https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2347

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR RELATIONS COURT AT NAIROBI** **ELRC CAUSE NO. E452 OF 2022** (D. K. Njagi Marete) **BETWEEN** **RAHAB NJUGUINI MANYEKI CLAIMANT** **VERSUS** **MHASIBU NWDT SACCO SOCIETY LIMITED 1ST RESPONDENT** **ANTHONY GICHIA KAHORU 2ND RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** This matter came to court by way of a Statement of Claim dated 23rd June, 2022. The issues in dispute are therein cited as; 1. *Unfair Labour Practices* 2. *Unfair and unlawful termination* 3. *Discrimination* 4. *Sexual harassment* 5. *Harassment by Management* 6. *Payment of full salary* 7. *Acting allowance* 8. *Payment of bonus* 9. *Payment in lieu of notice* 10. *Refund of expenses incurred on behalf of employer* 11. *Annual leave allowance* 12. *Compensation for compassionate leave denied* 13. *Overtime payment; and* 14. *Reinstatement* The 1st and 2nd Respondents in The Defence and Response to the Statement of Claim dated 16th September 2022, deny the claim and pray that it be dismissed with costs. The Respondents gave notice of an intention to raise a Preliminary Objection touching on the competence of the suit, particularly as against the 2nd Respondent personally, but did not press or argue the same at the hearing, and the matter proceeded to full trial on the merits against both Respondents. The Claimant's case is that she was employed by the 1st Respondent on 26th October, 2015 as a Management Trainee at a monthly salary of Kshs. 50,000.00 and upon confirmation and completion of training, was placed in the Loans Recovery Department as Assistant Loans Recovery Officer with effect from 1st April 2017, vide a Placement Letter dated 23rd March 2017 which described her as having been "permanently placed" in that department. Her salary rose to Kshs. 86,600.00 by the time of her separation. The Claimant's case is further that she discharged her duties diligently and without negative appraisal and that on several occasions between 2017 and 2020 she took up the duties of more senior officers who had left the 1st Respondent's employment, namely Robert Malaba, James Atemba and Nelly Kamau, without being paid the acting allowance provided for under Clause 3.5 of the 1st Respondent's Human Resource Manual. The Claimant's other case is that beginning before her confirmation in 2017, she was sexually harassed by the 2nd Respondent, the Chief Executive Officer of the 1st Respondent, through unwelcome verbal advances, calls, texts, physical touching, and a planned trip to Naivasha, and that her placement in the Loans Recovery Department, a department she describes as undesirable to new staff, was itself a consequence of her having declined the 2nd Respondent's advances. The Claimant avers that on 23rd November, 2021 she was issued with a letter informing her of a lateral transfer to the Accounts Department as Assistant Accountant, effective 1st December 2021, which she protested on the grounds that it amounted to an unconsulted move from a position she had held for six years to another entry-level post without salary improvement. Further, this would expose her to direct reporting contact with the 2nd Respondent and that it followed her having raised queries over what she believed were irregular transactions in the loan recovery process. The Claimant's case is that following her protest and her appeal against the transfer to the 1st Respondent's Board, she suffered escalating harassment, including denial of system access, denial of annual leave and denial of compassionate leave on the death of her brother on 27th November 2021, during which period her substantive position was advertised by the 1st Respondent. The Claimant avers that her appeal was directed to be held in abeyance by the board chairperson vide an email dated 30th December, 2021 pending its determination, but that the board nonetheless rendered an adverse decision on 1st March, 2022 upholding the transfer, declining any acting allowance and dismissing her sexual harassment complaint following which she escalated the matter to the 1st Respondent's Supervisory Committee. The Claimant's avers that on 7th March, 2022 a day before the Supervisory Committee rendered its decision, she was simultaneously issued with a Notice to Show Cause and a letter placing her on thirty (30) days' compulsory leave, both premised on her alleged defiance of management and board instructions, and that the Supervisory Committee's decision of 8th March, 2022 merely adopted the board's earlier findings without independent inquiry. The Claimant further avers that she was thereafter invited to, and attended, a disciplinary hearing on 31st March, 2022 during which she was denied access to her work station and files and was not furnished with the minutes of proceedings despite request and that she was subsequently issued with a letter of summary dismissal dated 7th April, 2022, effective on the same date, for failing to obey management and board instructions. The Claimant's case is that she was thereafter required to accept reversion of her staff loan to the commercial interest rate before being paid her final dues, that the cheques issued to her totalling Kshs. 82,553.00 were not accompanied by any breakdown despite request and that she remains owed various further sums including acting allowance, leave dues, notice pay, refund of expenses, and unpaid overtime. The Claimant therefore prays for the relief as follows: 1. *A declaration that the termination of the Claimant's employment was unjustified, unfair and unlawful;* 2. *A declaration that the Claimant was discriminated against, in violation of her rights under Article 27 of the Constitution of Kenya;* 3. *Reinstatement of the Claimant;* 4. *Twelve (12) months' salary for unfair termination, being Kshs. 1,039,000.00;* 5. *Twelve (12) months' salary as damages for discrimination and unfair labour practices, being Kshs. 1,039,000.00;* 6. *Interest on (d) and (e) above at court rates from the date of judgment until payment in full;* 7. *Damages for sexual harassment by the 2nd Respondent;* 8. *Damages for harassment by management of the 1st Respondent;* 9. *Payment of full salary for April 2022, being Kshs. 86,600.00;* 10. *Acting allowance of Kshs. 2,553,334.00;* 11. *Payment of a bonus for 2022;* 12. *Payment in lieu of notice, being Kshs. 86,600.00;* 13. *Refund of expenses incurred on behalf of the employer, being Kshs. 800.00;* 14. *Compensation for pending leave days, being Kshs. 17,082.00;* 15. *Annual leave allowance, being Kshs. 16,000.00;* 16. *Compensation for compassionate leave denied, being Kshs. 11,388.48;* 17. *Overtime payment, being Kshs. 8,000.00;* 18. *An order halting repayment of the loan owed by the Claimant to the 1st Respondent, or alternatively, a resumption of the preferential interest rate applicable to the Claimant's loan during her employment;* 19. *Costs of the suit; and* 20. *Any other relief the Court may deem fit to grant.* The Respondents' case in answer, is *in toto,* a denial of the claim. The Respondents aver that the Claimant was engaged on 26th October, 2015 as a Management Trainee at a monthly salary of Kshs. 50,000.00 having professed in her job application to be a qualified accountant, and that upon her confirmation on 24th March, 2016 her designation remained Management Trainee, a role the Respondents contend entailed rotation across the loan processing, loan recovery, and accounts sections of the 1st Respondent, before her eventual placement in Loans Recovery vide letter a dated 23rd March, 2017. The Respondents deny that the Claimant was ever sexually harassed by the 2nd Respondent, averring that the 1st Respondent maintains a zero-tolerance policy on sexual harassment with an escalation mechanism for complaints. No report of any kind was made by the Claimant during the period the conduct is alleged to have occurred and that the allegation surfaced for the first time only in the context of and as an afterthought to her resistance to the 2021 transfer. The Respondents further case is that the lateral transfer of the Claimant to the Accounts Department was a routine and lawful exercise of managerial prerogative occasioned by a vacancy in that section, that it was at the same salary and grade as her substantive post, that her training and background as a Management Trainee equipped her for the role. No consultation was legally required for what was, in substance, an internal deployment rather than a variation of any fundamental term(s) of her contract. The Respondents deny that any allowance is owed to the Claimant for higher duties said to have been performed, averring that under Clauses 3.5 and 3.6 of the 1st Respondent's Human Resource Manual, an acting or special duty allowance accrues only where a member of staff has been formally appointed in an acting capacity, a step the Respondents maintain was never taken in respect of the Claimant. The Respondents other case is that the Claimant was afforded a full and fair internal hearing, first by the board, then on a second appeal by the Supervisory Committee, and finally before a Disciplinary Committee on 31st March, 2022 at which she elected to rely solely on her earlier written response to the Notice to Show Cause and made no further representations. Her summary dismissal on 7th April, 2022 was grounded in her sustained refusal to obey lawful and proper instructions, amounting to gross misconduct under Section 44(4)(e) of the Employment Act, 2007. The Respondents in finality aver that the Claimant was paid her full and final dues, including pay for the days she worked in April, 2022 her outstanding leave days and her 2021 bonus, vide a payment voucher dated 9th May 2022 totalling Kshs. 82,553.00. This is a tabulation the Claimant did not at any stage specifically dispute and that her preferential staff loan rate of 6% lawfully reverted to the prevailing commercial rate upon the cessation of her status as an employee of the 1st Respondent SACCO. At the hearing, the Claimant testified as PW1 substantially in the terms of her witness statement, maintaining that she had taken up acting duties on three occasions between 2017 and 2020 without payment. Again, she was sexually harassed by the 2nd Respondent from before her confirmation in 2017 and that the transfer to Accounts was retaliatory and designed both to expose her to closer contact with the 2nd Respondent and to frustrate her career progression. Under cross-examination, the Claimant conceded that she had placed no documentary evidence before the court of having been formally appointed to an acting role, could not confirm that any specifically named comparator had in fact been paid an allowance for similar duties, and could not quantify the hours of overtime she claimed to have worked. PW2, Allan Mwachi, a former colleague of the Claimant in the Loans Recovery Department who resigned in January, 2022 corroborated the Claimant's account of having shared in unremunerated higher duties between 2017 and 2020. He further testified to having personally witnessed the 2nd Respondent and other senior staff repeatedly confronting the Claimant at her desk over the proposed transfer between November, 2021 and his own resignation, including instances of raised voices and knocking on her desk. He had been granted compassionate leave on the death of his father, a circumstance he contrasted with the Claimant's case. DW1, Caroline Njoki Murima, the 1st Respondent's Human Resource Manager, testified that the Human Resource Manual had been revised on several occasions and that a sexual harassment policy was only introduced in 2019. Further, the assignment of additional duties between members of staff did not, absent a formal letter of appointment, attract an acting allowance regardless of the nature or duration of the duties assigned and that the Claimant's gross salary at the time of termination was in the region of Kshs. 86,600.00 The issues for determination therefore are; 1. Whether the deployment of the Claimant to the Accounts Department was an unfair labour practice. 2. Whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful, unfair and unlawful. 3. Whether the Claimant proved her allegation of sexual harassment against the 2nd Respondent. 4. Whether the Claimant was otherwise discriminated against or harassed by the management of the 1st Respondent. 5. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought. 6. Who shall bear the costs of the suit. The 1st issue for determination is whether the deployment of the Claimant to the Accounts Department was an unfair labour practice. Section 10(5) of the Employment Act, 2007 requires an employer to consult an employee, and to reduce to writing, any change to a matter specified in a written contract of service. Clause 1 of the Claimant's letter of appointment dated 26th October, 2015 however, expressly reserved to the 1st Respondent's management the right to assign and reassign the Claimant's duties from time to time, a term the Claimant accepted at the commencement of her employment and at no point thereafter challenged until the events giving rise to this suit. The deployment of an employee between departments of the same employer, at the same grade and salary, ordinarily falls within the prerogative of an employer to organize its own operations, and this court will not lightly interfere with that prerogative absent exceptional circumstances, such as a clear demonstration of bad faith or disregard for fair labour practice. This is as was observed in the authority of **Kirigha v Kenya Revenue Authority (Cause E114 of 2024) [2025] KEELRC 2414 KLR**. The Claimant's placement letter of 2017 described her as "permanently" placed in the Loans Recovery Department, but the unrebutted evidence of DW1 was that this language referred to the permanent, as opposed to probationary, character of her appointment, a reading consistent with the Claimant's own unchallenged history of having been rotated across departments as a Management Trainee between 2015 and 2017. The Claimant did not displace this evidence. The Claimant's most substantial point on this issue is that a transfer, coming after six years of service in Loans Recovery, to another entry-level post in Accounts without any improvement in salary, amounted in substance to a demotion calculated to frustrate her career progression. The concern is understandable, but it does not, without more, establish bad faith. The transfer carried no reduction in grade or salary and the Claimant did not establish, on the evidence before the Court, that the Accounts post was in fact a step backward in objective terms rather than a lateral move she simply did not wish to make. The Claimant's further contention, that the transfer was retaliatory, either for her having raised concerns over irregular transactions or for resisting the 2nd Respondent's advances was not corroborated by any witness beyond her own testimony, and is, for the reasons set out under Issue No. 3 below not established on a balance of probabilities. This court finds that the deployment of the Claimant to the Accounts Department was a lawful exercise of the 1st Respondent's managerial prerogative, and did not, of itself, amount to an unfair labour practice.This answers the 1st issue for determination. The 2nd issue for determination is whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful, unfair and unlawful. Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007 require an employer to prove both a valid, fair and substantive reason for termination and that fair procedure was observed in effecting it. The 1st Respondent's case that the Claimant's sustained refusal to obey a lawful instruction to report to the Accounts Department, falls within the scope of Section 44(4)(e) of the Act, being a knowing refusal to obey a lawful and proper command. Having found at Issue No. 1 that the underlying instruction was lawful, the Claimant's continued and substantially admitted non-compliance with it over a period spanning November, 2021 to April, 2022 notwithstanding two internal appeals, both of which upheld the transfer, discloses a substantive reason genuinely believed by the 1st Respondent to exist, and reasonably capable of justifying disciplinary action against the Claimant. The authority of **Galgalo Jarso Jillo v Agricultural Finance Corporation [2021] eKLR (Cause 13 of 2019)**, illustrates this. It agrees with the employer's burden under Section 43 to establish a valid reason for termination. The procedural picture is less straightforward. It is common ground that the Notice to Show Cause and the letter placing the Claimant on thirty days' compulsory leave were both dated and issued on 7th March, 2022 the day before the Supervisory Committee, the final internal appellate organ available to the Claimant under the 1st Respondent's Human Resource Manual, rendered its decision on her pending appeal late that same night and into the following morning. An employee who has lodged an internal appeal against an instruction, and whose appeal remains undetermined, cannot fairly be charged with defiance of that instruction in the interim. Section 41 of the Employment Act, 2007 requires, among other things, that an employer hear and consider any representations made by an employee before taking disciplinary action against them. The authority of **Alphonce Machanga Mwachanya v Operation 680 Limited [2013] eKLR**, applies on the general requirements of Section 41. Commencing disciplinary action against the Claimant, and indeed removing her from the workplace altogether on compulsory leave, before her last avenue of internal appeal had run its course, was premature and fell short of that standard. This defect is not, in the court's observation, cured by the fact that the Supervisory Committee's decision, when it came, was adverse to the Claimant, nor by the fact that the disciplinary hearing proper was convened on 31st March, 2022 after that decision had issued. For the better part of a month the Claimant was on enforced compulsory leave and under a disciplinary cloud raised before her internal remedies had been exhausted, a sequence of events the 1st Respondent's own Human Resource Manual, with its provision for escalating internal appeal, plainly did not contemplate. This court is conscious that the Claimant was, in other respects, treated with a measure of procedural regularity. She was granted a postponement of her disciplinary hearing on request, was not denied an opportunity to be heard and the refusal to permit advocates to appear on their behalf at that hearing was lawful and consistent with Section 41 of the Act, which does not extend the right of representation in internal disciplinary fora to legal counsel. The procedural infirmity identified above is narrow but real and Section 45(2)(c) of the Act renders a termination unfair for failure to follow fair procedure, independently of the existence of a valid substantive reason. This court finds that the termination of the Claimant's employment, while substantively grounded in a genuine and reasonably held belief in her misconduct, was procedurally unfair on account of the premature initiation of disciplinary action before her internal appeal had been determined and was, to that limited extent, unfair within the meaning of Section 45 of the Employment Act, 2007. The 3rd issue for determination is whether the Claimant proved her allegation of sexual harassment against the 2nd Respondent. Section 6 of the Employment Act, 2007 defines sexual harassment broadly, and it is well settled that the absence of intent on the part of an alleged harasser is no defence, the complainant's own experience of the conduct as unwelcome being determinative. This is as expressed in the authority of **Ooko & another v SRM & 2 others [2022] KECA 44 KLR**. This principle does not, however, relieve a claimant of the ordinary burden of proving the occurrence of the conduct complained of on a balance of probabilities. The Claimant's account, while given on oath and unrefuted by any testimony from the 2nd Respondent personally, who neither filed a defence nor testified in his own cause, suffers from material difficulties. Her pleadings are internally inconsistent as to the period over which the conduct is said to have occurred, her Statement of Claim placing it between 2016 and 2022, while her response to the Notice to Show Cause, predating this suit, confined it to 2017 and 2018. The documentary evidence she herself produced, being WhatsApp exchanges from 2017, reads on its face as a familiar and reciprocal exchange rather than the one-sided conduct described in her pleadings and testimony. No complaint of sexual harassment was raised by the Claimant at any point between 2015 and November, 2021 notwithstanding her own evidence that the 1st Respondent had, by 2019, instituted a sexual harassment policy with an escalation mechanism. The allegation surfaced for the first time in the context of, and only after, her resistance to the 2021 transfer. Delayed reporting is not, without more, fatal to a claim of this nature, particularly given the acknowledged absence of any compliant sexual harassment policy in the earlier period, but the proximity of the complaint to the transfer dispute, taken with the character of the 2017 messages and the inconsistency in the pleaded period, leaves the court disabled from finding on a balance of probabilities, that the specific conduct alleged, namely propositioning, physical touching, and a planned trip to Naivasha, occurred as described. The evidence of PW2, while it corroborates a pattern of pressure and intimidation connected to the transfer dispute in late 2021, does not corroborate the earlier and more serious allegations forming the substance of this particular claim. This court finds that the Claimant has not discharged her burden of proving her claim of sexual harassment against the 2nd Respondent. The court notes, separately and for completeness, that the 1st Respondent's admitted failure to maintain a sexual harassment policy compliant with Section 6(2) of the Employment Act, 2007 at a time when it employed more than twenty members of staff was a breach of statutory duty, though this finding does not, on its own, establish the unproven allegations addressed above. The 4th issue for determination is whether the Claimant was otherwise discriminated against or harassed by the management of the 1st Respondent. The Claimant's broader claim of discrimination, grounded principally in the allegation that she alone among similarly placed staff was denied an acting allowance for higher duties performed, is undermined by her own evidence. Under cross-examination, the Claimant conceded that she had no documentary evidence of having been formally appointed to an acting role, and could not confirm that any specifically named comparator had in fact been paid an allowance for comparable duties. DW1's evidence on this point, properly understood, was that the 1st Respondent did not, as a matter of policy, pay an acting allowance absent a formal letter of appointment to the higher post, a position consistent with Clauses 3.5 and 3.6 of the Human Resource Manual and not an admission that the Claimant's own individual claim to such an allowance was established. This court is unable, on this state of the evidence, to find that the Claimant was discriminated against within the meaning of Article 27 of the Constitution or Section 5 of the Employment Act, 2007 in respect of acting allowances, promotion, or remuneration generally. The Claimant's narrower complaint of harassment by management, distinct from the unproven sexual harassment claim, stands on firmer footing. PW2 corroborated, from his own direct observation between November 2021 and his resignation in January 2022, a pattern of the 2nd Respondent and other senior staff repeatedly confronting the Claimant at her desk, raising their voices, and pressing her to accept the transfer, conduct that continued even after the Board Chairperson had directed that the transfer be held in abeyance pending appeal. It is further uncontroverted that the Claimant's substantive position was advertised by the 1st Respondent while she was away attending her brother's burial. This conduct, even allowing that the underlying transfer instruction was itself lawful, went beyond legitimate managerial persistence and was calculated to demean and pressure the Claimant during a period of bereavement and pending internal appeal. It engaged her right to dignity under Article 28 of the Constitution. The decision of **Ahmed Issack Hassan v Auditor General [2015] eKLR** speaks of this. The court finds that the Claimant has established, on corroborated evidence, a narrow but genuine claim of harassment by the management of the 1st Respondent, distinct from and independent of the unproven sexual harassment allegation against the 2nd Respondent personally. The 5th issue for determination is whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought. Having made the foregoing findings, this court turns to each head of relief thus; (a) Declaration of unfair termination: Granted, for the reasons set out under Issue No. 2 above. (b) Declaration of discrimination under Article 27 of the Constitution: Declined, for the reasons set out under Issue No. 4 above. (c) Reinstatement: Declined. More than three years have elapsed since the Claimant's dismissal on 7th April, 2022 and Section 12(3)(vii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act confines an order of reinstatement to within three years of dismissal. The remedy is, in any event, impracticable at this remove and the court additionally notes that the Claimant's own sustained conduct contributed materially to the impasse that culminated in her termination. (d) Compensation for unfair termination: The Claimant's compensation under Section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007 falls to be assessed having regard to the narrow, procedural character of the unfairness found, the Claimant's own substantial contribution to her termination through sustained non-compliance with a lawful instruction upheld on two internal appeals, and her length of service. The Court considers an award of four (4) months' gross salary, being Kshs. 346,400.00, to be just in the circumstances and declines the maximum of twelve months sought. This sum is payable by the 1st Respondent. (e) Damages for discrimination and unfair labour practices: Declined, for the reasons set out under Issue No. 4 above, the underlying claim not having been established. (f) Interest on (d) above from the date of judgment until payment in full: Granted, at court rates. (g) Damages for sexual harassment by the 2nd Respondent: Declined, for the reasons set out under Issue No. 3 above. (h) Damages for harassment by management of the 1st Respondent: Granted, in the sum of Kshs. 150,000.00 being general damages for the violation of the Claimant's right to dignity, for the reasons set out under Issue No. 4 above. This sum is payable jointly and severally by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. (i) Full salary for April 2022: Declined. It is uncontroverted that the Claimant worked only seven days of April, 2022 before her dismissal and that she was paid her dues for the period worked vide the payment voucher of 9th May 2022. An award of a full month's salary in addition would amount to double payment for the same period. (j) Acting allowance of Kshs. 2,553,334.00: Declined. The Claimant's own concession under cross-examination that she has no evidence of formal appointment to an acting role, taken with the absence of any letter of appointment as required under Clauses 3.5 and 3.6 of the Human Resource Manual, is fatal to this head of claim, which in any event constituted the single largest item in the Claimant's pleaded claim and required correspondingly cogent proof. This fits into the authority in **Richard Erskine Leakey & 2 others v Samson Kipkoech Chemai [2019] eKLR**. (k) Bonus for 2022: Declined. It is uncontroverted that the Claimant's 2021 bonus was settled vide the payment voucher of 9th May, 2022 and that her service in 2022 extended to only seven days before dismissal, a period insufficient to found an entitlement to a discretionary annual bonus for that year. (l) Payment in lieu of notice: Granted, in the sum of Kshs. 86,600.00. Having found the termination unfair, the Claimant is entitled to the statutory remedy of notice pay under Section 49(1)(a) of the Employment Act, 2007. This sum is payable by the 1st Respondent. (m) Refund of expenses: Granted, in the sum of Kshs. 800.00. The sum is modest, was supported by a receipt referred to in the Claimant's testimony, and was not specifically engaged with in the Respondents' rebuttal beyond a generic denial. This sum is payable by the 1st Respondent. (n) Pending leave days: Declined. It is uncontroverted and was not specifically disputed by the Claimant at any stage that her outstanding leave days were tabulated and settled in the payment voucher of 9th May 2022. (o) Annual leave allowance: Declined. Clause 3.4 of the Human Resource Manual ties entitlement to leave allowance to an employee proceeding on annual leave having accrued not less than half her annual entitlement, a threshold the Claimant had not met as at the date of her termination. (p) Compensation for denied compassionate leave: Granted, in the sum of Kshs. 11,388.48.00 Whatever the precise definition of "immediate family" under Clause 4.6 of the Human Resource Manual, which was not placed before the Court in full, the unrebutted evidence of PW2 that compassionate leave had in practice been extended to staff mourning relatives outside the narrowest reading of that term persuades the Court that the Claimant was treated inconsistently with established practice, at the cost of annual leave days she ought not to have had to expend on the occasion of her brother's death. This sum is payable by the 1st Respondent. (q) Overtime payment: Declined. The Claimant conceded under cross-examination that she could not specify the hours of overtime worked or the period to which her claim related, leaving the claim without the particularity special damages of this kind require. (r) Order halting loan repayment, or alternatively reversion to the preferential interest rate: Declined. The preferential 6% rate was, on the unrebutted evidence, a benefit reserved to active staff of the 1st Respondent SACCO and its lawful reversion to the prevailing commercial rate upon the cessation of the Claimant's status as a member-employee is not disturbed by the finding of procedural unfairness in her termination, reinstatement not having been ordered. The 6th issue for determination is costs. Costs are at the discretion of the court under Section 12(4) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act. The Claimant has succeeded on the central declaration of unfair termination and on a modest schedule of consequential reliefs, but has failed on the substantially larger part of her claim by value, including her single largest pleaded head, her claim of sexual harassment, and her broader claim of discrimination. However, with success on a case of unfair and unlawful termination of employment, she becomes entitled to the costs of this cause. I am therefore inclined to partially allow the claim and order relief as follows; 1. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the termination of the employment of the Claimant by the 1st Respondent was wrongful, unfair and unlawful. 2. Four (4) months salary as compensation for unfair termination of employment ………………………………………………Kshs. 346,400.00. 3. One (1) months salary in lieu of notice…………………..… Kshs. 86,600.00. 4. Refund of expenses incurred in the course of employment …..Kshs. 800.00. 5. The 1st Respondent shall pay to the Claimant compensation for compassionate leave denied, being ………………………..Kshs. 11,388.48. 6. General damages for harassment by management payable by both Respondents ……………………………………………...Kshs. 150,000.00. **Total of Award …………………………………….……Ksh. 460,188.48** 1. Interest on all monetary awards, being items (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) above, shall accrue at court rates from the date of this judgment of court until payment in full. 2. The costs of this cause shall be borne by the Respondent. Delivered, dated and signed this **29th** day of **July** 2026. **D. K. Njagi Marete** **JUDGE** **Appearances:** 1. Miss Gathoni holding brief for Miss Muga instructed by Sian & Mutua Advocates for the Claimant 2. Mr. Githinji instructed by Simba & Simba Advocates for the Respondent.