached to the Plaintiff’s pleadings, and a link was provided for reference. The service was acknowledged by the Defendants' Notice of Appointment of Advocate. On the 10th March 2025, Mr Havi and M/S Esther Anganwa were present on behalf of the Defendant and submitted that they were under no obligation to file a response to the Application dated 12th February 2025. They sought instead that the matter be referred for arbitration and that the court schedule a date for hearing on their Motion dated the 18th February 2025. The parties took directions on the application dated the 18th February 2025, and interim orders were extended in the presence of the Defendants’ Counsel. 8. The Court of Appeal in the **Shimmers Plaza Limited v National Bank of Kenya Limited [2015] eKLR** had held as follows: *‘’Kenya's growing jurisprudence right from the High court has reiterated that knowledge of a court order suffices to prove service and dispense with personal service for the purposes of contempt proceedings. For instance,* ***Lenaola J*** *in the case of* ***Basil Criticos Vs Attorney General and 8 Others******[2012] eKLR*** *pronounced himself as follows:-* *“...the law has changed and as it stands today knowledge supersedes personal service.....where a party clearly acts and shows that he had knowledge of a Court Order; the strict requirement that personal service must be proved is rendered unnecessary”* *This position has been affirmed by this Court in several other cases including the* ***Wambora case*** *(supra).* *…….Would the knowledge of the judgment or order by the advocate of the alleged contemnor suffice for contempt proceedings? We hold the view that it does. This is more so in a case such as this one where the advocate was in Court representing the alleged contemnor and the orders were made in his presence. There is an assumption which is not unfounded, and which in our view is irrefutable to the effect that when an advocate appears in court on instructions of a party, then it behoves him/her to report back to the client all that transpired in court that has a bearing on the client’s case.* *This is the position in other jurisdictions within and outside the commonwealth.’’* 1. It can be seen from the above holding, which is binding to this court, that the Court of Appeal had made a significant finding that relaxed the strict requirement for personal service in contempt proceedings. The court held that jurisprudence had gradually moved beyond the necessity of personal service of orders to focus on whether the alleged contemnor had actual knowledge of the terms of the court order. It held that, provided it could be shown that the person alleged to be in contempt was aware of the terms of the court order, the failure to comply with the order did not vitiate the contempt proceedings. The primary consideration thus shifted to the substantive issue of awareness and willful disobedience of the court's command. I find that the Defendant herein had actual knowledge of the terms of the court order, and therefore, personal service was unnecessary. 2. Lastly, as to whether the Defendant deliberately and willfully failed to comply with the terms of the said order, and is therefore guilty of contempt of Court orders, the Plaintiffs' complaint was that during the month of March 2025, and in the pendency of status quo orders, on the 17th March 2025, the Defendant’s Chairman (Stanley Kinyanjui) led hired goons and armed police where they forcibly invaded/stormed into the property, evicted the Plaintiffs, took over 9 houses, and destroyed trees. The Defendants also brought animals (cattle, dogs, and sheep) onto the land, which were wandering into the flower farms and clearing vegetation around guest houses. Their complaint was supported by a police report (OB) extract and pictorial evidence annexed as ‘’ÁN’’ and “SN” to the sworn Affidavits of the Plaintiff’s legal officer and security Manager, respectively. 3. The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s lease expired on 28th February 2025, and that the Defendant was therefore exercising their right to possession. In the **Shimmers Plaza Limited** case (supra), the Court of Appeal held that a court order must be obeyed even if a party believes it to be irregular, as follows; *‘’It cannot be gainsaid that the duty to obey the law by all individuals and institutions is paramount in the maintenance of the rule of law, good order and the due administration of justice.* *As stated by Romer, L.J. In****Hadkinson –vs- Hadkinson******(1952) ALL ER 567,*** *“It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of, whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, L.C., said in Chuck –vs- Cremer (1) (1 Coop. temp.Cott 342):* *“A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it… It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid- whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it exists it must not be disobeyed.”* 1. Indeed, a status quo order is used to preserve the state of affairs as they exist at the time of the order. The core of the Defendant's case is that the lease-back contract gave them a right to possession on 28th February 2025, which superseded the court order. This is a profound misapprehension of the rule of law. Indeed, if the Defendant believed that the expiry of the lease entitled them to possession despite the court order, their remedy was to move the Court to vary the order, not to engage in self-help. 2. By entering the land on the 17th March 2025 and engaging in the impugned activities complained of by the Plaintiff, the Defendant unilaterally decided that the expiration of the Lease-Back agreement took precedence over a judicial command. If the Defendant believed the lease's end entitled them to act as they did, nothing prevented them from seeking to vary the status quo order before invading the land. I find that the Defendant's conduct was a direct and wilful act of defiance against the court and the rule of law. 3. It is therefore mandatory that, unless and until a Court order is discharged, it ought to be obeyed and that it is not open to any person or persons to choose whether to comply with or ignore such orders as directed to him or them by a Court of law. 4. In the case of **Awadh vs Marumbu (No. 2) No. 53 of 2001 (2004) KLR 458,** the Court held that it is theduty of the Court not to condone deliberate disobedience of its orders, nor to waive its responsibility to deal decisively and firmly with the approved contemnors. 5. The Supreme Court of Kenya in **Republic v Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammed & Another [2018] eKLR** held that; *“The power, to commit a person to jail, must be exercised with utmost care, and exercised only as a last resort. It is of utmost importance, therefore, for the Respondents to establish that the alleged Contemnor’s conduct was deliberate, in the sense that he or she willfully acted in a manner that flouted the Court Order.’’* 1. It is therefore trite that contempt of Court proceedings and Applications are subtle and criminal in nature and would impose criminal sanctions if a conviction followed. Having found that the Defendant’s Chairman, Stanley Kinyanjui, hadactual knowledge of the status quo order but went ahead to commit the impugned activities, it is sufficient to find that he was in contempt. His actions in the pendency of a status quo order are a clear example of the precise action the court seeks to prevent, and the courts treat such blatant disregard with the utmost seriousness to uphold the dignity and authority of the judicial process. 2. Being mindful that the burden of proof in contempt proceedings is higher than that in a normal civil matter because such proceedings have the potential of impacting the rights of a party who may end up being committed to civil jail, I thus find the Plaintiff’s application dated the 17th March 2025, merited. 3. The Defendant’s Chairman, Stanley Kinyanjui, I find, was in blatant, deliberate and intentional violation of the court’s dignity, repute and authority wherein his conduct substantially adversely interfered with the substratum of the matter. I thus find him in contempt of the court order of 14th February 2025, which was extended on 10th March 2025, and will accordingly proceed to punish him. 4. On the last Application, namely whether to grant an injunction order pursuant to the application dated 12th February 2025, the court, having pronounced itself on the issue of ‘’whether it had jurisdiction to hear the matter or to refer it to arbitration’’, and having noted that the Defendant did not file a response to the application based on their application dated the 18th February 2025, and being mindful of the provisions of Article 50 of the Constitution on fair hearing, directs the Defendant to file its response within 14 days, and the Plaintiff shall have 7 days to file their rejoinder. 5. The Plaintiff shall have costs of both the Applications herein above dispensed with. **Dated and delivered via Microsoft Teams at Naivasha this 21st day of May 2026.** **M.C. OUNDO** **ENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT– JUDGE**