https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/13122

Linturi v M'Ethingia (Civil Suit E005 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 13122 (KLR) (18 August 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 13122 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Meru Civil Suit E005 of 2026 HM Nyaga, J August 18, 2026 Between Frankline Mithika Linturi Plaintiff and Hon Rev Isaac Mutuma M'Ethingia Defendant Ruling 1.The plaintiff approached this court vide a Notice of Motion dated 17th March 2026 seeking the following orders against the Respondent;a.Spent.b.That pending hearing and determination of this application inter-partes, this Honorable Court be pleased to issue an interim temporary injunction restraining the Defendant/Respondent, whether by himself, his agents, servants, employees, or anyone acting under his direction, from further publishing, printing, broadcasting, uttering or in any way circulating defamatory words set out in the plaint or any similar words defamatory of the plaintiff.c.That pending hearing and determination of this suit, a temporary injunction be and is hereby issued restraining the Defendant/Respondent, whether by himself, his agents, servants, employees, or anyone acting under his direction, from further publishing, printing, broadcasting, uttering or in any way circulating defamatory words set out in the plaint or any similar words defamatory of the plaintiff.d.That costs of this application and any other appropriate relief this Honorable Court deems just and fit to grant. 2.The application is anchored by the supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff/Applicant sworn on even date. 3.The applicant contends that he is a man of impeccable reputation, a senior statesman and a holder of National Honor of EGH. That he is also a former cabinet secretary, senator and is currently the organizing secretary of a national political party. 4.The Applicant further contends that on the 8th March 2026, at a heavily attended public political rally at Makutano Shopping Centre within Meru County, the Defendant/Respondent knowingly, maliciously and falsely published extremely defamatory words against the Applicant. The said words and their English translation are reproduced as follows:“…Makutano oyee! Makutano Mpooo? Kuna wakora wamevamia Meru. Kuna wakora walivamia Meru. Wale, wale walichoma meru wakati mwingine. Walikuja wakachoma Magunas. Wakataka kwenda kuchoma Meru ndiiri (read dairy). Wakachoma Cereals Board Maua. Mithika Ndirenda Umwira atirii. Mithika Ndirenda Umwira atirii………Mithika Linturi nue weithacia Magunas. Mithika Linturi nue waithirie Magunas. Thikerei, Mithika Linturi inii mbitite umwikia retire. Inii mbitite wikia Mithika Linturi retire….. Twire Linturi Nthuki yoo, ikuthiria mahinga. Linturi atwiire ukaacia ameru. Linturi atwire ukaacia ameru. Thaii tuukumite nguine. Immorality vs morality. Mwamba vs muntu ukwenda Ameru. Turenda umwira naatransactire, naaenderie ba iembe mantu ya miraa. Na tutimwitikiria aendelea ukaacia Ameru.” 5.The applicant gave those words the following translation in English;“……. Makutano oyee! Makutano Mpooo? There are crooks who have invaded Meru. There are crooks who invaded Meru. Those, those who burned Meru some time ago. They came and burned Magunas. They wanted to burn Meru dairy. They burned the Cereals Board in Maua. What I want to tell Mithika is. What I want to tell Mithika is…. It is Mithika Linturi who was burning Magunas. It was Mithika Linturi who set Magunas ablaze. Listen, I am the one who will retire Mithika Linturi. I am the one going to retire Mithika Linturi….. Let us tell Linturi that his age group is outdated. Linturi has been deceiving the Ameru people. Linturi has been deceiving the Ameru. Now, we are getting to work. Immorality vs morality. A thief vs someone who loves the Ameru. We want to tell him that he transacted, he sold (betrayed) the Igembe 6 people, on the miraa issue. And we will not allow him to continue deceiving the Ameru.” 6.The Plaintiff/Applicant also contends that the said rally was a forum of immense national and regional significance, graced by His Excellency the Deputy President of the Republic of Kenya, alongside a distinguished gathering of National and County leaders, including several members of Parliament, members of the County Assembly of Meru and other senior political leaders from across the region. 7.The applicant avers that in their natural and ordinary meaning, and by way of innuendo, the said words by the Defendant/Respondent were understood by right thinking members of society to mean and were intended by the Defendant/Respondent to mean that the Plaintiff/Applicant:i.Is an arsonist and a dangerous criminal;ii.Personally, and criminally set fire to Magunas Supermarket and the Cereals Board in Maua;iii.Is a leader who directs criminal gangs to destroy property;iv.Is a chronic liar and a fraudster who has consistently deceived the people of Meru;v.Is an immoral person and a "mwamba" (thief) who betrayed his own people;vi.Is a corrupt individual who "sold out" the Igembe community on the critical miraa issue; andvii.Is a person of low moral standing who is unfit to hold any public or leadership office? 8.The applicant further avers that by reason of the said publications, he has been gravely injured in his character, credit, reputation, and standing in society and suffered immeasurable damage in the sense that:a.He has been brought into and continues to be exposed to public hatred, scandal, and odium, with right-thinking members of society now associating him, falsely and unjustly, with the serious criminal acts of arson and theft.b.He has been exposed and subjected to widespread contempt, scorn, and ridicule, being cruelly mocked and disparaged in public discourse, on social media, and within his own community as a "mwamba" (thief) and a criminal incendiary.c.He has suffered and continues to suffer social and professional shunning, with some members of the public and even former associates keeping their distance for fear of being associated with a person falsely branded a criminal and a liar.d.He has suffered and continues to suffer immense mental anguish, emotional distress, humiliation, and profound psychological injury, compounded by the fact that these malicious falsehoods emanated from a sitting Governor and man of the cloth.e.He has been subjected to acute personal embarrassment and shame, and his family, have been caused immense distress and embarrassment in their social circles and academic institutions.f.His political career and legitimate leadership aspirations have been severely jeopardized, as the Defendant's calculated attack was designed to, and has effectively, eroded the goodwill and trust he has cultivated with the electorate over three decades.g.His standing as a prominent businessman has been injured, causing him economic loss and damaging the trust and confidence reposed in him by business partners, financial institutions, and investors.h.His hard-earned and priceless reputational capital, carefully built and meticulously guarded over a lifetime of exemplary and distinguished public service, and solemnly recognized by the national honour of E.G.H. and the sacred cultural office of Mugambi wa Ameru, has been severely, and may well be irreparably, tarnished.i.He has suffered a grave injury to his dignity and personal honour, diminishing the respect and reverence he has traditionally commanded as a senior citizen, a statesman, and a cultural leader of the Meru people. 9.The Applicant further avers that pursuant to the publication of the said words he has been summoned for disciplinary action by his political party (DCP), placing his political career in jeopardy. 10.It is the Applicant’s contention that despite serving the Defendant/Respondent with a formal demand notice, the Respondent, in utter disregard of the same and with heightened malice repeated and republished the said defamatory words at another public rally held at Laare Town on the 10th March 2026, thus causing fresh and ongoing injury. 11.The Applicant further states that the continued injury to his reputation by the Respondent is causing unprecedented harm to his already declared political interests and his bid to vie for the Gubernatorial seat in the anticipated August 2027 elections. 12.The Applicant asserts that the Respondent is the incumbent Governor of Meru County and his closest competitor. Thus, he says, his formidable political strength is at risk if the Respondent is allowed to continue making false and defamatory remarks which were deliberate, calculated and strategically timed to achieve maximum harm. 13.The application is opposed vide the Respondent’s replying affidavit sworn on the 3rd April 2026. 14.The respondent avers that the matters alluded to by the applicant regarding his character constitute his own self appraisal and subjective estimation of his own character, reputation and standing in society. 15.The Respondent denies making any defamatory statements regarding the applicant and that if he so did, he contends, that the Applicant, being a public official and seasoned politician is inevitably subject to public accountability, criticism and scrutiny. That the words, allegedly uttered by him were made in the course of political discourse on matters of public interest. That the said utterances, if at all, were comments as to the applicant’s fitness to hold a public office, which is a matter of public concern for Meru County. 16.The Respondent further contends that he is neither responsible nor liable for the alleged widespread dissemination of the impugned content across social media. That if indeed there was widespread dissemination of the impugned content in the social media, the same was done without any authority, control or direction as the responsible individuals independently opted to publish the same. That the applicant has not shown that the alleged publication was authorized or procured by him. 17.The respondent further denied that the alleged comments were motivated and actuated by malice or political ill-will and were never intended to be taken literally as criminal charges, but rather as rhetorical hyperbole common in the rough and tumble of Kenyan politics. That the crowd at Makutano fully appreciated the political context of the occasion and understood them to be trivial political talk as opposed to statements of fact or criminal finding. 18.The respondent further denied that there was a replication of the alleged comments for the reason that no defamatory content was published in the first place. That the mention of the applicant was made in the context of political campaigns, with the applicant seeking to secure the very seat that the respondent holds in the 2027 gubernatorial elections. 19.The respondent also avers that a grant of the orders sought would unjustifiably and unnecessarily curtail his constitutional right to freedom of expression and political engagement. That the orders would uphold the applicant’s attempts to stifle a healthy political competition by curtailing his ability to mention the applicant’s name in political campaigns, thereby conferring an undue advantage on the applicant. 20.In conclusion, the respondent avers that the applicant has not demonstrated any special circumstances that would justify the injunctive relief sought. That the balance of convenience tilts in his favour in declining to grant the orders, noting that the two parties are political actors in an upcoming political contest and it is in the public interest there be open robust and uninhibited political engagements and campaigns. 21.The application was canvassed through written submissions. 22.For the applicant it was submitted that test was whether he had met the threshold set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd ( 1973) EA 358, which were;a.The Applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success;b.The Applicant must demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable injury which cannot be compensated by award of damages;c.Where the court is in doubt, the court must decide the matter on a balance of convenience. 23.It is submitted that the respondent’s acts and words are per se defamatory in that they are immensely injurious to the character, name, status, dignity and reputation of the Plaintiff/Applicant, who is a senior citizen, leader and a man of high standing within the community and the nation in large. That for the Respondent to call the Applicant, who is a senior leader and respectable person in the society, an “arsonist" and a "thief" in a public forum is to attack the very core of his character, reputation and dignity. 24.It is further submitted that the Respondent’s defence of justification or fair comment are in the circumstances untenable, owing to the existence of ongoing criminal charges against the suspects and perpetrators of the incident, and none of whom is the Applicant. That given the status of the Respondent as a Governor, it provides him access to this information and is therefore fully knowledgeable and aware of the ongoing criminal proceedings. That despite this fact, the respondent chose to propagate known falsehoods against the Applicant. That this outright and deliberate action constitutes express malice, which defeats any defence of qualified privilege or fair comment. 25.It is further argued that whereas the Respondent attempts to frame the utterances made as mere political speech, there is no "political exception" to the law of defamation that allows one to falsely accuse another of a felony. That by choosing to bypass the police and instead use a political rally to "charge" the Applicant, the Respondent acted with a diabolical motive to gain an unfair political advantage for the 2027 elections. 26.Given the above the applicant submits that he has surmounted the first hurdle under the principles set out in Giella vs Cassman Brown & Co Ltd (supra). 27.On the question of irreparable harm or damage, the applicant submits that an individual’s reputation and dignity is a unique property right and once soiled cannot be restored through any monetary compensation. That this is the exact murky position that the Applicant has been put in by the Respondent. That the continued defamatory acts by the Respondent are bound to cause immense and irreparable injury to the Applicant, by destroying his reputation, name and standing built over the years, which loss no monetary award can reclaim and restore. 28.It is further submitted that the injury to the Applicant as a result of the Respondent’s defamatory acts and publications, is not merely theoretical as the Applicant has been summoned by his political party, and is facing disciplinary actions over the same. That the Applicant further stands the risk of disqualification from the party and/or potential disqualification from future elections based solely on the Respondent's utterances. 29.It is thus the applicant’s argument that unless the Respondent is restrained, he will continue to use his platform as a Governor and Reverend to entrench these falsehoods against him, effectively "convicting" him in the court of public opinion before this suit is determined. That as such the only available remedy is a grant of the orders of temporary injunction barring and restraining the Respondent from further engaging in acts of defamation and demeaning of the Applicant’s name and Character. 30.The applicant also argues that even on a balance of convenience, having ascertained that he has a prima facie case, it then follows that he stands to suffer great prejudice and irreparable loss should the injunction orders not be granted. 31.On this last point the applicant relied on the decisions in R.J.R. Macdonald V Attorney General (1941) 1 S.C.R 311 and Amir Suleiman v Amboseli Resort Limited [2004] eKLR. 32.For the respondent it is submitted that in defamation matters, the threshold for a prima facie case is higher than in ordinary suits. That the courts have consistently held that interlocutory injunctions in defamation suits ought to be granted only in the clearest and most obvious cases and where the words complained of are manifestly defamatory and incapable of any lawful defence. On this issue the respondent cited the decisions in Cheserem v Immediate Media Services & 4 Others [2000] eKLR, and Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269. 33.Relying on the two decisions it is further submitted that where a Defendant states an intention to justify the words complained of or rely on recognized defences, the Court ought not to restrain publication before trial. That Courts are slow to impose prior restraint upon speech before hearing evidence in full because doing so risks suppressing lawful expression and prejudging contested factual issues. 34.It was submitted that in the present case, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that this is one of those rare and obvious cases warranting interlocutory restraint on the respondent’s freedom of speech. That the alleged statements arose within an undeniably political context involving public leadership, governance, accountability, morality, and public conduct, and that both parties are prominent political actors within Meru County and are evidently engaged in active political contestation ahead of the 2027 electoral cycle. 35.It is further submitted that political speech enjoys elevated Constitutional protection under Article 33 of the Constitution of Kenya. That although that freedom is not absolute, any limitation must satisfy the constitutional test of legality, necessity, and proportionality. 36.The respondent thus urged the court to exercise exceptional caution before limiting speech concerning public affairs and public leaders. 37.The respondent further submitted that the applicant had himself pleaded his prominence as a former Cabinet Secretary, Senator, Member of Parliament, businessman, party official, and cultural leader and that such prominence inevitably subjects him to heightened public scrutiny, criticism, and political commentary. That it is thus not sufficient for the applicant to merely to allege reputational injury. That he must demonstrate that the impugned words are plainly indefensible and incapable of falling within recognized defences such as justification, fair comment, or constitutional protection of political expression. This, it is argued, he has failed to do so. 38.It is further submitted that the applicant has failed to satisfy this court as to the existence of any malice in the context of the respondent’s alleged utterances. That mere vulgar abuse or statements made in the heat of a political contest are not actionable as defamation because they lack the necessary defamatory meaning in that specific context. 39.It is the respondent’s position that the alleged utterances, if ever made, were never intended to be taken literally as criminal charges, but rather as rhetorical hyperbole common in the 'rough and tumble' of Kenyan politics. That the court ought to view these statements, made in a political context, through the lens of the political audience. That from such perspective, the court would naturally conclude that it is customary practice that the audience at a political rally expects heated, exaggerated language. That in such setting, it is standard that terms like 'crook' or 'thief are understood as critiques of political character rather than specific accusations of a crime. 40.It is also argued that for a statement to be defamatory, it must actually lower the reputation of the subject in the eyes of right-thinking members of society. That at a political rally, however, any right-thinking member will inevitably discount such talk as mere campaigning, and the words would definitely be understood as mere political talk as opposed to statements of fact. That the crowd at Makutano understood the word 'wakora' (crooks) as mere political labels as opposed to a forensic or criminal finding. 41.The respondent further submits that the applicant is improperly inviting this Honourable Court to conclusively determine the falsity of the impugned statements merely because he has not been charged in the criminal proceedings relating to the alleged incidents. That the absence of criminal charges does not automatically render political commentary false, malicious, or indefensible. 42.The respondent also submitted that whether the impugned statements constituted factual assertions, rhetorical political speech, opinion, or fair comment are substantive matters requiring full evidentiary interrogation at trial, and cannot properly be determined summarily at an interlocutory stage without hearing oral evidence, testing credibility, and examining the full factual context. 43.It is further submitted that the Application seeks excessively broad and vague orders restraining the respondent from uttering not only the specific words complained of but also "any similar defamatory words." That such an order would be uncertain, oppressive, and dangerously expansive, and it would effectively place the respondent under an indefinite speech embargo without clear parameters as to what future speech may be prohibited. That the Courts have consistently frowned upon vague gag orders that have the effect of chilling lawful speech and political discourse. 44.From these submissions, it was the respondent’s position that submission that the applicant has failed to establish a prima facie case warranting grant of interlocutory injunctive relief as set out in Giella vs Cassman Brown Ltd (supra). 45.On irreparable injury which may not adequately be compensated by an award of damages it was submitted that the applicant has equally failed to demonstrate the same. Cited in support of this submission was Nguruman Limited v Jane Bonde Nielsen and 2 Others, [2014] eKLR, 46.It is further submitted that Defamation Law is fundamentally premised on damages as the primary remedy for reputational injury, and if the applicant ultimately succeeds at trial, he may be compensated through an award of damages. 47.The respondent further submitted that there is no evidence before placed before the court demonstrating that the applicant’s political career has collapsed, or that he has been removed from office, or that the alleged reputational injury is incapable of quantification. That the alleged disciplinary summons from the DCP party merely requested an explanation concerning publicly circulating allegations and did not amount to any finding of guilt or disciplinary sanction against the applicant. 48.On the balance of convenience, it is submitted that where doubt exists on the two tests above, the Court is called upon to determine court makes a determination as to which party will suffer the greater harm with the outcome of the motion. 49.The respondent submits that he balance of convenience overwhelmingly favours refusal of the injunction sought. That if the orders sought are granted, the respondent’s constitutional freedom of expression under Article 33 of the Constitution shall be substantially curtailed before trial. That the Court would effectively silence one side of an ongoing political discourse before hearing evidence in full, while permitting the other side unrestricted public engagement. Cited in support of these submissions were the decisions in Paul G. Wanjau -vs- Gathuthi Tea Factory Co. Ltd [2016] eKLR, Nation Media Group & 2 Others v John Harun Mwau [2014] eKLR, and Royal Media Services Limited & Another v Jakoyo Midiwo [2018] eKLR. 50.It is argued that public prominence does not diminish scrutiny, and public figures, especially politicians seeking elective office, must tolerate wider limits of criticism and public commentary than private citizens. That this is a principle central to democratic constitutionalism and open political discourse, which effectively tilts the balance of convenience to the Defendant's favour. 51.As correctly submitted by the parties, for a court to grant an order of temporary injunction, 3 mandatory conditions must be met, as was held in the landmark case of Giella V Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd EA (supra). These are;a.Prima Facie Case: The applicant must demonstrate that they have a legitimate claim with a probability of success, raising serious questions to be tried.b.Irreparable Injury: The applicant must prove that they will suffer harm or damage that cannot be adequately compensated by an award of financial damages.c.Balance of Convenience: If the court is in doubt about the first two conditions, it will weigh the potential inconvenience and harm that each party would suffer if the injunction is granted versus if it is denied. 52.The Court of Appeal in the case of Nguruman Ltd v Nielsen & 2 others(supra) reiterated this position. 53.The court of appeal in the case of Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR) which was cited by both parties, defined what would amount to a prima facie case. The court held as follows;“A prima facie case in a civil application included but was not confined to a genuine and arguable case. It was a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself would conclude that there existed a right which had apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.” 54.The first issue then is to determine if the applicant has surmounted the first hurdle as set out in Giella vs Cassman Brown Ltd (supra). 55.The legal threshold for grant of injunctions in defamation cases is well captured in the case of Micah Cheserem vs Immediate Media Services (supra) where it was held that: -“Application for interlocutory injunction in defamation cases are treated differently from ordinary cases because they bring out a conflict between private and public interest. Though the conditions applicable in granting interlocutory injunctions set out in Giella vs Cassman Brown & co. Ltd (1973) EA 258 generally apply, in a defamation case those conditions operate in special circumstances. Over and above the test set out in Giella’s case, in defamation cases the court’s jurisdiction to grant an injunction is exercised with the greatest caution so that an injunction is granted only in the clearest possible cases. The court must be satisfied that the words or matter complained of are libelous and also that the words are so manifestly defamatory that any verdict to the contrary would be set aside as perverse. Normally the court would not grant an interlocutory injunction when the defendant pleads justification or fair comment because of the public interest that the truth should be out and the court aims to protect a humane, responsible, truthful and trustworthy defendant.” 56.The reason why caution should be exercised in granting injunctions in defamation cases is because of the need to balance between the constitutional right to freedom of expression with the individual right to reputation. This is enshrined in Article 33(1) (a) of our Constitution which provides that every person has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive or impart information or ideas. 57.It was held in Renton Company Limited vs Philip Kisia & 2 Others [2012] eKLR that;“However, that freedom is limited by clause (3) thereof which provides that in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, every person shall respect the rights and reputation of others.It, therefore, follows that in suits for defamation the Courts must weigh between the freedom to express oneself and impart information against the respect for others’ rights and reputation. Where a person alleges that what was said is true, for example, to gag the dissemination of the information may be as detrimental as to allow false information to be published to the detriment of one’s reputation. Reputation once lost, it must be recognized and may not be regained. The grant of interlocutory injunctions in defamation cases, though following the general principles in applications for interlocutory injunctions, have been modified to suit the unique subject of defamation.” 58.The authors of Gatley on Libel and Slander 12th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell at paragraph 25.2 give guidance on what the court should consider in weighing whether or not to grant an interlocutory prohibitory injunction in defamation cases. In a nutshell the court must be satisfied as to the following:i.That the statement is unarguably defamatory;ii.That there are no grounds for concluding the statement to be true;iii.That there is no other defence which might succeed;iv.That there is evidence of an intention to repeat or publish the defamatory statement. 59.The above extract is often cited as definitive on defamation and was adopted by the Supreme Court of Northwest Territories (Canada) in the Canadian case of Thomas V CBC (1981) 27 AR 547(NWTSC). The court held as follows:“The gist of the torts of libel and slander is the publication of matter (usually words) conveying a defamatory imputation. A defamatory imputation is one to a man's discredit, or which tends to lower him in the estimation of others, or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injure his reputation in his office, trade or profession, or to injure his financial credit. The standard of opinion is that of right-thinking persons generally. To be defamatory an imputation need have no actual effect on a person's reputation; the law looks only to its tendency. A true imputation may still be defamatory, although its truth may be a defence to an action brought on it; conversely untruth alone does not render an imputation defamatory." 60.It is not in dispute that both the plaintiff/applicant and the defendant/respondent are public officials who have held leadership positions within the political atmosphere. 61.It is apparent that 2 distinct public political rallies were held on the 8th and 10th March 2026, where it is contended that the Defendant/Respondent uttered defamatory words in reference to the plaintiff/applicant. 62.The respondent has denied such utterances and stated that even such were made they were made in a political arena. 63.It is common knowledge that utterances made on political podiums, know no boundaries. Such utterances, in the Kenyan context, more often than not, carry distasteful characterization of the opposing figures. 64.The test is whether such utterances go beyond political rhetoric and wade into the realm of defamation or libel. 65.In the present case, the applicant annexed video clips that appear to depict the respondent uttering the words complained of. 66.In my view, at this stage it is difficult to make a conclusive finding that the words, in their ordinary meaning, are outrightly defamatory or are mere political rhetoric. I believe that at the appropriate time each side would have a chance to convince the court on its stand on the issue. 67.As has been stated in the authorities cited above, there is a delicate balance to be done between alleged defamatory remarks and the freedom of expression. These are not matters that I can decide without having given each party a chance to address the court fully. 68.I am thus, at this stage, not very certain on whether or not there is a prima facie case established. In other words, the matter is open for debate. 69.On the question of irreparable harm, the earlier cited case of Nguruman Ltd v Nielsen & 2 others (supra) defined it as follows;“On the second factor, that the applicant must establish that he “might otherwise” suffer irreparable injury which cannot be adequately remedied by damages in the absence of an injunction, is a threshold requirement and the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate, prima face, the nature and extent of the injury. Speculative injury will not do; there must be more than an unfounded fear or apprehension on the part of the applicant. The equitable remedy of temporary injunction is issued solely to prevent grave and irreparable injury; that is injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable; injury that cannot “adequately” be compensated by an award of damages. An injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy or the injury or harm is such a nature that monetary compensation, of whatever amount, will never be adequate remedy.” 70.I am of the view that at present, the applicant is still, as submitted by the respondent, on the campaign trail, the determination of the disciplinary matters notwithstanding. Should the applicant succeed in the main suit, an award of damages would be sufficient, noting that this court has unlimited jurisdiction as to how much it can award. 71.On a balance of convenience, I find that the court ought to exercise great caution in trying to curtail a party from campaigning, even though it is too early in the day for such campaigns to be undertaken. A blanket order may be deemed as a gag order on the respondent, while the applicant has no such restraint upon him. 72.That said, the court highly discourages the lack of self -control when parties hold that political microphone. They owe a duty to each other and the nation at large, to engage in healthy and mature political discourse, based on relevant issues and competing ideas, rather than personalized attacks on each other. 73.Having carefully considered the matter, I am of the opinion that the balance of convenience tilts on the side of not granting any interlocutory injunction at this stage. As I said, a blanket order may be prone to incorrect interpretation and will be hard to implement. 74.That said I find that the application dated 17/03/2026 fails. It is disallowed. 75.The costs of the application shall abide by the outcome of the suit. 76.Orders accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MERU THIS 18TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026.H. M. NYAGAJUDGE