https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/1628

Lagat v Government, County Government of Uasin Gishu & 4 others (Petition E011 of 2026) [2026] KEELRC 1628 (KLR) (8 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 1628 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Eldoret Petition E011 of 2026 MA Onyango, J June 8, 2026 Between Joseph Kipngetich Lagat Petitioner and The Government, County Government of Uasin Gishu 1st Respondent The County Government of Uasin Gishu 2nd Respondent The Speaker of the County Assembly 3rd Respondent Uasin Gishu County Assembly 4th Respondent and Loice Chelimo C Murray Interested Party Ruling 1.Vide a Notice of Motion dated 21st April, 2026, filed by the Petitioner herein under certificate of urgency, he seeks the following orders:a.Spent.b.That pending the hearing of this Application inter parties, a conservatory order be and is hereby issued suspending and staying the processing, implementation, enforcement and or operationalization of the circular issues by the 2nd Respondent on nomination and appointment to the position to the County executive dated the 9th day of April 2026.c.That the hearing of this Application inter parties, a conservatory order be and hereby issued restraining the 3rd and 4th Respondents from receiving, vetting or in any other way processing the nomination of the interested party as a member of the County Executive Committee.d.That pending the hearing of the Petition herein, a conservatory order be and is hereby issued suspending and staying the processing, implementation, enforcement and or operationalization of the circular issues by the 2nd Respondent on nomination and appointment to the position of the County executive dated the 9th day of April 2026.e.That the hearing of this Application inter parties, a conservatory order be and hereby issued restraining the 3rd and 4th Respondents from receiving, vetting or in any other way processing the nomination of the interested party as a member of the County Executive Committee.f.That this Honourable Court be pleased to grant any other orders it may deem fit and just to grant in the circumstances. 2.The application is brought pursuant to Article 1(1), 1(3), 2(1),2(2), 2(4),3(1), 10,23,(3) (c), 165(6), 25(c), 35(, 47(1), 50(1), 50(2) 236(b) 258(1), 258(2), and 259(1) of the constitution of Kenya 2010, Section 40 (3) (b) of the County Governments Act, Sections 3(1), 3(2), 3(4), 4(1) and 23(1) The Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013) It is supported by the grounds at the foot thereof and the supporting affidavit of Joseph Kipngetich Lagat, the Petitioner herein, sworn on 21st April, 2026. 3.The grounds upon which the application is premised are that the Petitioner was by letter dated 2nd November, 2022 appointed as a County Executive Committee Member for a period of 5 years and assigned the docket of Roads, Transport and Public Works. That vide a circular dated 3rd December, 2025 titled “Re-organization of County Executive” the 1st Respondent re-assigned the Petitioner to the Department of Public Service Management, Administration and Devolved Units, which he has dutifully served in as provided in Article 183 of the Constitution and section 36 of the County Government Act. That through a Media release dated 9th April, 2026, the 1st Respondent announced that he had nominated the Interested Party to serve as the County Executive Committee Member for Public Service Management, Administration and Devolved Units, pending approval by the County Assembly. 4.The Petitioner avers that, in total disregard of the well-laid-out procedures for the removal of a County Executive Committee Member as provided for in Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution as read together with section 40 of the County Government Act, the 2nd Respondent has subjected the Petitioner to acts amounting to constructive dismissal in that the 1st Respondent has issued a circular dated the 9th day of April 2026 titled Nomination and Appointment to Key Position in the County Executive in which the 1st Respondent nominates the Interested Party as the County Executive Committee Member for Public Service Management, Administration and Devolved Unit pending approval by the 4th Respondent, a position substantively held by the Petitioner. 5.The Petitioner contends that whereas the 1st Respondent can dismiss a County Executive Committee member (CECM) in accordance with the provisions of section 31(a) of the County Governments Act 2012, the said power must be exercised reasonably and not for arbitrary or whimsical reasons. That there must be adequate grounds for the dismissal, and it must be beneficial to the County Government and must not infringe the rights of the Petitioner, that the same must be procedurally fair as provided for under Article 47 of the Constitution, as read together with the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 and section 40 of the County Governments Act, 2012. 6.That the impugned circular appointing the Interested Party is both irregular and unprocedural for its non-conformity and/or adherence to the mandatory provisions of Articles 47, 50 and 236(b) of the Constitution of Kenya, as read together with the provisions of section 40 of the County Government Act. 7.The Petitioner avers that no notice and/or reasons for termination or dismissal have been issued to him, and he only became aware of the said decision vide the impugned media release dated 9th, April 2026 purporting to nominate the Interested Party to fill his substantive position. 8.The Petitioner avers that the decision to issue the impugned media released dated 9th April 2026, was unexpected, arbitral, procedurally unfair and in blatant disregard of the provisions of Article 47, 50, 50 and 236(b) of the Constitution as read together with section 40 of the County Government Act, 2012. 9.The Petitioner avers that the strength of the Petitioner’s case and its proportionate magnitude, the irreparable harm he stands to suffer and the justice and equity of the case all tilt in favour of granting of some temporary relief in his favour. 10.In response to the application, the 1st and 2nd Respondents filed Grounds of Opposition dated 28th April 2026, in which they raise the following grounds:a.The Notice of Motion is an abuse of Court process and does not meet the threshold for grant of the orders sought as set out in the landmark case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KLR 154.b.The interim reliefs have no legal or ascertainable factual backing nor are they hinged in the main petition and hence not grantable.c.The orders sought are based on speculations and there is no material facts placed before the court to determine matters sought at interim stage and there is no demonstration of specific violation of section 40 of the County Governments Act.d.The matters raised in the motion are not specific, have no precision and the conservatory orders sought will prejudice public interest and violate the county government act.e.The reliefs of damages as sought in the Petition can only be determined on merit and the petitioner has not met the threshold required for grant of conservatory orders.f.The Petitioner has not demonstrated the loss he will suffer and his reliefs pleaded can only be considered by hearing the main suit on merits and his rights under Article 50have not been infringed.g.The petition is a public interest matter that obliges the court to hear the matters on merit before granting any relief or orders sought.h.The Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the orders as sought as the same will frustrate the functioning of state organs in exercising their constitutional mandates, matters meant for the court have not crystalized.i.The Petition and the motion are an abuse of the court process and ought to be dismissed with costs as the court is invited to give orders that are not enforceable.j.The Motion is bad in law and the allegations of violation of the Constitution are misplaced, as the circumstances complained of do not constitute a dispute meriting the grant of the orders sought at the interim stage.k.The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate the precise point at which his alleged removal occurred, thereby rendering the claim speculative and legally untenable.l.The Petition does not disclose with precision the alleged violation of constitutional rights, and therefore falls short of the threshold required in constitutional litigation and ought be struck out. 11.The 1st and 2nd Respondents further filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection in which they raise objections that:a.That this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Petition/Application by virtue of the exhaustion doctrine, the Petitioner having failed to utilize the constitutionally and statutorily prescribed dispute resolution mechanism through the County Assembly in matters touching on the nomination, vetting, and removal of County Executive Committee Members.b.That the Petition/Application is premature and speculative, as the nomination and vetting process by the County Assembly is ongoing and no final decision has been made capable of giving rise to a justiciable cause of actionc.That the Petitioner has failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, having failed to seek reinstatement to the position in question yet seeking to interfere with the constitutional vetting process. 12.In rejoinder, the Petitioner filed a Supplementary Affidavit sworn on 21st April, 2026 in which he deposes that the Application is not an abuse of the Court process and meets the threshold for the grant of conservatory orders pending the hearing and determination of the Petition, and that it satisfies the established requirements for conservatory orders, including the existence of a prima facie case with a likelihood of success, the demonstration of a violation or threatened violation of constitutional rights, and that the grant of the orders sought is in the public interest, that the Respondents' assertion that the reliefs sought by the Petitioner have no legal or ascertainable factual basis is incorrect and misleading to this Court; that on the contrary, the said reliefs are firmly anchored in the facts pleaded and are supported by the affidavits and exhibits on record. That the Application clearly sets out specific issues for determination as required in petitions and that the interim orders sought will not in any way prejudice public interest as there can be no public interest in the violation of the Constitution and that public interest can never override constitutionalism. The Petitioner pleads that unless the conservatory orders sought are granted, he stands to suffer prejudice and irreparable harm, that remedies issued at the judgment stage will not suffice to redress the prejudice to which he is exposed to, that contrary to claims by the Respondents, this Court has the Jurisdiction under Article 23 to determine constitutional claims, to fashion appropriate reliefs for the protection and enforcement of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. 13.The Petitioner deposes that he has clearly demonstrated the circumstance surrounding the action or inaction of the 1st Respondent, including the impugned decision to nominate the Interested Party to his substantive position which raises serious issues that requires evidentiary interrogation and cannot be dismissed at this stage. 14.The Petitioner deposes that the grounds of opposition raised by the 1st and 2nd Respondents dated April 28, 2026 are unmerited, raise no new facts of significance, disclose no point of law capable of disposing of this Application, and are only intended to delay the course of justice. 15.The application was disposed of by way of written submissions. The 3rd and 4th Respondents, and the Interested Party did not participate in the application or file any documents in respect thereof. Submissions of the Petitioner 16.In his submissions dated 29th April, 2026 the Petitioner identifies only one issue for determination: whether he meets the threshold for grant of conservatory orders. 17.The Petitioner submits that the threshold for conservatory orders as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others [2014] eKLR is as follows:a.The petition is arguable and not frivolous;b.unless the conservatory order is granted, the petition would be rendered nugatory;c.It is in the public interest that the order be granted. 18.The Supreme Court explained that the third condition is “dictated by the expanded scope of the Bill of Rights and the public spiritedness that runs through the Constitution.” 19.He submits that other courts have interpreted this third limb as incorporating the doctrine of proportionality, requiring courts to adopt the course that carries the lower risk of injustice. 20.The Petitioner submits that the threshold was restated by the High Court in Nkunja v Magistrates and Judges Vetting Board & another (Petition No. 154 of 2016) [2026] KEHC 7269(KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) where the court, after analyzing several decisions endorsed the Position in Munya as follows:a.The applicant must demonstrate a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and show that, unless the court grants the conservatory order, there is a real danger of suffering prejudice as a result of the violation or threatened violation of the Constitution;b.The applicant must show that, if the conservatory order is not granted, the petition alleging a violation or threatened violation of rights will be rendered nugatory; andc.The court must consider the public interest before granting a conservatory order. 21.The petitioner submitted that he had a prima facie case with likelihood of success as he had disclosed various arguable constitutional issues to wit:a.The impugned decision appointing the Interested Party contravenes Articles 47,50,and 236(b) of the Constitution, as read together with Section 40 of the County Governments Act, 2012, for failure to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements governing the removal of a County Executive Committee Member.b.Constructively dismissing the Petitioner without following a clear procedure for the removal of a County Executive Committee Member, and incorporates the right to fair hearing and fair administrative action as guaranteed under the Constitution, Section 40 of the County Governments Act.c.Contravening the applicable legal framework by failing to issue the Petitioner with any notice or reasons for his termination or dismissal, with the Petitioner only becoming aware of the decision through the impugned media release dated April 9th, 2026 nominating the Interested Party to his substantive position.d.Failing to inform the Petitioner of the administrative action taken against him and by denying him prior notice and an opportunity to be heard contrary to provisions to Section 4(3)(a), (b), and (g) of the Fair Administrative Action Act.e.Failing to provide the Petitioner with information and documentation necessary to appeal or/review the decision contravening Section 6(1) of the Fair Administrative Action Act.f.Failing to furnish the Petitioner reasons for the action taken and to provide relevant documents relating to the decision contravening Sections 6(2)(a) and (b) of the Fair Administrative Action Act. 22.The petitioner submitted that in Centre for Human Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) & 7 others v Attorney-General (2011) eKLR the court explained that:‘A party seeking a conservatory order only requires to demonstrate that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that unless the court grants the conservatory order there is real danger] a result of the violation of threatened violation of the Constitution’.Further, that an Applicant dislodges this hurdle if they highlight either a violation or a threat to a right, arguable constitutional issues, so as to warrant a response from the Respondents. 23.The Petitioner further submitted that he had demonstrated that the petition will be rendered nugatory should the orders sought not be granted being thata.The impugned decision appointing the Interested Party will continue to contravene Articles 47, 50, and 236(b) of the Constitution, as read together with Section 40 of the County Governments Act, 2012, thereby perpetuating violations of mandatory procedural safeguards governing the removal of a County Executive Committee Member.b.The constructive dismissal of the Petitioner without adherence to the procedure for removal of a County Executive Committee Member, as provided under Section 40 of the County Governments Act and the constitutional guarantees of fair hearing and fair administrative action, will remain in force and remedied.c.The continued implementation of the impugned action, despite failure to issue the Petitioner with any notice or reasons for his termination or dismissal, will persist, with the Petitioner having only become aware of the decision through the impugned media release dated 9th April 2026 nominating the Interested Party to his substantive position.d.The Respondents will continue to violate section 4(3)(a), (b), and (g) of the Fair Administrative Action Act by denying the Petitioner prior notice, information, and an opportunity to be heard in respect of the administrative action taken against him.e.The Respondents will further continue to contravene section 6(1) of the Fair Administrative Action Act by withholding information and documentation necessary to enable the Petitioner to lodge an appeal or seek review of the decision.f.The Respondents will also continue to contravene sections 6(2)(a) and (b) of the Fair Administrative Action Act by failing to furnish reasons for the action taken and by withholding relevant documents relating to the decision, there by rendering any eventual remedy at the hearing stage insufficient to cure the ongoing constitutional and statutory violations. 24.The Petitioner submits that in the absence of preservation of the substratum of the Petition, the eventual determination of this Court will be rendered largely in effectual, as post hoc remedies cannot restore or safeguard constitutional guarantees. That such a final determination will neither arrest nor remedy the prevailing lawlessness and impunity, which are likely to persist and escalate unless the conservatory orders sought are granted. 25.On the limb of public interest the Petitioner submits that there can be no greater public interest than the strict observance and adherence to the Constitution. That permitting the Respondents to unconstitutionally and constructively dismiss the Petitioner, without adherence to the due procedures envisaged under Articles 22(1), 47(1), and 50 of the Constitution, would be contrary to the public interest. 26.Lastly, the Petitioner submits that the prejudice likely to be suffered by the public, by being subjected to pronouncements that may ultimately be found unconstitutional, far outweigh any prejudice that the State might suffer. He submits that public interest demands that the culture of human rights and constitutional propriety be promoted and safeguarded by the Judiciary. That constitutional propriety requires scrupulous compliance with the Constitution by public bodies and does not countenance the arbitrary or malicious exercise of public power. Conversely, that the culture of human rights demands that any limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms must have a clear foundation in both the law and the Constitution. Public interest, therefore, tilts firmly in favour of granting a conservatory order to forestall any continued violation of constitutional provisions, rights, and values, including the rule of law, democracy, human dignity, equity, social justice, human rights, non-discrimination, good governance, integrity, transparency, and accountability, as enshrined under Article 10 of the Constitution. 27.The Petitioner relied on the High Court decision in Republic v County Government of Mombasa Ex-parte Outdoor Advertising Association of Kenya [2014] eKLR where the court held that,“there can never be a public interest in breach of the law because public interest must accord to the Constitution and the law as the rule of law is one of the national values under Article 10 of the Constitution”.The Petitioner submitted that there can be no public interest in the violation of the Constitution. Put differently, public interest can never override constitutionalism. 28.It is submitted that in the public interest, the Court is vested with protective jurisdiction to arrest any threat to constitutionalism without having to await the final determination of the Petition relying on the decision in Mohamed & 6 others v County Assembly of Wajir & 9 others (Constitutional Petition E009 & E017 of 2021 (Consolidated) [2022] KEHC 169 (KLR) (16 February 2022) (Judgment), where the court held that judicial authority imports both anticipatory and post facto power to respectively restrain or remedy breach or violation of rights. That judicial authority exists where rights and fundamental freedoms are violated or threatened with violation, within the textual provisions of Article 22. Further, that a party cannot be required to suffer an illegality, a breach of his rights, and resultant injustice on the mere assurance that his grievance will be remedied upon appeal or other review after the damage has been done. 29.The Petitioner submits in conclusion, that Article 23 confers upon this Court constitutional jurisdiction to determine constitutional claims, to fashion appropriate reliefs for the protection and enforcement of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. That it is incumbent upon this Court to grant such remedies as will ensure that the Petitioner is not rendered helpless in the face of the wrongs already committed or imminently threatened against him. Such jurisdiction is intended to afford interim protection to shield persons from preventable harm, risk, or prejudice that may arise through inaction or omission. Submissions of the 1st and 2nd Respondents 30.The 1st and 2nd Respondents identified the following issues for determination in their submissions dated 4th May, 2026:i.Whether the Applicant has met the threshold for grant of conservatory orders;ii.Whether the orders sought are consistent with the substantive reliefs in the Petition;iii.Whether this Honourable Court should interfere with the constitutional mandate of the County Assembly and the Governor. 31.On the 1st issue the 1st and 2nd Respondents rely on the decision in Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others and submit that the Petitioner has not met the threshold for grant of conservatory orders as public interest rank higher than the personal interests of the Petitioner. The 1st and 2nd Respondents submit that the Petitioner has not sought reinstatement and thus his claim ought to be considered at the hearing of the main petition. 32.They further submit that because the Petitioner has not sought reinstatement there is no real danger posed if the 3rd and 4th Respondents received, vetted or in any other manner processed the nomination of the Interested Party as a member of the Executive Committee. They submit that the Petitioner’s prayers in the application are not anchored on any substantive relief in the petition. For emphasis they rely on the decision in Venasio Mbataro Kariuki v The Governor, County Government of Nyandarua & 2 others [2019] KEELRC 333 (KLR) where the court held that as a government functioning to serve the people, pending hearing and determination of the Claimant’s suit the County Government has a duty to the people in the county government of Nyandarua and that it is in the interests of the public not to grant the orders sought as granting the orders would be prejudicial since the orders would paralyze county executive functions by interfering with the constitutional mandate of the County Executive. 33.On the second issue the 1st and 2nd Respondents submit that the Petitioner having sought compensation in the Petition, the orders of certiorari quashing the nomination and subsequent vetting of the Interested Party are not compatible, relying on the decision in Law Society of Kenya v Anne Kananu Mwenda & 6 others [2021] KEHC 449 (KLR) where it was held that a court has a primary duty to uphold the Constitution and should not create a constitutional crisis. That granting prayers B to E in the Petitioner’s application would result in a constitutional crisis. That the court should allow the vetting to proceed as this would be in the best interest of the people of Uasin Gishu. They submit that in the case cited the court held that the process of vetting was valid and lawful as it was undertaken by a constitutional entity solely mandated to do so. 34.On the final issue the 1st and 2nd Respondents submit that in any litigation the duty of the court is not only to consider the rights of the parties before it but also to weigh the competing interests. They submit that the matter before the court involves the people of Uasin Gishu and their governance. That the matters raised have not crystalized at this stage sufficiently to be determined by hearing parties on merit. They submit that the Petitioner has joined the County Assembly in this matter and the proper forum for him to raise the issues is in the County Assembly and not before this court. They submitted that the matter is before this court prematurely as the Petitioner should first exhaust the avenue available, relying on the decision of Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 others. Determination 35.I have considered the Notice of Motion, the affidavits filed by the Petitioner, the Grounds of Opposition and the Preliminary Objection filed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. I have further considered the submissions on record. The issues that arise for determination are:i.Whether the Preliminary Objection dated 16th October 2025 is merited;ii.Whether the Petitioner has established a prima facie case warranting the issuance of conservatory orders;iii.What orders should issue? Whether the Preliminary Objection dated 16th October 2025 is merited 36.The 1st and 2nd Respondents raised a Preliminary Objection contesting the jurisdiction of this court to hear the petition herein on grounds that the Petitioner has not exhausted the constitutionally prescribed dispute resolution mechanism through the County Assembly in matters touching on nomination, vetting and removal of County Executive Committee Members. 37.A preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law which, if upheld, would dispose of the matter without the need for further evidence, as stated in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. 38.From the outset, the court notes that the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of this court as an issue for determination in their submissions and did not make any submissions in respect of the Preliminary Objection. It is therefore the opinion of the court that the 1st and 2nd Respondents have abandoned the preliminary objection. 39.The foregoing notwithstanding, the court wishes to clarify that the preliminary objection has been mis-conceptualized as it raises the doctrine of exhaustion in respect of removal from office of County Executive Committee Members which is provided for in Article 194 of the Constitution as read with section 40 of County Governments Act. The said provisions do not state that a Member of the County Executive Committee aggrieved with the process of his removal would approach the County Assembly for redress. 40.The Petitioner’s grievance is that his position is in the process of being filled by the 1st and 2nd Respondents yet he has not been removed from office through the process set out in Article 194 of the Constitution as read with section 40 of County Governments Act.. The 1st and 2nd Respondents have not explained how the doctrine of exhaustion is applicable in the circumstances of this case. 41.The other two grounds of preliminary objection do not constitute grounds of preliminary objection as defined in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing case. It is for these reasons that I find no merit in the preliminary objection dated 4th May, 2026. Whether the Petitioner has established a prima facie case warranting the issuance of conservatory orders 42.Turning to the application, the petitioner seeks conservatory orders against the Respondents to stop the processing of the nomination of the Interested Party on grounds that the Petitioner is the holder of the position that is intended to be filled by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. 43.Conservatory orders are a public law remedy intended to preserve the subject matter of a constitutional dispute pending its determination. The guiding principles for the grant of conservatory orders were stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Gatirau Peter Munya. An applicant must demonstrate a prima facie case with a likelihood of success, show that unless the orders are granted the Petition will be rendered nugatory, and establish that the public interest favours the grant of the orders. 44.The Respondents have at this stage not contested the facts of the case as presented by the Petitioner who states that his position is in the process of being filled by the Respondents yet he is still in office. That if this court does not intervene he is likely to be constructively dismissed and his petition will thus be rendered nugatory. 45.The Petitioner has further stated that it is in the public interest that the Respondents strictly observe and adhere to the Constitution as envisaged in Articles 22(1), 47(1) and 50. That the prejudice likely to be suffered by the public far outweigh any prejudice that the state might suffer if the orders sought are granted. 46.The 1st and 2nd Respondents argue that the Petitioner has not sought reinstatement, that he has prayed for damages for unlawful termination and has not demonstrated the nexus between his prayers for claim of damages. That the public interest overrides the Petitioner’s rights. 47.I do not agree with the Respondents. They have not stated how vetting of the Interested Party to fill the position currently held by the Petitioner would be in the public interest. 48.Without making definitive findings at this interlocutory stage, the Court notes that the issues raised are weighty, arguable, and deserving of full judicial interrogation. 49.I thus find that the Petitioner has established a prima facie case with likelihood of success. 50.On whether the Petition would be rendered nugatory, the Court notes that should the Interested Party be vetted, approved, and assume office, the substratum of the Petition would be substantially altered as the Petitioner would likely lose his position as the County Executive Committee Member for Public Service Management, Administration and Devolved Units, without due process as envisaged in Article 194 of the Constitution and section 40 of County Governments Act. 51.The Respondents argued that halting the process would cripple the operations of Eldoret City. The Court is alive to the need for effective governance but is also mindful that constitutional compliance in the constitution of public bodies is mandatory. In any event the Petitioner is still in office and no crisis would be created by stopping the recruitment process of the Interested Party. It is not explained how the orders of the court would cripple the functioning of any of the Respondents’ offices. 52.For the forgoing reasons the Notice of Motion dated 21st April, 2026 is found to be with merit and the court makes the following orders:a.That pending the hearing and determination of the Petition herein, a conservatory order be and is hereby issued suspending and staying the processing, implementation, enforcement and/or operationalization of the Circular issued by the 2nd Respondent on nomination and appointment of the Interested Party to the position of the County Executive Committee Member for Public Service Management, Administration and Devolved Units in terms of the Media Release dated 9th April, 2026;b.That pending the hearing and determination of the Petition herein, a conservatory order be and is hereby issued restraining the 3rd and 4th Respondents from receiving, vetting or in any other way processing the nomination of the Interested Party as the County Executive Committee Member for Public Service Management, Administration and Devolved Units. 53.The Petition shall be heard and determined on a priority basis. 54.Costs of the Notice of Motion shall abide the outcome of the Petition. 55.It is so ordered. DATED, DELIVERED AND SIGNED ON THIS 8TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026.M. ONYANGOJUDGE