Chege v Karanja & 4 others (Civil Application 5 of 2016) [2026] KECA 1100 (KLR) (12 June 2026) (Ruling)

Chege v Karanja & 4 others (Civil Application 5 of 2016) [2026] KECA 1100 (KLR) (12 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1100 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Application 5 of 2016 F Tuiyott, MN Nduma & P Lilan, JJA June 12, 2026 Between Lucy Wamaitha Chege Applicant and Rose Wakanyi Karanja 1st Respondent Grace Wangari Karanja 2nd Respondent Kenneth Ndichu karanja 3rd Respondent William Muigai Karanj (As legal administrators of the Estate of Late Walter Karanja Muigai) 4th Respondent and Geoffrey Chege Kirundi Interested Party (Being an application for leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Kenya from the judgment and orders of the Court of Appeal at Nairobi (Warsame, Mwilu & Sichale JJ.A.) dated 29th day of July 2016inCivil Appeal No.172 of 2010 Civil Appeal 172 of 2010 ) Ruling 1.Before this Court is a Notice of Motion dated 29th September 2016 brought pursuant to Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution, section 15 of the Supreme Court Act, 2011, section 3A and 3B of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act and rule 5(2)(b) and 42 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2010. Through the application, the applicant principally seeks certification and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court delivered on 29th July 2016 in Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010 on the ground that the intended appeal raises matters of general public importance within the meaning of Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution. The applicant also seeks an order staying the execution and implementation of the said judgment pending the hearing and determination of the intended appeal. 2.The brief background to this application is that a dispute arose concerning a parcel of land known as L.R. No. 10090/23, a 47- acre parcel of agricultural land located in Juja, Kiambu County (the suit property) originally owned by the late Walter Karanja Muigai (deceased). On 15th February 1985, the deceased entered into a sale agreement with a man identified as Mr. Mugo and his wife (jointly the Kirikas) at Kshs. 35,000/= per acre. The Kirikas paid Kshs. 405,000/= as part payment, but failed to complete payment of the balance despite an extension of the completion period to 16th September 1985. The deceased consequently rescinded the agreement. The rescission triggered High Court Civil Case No. 3398 of 1988, filed by the Kirikas against the deceased seeking enforcement of their agreement. The deceased was represented in that litigation by Geoffrey Chege Kirundi, an advocate and the interested party in this application. On 28th October 1993, Aluoch J. (as she then was) dismissed the Kirikas' claim and ordered refund of Kshs. 405,000/=. Dissatisfied, the Kirikas lodged Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1994. The Kirikas also obtained an injunction from this Court restraining any disposal or alienation of the suit property pending determination of the appeal. The appeal was ultimately dismissed on 21st January 2000, thereby finally terminating the Kirikas claim. 3.However, and while the Kirikas litigation was still pending, the deceased entered into a second sale agreement dated 26th October 1990 with Geoffrey Chege Kirundi (the interested party) and his wife, Lucy Wamaitha Chege (the applicant). The agreed purchase price was Kshs. 2,500,000/=. Under the agreement, Kshs. 450,000/= was payable upon execution, Kshs. 405,000/= was earmarked for refund to the Kirikas, and the balance of Kshs. 1,635,000/= was payable upon registration of the transfer. According to the applicant and the interested party, the transaction was undertaken with the knowledge and consent of members of the deceased's family and was intended to rescue the deceased from financial difficulties and an impending realization of securities by Kenya Commercial Bank. On 16th December 1993, the applicant and the interested party procured consent of the Land Control Board in respect of the transaction. The deceased subsequently died on 21st June 1996 before the transfer was completed. 4.Following the deceased's death on 21st June 1996, Rose Wakanyi Karanja, Grace Wangari Karanja, Kenneth Ndichu Karanja and William Muigai Karanja (the respondents herein) filed Succession Cause No. 3608 of 2003 on 18th December 2003 seeking letters of administration in respect of his estate. In the petition, the respondents did not disclose the applicant's and the interested party's claim arising from the sale transaction and instead indicated that the estate had no liabilities. Upon learning of the omission, the interested party filed an affidavit of protest dated 29th April 2004, asserting that he and the applicant were creditors of the estate and that the suit property ought to have been disclosed as a liability rather than an asset of the estate. The protest prompted the respondents to amend the petition on 23rd September 2004 to include the suit property among the assets of the estate. The interested party, however, maintained his objection and filed a further affidavit of protest on 7th December 2004, reiterating his position that the suit property was not available for distribution as an asset of the estate but constituted a liability arising from the deceased's contractual obligations to him and the applicant. 5.Separately, the applicant and the interested party commenced two suits. First, on 24th September 2004 they filed Miscellaneous Application No. 1277 of 2004 (OS) against the estate of the deceased seeking inter alia extension and validation of the consent of the Land Control Board and leave to pursue transfer of the property. Secondly, on 24th December 2004 they filed HCCC No. 1401 of 2004 (OS) against the respondents seeking orders compelling execution of transfer documents, registration of the grant against the title, and removal of an injunction registered against the suit property.Eventually, Succession Cause No. 3608 of 2003, HCCC No. 1401 of 2004 (O.S.) and High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 1277 of 2004 (O.S.) were consolidated for hearing and determination before Rawal, J. (as she then was) who directed that the consolidated proceedings be disposed of through affidavit evidence and written submissions by the parties. 6.Before the High Court, the applicant and the interested party maintained that the 1990 agreement remained enforceable, that the Land Control Board consent obtained on 16th December 1993 was valid because time only began running after the High Court determined the Kirikas litigation on 28th October 1993, and that any delay was capable of being cured through extension of time under section 8 of the Land Control Act. They further contended that the agreement was merely conditional upon resolution of the Kirikas dispute and therefore did not offend either the doctrine of lis pendens or section 46 of the Advocates Act. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the suit had been improperly commenced by originating summons, that the Land Control Board consent was hopelessly out of time, that the transaction violated section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act because litigation over the land was pending, that it violated section 46 of the Advocates Act because the interested party was the deceased's advocate in the Kirikas litigation, and that the claim was statute-barred. 7.Rawal, J. found in favour of the applicant and the interested party. She held that notwithstanding the complexity of the issues, the matter could properly proceed by originating summons because the parties had agreed to determine it on affidavit evidence and submissions. She further held that the 1990 sale agreement was essentially conditional or inchoate and that the parties' obligations crystallized only after the Kirikas litigation had been resolved. In her view, the agreement did not offend section 46 of the Advocates Act because enforcement became possible only after the litigation had ended. She also held that the pending Kirikas litigation created what she described as a legal disability which suspended the running of time under the Land Control Act. Consequently, she found that the Land Control Board consent obtained on 16th December 1993 was valid, or alternatively capable of validation through extension of time. She therefore allowed HCCC No. 1401 of 2004, compelled the administrators to execute transfer documents, directed removal of the injunction from the title, ordered payment of the outstanding balance of the purchase price, and upheld the interested party’s protest in the succession cause by directing removal of the suit property from the estate assets. 8.Following that ruling, and after the respondents declined to execute the requisite transfer documents, the Deputy Registrar executed the instruments necessary to effect the transfer. Consequently, the suit property was transferred to and registered in the joint names of the applicant and the interested party on 24th April 2009. The applicant further depones that she and the interested party subsequently transferred their interest in the property to Everton Coal Enterprises Limited which later transferred its interest to Jovis Traders Limited. According to the applicant, separate proceedings touching on the property were thereafter instituted before the Environment and Land Court. 9.Aggrieved by the decision of Rawal, J., the respondents lodged Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010. In a judgment delivered on 29th July 2016, this Court (Warsame, Mwilu, & Sichale, JJ.A.) undertook a fresh evaluation of the entire dispute and fundamentally disagreed with the decision by Rawal, J. The Court first held that the dispute was wholly unsuitable for determination by way of originating summons. According to the Court, the consolidated proceedings raised numerous contested and complex issues, including the effect of the Kirikas litigation, the legality of the transaction under the Advocates Act, the application of the doctrine of lis pendens, and the validity of the Land Control Board consent. The Court emphasized that originating summons is intended for relatively straightforward matters and not for serious disputes involving contested facts and substantial legal questions. Although the administrators had acquiesced in the procedure, that acquiescence could not transform a fundamentally unsuitable process into a proper one. 10.The Court next addressed the relationship between the interested party and the deceased. It found as a matter of fact that the interested party acted for the deceased in the Kirikas litigation both in the High Court and in this Court. The Court rejected the conclusion by Rawal, J. that the sale agreement was merely conditional and outside the scope of section 46 of the Advocates Act. In its view, the interested party had purchased his client's interest in property that was directly the subject of contentious litigation. The agreement specifically contemplated payment of Kshs. 405,000/= to the Kirikas and was entered into during the pendency of the dispute. The transaction therefore offended section 46 of the Advocates Act and was contrary to public policy. 11.The Court further held that the transaction violated section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which embodies the doctrine of lis pendens. At the time the agreement was executed on 26th October 1990, HCCC No. 3398 of 1988 was actively pending. The property could not lawfully be transferred or otherwise dealt with without leave of the court. The Court rejected Rawal, J's holding that the agreement was somehow suspended until the litigation concluded. Instead, it held that the deceased and the interested party were legally prohibited from dealing with the property during the pendency of the suit and that the doctrine existed precisely to prevent parties from frustrating the outcome of ongoing litigation. 12.The Court regarded the Land Control Board issue as decisive. It held that the agreement was executed on 26th October 1990 and that section 8 of the Land Control Act required consent to be sought within six months from that date. The consent obtained on 16th December 1993 was therefore clearly outside the statutory period. The Court rejected the notion that the pendency of the Kirikas litigation created a legal disability capable of suspending time. It found no legal basis for such a concept, noting that the disabilities recognized under limitation statutes did not include the existence of pending litigation. More importantly, the Court observed that the same litigation which the interested party relied upon as creating a disability actually prohibited dealings with the property under the doctrine of lis pendens. 13.The Court also rejected the High Court's validation of the out- of-time consent. It held that section 8 of the Land Control Act permits extension of time before consent is sought but does not authorize retrospective validation of a consent already obtained irregularly and outside the statutory period. Since the Land Control Board had granted consent long after the transaction had become void and the Board itself was not even a party to the proceedings seeking validation, the High Court's order had no legal foundation. Relying on the decision of this Court in Karuri v Gituru [1981] KLR 247, the Court held that a consent granted outside the statutory period could not revive a transaction that had already become void. 14.Having found that the transaction offended section 46 of the Advocates Act, violated the doctrine of lis pendens, and lacked a valid consent of the Land Control Board, the Court concluded that the sale became null and void upon expiry of six months from 26th October 1990. Although it expressed sympathy for the applicant and the interested party, it emphasized that the Land Control Act contains mandatory provisions that cannot be relaxed through equitable considerations. The Court therefore allowed the appeal in its entirety, set aside the decision of Rawal, J. and awarded costs to the respondents as the legal representatives of the deceased’s estate. 15.The applicant, through the present application, seeks certification and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court delivered on 29th July 2016. 16.In the motion and the supporting affidavit, the applicant contends that the intended appeal raises substantial questions of constitutional and general public importance warranting determination by the Supreme Court. In particular, she asserts that this Court misinterpreted and misapplied section 46 of the Advocates Act by failing to recognize her independent proprietary interest in the suit property and by treating her rights as inseparable from those of the interested party. She further maintains that the decision raises important questions regarding the constitutional protection of matrimonial property and the property rights of spouses, particularly where one spouse is not an advocate and is not privy to the professional relationship giving rise to the impugned transaction. The applicant also argues that the judgment has implications for the rights of married persons who jointly acquire property and for the extent to which one spouse's professional status or conduct may affect the proprietary rights of the other. 17.The applicant further contends that this Court incorrectly applied the doctrine of lis pendens and, in so doing, expanded its scope beyond its established limits. According to her, the intended appeal raises important questions regarding the effect of pending litigation on contractual and proprietary rights in land, the distinction between void and voidable transactions, and the circumstances under which a transaction may be invalidated on account of ongoing proceedings. She maintains that clarification by the Supreme Court is necessary to ensure certainty in land transactions and property dealings undertaken during the pendency of disputes. 18.The applicant also challenges this Court's findings concerning the Land Control Board consent arguing that the judgment raises significant questions regarding the interpretation and application of the Land Control Act, including when time begins to run for purposes of obtaining consent, the effect of intervening legal impediments, and the extent to which a court may intervene where compliance within the prescribed period becomes impracticable. She further contends that the decision creates uncertainty as to the legal effect of a consent previously accepted and acted upon by parties and courts over an extended period. 19.Additionally, the applicant contends that this Court failed to adequately consider the constitutional guarantees of equality, non-discrimination, access to justice and protection of property. In her view, the judgment has the effect of extinguishing proprietary rights acquired through a joint transaction without sufficient regard to her separate legal and beneficial interests thereby raising constitutional questions that transcend the circumstances of the present dispute. 20.Finally, the applicant maintains that the impugned judgment has far-reaching implications beyond the immediate parties, as it affects the rights of spouses in joint property transactions, the conduct of advocates involved in commercial dealings with clients, the administration of land transactions, and the certainty of contractual and proprietary rights. She therefore urges that the intended appeal transcends the interests of the parties and raises issues of general public importance meriting consideration by the Supreme Court. 21.The application is opposed by the respondents vide a replying affidavit sworn by William Muigai Karanja on his own behalf and on behalf of the other administrators of the deceased’s estate. He depones from the onset that the application is incompetent, misconceived and devoid of merit as it neither raises issues of constitutional interpretation nor matters of general public importance warranting certification and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. He avers that the dispute concerns competing proprietary claims between private parties over a private parcel of land and that this Court merely restored the suit property to the estate of the deceased. He therefore contends that the issues sought to be escalated to the Supreme Court do not transcend the interests of the parties to the litigation. 22.The deponent further contends that the applicant and the interested party are improperly seeking to re-litigate matters that were conclusively determined by this Court. He reiterates that this application amounts to an abuse of the court process and does not satisfy the constitutional and statutory threshold for certification. 23.With regard to the specific grounds advanced by the applicant, the deponent maintains that no novel or unsettled constitutional questions arise from the judgment of this Court. He contends that the issues relating to section 46 of the Advocates Act, the doctrine of lis pendens, and the validity of the consent of the Land Control Board were fully canvassed and determined in accordance with settled legal principles and do not warrant further consideration by the Supreme Court. 24.The deponent further avers that the applicant and the interested party have not approached the Court with clean hands. In that regard, he alludes to a series of transactions involving the suit property, including arrangements with third parties and subsequent transfers effected after the judgment of the High Court, which, in his view, demonstrate a deliberate attempt to defeat the interests of the estate and to place the property beyond the reach of the respondents. 25.The deponent also disputes the applicant's assertion that she and the interested party were ever in possession of the suit property and maintains that possession remained with the beneficiaries of the deceased's estate. He contends that the applicant has failed to demonstrate any constitutional violation or any issue of public importance arising from the judgment of this Court. 26.In conclusion, the deponent avers that the intended appeals do not raise issues deserving the attention of the Supreme Court and urges the Court to dismiss the application with costs. 27.At the hearing of this application, learned counsel Mr. Makori appeared for the applicant while learned counsel Mr. Keffa was present for the respondents. Highlighting the applicant's written submissions dated 1st September 2017, Mr. Makori submitted that the intended appeal satisfies the threshold for certification under Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution as it raises matters of general public importance warranting consideration by the Supreme Court. Counsel emphasized that the applicant's case is distinct from that of the interested party and that the principal issue arising from the impugned judgment concerns the rights of married women who jointly acquire property with their spouses and whether such rights remain independent and enforceable when disputes arise. 28.Counsel submitted that this Court failed to recognize the applicant's separate contractual and proprietary rights in the suit property and instead treated her interests as inseparable from those of the interested party by virtue of their marital relationship. He contended that while one of the grounds upon which the transaction was invalidated was the interested party's status as an advocate and the application of the doctrine of champerty, the applicant herself was neither an advocate nor accused of any wrongdoing. According to counsel, the Court consequently subsumed the applicant's rights under those of her husband without considering her independent legal interest in the property. 29.It was further submitted that the intended appeal raises important constitutional questions regarding the autonomy of married women in contractual and property transactions, the extent to which they may enforce rights acquired through joint ownership, and whether their proprietary interests may be defeated by legal objections directed solely at their spouses. Counsel argued that these questions transcend the circumstances of the parties and affect many spouses who jointly own property or engage in commercial transactions. 30.In support of the threshold for certification, counsel relied on Sum Model Industries Limited v Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation [2011] eKLR, Hermanus Phillipus Steyn v Giovanni Gnecchi-Ruscone [2013] eKLR and Town Council of Awendo v Nelson Oduor Onyango & 13 Others [2015] eKLR. He submitted that these decisions establish that certification ought to issue where a matter raises a substantial point of law, bears significantly on the public interest, or presents issues whose determination would contribute to the development of jurisprudence. Counsel asserted that the intended appeal satisfies that threshold because it concerns the recognition and protection of independently acquired proprietary rights within marriage. 31.Counsel further submitted that the impugned judgment is inconsistent with Articles 2, 10, 27, 40, 45 and 259 of the Constitution. He contended that the Constitution requires courts to interpret and develop the law in a manner that promotes constitutional values, equality, justice, human rights and access to justice. In his view, the impugned decision undermines the constitutional and statutory recognition of women as independent legal actors capable of acquiring, owning and enforcing proprietary rights in their own right. 32.To reinforce that position, counsel relied on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act, 2013. He submitted that these instruments recognize and protect the independent proprietary rights of women and that this Court failed to appreciate the applicant's separate contribution to the acquisition of the suit property and the legal framework governing matrimonial property rights in Kenya. 33.Counsel also contended that the intended appeal presents an opportunity for the development of the common law doctrine of champerty in light of the Constitution. He submitted that champerty is a common law doctrine founded on considerations of public policy and equity and that courts are constitutionally obligated to develop such doctrines in conformity with constitutional values. According to counsel, jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, South Africa, Singapore and Hong Kong have moved away from the traditional prohibition of champerty and now regulate litigation funding. He therefore contended that the issue warrants consideration by the Supreme Court as part of the continued development of Kenyan jurisprudence. 34.In advancing those arguments, counsel cited White v Cedzich [1929] 43 C.L.R. 493 and Rimmer v Rimmer [1953] 1 Q.B. 63, contending that modern jurisprudence recognizes the equal proprietary status of spouses and rejects historical doctrines that subordinated a married woman's legal identity and property rights to those of her husband. He submitted that the impugned judgment effectively revives such outdated notions and raises important jurisprudential questions requiring clarification by the Supreme Court. 35.Counsel therefore urged this Court to find that the intended appeal raises substantial constitutional and legal questions concerning women's property rights, matrimonial property rights, joint ownership of property, the development of the common law, and the enforceability of independent proprietary interests within marriage. He accordingly invited this Court to certify the matter as one of general public importance and grant the applicant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 36.On their part, the respondents vide the further written submissions dated 18th February 2026 and highlighted by learned counsel Mr. Keffa, opposed the application and urged this Court to decline certification and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Counsel submitted that the issues raised by the applicant had already been canvassed and determined by various courts, including the Supreme Court, and therefore did not raise any novel question of law or matter of general public importance. 37.In that regard, counsel placed reliance on Everton Coal Enterprises Limited v Karanja & 5 others [2023] KESC 98 (KLR), where the Supreme Court declined to certify issues arising from the same dispute for appeal. Counsel submitted that the Supreme Court had already found that the issues sought to be raised did not transcend the circumstances of the parties and lacked any significant bearing on the public interest. He argued that the present application merely seeks another opportunity to reopen issues that have repeatedly been litigated before the courts. 38.Counsel further submitted that the judgment of this Court delivered on 29th July 2016 has subsequently been affirmed and applied in later proceedings involving the same property. In particular, he relied on Josvir Traders & Agencies Limited v Geoffrey Chege Kirundi & 2 Others [2022] eKLR, where the court recognized that the title previously held by the applicant and the interested party had been nullified by the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010 and that ownership of the suit property had consequently reverted to the estate of the deceased. Counsel contended that this demonstrated that the legal consequences of the impugned judgment had already been settled and accepted in subsequent litigation. 39.Counsel also relied on Everton Enterprises Limited & 2 others v Karanja and Karanja (As administrators of the Estate of Walter Karanja Muigai -Deceased) & another [2026] KEELC 1880 (KLR), where the Environment and Land Court held that disputes concerning the suit property had been the subject of extensive litigation dating back to 1988 and that subsequent proceedings involving the same parties and property were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. He submitted that the recurring attempts to relitigate the dispute reinforced the conclusion that the issues raised were private in nature and did not warrant the intervention of the Supreme Court. 40.On the whole, counsel maintained that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that the intended appeal raises any novel, unsettled or jurisprudentially significant issue requiring determination by the Supreme Court. He contended that the issues identified by the applicant neither transcend the facts of the present case nor bear upon the public interest and therefore fall short of the threshold for certification under Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution. Counsel accordingly urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs. 41.We have duly considered the application, the affidavits on record, the rival submissions by learned counsel, the authorities cited and the applicable law. 42.Before considering whether the intended appeal raises a matter of general public importance within the meaning of Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution, we take note of a poignant aspect arising from the timing of the application. Rule 40 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2010 provides that where no appeal lies unless the superior court certifies that a point of law of general public importance is involved, an application for such certification is to be made either informally at the time the impugned decision was delivered or by way of a formal application within fourteen days of that decision. 43.In the present case, the judgment sought to be appealed against was delivered on 29th July 2016 whereas the present application was filed on 29th September 2016, well outside the period prescribed by rule 40. 44.It is also noteworthy that no application for extension of time under rule 4 of the Rules of this Court was made by the applicant. In Njowamu Construction Company Ltd & Another v Samuel Ngige Kiarie, Civil Application Sup No. 20 of 2019, this Court considered a similar objection and held that an application filed outside the prescribed time, without any application for enlargement of time, was incompetent. See also Alice Nduta Mburu & 5 Others v Barclays Bank of Kenya Limited, Civil Application Sup No. 22 of 2019. 45.We are mindful, however, that the said erstwhile rule 40 makes mention of ‘superior court’, thus inviting debate regarding its applicability to certifications on matters of general public importance emanating from decisions of this courtto the apex Court. We need not say more on this aspect preferring, as a matter of justice, to focus on the substantive question before us. 46.We do so while bearing in mind the age of this litigation, the extensive arguments addressed to us on the substantive question of certification, and this Court’s desire to bring finality to a dispute that has engaged the courts for several decades, we do not consider it necessary to dispose of the matter solely on that procedural slip. We shall therefore proceed to consider whether, assuming the application was properly before the Court, the applicant has satisfied the threshold for certification under Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution. 47.Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution provides that appeals shall lie from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court in any case in which either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal certifies that a matter of general public importance is involved. The principles governing certification are now well settled. In Hermanus Phillipus Steyn v Giovanni Gnecchi Ruscone (supra), the Supreme Court held that for a matter to qualify as one of general public importance, it must transcend the circumstances of the particular case, have a significant bearing on the public interest, and raise a substantial point of law whose determination will have consequences beyond the interests of the parties. Similar principles were reiterated in Malcolm Bell v Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi & another [2013] eKLR and Town Council of Awendo v Nelson Oduor Onyango & 13 Others (supra). 48.It follows therefore that certification is not available merely because a party is dissatisfied with the outcome of litigation or because constitutional provisions have been invoked. An applicant must identify with precision the specific issue said to be of general public importance and demonstrate that its resolution will have a substantial impact beyond the immediate interests of the parties. Equally, certification is not intended to afford relentless litigants a further opportunity to challenge findings reached through the application of settled legal principles to the facts of a particular case. 49.The gravamen of the applicant's case is that this Court failed to recognize her independent proprietary interest in the suit property and instead treated her rights as inseparable from those of the interested party. It is contended that the intended appeal raises important questions regarding the rights of married women who jointly acquire property with their spouses and whether such rights may be defeated by legal objections directed solely at one spouse. 50.We fully appreciate that the constitutional guarantees of property rights and the equal treatment of spouses within marriage are important and enduring features of our constitutional framework. Indeed, Articles 27, 40 and 45 of the Constitution, together with the Matrimonial Property Act,2013, reflect the commitment of our legal system to equality and the protection of proprietary rights. 51.Against that backdrop and having carefully examined the judgment sought to be appealed from, we are far from being convinced that the issues identified by the applicant satisfy the threshold for certification. In stating so, we note that the decision of this Court did not turn on the legal status of married women, the constitutionality of matrimonial property rights, or the general capacity of spouses to own property jointly. Rather, the appeal was determined on the basis of settled legal principles relating to section 46 of the Advocates Act, the doctrine of lis pendens, and the mandatory provisions of the Land Control Act. The conclusions reached by this Court were therefore undoubtedly anchored on the particular facts and circumstances of the transaction under consideration. 52.Similarly, the questions concerning the doctrine of lis pendens and the validity of the consent of the Land Control Board or manner and when to seek extension of time for such consent under section 8 of the Land Control Act have not advanced or raise any novel, unsettled or jurisprudentially significant issues of law. The applicant has not, in our view, demonstrated the existence of conflicting authorities, uncertainty in the law, or any lacuna requiring clarification by the Supreme Court. To the contrary, the legal principles governing those issues are well settled and were applied by this Court to the facts before it. 53.The applicant also submitted that the intended appeal raises important questions regarding the place of the common law doctrine of champerty within Kenya's constitutional framework and presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify and develop the law in that regard. In our view, although the development of the law is an important judicial function, the mere assertion that an established legal doctrine ought to be revisited or developed does not, without more, warrant certification. An applicant must demonstrate that the judgment sought to be appealed raises a substantial question of law whose determination transcends the interests of the parties and bears significantly on the public interest. That threshold has not been met in the present case. In any event, and this is fundamental, the doctrine was not at the heart of issues raised before the Court nor did the decision sought to be impugned turn on it. 54.We are also alive to the submission by the respondents that issues arising from the same dispute have continued to engage various courts and have, in certain respects, attracted consideration by both the Supreme Court and other superior courts. In particular, reliance was placed on Everton Coal Enterprises Limited v Rose Wakanyi Karanja & Others (supra), in which the Supreme Court declined to certify issues arising from the same dispute on the basis that they did not transcend the circumstances of the parties or bear significantly upon the public interest. While that decision is not determinative of the present application, particularly given the distinct position advanced by the applicant, it nonetheless lends credence to the view that the issues arising from this protracted dispute are closely intertwined with the particular circumstances of the parties. 55.We are also cognizant of the applicant's argument that her position is distinguishable from that of Everton Coal Enterprises Limited v Rose Wakanyi Karanja & Others (supra) because she seeks to vindicate what she describes as her independent proprietary rights as a spouse and co- purchaser. However, upon careful consideration, we are unable to discern any novel constitutional or legal issue arising from that contention that would warrant the intervention of the Supreme Court. The question as to whether the applicant's rights were affected by the findings made in respect of the interested party is one that was addressed by this Court within the factual matrix of the dispute and does not, in our view, raise a substantial question of law whose determination would have consequences beyond the parties before the Court. 56.In our view, what the applicant seeks through the present application is, in substance, a reconsideration of this Court's conclusions regarding the effect of section 46 of the Advocates Act, the doctrine of lis pendens, the validity of the Land Control Board consent, and the consequences flowing therefrom. Those matters were fully canvassed and determined in the judgment sought to be appealed. The fact that the applicant disagrees with those conclusions does not, without more, convert the dispute into one involving a matter of general public importance. Certification under Article 163(4)(b) is not intended to provide litigants with a second bite at the cherry or a further opportunity or open ended licence to challenge factual and legal conclusions reached by this Court. In addition, the applicant has not demonstrated that there exists any uncertainty in the law requiring clarification by the Supreme Court. 57.In the end, we are not satisfied that the applicant has demonstrated that the intended appeal raises any issue whose impact and consequences transcend the interests of the parties or bear significantly upon the public interest. 58.The applicant also seeks an order staying the execution and implementation of the impugned judgment pending the intended appeal. Quite apart from our conclusion that the application has not satisfied the threshold for certification under Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution, we note that this Court became functus officio upon delivery of its judgment in Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010. In Dickson Muricho Muriuki v Timothy Kagondu Muriuki & 6 Others [2013] eKLR, this Court affirmed that it lacks jurisdiction, after rendering its final judgment, to grant a stay pending an intended appeal to the Supreme Court. The prayer for stay must therefore fail. 59.Consequently, the Notice of Motion dated 29th September 2016 is not merited and is accordingly dismissed in its entirety with costs to the respondents. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 12TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026F. TUIYOTTJUDGE OF APPEAL..............................NDUMA NDERIJUDGE OF APPEAL..............................PAUL LILANJUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original SignedDEPUTY REGISTRAR