Gathogo v Mwangi (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Case E006 of 2026) [2026] KEELC 3874 (KLR) (Environment and Land) (25 June 2026) (Ruling)

Gathogo v Mwangi (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Case E006 of 2026) [2026] KEELC 3874 (KLR) (Environment and Land) (25 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3874 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Naivasha Environment and Land Environment and Land Miscellaneous Case E006 of 2026 MC Oundo, J June 25, 2026 Between Louis Kimani Gathogo Applicant and Jane Wacera Mwangi Respondent Ruling 1.What is before me for determination is a Notice of Motion Application dated 4th March 2026 brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 (1) (b), Section 1A & 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 3 of the Environment & Land Court Act, Order 51 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, Article 159 (2) (d) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, and all other enabling provisions of law in which the Applicant seeks to withdraw the suit pending before the Naivasha Magistrate’s Court, being Naivasha Chief Magistrate’s Court ELC No. 64 of 2019, Louis Kimani Gathogo-versus-Garishon Mwangi Kamau and Jane Wacera Mwangi, so as to transfer the same to the Environment and Land Court to be tried and disposed. She also seeks the application costs. 2.The Application is premised on the grounds set out therein and on a Supporting Affidavit of even date, sworn by the Applicant, Louis Kimani Gathogo, who deposed that for about 30 years, from 1994 to May 2024, he was a tenant of the Respondent at business premises in Naivasha town, Plot Title LR No. 1144/679, owned by the Respondent jointly with her now late husband, Gerishon Mwangi Kamau (Deceased). That he used to run a hardware shop/business thereunder, under the trade name Genesis Glassmart. That, nonetheless, he was illegally, viciously and violently evicted from the said suit premises by the Respondent, using her sons, hired goons and police protection, on the night of 17th February 2024. 3.He argued that the said eviction had been carried out illegally and in utter contempt of court, as there are Orders of Injunction in place which were issued by the High Court against the Respondent (Defendant therein) in an ongoing partly heard suit between the same parties over the same subject matter in Nakuru HCC No. 12 of 2010 which was subsequently transferred to the lower Court in Naivasha, and was currently proceeding as Naivasha Naivasha CMCC ELC No. 64 of 2019, Louis Kimani Gathogo-v- Jane Wacera Mwangi. 4.He contended that pursuant to filing suit in Nakuru HCC No. 12 of 2010 against both the Respondent and her now late husband, the Court had granted orders of injunction against the Respondent and directed her to rebuild the roof and remove the blockage to the shop entrance, where in default the Applicant does so at the Respondent’s costs. That he had complied and the said costs now form part of his claim in the said suit. 5.That the Nakuru court had also barred the Respondent from entering or in any way interfering with his quiet possession of the suit/tenancy premises, pending the hearing and determination of the suit. The Respondent had counter-claimed for vacant possession of the suit premises. 6.That, in the pendency of the hearing before the subordinate court, on the night of Friday the 17th May 2024, the Respondent (Defendant), through her sons and a group of hired goons, with the protection of armed police officers, forcibly broke into the suit premises and threw out all his goods, stock, equipment, documents, furniture and literally everything from the shop, where they then welded shut the shop door, ensuring that he could no longer access the shop. 7.That, indeed, his entire business, which he had built over a period of 30 years, was completely ruined and destroyed, causing him loss and damage, including loss of business, goodwill and income, in excess of Kshs. 25,000,000/=, which he intended to claim from the Respondent by way of an appropriate amendment to the Plaint in the aforesaid suit, an application he had since filed. 8.On realising that the said additional claim would exceed the pecuniary jurisdiction of the subordinate court, he filed the present application for transfer of the said suit to this court for hearing and disposal. 9.That whereas in response to his Application for Leave to Amend the Plaint, the Respondent claimed to have evicted him following an order from the Business Premises Rent Tribunal (BPRT) in Nakuru BPRT No. E016 of 2024, Jane Wacera Mwangi -v-Louis Kimani Gathogo. He had not been aware of such proceedings as he was never served, notified of, or participated in the said case. 10.He argued that the BPRT matter was clearly sub judice since the initial suit over the same subject matter and between the same parties was still pending hearing and determination before the subordinate court, and therefore, the BPRT had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. 11.That accordingly, he intended to include a prayer for a Declaration that the proceedings and orders before the BPRT were nullity ab initio, in consequential, and lacked effect whatsoever, in his intended Amended Plaint. He contended that the subordinate court may not be seized of jurisdiction to issue the said declaratory reliefs against the proceedings and orders of the BPRT, hence the instant application seeking the transfer of the said suit from the subordinate court to this Court. 12.That in any event, there had been no lawful execution of the said BPRT Orders since the same had not been adopted nor a Decree issued thereon by the Magistrate’s Court as mandatorily required by the law. Furthermore, neither Warrants of Attachment nor of Eviction had been issued by the court, nor was any Auctioneer involved in the execution of the purported Orders. That consequently, what had taken place was purely an arbitrary hooliganism and impunity by the Defendant, her children, hired goons and the police. 13.He asserted that it is trite that BPRT Orders or decisions are not self-executing and that BPRT has no jurisdiction to execute its own Orders as such Orders can only be executed by the Magistrate’s Court, through a procedure set out under the provisions of Section 14 of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act and Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules. He argued that no explanation had been given to him at the time of his eviction, despite having always paid his monthly rent regularly and faithfully, often under the superintendence and Orders of the Court, after the Respondent (Defendant) refused to receive the rent. That by May 2024, when he was evicted, he had paid his rent through the end of 2024. 14.That accordingly it was evident that the present Application and the circumstances necessitating the same had been wholly and deliberately occasioned and necessitated by the illegal actions of the Defendant/Respondent during the pendency of the existing suit and in contempt of the existing Court Order, which the subordinate Court may not be seized with the juridical or the pecuniary jurisdiction to handle. He explained that he was unable to file the instant Application immediately after his eviction for the reason that the impugned action had devastated and disoriented him, in addition to the fact that he did not know of the BPRT proceedings until the same had been brought to his attention vide the Respondent’s Replying Affidavit dated 10th February 2026. 15.He thus beseeched the Court to allow the instant Application, recall and transfer the aforesaid suit back to this court for hearing and disposal. 16.In response and in opposition to the said Application, the Respondent vide her Replying Affidavit dated 17th March 2026 deposed that the dispute forming the subject of the Applicant’s Application herein has been pending before the subordinate for determination, wherein the Applicant had actively participated for a long period without raising any prompt or bona fide objection on jurisdiction. That in the year 2024, she had moved the Business Premises Rent Tribunal (BPRT) in respect of the tenancy between herself and the Applicant and obtained orders touching on the tenancy relationship and the Applicant’s continued occupation of the premises; thus, the Applicant’s allegations that he had been illegally and violently evicted are false, exaggerated and calculated to mislead the Honourable Court. 17.She argued that at all material times, the Applicant’s removal/eviction from the premises had been undertaken pursuant to the BPRT process and the orders issued therein and which had been lawfully supervised by the relevant authorities. Accordingly, the Applicant’s claim that he was unaware of the BPRT proceedings is untrue, as he deliberately ignored the tribunal process. That, in any event, the Applicant had not reviewed, appealed, and/or otherwise lawfully challenged the said BPRT order; thus, he cannot sidestep or relitigate the said outcomes through a belated transfer application. She maintained that the Applicant was fully aware of the Tribunal’s proceedings and orders, but had chosen to present a distorted narrative to obtain discretionary relief from the Court. 18.That whereas the Appellant was now claiming, without any pleaded or proven basis, that his property was valued at Kshs. 25,000,000/= during the alleged eviction, the said figure is unsupported by any valuation, inventory, receipts, assessment report, police abstract, photographs, or credible particulars, and has plainly been introduced as an afterthought solely to create an artificial argument on pecuniary jurisdiction and to “manufacture” grounds for transfer. She argued that the alleged damages were not part of the original dispute between the parties in the subordinate court but had been introduced late with the improper objective of changing the character of the suit midstream and delaying its finalization. 19.She contended that the Applicant’s conduct throughout demonstrates a consistent pattern of delay and obstruction, including filing numerous interlocutory applications which had had the effect of stalling the hearing and determination of the main suit. That vide the instant Application, the Applicant was attempting to avoid the consequences of the steps he had already taken in the subordinate court to restart litigation in a different forum after years of participation. That, in any event, nothing prevented the Applicant, if he genuinely believed the subordinate court lacked jurisdiction, from taking the proper procedural steps at the earliest opportunity, including raising jurisdiction promptly and/or withdrawing and filing afresh in a court he believed competent. She contended that the Applicant cannot now seek to have the Court sanitize delay and tactical litigation by granting a transfer late in the day. 20.She argued that the Applicant’s attempt to rely on “intended amendments” to justify transfer is misconceived since jurisdiction cannot be conferred by proposed amendment or inflated figures introduced after years of proceedings. That the present Application is legally and procedurally untenable, and should it be allowed, it would occasion her grave prejudice, including delay in a matter that has been pending for many years, increased expense, disruption of the trial, and needless duplication of proceedings already undertaken. That subsequently, the matter before the lower court should be allowed to proceed, and this court should be moved appropriately as an appellate court and not in the manner sought herein. 21.That the Applicant had not demonstrated any exceptional, credible or lawful basis to justify the drastic orders sought, thus the balance of justice plainly favoured that the matter proceed to a conclusion in the court where it had been pending. Accordingly, the Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 4th March 2026 was without merit, brought in bad faith, and should be dismissed with costs. 22.The Application was disposed of by way of written submissions wherein the Applicant, vide his submissions dated 21st April 2026, upon summarizing the factual background, outlined his issues for resolution as follows:i.Whether the Court has power to withdraw and transfer the suit.ii.Whether the subordinate court lacks jurisdiction to grant the intended declaratory relief.iii.Whether the lower court lacks pecuniary jurisdiction over the intended enhanced damages claim.iv.Whether Appeal and Judicial Review are no longer efficacious remedies.v.Whether the Respondent’s conduct amounts to abuse of court process.vi.Whether the transfer best serves the interest of justice. 23.The Applicant relied on the provisions of Section 18 of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 162(2) of the Constitution, and the decision in Law Society of Kenya Nairobi Branch v Malindi Law Society & Others [2017] eKLR to assert that the Environment and Land Court (ELC) had full, inherent jurisdiction to withdraw and transfer suits from lower courts to itself to ensure proper justice. 24.He argued that normal appellate routes are closed. By the time he learned of the 2024 BPRT orders in February 2026, the statutory 30-day window to appeal and 6-month window for Judicial Review (Certiorari) had long expired. That he could not ask the Tribunal to set aside its own orders because the physical eviction had already terminated the landlord-tenant relationship. Therefore, a fresh ELC declaration of nullity was his only surviving remedy. 25.While he acknowledged a delay in bringing this application due to the severe emotional and financial distress of the eviction, he noted that under Section 4(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act, a claim in tort (damages for destruction of property/business) had a 3-year limitation period and that he was well within this window. 26.He cited the provisions of Order 8 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules,to argue that the law permitted an amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. 27.He acknowledged that the case originally began in the Nakuru High Court in 2010, then moved to the Nakuru ELC in 2012, and was later transferred suo moto to the Naivasha Magistrate's Court. 28.He, however, argued that the illegal 2024 BPRT proceedings and subsequent eviction completely changed the nature and scale of the original dispute midstream, rendering the subordinate court incapable of granting complete relief. 29.That because the original suit regarding the tenancy was actively pending in the Magistrate's court, the subsequent BPRT case filed by the Respondent violated Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act (sub judice) and was an abuse of process. The eviction was carried out in direct violation of active High Court injunctions. Furthermore, the BPRT orders could not be executed; they were never adopted by a Magistrate, no warrants were issued, and no court auctioneer was involved, making the eviction an act of pure impunity. 30.His argument was that the planned amendments would introduce complex constitutional and declaratory questions (e.g., declaring Tribunal orders a nullity) alongside an enhanced Kshs. 25,000,000/= damages claim in which the subordinate court lacked both pecuniary and juridical jurisdiction to handle these elements. That splitting or fragmenting these deeply intertwined issues across multiple forums risks contradictory outcomes, while consolidating the entire dispute into a single comprehensive forum (the ELC) satisfies the overriding objectives of Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 3 of the Environment and Land Court Act and Article 159 of the Constitution. 31.The Respondent, on the other hand, vide her Submissions dated 17th April 2026 summarized the factual background of the matter and then framed her issues for determination as follows:i.Whether the Applicant has established a legal and factual basis for the transfer of Naivasha CMCC ELC No. 64 of 2019 to this Honourable Court;ii.Whether the proposed amendments and additional claims are legally tenable or constitute an abuse of the court process;iii.Whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders sought, including whether this Honourable Court has been properly moved. 32.The Respondent highlighted an internal contradiction in the Applicant’s case, stating that if the subordinate court lacked jurisdiction as alleged, then there was no legally competent suit capable of being transferred. Conversely, if it was competently instituted, subsequent inflated claims or tactical amendments cannot retrospectively divest it of jurisdiction. 33.She placed reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Albert Chaurembo Mumba & 7 Others v Maurice Munyao & 148 Others [Petition No. 3 of 2016] (citing Kagenyi v Musiramo & Another), to submit that a transfer order can only happen if the suit was originally brought before a court with proper jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is determined at the time of filing, not by subsequent events. 34.She submitted that the alleged eviction occurred in May 2024, yet the application was filed in March 2026, which was nearly a delay of two years that is unexplained. The Applicant's claim of distress also lacked medical verification. 35.That she was an elderly, physically disabled widow and therefore prolonging a case that began in 2010 through midstream forum-shopping would cause her deep financial and physical prejudice. She noted that no formal application to amend had been presented before the trial court, and furthermore, an amendment ought to arise from the same facts as the original claim. A 14-year temporal gap existed between the original 2010 landlord-tenant dispute and the new 2024 tort claims (eviction and property destruction). These were independent causes of action that could not be grafted onto an old suit to circumvent lower-court limits. 36.That the Kshs. 25,000,000/= claim was entirely unsubstantiated by valuation reports, inventories, or financial records. Citing the case of Joseph Ochieng & 2 Others t/a Aquiline Agencies v First National Bank of Chicago, the Respondent submited those substantial damages cannot simply be plucked from the air but must be explicitly pleaded, particularized, and brought in good faith. That if the Applicant had legitimate claims regarding the 2024 eviction, the procedurally correct path was to file a fresh suit in a competent court, rather than manipulating an ongoing 2010 matter to reset litigation. 37.She contended that the Environment and Land Court did not possess the statutory or constitutional mandate to hear this matter. Under Article 162(2) of the Constitution and the Environment and Land Court Act, the court is empowered to hear disputes concerning land use, public land, and environmental titles. The dispute emanated strictly from a commercial landlord-tenant relationship and claims of wrongful eviction, whereby the Environment and Land Court can only interact with BPRT matters in an appellate capacity, which this application was not. 38.She concluded that if the Applicant genuinely wanted to pursue an independent tort and declaratory claim of this pecuniary value, the proper forum to institute a fresh suit would have been the High Court, and not the Environment and Land Court. The application was a clear case of forum shopping and should be dismissed with costs. Determination. 39.I have considered the Applicant’s application, the Respondent’s response, the applicable law, the authorities cited and the submissions. 40.Briefly, the Applicants seek to withdraw a pending suit in Naivasha CMCC ELC No. 64 of 2019, from the Naivasha Chief Magistrate’s Court and transfer it to the Environment and Land Court (ELC) for hearing and determination. He claims to have been a regular rent-paying tenant for 30 years running ‘’Genesis Glassmart Hardware’’ until 17th February 2024, when the Respondent allegedly used hired goons and police protection to violently and illegally evict him. 41.He argued that the eviction was based on Business Premises Rent Tribunal (BPRT) orders in Nakuru BPRT No. E016 of 2024, in utter contempt of active High Court injunction orders (from the original case Nakuru HCC No. 12 of 2010 before it was transferred to Naivasha), which barred the Respondent from interfering with his quiet possession. That he now intends to amend his Plaint to claim damages in excess of Kshs. 25,000,000/= for the complete destruction of his business, stock, and goodwill, which amount exceeds the financial jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court. 42.The Applicant's argument was that he was never served or notified of the BPRT case, which was a sub judice matter pending before the Magistrate's court. The BPRT orders were self-executing as they were never adopted by a Magistrate’s court, and no lawful warrants or auctioneers were involved. 43.That he is desirous of proceeding before the Environment and Land Court (ELC) to seek a formal declaration that the BPRT proceedings were a nullity, which declaratory relief he argues, the subordinate Magistrate's court lacks the jurisdiction to grant. 44.In opposing the application, the Respondent sought the dismissal of the transfer application with costs and allow the case to conclude in the lower court. She denied any illegal or violent eviction, maintaining that the Applicant’s removal was lawfully executed and supervised by authorities pursuant to valid orders obtained from the BPRT. 45.That the Applicant deliberately ignored the BPRT process and has failed to file any lawful appeal or review against the tribunal's orders, for which he cannot now use a transfer application to sidestep those outcomes. Further, she contended that the Kshs. 25,000,000/= damage figure was completely unsupported by any valuation, inventory, or police abstracts, and was inflated as an afterthought solely to create an artificial argument to escape the Magistrate's jurisdiction. 46.That the Applicant has spent years actively participating in the subordinate court without objecting, and therefore his application should be viewed as a late-stage tactical manoeuvre to reset the litigation, change the character of the suit midstream, and cause further delay. That transferring the case after years of proceedings would cause her grave financial prejudice and waste judicial time. She asserted that jurisdiction cannot be established by intended amendments and that the Environment and Land Court (ELC) can only address this matter as an appellate court. 47.From the summation of the matter as herein mentioned above, I find the issue for determination as being:i.Whether a suit can be transferred under Section 18 of the Civil Procedure Act on the basis of prospective, unapproved amendments.ii.Whether the Environment and Land Court (ELC) has the subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine a dispute centred on commercial tenancy, wrongful eviction, and commercial tort damages. 48.Section 18 of the Civil Procedure Act bestows upon the High Court (read ELC) the powers to transfer suits of a civil nature. The said provisions of the law provide as follows;“(1)On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court may at any stage—(a)transfer any suit, Appeal or other proceeding pending before it for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or(b)withdraw any suit or other proceeding pending in any court subordinate to it, and thereafter—(i)try or dispose of the same; or(ii)transfer the same for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or(iii)retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the court from which it was withdrawn.(2)Where any suit or proceeding has been transferred or withdrawn as aforesaid, the court which thereafter tries such suit may, subject to any special directions in the case of an order of transfer, either retry it or proceed from the point at which it was transferred or withdrawn”. 49.The power to transfer a suit is discretionary, and therefore a party seeking to transfer a matter from one court to another bears the burden of showing that the transfer is warranted. A matter can only be transferred if the Court from which the Applicant seeks transfer has jurisdiction over it. 50.In Albert Chaurembo Mumba and 7 Others vs Maurice Munyao & 148 Others (2019) eKLR, the Supreme Court held that: -“However, as it was well elucidated in the case of Kagenyi vs Musiramo & Another (1968) EALR 43, an order for transfer of a suit from one court to another cannot be made unless the suit has been brought, in the first instance, to a court which has jurisdiction to try it. It’s therefore irrelevant as parties cannot consent to confer jurisdiction to a Court or tribunal where it is not provided by law.” 51.From the above holdings, a transfer order can only occur if the suit was originally brought before a court with proper jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is determined at the time of filing, not by subsequent events. It is therefore clear that if the subordinate court lacks jurisdiction as alleged, there is no legally competent suit that can be transferred. Conversely, if the suit was competently instituted, subsequent inflated claims or tactical amendments cannot retroactively divest the magistracy court of jurisdiction. 52.On the second issue for determination, pursuant to Article 162(3) of the Constitution, Parliament enacted the Environment and Land Court Act, section 13(1) of which outlines the ELC’s jurisdiction as follows:“(2)In exercise of its jurisdiction under article162(2) (b) of the Constitution, the Court [the ELC] shall have power to hear and determine disputes—(a)relating to environmental planning and protection, climate issues, land use, planning, title, tenure, boundaries, rates, rents, valuations, mining, minerals and other natural resources;(b)relating to compulsory acquisition of land;(c)relating to land administration and management;(d)relating to public, private and community land and contracts, choses in action or other instruments granting any enforceable interests in land; and(e)any other dispute relating to environment and land.(3)Nothing in this Act shall preclude the Court from hearing and determining applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, rights or fundamental freedom relating to a clean and healthy environment under Articles 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution.” 53.It is an established tenet of law that the Environment and Land Court (ELC) does not possess residual, general jurisdiction over everyday civil wrongs, commercial contracts, or general torts simply because the subject matter rests upon a piece of land. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic v Chengo & 2 others [2017] KESC 15 (KLR) had been as follows:“It follows from the above analysis that, although the High Court and the specialized Courts are of the same status, as stated, they are different Courts. It also follows that the Judges appointed to those Courts exercise varying jurisdictions, depending upon the particular Courts to which they were appointed. From a reading of the statutes regulating the specialized Courts, it is a logical inference, in our view, that their jurisdictions are limited to the matters provided for in those statutes.’’ 54.What is the true character of the suit before the Naivasha Magistrate's court which the Applicant wants this Court to assume? It is a dispute over a commercial tenancy. The Applicant was a tenant; the Respondent was a landlord. 55.The remedies sought of Kshs. 25,000,000/= for loss of business, destroyed stock, and a declaration of nullity against the Business Premises Rent Tribunal (BPRT) are rooted in tenancy law and the law of torts (wrongful eviction and conversion of property), not land ownership, title, or borders. 56.Disputes concerning controlled commercial tenancies are governed strictly under the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act (Cap 301). Initial jurisdiction vests exclusively within the BPRT. While Section 13 of the ELC Act grants this court jurisdiction over leases and rents, it does not convert a general commercial tort claim (compensation for destroyed hardware inventory) into an environmental or land title issue. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that the mere fact that a business premises sits on land does not automatically convert a commercial tenancy or tort dispute into an ELC matter. 57.Furthermore, the Applicant seeks to amend his plaint to ask for a declaration of nullity against the BPRT orders. While the ELC routinely hears statutory appeals from the BPRT, the Applicant admits that a standard appeal is time-barred under the 30-day statutory window. Instead of an appeal, the Applicant is seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of the BPRT proceedings within a transferred civil suit. 58.By attempting to bypass the standard appellate mechanism through a civil suit amendment, the Applicant is asking the ELC to exercise original, general supervisory jurisdiction over a statutory tribunal. This specific power of issuing general declarations of nullity against external administrative decisions typically resides within the High Court under its judicial review or constitutional supervisory mandate, rather than the ELC as a specialized land court. The Applicant cannot circumvent the tribunal's explicit statutory appellate timelines by mounting a collateral attack in an ordinary civil suit. 59.Consequently, I find that the true gravamen of the intended amended suit is a commercial tenancy dispute coupled with a heavy tortious claim for special damages. The ELC lacks the subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such a case as a court of first instance. 60.It is trite as was held in the case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 that;“Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to see one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, it will down tools." 61.On this ground alone, I find as follows:i.The Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 4th March 2026 is hereby dismissed in its entirety.ii.The main suit, Naivasha Chief Magistrate’s Court ELC No. 64 of 2019, shall proceed to its logical conclusion before the subordinate court in Naivasha.iii.The costs of this application are awarded to the Respondent. DATED AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS AT NAIVASHA, THIS 25TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.M.C. OUNDOENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT – JUDGE