https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/529

 **REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE CHIEF MAGISTRATE’S COURT AT NAKURU** **CIVIL CASE NO. E860 OF 2025** **MARY NJERI MAINA** **FRESHIA MUKUHI NYANJUI** *(Suing as the Legal Representatives of the Estate of FRANCIS KINYANJUI KIMANI (Deceased))* ................... **PLAINTIFFS/APPLICANTS** **-VERSUS-** **DIRECTLINE ASSURANCE** **COMPANY LIMITED**........................................**DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT** **RULING** **Introduction** 1. The Plaintiffs/Applicants moved this Court by a Notice of Motion dated 5th November 2025 seeking, principally, an order that the Defendant’s Statement of Defence dated 19th September, 2025 be struck out in its entirety and that Judgment be entered in favour of the Plaintiffs as prayed in the Plaint dated 8th September 2025. The Application is expressed to be brought under Order 2 Rule 15(1)(a) and (c), Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and all other enabling provisions of the law. The Plaintiffs also seek the costs of the Application and the suit. 2. The Application arises from a declaratory claim founded upon an accident which occurred on 19th April 2019 involving motor vehicle registration number KBD 704T. The Plaintiffs' case is that the deceased, Francis Kinyanjui Kimani, sustained fatal injuries following the accident and that the vehicle was insured by the Defendant under Policy No. 01042702. The Plaintiffs further rely on the Judgment and Decree arising from **Nakuru CMCC No. 1234 of 2019,** which they contend has not been appealed against and remains valid and enforceable. 3. The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant, being the insurer of the Motor Vehicle, is statutorily obligated to satisfy the Judgment obtained against its insured, subject to the provisions of the **Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act, Cap. 405**. Their case is that the Defendant's Statement of Defence raises no genuine issue for trial and consists substantially of bare denials intended to delay the Plaintiffs from enjoying the fruits of the decree in the primary proceedings. 4. The Defendant opposes the Application. Its fundamental position is that the Defence raises bona fide triable issues, particularly whether it insured Motor Vehicle Registration Number **KBD 704T** at the material time, whether the statutory notice required under section 10 of Cap. 405 was properly served, and whether the Defendant is legally liable to satisfy the decree arising from the primary proceedings. 5. The Court is therefore called upon to determine whether, on the material placed before it, the Defendant's Defence is so plainly untenable that it ought to be summarily removed from the record, or whether the issues raised therein should be determined after a full hearing. **Plaintiffs' Case** 1. The Plaintiffs' Application dated 5th November 2025 seeks three principal orders: first, that the Statement of Defence dated 19th September 2025 be struck out; secondly, that Judgment be entered for the Plaintiffs as prayed in the Plaint dated 8th September 2025; and thirdly, that the Defendant be condemned to pay the costs of the application and the suit. 2. The grounds of the application are that the Defence discloses no reasonable Defence in law; that it is prejudicial and delays the fair trial of the action; that it prevents the Plaintiffs from enjoying the fruits of the judgment and decree in **Nakuru CMCC No. 1234 of 2019;** that the Defendant is the insurer of the accident motor vehicle; and that no appeal has been lodged against the decree in the primary suit. 3. The Application is supported by the Supporting Affidavit of George Kirumba Mbiyu sworn on 7th November ,2025, an advocate acting for the Plaintiffs. He states that the Defendant's Defence does not disclose a reasonable defence in law and is delaying the fair determination of the proceedings. He confirms that the Defendant appointed KRK Advocates LLP to defend the present proceedings and asserts that Directline Assurance Company Limited was the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. 4. The Plaintiffs rely on documents emanating from **Nakuru CMCC No. 1234 of 2019**, including the pleadings, statutory notice, police abstract and correspondence relating to the Judgment and demand for settlement. 5. The Plaintiffs' Further Affidavit sworn by George Kirumba Mbiyu and dated 27th June 2026 responds to the Defendant's opposition. The Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendant has not produced documentary evidence capable of substantiating its denial that it insured motor vehicle KBD 704T. 6. The Plaintiffs particularly challenge the Defendant's reliance on the issue of the Police Abstract. Their position is that the police abstract was produced in the primary proceedings by a police officer and that the Defendant's insured had the opportunity to challenge the evidence in those proceedings. 7. The Plaintiffs also rely on documents from the primary proceedings, including the Memorandum of Appearance and Defence, to demonstrate what they consider to be the connection between the Defendant and the insured. 8. The Plaintiffs have further exhibited what they describe as the statutory notice, demand letter and police abstract. The statutory notice identifies John Kanyita Chege as the insured, Policy No. 01042702, the accident date as 19th April 2019, and Motor Vehicle Registration Number KBD 704T. 9. The Plaintiffs consequently submit that the Defendant's denial of the insurance relationship is a bare denial and does not amount to a bona fide triable issue. **The Defendant's case** 1. The Defendant's Statement of Defence is dated 19th September 2025. The Defence substantially denies the allegations pleaded by the Plaintiffs. The Defendant admits only limited descriptive matters and puts the Plaintiffs to strict proof of the material allegations. 2. Of particular significance, the Defendant denies that the deceased was lawfully walking along Nakuru–Bahati Road when the insured driver negligently lost control of motor vehicle KBD 704T and caused the fatal accident. 3. More importantly, the Defendant denies the alleged insurance cover and puts the Plaintiffs to strict proof that the vehicle was insured by the Defendant under the alleged policy. 4. The Defendant also disputes the Plaintiffs' allegations concerning **Nakuru CMCC No. 1234 of 2019**, including the circumstances under which the earlier proceedings were instituted, the Judgment and the amount said to have been decreed. 5. The Defence further denies that the earlier Judgment determined liability covered by a policy issued by the Defendant and denies having received the demand and statutory notices in the manner alleged by the Plaintiffs. 6. The Defence ultimately seeks dismissal of the Plaintiffs' declaratory suit with costs. 7. The Defendant opposed the Motion through a Replying Affidavit sworn by Rayn Wendo, the Defendant's Deputy Claims Manager. The Defendant's principal position is that its Defence raises substantial triable issues which cannot properly be resolved summarily. 8. The Defendant particularly maintains that it has expressly denied being the insurer of motor vehicle KBD 704T. It argues that whether it issued the alleged policy is not a peripheral question but goes to the very foundation of the Plaintiffs' claim. 9. The Defendant also disputes service of the statutory notice. It states that the notice relied upon by the Plaintiffs does not bear the Defendant's receiving stamp and that there is no certificate of postage demonstrating service. 10. The Defendant challenges the evidential weight of the police abstract, contending that the contents thereof are rebuttable and should be tested by evidence at trial rather than conclusively determined on an interlocutory application. 11. The Defendant consequently submits that the Plaintiffs are asking the Court to determine contested questions of fact without the benefit of oral evidence, Cross-Examination and full consideration of the documentary evidence. 12. The Defendant further contends that it has not filed a sham Defence and that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Defence is incapable of amendment or that it raises no bona fide issue deserving adjudication. 13. In response, the Plaintiffs filed a Further Affidavit sworn by George Kirumba Mbiyu and dated 27th June 2026. 14. The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant has failed to produce any documentary evidence demonstrating that it was not the insurer of motor vehicle KBD 704T. 15. They further argue that the issue concerning the police abstract was not raised in the Defence and is therefore an afterthought. They contend that the police abstract was produced in the primary proceedings and was not successfully challenged. 16. The Plaintiffs rely on documents from the primary proceedings, including the Memorandum of Appearance and Defence, and draw attention to similarities in the details of the advocates involved in the primary proceedings and the present matter. 17. They maintain that the statutory notice, demand letter and Police Abstract demonstrate the insurance relationship and that the Defendant's denial is merely intended to delay the Plaintiffs from enjoying the fruits of the decree. **Plaintiff’s Submissions** 1. The Plaintiffs' Written Submissions are dated **7th July 2026**. They urge the Court to allow the application and strike out the Defence. 2. The Plaintiffs rely on **Order 2 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules** and submit that the Defence discloses no reasonable defence in law, is frivolous and vexatious, may delay the fair determination of the matter and constitutes an abuse of the court process. 3. They rely, inter alia, on **Kenya Orient Insurance Ltd v Kagau alias Kale, First Assurance Co. Ltd v Florence Wavinya Mutua** and authorities dealing with the statutory obligation of insurers under section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act. 4. The Plaintiffs submit that the accident occurred on **19th April 2019**, that motor vehicle KBD 704T was insured under Policy No. **01042702**, that the primary proceedings resulted in a Judgment and Decree and that the Defendant was duly notified. 5. The Plaintiffs contend that the documentary evidence demonstrates the insurance relationship and that the Defendant's denial, unsupported by documentary evidence from the insurer's own records, is a bare denial. **Defendant’s submissions** 1. The Defendant's submissions, as captured in the record, maintain that the Defence raises bona fide triable issues. The Defendant particularly relies upon the disputed insurance cover, service of statutory notice and the legal consequences of the primary Judgment. 2. The Defendant submits that striking out is a drastic remedy and that the Court should not determine contested factual questions through an Interlocutory Application. 3. It was submitted that striking out a Defence is a **drastic remedy** which should only be exercised in clear cases where a pleading is plainly hopeless. The Defendant relied on **Blue Shield Insurance Co. Ltd v Joseph Mboya Oguttu*,* Bekya Floriculture Ltd v Gimalu Estates Ltd *and* Ajit Singh Virdi v JF McCloy*.*** 4. The Defendant identified the principal triable issue as **whether it was the insurer of motor vehicle registration number KBD 704T** at the material time. 5. The Defendant maintained that it had expressly denied the alleged insurance relationship and that the Plaintiffs were required to prove the existence of the alleged policy and the extent of any liability arising therefrom. 6. It was further submitted that the **Police Abstract was not conclusive proof of insurance cover,** and that its contents and evidential value should be tested at the hearing. 7. The Defendant also disputed the alleged **service of the statutory notice** under section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act, contending that the notice did not bear its receiving stamp and that no certificate of postage or other sufficient evidence of receipt had been produced. 8. The Defendant submitted that compliance with section 10 was a substantive issue because its statutory obligation to satisfy the judgment depended upon fulfilment of the requirements prescribed by the Act. 9. The Defendant further submitted that the existence of the Judgment in **Nakuru CMCC No. 1234 of 2019** did not, by itself, establish its liability. The Plaintiffs were still required to prove the nexus between the Defendant, the alleged insurance policy and the decree. 10. It was argued that the Defence was neither **frivolous nor vexatious nor an abuse of the court process**, since it raised specific and substantive issues directly related to the Plaintiffs’ claim. 11. The Defendant urged the Court not to conduct a **mini-trial** at the interlocutory stage by weighing the competing documentary evidence or making final findings on disputed facts. 12. The Defendant consequently submitted that the Defence should remain on record and the disputed matters be determined after a **full hearing and cross-examination of the witnesses**. 13. The Defendant therefore prayed that the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion dated **5th November 2025** be **dismissed with costs**. **Analysis and Determination** 1. From the Pleadings, Affidavits and Submissions, the following issues to arise for determination: 1. Whether the Defendant's Statement of Defence raises bona fide triable issues; 2. Whether the Defence ought to be struck out under Order 2 Rule 15(1)(a) and (c) of the Civil Procedure Rules; 3. Whether Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution has any application to the alleged defects in service of the statutory notice; 4. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to Judgment as prayed upon the striking out of the Defence; and 5. Who should bear the costs of the Application. 2. The jurisdiction to strike out pleadings is found in **Order 2 Rule 15(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010**. The Rule permits the Court, at any stage of proceedings, to strike out or amend a pleading where it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence in law; is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. 3. The jurisdiction is discretionary but must be exercised cautiously. The reason is that striking out a Defence has the effect of removing a party from the arena of litigation without the benefit of a full hearing. 4. The seminal authority remains **D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Limited v Joseph Mbaria Muchina & Another [1982] KLR 1**. The Court of Appeal made it clear that the power to strike out pleadings should be exercised only in plain and obvious cases. The Court should not embark upon a trial when considering an Application under the rule. 5. In **Blue Shield Insurance Company Ltd v Joseph Mboya Oguttu [2009] eKLR,** the Court of Appeal reiterated that the jurisdiction to strike out pleadings is a draconian one and should be exercised sparingly and cautiously. Where a Defence raises a bona fide triable issue, it should ordinarily be allowed to proceed to trial. 6. The same principle is reflected in **Patel v E.A. Cargo Handling Services Ltd [1974] EA 75,** where the Court explained that a triable issue is one which raises a prima facie defence deserving consideration by the Court. 7. The essential question is therefore not whether the Defence is likely to succeed. Nor is the question whether the Plaintiffs have produced stronger evidence at this interlocutory stage. The question is whether the Defence raises an issue which is sufficiently genuine to require adjudication. **Whether the Defence raises triable issues** 1. I have carefully considered the Defence dated 19th September 2025 as a whole. I accept that several Paragraphs contain denials and strict proof. However, the Defence cannot be assessed by isolating individual sentences. Its substance must be considered in its entirety. 2. The Defendant's most material contention is that it did not insure motor vehicle KBD 704T. The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant insured the vehicle under Policy No. 01042702. 3. This is not a peripheral matter. It goes to the very foundation of the Plaintiffs' declaratory claim. If the Defendant was not the insurer of the vehicle, then the statutory obligation under section 10 of Cap. 405 could not ordinarily arise against it merely because a judgment was entered against the vehicle's owner or driver. 4. The Plaintiffs invite the Court to find that the documentary material before it conclusively establishes the insurance relationship. The Defendant, however, disputes that relationship. 5. This Court cannot, on an Interlocutory Application of this nature, weigh the competing evidence and make a final finding as to the existence of the policy. That is the function of the trial court after receiving evidence. 6. The Defendant has also raised a specific objection regarding service of the statutory notice. The Plaintiffs assert that notice was served. The Defendant disputes receipt and points to the absence of its receiving stamp and a certificate of postage. 7. Whether the notice was properly served is material because the obligation imposed upon an insurer under section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act is statutory. The Court must ultimately determine whether the conditions prescribed by the statute have been met. 8. The existence of a previous Judgment against the insured does not, by itself, dispose of all questions between a Judgment creditor and an insurer. The Plaintiffs must establish the statutory nexus between the Judgment, the policy and the Defendant. 9. I therefore find that the Defence raises bona fide triable issues, particularly: * 1. ***Whether the Defendant insured motor vehicle KBD 704T under Policy No. 01042702;*** 2. ***Whether the policy was operative and covered the relevant risk at the material time;*** 3. ***Whether the statutory notice contemplated under section 10 of Cap. 405 was duly served upon the Defendant; and*** 4. ***Whether, upon proof of those matters, the Defendant is legally obliged to satisfy the decree arising from Nakuru CMCC No. 1234 of 2019.*** 10. These are not sham issues. They go to the substance of the dispute. 11. **Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution and alleged procedural technicalities** 12. I now turn to the issue raised concerning the Statutory Notice. The Defendant's complaint is, among other things, that the notice does not bear its receiving stamp and that there is no certificate of postage evidencing service. 13. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that the statutory notice was served and argue that the Defendant's reliance upon the absence of a receiving stamp or certificate of postage should not defeat the substantive claim. 14. Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution provides that, in exercising judicial authority, courts and tribunals shall be guided by the principle that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities. 15. The constitutional command is important. Courts are not required to elevate procedural form above substantive justice. A procedural requirement which has been substantially complied with should not, merely because of an inconsequential defect in form, become an instrument for defeating an otherwise meritorious claim. 16. However, Article 159(2)(d) does not mean that procedural rules and statutory requirements have ceased to have legal effect. The constitutional provision refers specifically to **“undue regard”** to procedural technicalities. It does not direct courts to disregard every procedural requirement or to cure substantive non-compliance. 17. In **Raila Odinga & 5 Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 Others [2013] eKLR**, the Supreme Court explained that Article 159(2)(d) is not a licence for parties to disregard procedural rules. The Court must distinguish between procedural technicalities which do not affect the substance of the dispute and non-compliance which goes to the root of a statutory or legal requirement. 18. The Court of Appeal similarly explained in **Apungu Arthur Kibira v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 Others [2018] KECA 447 (KLR)** that Article 159(2)(d) is not a panacea for every procedural lapse. The Court must consider the nature and effect of the particular non-compliance. 19. In **Raiply Woods (K) Limited v Erick Kironget Ngeywo & 10 Others [2019] KECA 285 (KLR),** the Court of Appeal reiterated that Article 159(2)(d) cannot be invoked indiscriminately to cure all procedural defects. The question is whether the defect is merely technical or whether it affects a substantive legal requirement. 20. The distinction is therefore important in the present case. A receiving stamp is evidence of receipt; it is not necessarily the only means by which receipt may be proved. Similarly, absence of a certificate of postage, in itself, does not necessarily establish that service did not occur if other admissible evidence demonstrates receipt. 21. On the other hand, Article 159(2)(d) cannot be employed to presume that a statutory notice was served when, upon hearing the evidence, the Court finds that it was not. The Court cannot use Article 159 to dispense with a substantive statutory condition. 22. In the present case, the Plaintiffs have placed before the Court a statutory notice which they contend was served upon the Defendant. The Defendant disputes service. The dispute is therefore not simply about the absence of a stamp. It is about whether the statutory notice was actually brought to the Defendant's attention in compliance with section 10 of Cap. 405. 23. That is a factual and legal question which cannot properly be determined by merely examining whether a stamp appears on the document. Evidence may include the notice itself, correspondence, postal records, acknowledgments, testimony concerning delivery and any other admissible material relevant to service. 24. I therefore decline to find, at this interlocutory stage, that the absence of a receiving stamp or certificate of postage either conclusively defeats the Plaintiffs' claim or conclusively establishes service. 25. Article 159(2)(d) is consequently relevant in ensuring that the Court does not elevate a possible evidential or procedural deficiency into an absolute bar where the statutory purpose has otherwise been fulfilled. But the provision does not absolve the Plaintiffs from ultimately proving compliance with the substantive requirements of section 10. 26. The issue of service must therefore be left for determination at the hearing. Both parties should have an opportunity to adduce evidence on the circumstances in which the statutory notice was issued, transmitted and allegedly received. 27. This approach, in my view, gives effect to both **Article 159(2)(d)** and the statutory scheme under **section 10 of Cap. 405**. It avoids undue regard to technicalities without treating the constitutional provision as a licence to disregard substantive statutory requirements. **Whether the Defence is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process** 1. The Plaintiffs also contend that the Defence is frivolous, vexatious and intended to delay the proceedings. 2. A pleading is not frivolous merely because it is weak or because the opposing party believes it cannot succeed. Nor is it vexatious merely because it requires the parties to proceed to trial. 3. There must be material demonstrating that the pleading is plainly unsustainable, intended to harass or delay, or constitutes an improper use of the Court's process. 4. In the present case, the Defendant has raised specific issues regarding the insurance policy and service of statutory notice. Those issues are directly connected to the Plaintiffs' cause of action. 5. I therefore cannot characterise the Defence as frivolous or vexatious. Whether the Defendant will ultimately prove its assertions is a different question. At this stage, it has demonstrated that the Defence is not devoid of substance. 6. Equally, I find no sufficient basis for concluding that the Defence constitutes an abuse of the process of the Court. The Defendant has entered appearance, filed a Defence and responded to the application. It is entitled to have genuine questions relating to its alleged statutory liability determined. **The effect of the primary judgment** 1. The Plaintiffs rely heavily on the judgment in **Nakuru CMCC No. 1234 of 2019**, arguing that it remains unchallenged and that the Defendant should not be permitted to prevent them from enjoying its fruits. 2. I accept the general proposition that a successful litigant is entitled to enjoy the fruits of a valid judgment. However, the present proceedings are not an appeal from the judgment in the primary suit. 3. The question before this Court is whether the Defendant, as the alleged insurer, is legally bound to satisfy that judgment. That question depends upon proof of the insurance relationship and compliance with the statutory requirements governing an insurer's liability. 4. The Primary Judgment therefore does not, by itself, answer the questions raised by the Defence. 5. It follows that the existence of a decree against the insured cannot be used as a basis for summarily striking out a Defence in which the alleged insurer disputes that it was the insurer and disputes compliance with the statutory requirements. **Whether judgment should be entered for the Plaintiffs** 1. The Plaintiffs seek Judgment as prayed in the Plaint if the Defence is struck out. 2. That prayer cannot succeed because I have found that the Defence raises bona fide triable issues. 3. Entering judgment at this stage would require the Court to make final findings on disputed matters without hearing the evidence of the parties. Such a course would effectively convert an interlocutory application into a trial. 4. The proper course is to allow the substantive suit to proceed to hearing, where the Plaintiffs will have an opportunity to prove the insurance relationship, service of statutory notice and the other matters necessary to establish the Defendant's liability. **Conclusion** 1. Having considered the Notice of Motion dated 5th November 2025, the Plaint, the Defendant's Statement of Defence dated 19th September 2025, the Supporting Affidavit, the Defendant's Replying Affidavit, the Plaintiffs' Further Affidavit dated 27th June 2026, the written submissions of the parties and the authorities cited, I find that the Defendant's Defence raises bona fide triable issues. 2. The central issues concerning whether the Defendant insured motor vehicle **KBD 704T**, whether Policy No. **01042702** existed and covered the relevant risk, whether the statutory notice was duly served and whether the Defendant is consequently liable under section 10 of Cap. 405 cannot properly be determined summarily. 3. I further find that **Article 159(2)(d)** does not permit the Court to disregard substantive statutory requirements. At the same time, the absence of a receiving stamp or certificate of postage is not, by itself, conclusive proof that service did not occur. The question of service should be determined upon consideration of all the evidence at trial. 4. The Defence is therefore not so plainly hopeless, frivolous or vexatious as to warrant the exceptional remedy of striking it out. 5. The Court makes no finding at this stage that the Defendant was in fact the insurer of Motor Vehicle KBD 704T, nor that the statutory notice was duly served. Those questions remain open for determination at the hearing. **Disposition** 1. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion dated 5th November 2025 is hereby dismissed. 2. The Defendant's Statement of Defence dated 19th September 2025 shall remain on record. 3. The Plaintiffs' prayer for Judgment as prayed in the Plaint is consequently declined. 4. The substantive suit shall proceed to hearing on its merits. The following issues will, among others, require determination at trial: * 1. Whether the Defendant insured Motor Vehicle Registration Number KBD 704T on 19th April 2019; 2. Whether Policy No. 01042702 was issued by the Defendant and was operative at the material time; 3. Whether the policy covered the liability arising from the accident; 4. Whether the Statutory Notice required under section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act was duly served upon the Defendant; 5. Whether the statutory requirements governing an insurer's obligation to satisfy the Judgment were fulfilled; 6. What is the legal effect of the Judgment and Decree in **Nakuru CMCC No.1234 of 2019** upon the Defendant; and 7. Whether the Defendant is liable to satisfy the Decree, and if so, to what extent. 5. In view of the nature of the dispute and the fact that the substantive suit remains to be heard, the costs of the Application shall be in the cause. 6. Mention **9th September ,2026** for Pre Trial Directions 30 days Right of Appeal. **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_** **L.A. MUMASSABBA** **PRINCIPAL DEPUTY REGISTRAR** **19.8.2026** **RULING DATED, READ, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS PLATFORM THIS 19TH AUGUST ,2026** **In the Presence of:** Mr. Ndung’u for the Plaintiff /Applicant M/s Chemutai Holding Brief for Mr.Kagira for Defendant /Respondent Court Assistant: Phoebe