[2007] KEHC 1517 (KLR)
The court held that the defendant's defence could not be characterized as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the court process. The defendant denied interfering with the plaintiff's application for Land Board consent, and the issue of interference is a matter of fact that must be proved at trial. The court...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2007] KEHC 1517 (KLR)
- Parties
- Plaintiff: Kiundu Kimani; Defendant: Stephen Thumi Kimani
- Court
- High Court
- Court Station
- High Court at Nyeri
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Civil Case 30 of 2006
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Case / Ruling on Application to Strike Out Defence
- Outcome
- application dismissed with costs to the defendant
- Judges
- MM Kasango
- Legal Topics
- Striking Out of Pleadings, Summary Judgment, Land Ownership Disputes, Trusts in Land
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Kiundu Kimani
Plaintiff
Stephen Thumi Kimani
Defendant
Procedural Posture
Civil Case / Ruling on Application to Strike Out Defence
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the defence filed by the defendant is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the court process.
- 2 Whether the defence should be struck out under Order VI Rule 13 (1) (b) and (c).
- 3 Whether the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment or the matter should proceed to trial.
Ratio Decidendi
The court held that the defendant's defence could not be characterized as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the court process. The defendant denied interfering with the plaintiff's application for Land Board consent, and the issue of interference is a matter of fact that must be proved at trial. The court emphasized that summary procedures for striking out pleadings should be used cautiously and only in clear cases. Since the defence raised substantive issues regarding trust and ownership that require determination at trial, the application to strike out the defence was found to be misconceived and was dismissed with costs to the defendant.
Court Disposition
application dismissed with costs to the defendant
Orders
- The plaintiff's Chamber Summons dated 17th April 2007 is dismissed.
- Costs of the application are awarded to the defendant.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
23 paragraphs
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA
AT NYERI
Civil Case 30 of 2006
KIUNDU KIMANI…….…………………………………….…PLAINTIFF
Versus
STEPHEN THUMI KIMANI…………….…………………DEFENDANT
RULING
Plaintiff has brought Chamber Summons dated 12th April 2007 seeking that the defence filed herein be struck out for being frivolous, vexatious or for delay in the fair trial of this suit. The application is brought under Order VI Rule 13 (1) (b) and (c). The Plaintiff and the Defendant are brothers. The Plaintiff by his plaint claims that he is the registered owner of parcel No. LOC. 19/NYAKIANGA/1430. The Plaintiff further pleaded in his plaint that the Defendant has interfered with his use of that land by objecting to the Plaintiff’s application for Land Board consent to transfer that property to another person. As a consequence of that objection the Plaintiff claims he suffered loss and damage. The Plaintiff by his plaint prays for an injunction against the Defendant to stop him interfering with that land and he additionally seeks an award of damages.
In support of the application of striking out the defence the Plaintiff in his affidavit stated that he is the registered owner of that property. That there had been tribunal cases between the Defendant and his wife involving the subject property where the Defendant claimed ownership of that property. That that claim was dismissed.
In his defence the Defendant stated that the Plaintiff holds the land in trust for both of them. That the property originally belonged to their father and subsequently the Plaintiff caused that property to be registered in his name. He further stated that there is a tribunal matter that is still pending between them. Finally in his defence the Defendant denied having interfered with the Plaintiff’s quiet possession of that property.
The Plaintiff by his present application is seeking the Court to use its summary process of striking out the defence. In considering this summary process the courts have had the following to say: In the case of DYSON V ATTORNEY GENERAL [1911] 1 K.B 401 the court had the following to say:
“To my mind it is evident that our judicial system would never permit a plaintiff to be ‘driven from the judgment seat’ in this way without any court having considered his right to be heard, excepting in cases where the cause of action was obviously and almost incontestably bad.”
In the case of HUBBUCK & SONS LTD. V WILKINSON, HEYWOOD & CLARK.” [1899] 1 Q.B. 86 the court expressed itself as follows:
“The…….…summary procedure [i.e. under Rule 19] is only appropriate to cases which are plain and obvious, so that any master or judge can say at once that the statement of claim as it stands is insufficient, even if proved, to entitle the plaintiff to what he asks.”
In our local case of DT DOBIE & COMPANY (KENYA) LTD. V MUCHINA [1982] KLR 1, Madan J. A. stated:
“the Court ought to act very cautiously and carefully and consider all facts of the case without embarking upon a trial thereof before dismissing a case for not disclosing a reasonable cause of action or being otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. At this stage, the court ought not to deal with any merits of the case for that is a function solely reserved for the judge at the trial as the court itself is not usually fully informed so as to deal with the merits “without discovery, without oral evidence tested by cross-examination in the ordinary way.”
With the caution stated in the above case which I have relied upon, I find that the Defendant’s defence cannot be said to be frivolous, vexatious nor can it be said to be an abuse of the process of the Court. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant interfered by objecting to his application of Land Board consent. The Defendant in his defence denied that. The Defendant cannot be sent away from the seat of judgment for denying interfering with that application for consent. It is the Plaintiff’s claim that there is interference and in the face of the Defendant’s denial the Plaintiff has to prove his case. The Defendant’s defence cannot be said to be vexatious, scandalous or frivolous nor is it an abuse of the court process. I find the Plaintiff’s application by Chamber Summons dated 17th April 2007 is misconceived and the same is dismissed with costs to the Defendant.
MARY KASANGO
JUDGE
Dated and delivered at Nyeri this 14th day of November 2007.
By: M. S. A. MAKHANDIA
JUDGE