https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3648

Maru v Business Premises Rent Tribunal & 2 others (Environment and Land Judicial Review Case E003 of 2026) [2026] KEELC 3648 (KLR) (15 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3648 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Nairobi Environment and Land Judicial Review Case E003 of 2026 MN Kullow, J June 15, 2026 Between Andrew Maru Ex parte Applicant and The Business Premises Rent Tribunal 1st Respondent Isabella Njeri 2nd Respondent and Pauline Mwikali Kieleko Interested Party Judgment 1.Following the grant of leave to commence Judicial Review proceedings on 24th December 2025, the Ex Parte Applicant filed the instant Notice of Motion dated 5th January 2026 pursuant to Articles 23, 43 and 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, Sections 7, 9, 11 and 12 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, Order 53 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Sections 8 and 9 of the Law Reform Act seeking the following orders:a.An order of Certiorari do issue against the Respondents to remove into this Honourable Court and quash the ruling/order of the 1st Respondent delivered on 19th December 2025 in BPRT/E1256/2025 – Pauline Mwikali Kieleko Vs Isabella Njeri Wachira, which granted possession of the property known as L.R. NO. 7336/132 (situated off Nandi Road, Karen, Nairobi) to the 2nd Respondent where the Ex Parte Applicant is currently in occupation.b.An order of Prohibition do issue prohibiting the 2nd Respondent, her agents, servants, or any person acting on her behalf, from implementing, acting upon, or executing the said order of the 1st Respondent dated 19th December 2025, including but not limited to evicting the Ex Parte Applicant from the suit property.c.ADeclaration that the 1st Respondent’s decision to grant possession of the property known as L.R. NO. 7336/132 (situated off Nandi Road, Karen, Nairobi) to the 2nd Respondent without according due consideration to the Ex Parte Applicant who was in actual occupation thereof was in contravention of Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.d.The costs of the Application.e.Such further or other relief as this Honourable Court may deem fit and just to grant. 2.The Application is premised on the grounds set out on the Statutory Statement dated 19th December 2025 and the Verifying Affidavit of Andrew Maru sworn on the same date. The Ex Parte Applicant contended that he is the lawful tenant and occupant of L.R. No. 7336/132 situated off Nandi Road, Karen, Nairobi, having entered into a tenancy agreement with the Interested Party, the registered proprietor of the suit property. He averred that prior to taking possession, he conducted due diligence and confirmed the Interested Party’s ownership and that the premises were available for occupation. 3.The Applicant further stated that upon taking possession he paid the requisite rent and deposit and established both his residence and office at the premises. He asserted that he was not a party to BPRT Case No. E1256 of 2025 and was neither notified of nor afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings that culminated in the ruling delivered on 19th December 2025 granting possession of the suit property to the 2nd Respondent. 4.It was the Applicant’s case that the impugned decision directly affected his occupation and amounted to an eviction order against him notwithstanding that he had not been heard. He maintained that the decision violated his constitutional rights to fair administrative action and a fair hearing as guaranteed under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution and was therefore unreasonable, unfair and procedurally improper. 5.The Applicant consequently urged the Court to intervene by way of judicial review, contending that unless the impugned decision was quashed and its implementation prohibited, he and his family stood to suffer substantial prejudice, including loss of their residence and business premises. The 2nd Respondent’s Replying Affidavit 6.In opposition to the Judicial Review Application, the 2nd Respondent, Isabella Njeri, swore a Replying Affidavit on 16th February 2026. She averred that the Ex Parte Applicant’s Motion dated 5th January 2026 was frivolous, vexatious, incompetent and an abuse of the court process. She further stated that although the Motion was dated 5th January 2026, it was only served upon her on 27th January 2026 through WhatsApp, and that she had not been served with any substantive orders save for the leave orders issued on 24th December 2025. 7.The 2nd Respondent traced the background to the dispute and stated that she had earlier filed ELC Case No. E127 of 2024 challenging the Interested Party’s alleged acquisition of the suit property. That suit was struck out on 4th November 2025 for want of jurisdiction, after which she filed HCFCC No. E033 of 2025 on 7th November 2025, contending that the suit property was matrimonial property and that its acquisition by the Interested Party without her consent was unlawful. She stated that on 11th November 2025, the High Court issued conservatory orders restraining the Interested Party from evicting her, interfering with her occupation or dealing with the property, yet the Interested Party subsequently moved the Business Premises Rent Tribunal and obtained eviction orders on 14th November 2025. 8.She deponed that pursuant to the Tribunal’s orders, she was forcibly evicted from the suit property on 20th November 2025 by the Interested Party, two police officers from Karen Police Station and more than fifty hired persons. She stated that the eviction was carried out after 5.00 p.m., without notice, and in breach of the applicable eviction regulations, leaving her unable to retrieve her personal belongings. She thereafter filed urgent applications before the Tribunal on 21st and 24th November 2025 challenging the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the legality of the eviction, and the Interested Party’s non-disclosure of the pending High Court proceedings and conservatory orders. Upon hearing the parties, the Tribunal delivered the ruling of 19th December 2025, holding that the suit property was residential and outside its jurisdiction, and that the eviction order was founded on a void process. 9.The 2nd Respondent further challenged the Ex Parte Applicant’s alleged tenancy agreement dated 22nd November 2025, contending that it was entered into two days after her eviction and while the High Court Conservatory orders were still in force. She maintained that the agreement was illegal, null and void, and incapable of conferring any lawful rights upon the Ex Parte Applicant. 10.She also pointed out that the agreement expressly restricted use of the premises to residential purposes only, contrary to the Ex Parte Applicant’s assertion that he used the property as both an office and residence. According to her, the contradiction exposed a deliberate misrepresentation intended to clothe the Tribunal with jurisdiction and defeat her possession of the matrimonial home. She therefore urged the Court to dismiss the Judicial Review Application as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process. The 2nd Respondent’s Preliminary Objection 11.The 2nd Respondent also filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16th February 2026 seeking the striking out and dismissal in limine of the Judicial Review Application. She contended that the impugned ruling arose from proceedings before the Tribunal in which she successfully challenged her eviction from the suit property and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. According to the 2nd Respondent, after hearing the parties, the Tribunal delivered its ruling on 19th December 2025, holding that the suit premises were residential in nature, that no controlled tenancy existed, and consequently ordering her reinstatement into the premises. 12.The 2nd Respondent further contended that the Ex Parte Applicant’s claim to occupation of the premises was founded on a tenancy agreement dated 22nd November 2025, which she maintained was illegal, null and void. She argued that the agreement was executed in violation of the conservatory orders issued on 11th November 2025 in HCFCC No. E033 of 2025, which restrained the Interested Party from dealing with the property. 13.She further asserted that the agreement was entered into only two days after her eviction on 20th November 2025, thereby evidencing collusion between the Interested Party and the Ex Parte Applicant. Additionally, she pointed to Clause 5(d) of the tenancy agreement, which restricted use of the premises to residential purposes only, and argued that the Ex Parte Applicant’s assertion that he used the premises as a business premises constituted a deliberate misrepresentation intended to improperly invoke the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 14.Lastly, the 2nd Respondent asserted that the Ex Parte Applicant lacked locus standi to institute the proceedings since his alleged rights arose from an unlawful agreement. She further contended that ownership of the suit property remained the subject of HCFCC No. E033 of 2025, while the Interested Party had already challenged the Tribunal’s ruling through ELC Appeal No. E286 of 2025. In her view, the present Judicial Review proceedings were collateral, amounted to a multiplicity of proceedings, and constituted an abuse of the court process, thereby warranting their dismissal with costs. The Interested Party’s Case 15.The Interested Party, Pauline Mwikali Kieleko, filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 11th May 2026 in support of the Ex Parte Applicant’s Notice of Motion. She deponed that she was the registered proprietor of L.R. No. 7336/132 and had instituted BPRT Cause No. E1256 of 2025 against the 2nd Respondent. She stated that following the Tribunal’s orders of 14th November 2025 granting her vacant possession of the premises, she entered into a tenancy agreement dated 22nd November 2025 with the Ex Parte Applicant for a term of one year. According to her, the Ex Parte Applicant paid Kshs. 520,000 as rent and security deposit and thereafter took possession and occupation of the suit premises. 16.The Interested Party further stated that she placed evidence before the Tribunal demonstrating that the Ex Parte Applicant was already in occupation of the premises when the impugned ruling dated 19th December 2025 was delivered. She maintained that despite being informed of the Applicant’s tenancy and occupation, the Tribunal proceeded to restore possession of the property to the 2nd Respondent, thereby adversely affecting the Applicant’s rights and exposing him to eviction. It was her contention that the Applicant was not joined to the Tribunal proceedings and was not accorded an opportunity to be heard, notwithstanding that he was directly affected by the orders subsequently issued. 17.The Interested Party therefore asserted that the present Judicial Review proceedings arose because the Tribunal failed to sufficiently consider the existence, occupation and tenancy rights of the Ex Parte Applicant before rendering its decision. She expressed the view that the Applicant had established sufficient grounds for the Court’s intervention on account of the violation of his rights to fair hearing and fair administrative action. She consequently urged the Court to allow the Application, contending that unless the orders sought were granted, the Ex Parte Applicant stood to suffer grave prejudice and possible eviction from premises which he occupied pursuant to a valid tenancy agreement.Directions on Disposal of the Judicial Review Application and Preliminary Objection 18.When the matter came up before the Court on 7th May 2026, directions were issued that the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16th February 2026 and the Notice of Motion dated 5th January 2026 be disposed of together by way of written submissions. The parties thereafter filed and exchanged their respective submissions. The Ex Parte Applicant’s Submissions 19.On behalf of the Ex Parte Applicant, it was submitted that the 2nd Respondent’s Preliminary Objection did not meet the threshold of a valid preliminary objection as laid down in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd Vs West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. Counsel argued that the objection was founded on contested facts relating to the validity of the tenancy agreement, the Applicant’s occupation of the suit premises and the legality of his tenancy, all of which required evidentiary interrogation and could not properly be determined as pure points of law. It was further submitted that the issue of the Applicant’s locus standi was similarly dependent on disputed facts and therefore unsuitable for determination through a preliminary objection. 20.On the merits of the Motion, counsel identified two issues for determination, namely: whether the 1st Respondent violated the Applicant’s rights to fair administrative action and fair hearing under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution, and whether the Applicant had established a basis for the grant of the judicial review remedies sought. In support of those arguments, reliance was placed on Onyango Oloo Vs Attorney General [1986–1989] EA 456 for the proposition that a decision affecting a person’s rights cannot lawfully be made without affording that person an opportunity to be heard, and on Pastoli Vs Kabale District Local Government Council & Others [2008] 2 EA 300 on the grounds upon which judicial review remedies may issue, namely illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. 21.The Applicant maintained that although the Tribunal was aware of his occupation of the suit premises, it proceeded to issue orders adversely affecting him without joining him to the proceedings or according him a hearing, thereby violating the rules of natural justice and rendering the impugned decision amenable to judicial review. The 2nd Respondent’s Submissions 22.Counsel for the 2nd Respondent submitted in support of both the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16th February 2026 and the Replying Affidavit sworn on the same date. It was argued that the Ex Parte Applicant lacked locus standi to institute and maintain the Judicial Review proceedings because he was neither a party to nor a participant in the proceedings before the Business Premises Rent Tribunal that culminated in the impugned ruling of 19th December 2025. Counsel contended that the Applicant’s alleged interest in the suit property arose solely from a tenancy agreement dated 22nd November 2025, whose validity was itself in question. 23.Reliance was placed on Njau & 5 Others Vs City Council of Nairobi [1983] KLR 625, Republic Vs Soy Division Land Disputes Tribunal & 2 Others; Rotich (Interested Party) [2026] KEELC 1079 (KLR) and Julian Adoyo Ongunga & Another Vs Francis Kiberenge Bondeva [2016] eKLR, for the proposition that a party must demonstrate a direct and legally recognizable interest in a dispute before invoking the Court’s jurisdiction. 24.On the merits, the 2nd Respondent submitted that the tenancy agreement relied upon by the Applicant was void ab initio, having been executed in breach of the Conservatory Orders issued on 11th November 2025 in HCFCC No. E033 of 2025 and shortly after her alleged unlawful eviction from the suit property. Counsel further argued that the proceedings constituted an abuse of the court process because the dispute over ownership and occupation of the property was already the subject of HCFCC No. E033 of 2025, while the Interested Party had lodged ELC Appeal No. E286 of 2025 challenging the Tribunal’s ruling. 25.In support of those arguments, reliance was placed on Hadkinson Vs Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567, Macfoy Vs United Africa Co. Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169, Dina Management Limited Vs County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. E010 of 2021, Muchanga Investments Ltd Vs Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Ltd [2009] eKLR, John Florence Maritime Services Ltd & Another Vs Cabinet Secretary for Transport & Infrastructure & 3 Others [2021] KESC 39 (KLR) and Kenya Pipeline Company Limited Vs Glencore Energy (UK) Limited [2015] eKLR. Counsel therefore urged the Court to uphold the Preliminary Objection and dismiss the Notice of Motion with costs. The Interested Party’s Submissions 26.Counsel for the Interested Party supported both the Ex Parte Applicant’s Notice of Motion and opposed the 2nd Respondent’s Preliminary Objection. It was submitted that the Preliminary Objection did not satisfy the threshold set out in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd Vs West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 because it raised contested factual issues, particularly regarding the lawfulness of the Tribunal’s orders of 14th November 2025 and the validity of the tenancy agreement between the Interested Party and the Ex Parte Applicant. 27.Counsel argued that such matters required evidentiary interrogation and could not properly be determined as pure points of law. It was further submitted that by the time the Tribunal delivered its ruling on 19th December 2025, the Ex Parte Applicant was already in occupation of the suit premises pursuant to a tenancy agreement dated 22nd November 2025, a fact that had been expressly brought to the Tribunal’s attention. 28.On the merits of the Motion, counsel submitted that the Ex Parte Applicant was a person directly affected by the Tribunal’s decision and was therefore entitled to be heard before any adverse orders could issue against him. Reliance was placed on Onyango Oloo Vs Attorney General [1986–1989] EA 456 for the proposition that a decision made in breach of the rules of natural justice cannot stand, and on Municipal Council of Mombasa Vs Republic & Umoja Consultants Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 185 of 2001 [2002] eKLR on the scope of judicial review. 29.Counsel maintained that despite being aware of the Applicant’s occupation and tenancy rights, the Tribunal proceeded to restore possession of the premises to the 2nd Respondent without joining or hearing him. It was therefore submitted that the Tribunal’s decision violated the Applicant’s rights under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution, was procedurally unfair, and warranted the grant of the orders of Certiorari and Prohibition sought in the Motion. Issues for Determination 30.Having considered the pleadings, affidavits, Preliminary Objection and the parties’ submissions, the issues arising for determination are:a.Whether the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16th February 2026 is merited.b.Whether the ruling of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal delivered on 19th December 2025 violated the Ex Parte Applicant's rights to fair hearing and fair administrative action.c.Whether the Ex Parte Applicant has established a basis for the grant of the judicial review remedies sought. Analysis and Determination Issue No (a): Whether the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16th February 2026 is merited. 31.The parameters of consideration of a preliminary objection are now well settled. A preliminary objection must only raise issues of law. The principles that the Court is enjoined to apply in determining the merits or otherwise of the Preliminary Objection were set out by the Court of Appeal in the case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd Vs West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. At page 700 Law JA stated:“A Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”At page 701 Sir Charles Newbold, P added:“A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is usually on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of Judicial discretion... 32.Accordingly, for a Preliminary Objection to succeed, it must raise a pure point of law, be argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the opposing party are correct, and must not require the Court to ascertain disputed facts or exercise judicial discretion. A valid Preliminary Objection should, if successful, dispose of the proceedings. 33.I have considered the grounds set out in the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16th February 2026. The gravamen of the objection is that the Ex Parte Applicant lacks locus standi to institute these proceedings because his claim is founded on a tenancy agreement which the 2nd Respondent contends is illegal, null and void. The 2nd Respondent further contends that the agreement was executed in violation of conservatory orders issued in HCFCC No. E033 of 2025, that it was entered into shortly after her alleged unlawful eviction from the suit premises, that there was collusion between the Ex Parte Applicant and the Interested Party, and that the present proceedings constitute an abuse of the court process owing to the existence of parallel proceedings before other courts. 34.While these arguments may ultimately be relevant in determining the merits of the dispute, they are not matters capable of determination as pure points of law. Whether the tenancy agreement was executed in violation of court orders, whether there was collusion between the Ex Parte Applicant and the Interested Party, whether the Applicant acquired any legally recognizable interest in the suit property, and whether the proceedings amount to an abuse of process are all matters that require the Court to examine evidence and make findings of fact. Equally, the question whether the Ex Parte Applicant possesses sufficient standing to challenge the Tribunal’s decision is intertwined with the factual issue of whether he was in occupation of the suit premises and whether the impugned decision directly affected his rights and interests. 35.It is noteworthy that the parties have taken diametrically opposed positions on these matters. Whereas the 2nd Respondent contends that the tenancy agreement is unlawful and incapable of conferring any rights, both the Ex Parte Applicant and the Interested Party maintain that the agreement is valid and that the Applicant was lawfully in occupation of the premises when the impugned ruling was delivered. Resolving these competing positions would necessarily require the Court to interrogate affidavit evidence and documents placed before it. Such an exercise falls outside the ambit of a preliminary objection as contemplated in Mukisa Biscuit (Supra). 36.In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the issues raised by the 2nd Respondent constitute pure points of law capable of disposing of the proceedings without recourse to evidence. The Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16th February 2026 therefore fails to meet the threshold established in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd Vs West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 and is hereby dismissed. Issue No (b): Whether the ruling of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal delivered on 19th December 2025 violated the Ex Parte Applicant's rights to fair hearing and fair administrative action 37.The Ex Parte Applicant's grievance is that although he was in occupation of the suit premises pursuant to a tenancy agreement entered into with the Interested Party on 22nd November 2025, he was neither joined to nor heard in the proceedings culminating in the Tribunal's ruling of 19th December 2025. According to the Applicant, the orders restoring possession of the premises to the 2nd Respondent directly affected his occupation and exposed him to eviction without affording him an opportunity to be heard. 38.The right to fair administrative action is guaranteed under Article 47(1) of the Constitution, which provides that every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Article 47(2) further requires that where a right or fundamental freedom is likely to be adversely affected by administrative action, the affected person must be given written reasons for the action. 39.These constitutional guarantees are reinforced by Section 4(3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, which obligates a decision-maker, where an administrative action is likely to adversely affect a person's rights or fundamental freedoms, to accord such person prior and adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard and to make representations, notice of a right to review or appeal, and reasons for the proposed action. 40.Similarly, Article 50(1) of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or other independent and impartial tribunal or body. The central tenet of these provisions is the age-old rule of natural justice expressed in the maxim audi alteram partem that no person should be condemned unheard. 41.In Onyango Oloo Vs Attorney General [1986–1989] EA 456, the Court of Appeal held that a decision made in breach of the rules of natural justice is not cured by the fact that the same decision might nevertheless have been reached had the affected person been heard. Likewise, in Judicial Service Commission Vs Mutava & another [2015] KECA 741 (KLR) the Court of Appeal emphasized that Article 47 has elevated the common law duty to act fairly into a constitutional imperative and that every administrative body must adhere to the requirements of procedural fairness. 42.The scope of judicial review was succinctly stated in Municipal Council of Mombasa Vs Republic; Umoja Consultants Ltd (Interested Party) [2002] KECA 8 (KLR), where the Court held that judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the decision-making process. The Court's inquiry is directed at questions such as whether the decision-maker had jurisdiction, whether the affected persons were heard, and whether relevant considerations were taken into account. 43.Turning to the facts of the present case, it is not disputed that before the Tribunal rendered its ruling on 19th December 2025, the Interested Party had placed before it an affidavit sworn on 2nd December 2025 informing the Tribunal that she had entered into a tenancy agreement with the Ex Parte Applicant on 22nd November 2025, that he had paid rent and deposit, and that he had already taken possession of the premises. The Interested Party also annexed documents intended to demonstrate the Applicant's occupation of the suit property. Consequently, the Tribunal was aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware, that there existed a third party whose occupation and possession of the premises would be directly affected by its decision. 44.In those circumstances, procedural fairness demanded that the Ex Parte Applicant be afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings before adverse orders affecting his occupation were issued. Whether his tenancy was ultimately lawful or unlawful was a matter that could only be determined after hearing all affected parties. By proceeding to issue orders restoring possession of the premises to the 2nd Respondent without joining or hearing the Applicant, the Tribunal denied him an opportunity to present his case and thereby breached the requirements of Article 47, Article 50(1) and Section 4(3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act. 45.I therefore find that the process leading to the Tribunal's ruling of 19th December 2025 violated the Ex Parte Applicant's rights to fair administrative action and fair hearing and was consequently tainted by procedural impropriety. Issue No (c): Whether the Ex Parte Applicant has established a basis for the grant of the judicial review remedies sought 46.Having found that the process leading to the impugned ruling violated the Ex Parte Applicant's rights to fair hearing and fair administrative action, the next question is whether the Applicant has satisfied the threshold for the grant of the judicial review remedies sought. 47.The grounds upon which judicial review remedies may issue were succinctly stated in Pastoli Vs Kabale District Local Government Council & Others [2008] 2 EA 300, where the Court held that judicial review is available where there is illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. Procedural impropriety includes failure to act fairly in the decision-making process and failure to observe the rules of natural justice. Similarly, in Municipal Council of Mombasa Vs Republic; Umoja Consultants Ltd (Interested Party) [2002] KECA 8 (KLR) the Court emphasized that judicial review is concerned with the legality of the decision-making process and not with the merits of the decision itself. 48.In the present case, the Court has already found that the Tribunal rendered a decision affecting the Ex Parte Applicant's occupation and possession of the suit premises despite being aware of his claimed interest and occupation and without affording him an opportunity to be heard. The failure to hear a person whose rights or interests are likely to be adversely affected constitutes procedural impropriety and a violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned decision was therefore arrived at through a flawed process. 49.The remedy of Certiorari issues to quash a decision made without jurisdiction or in violation of the rules of natural justice. In Kenya National Examinations Council Vs Republic ex parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 Others [1997] eKLR, the Court of Appeal explained that an order of Certiorari issues to quash a decision already made where the decision-maker acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or where the rules of natural justice were not complied with. In view of the finding that the Ex Parte Applicant was condemned unheard, I am satisfied that a basis has been established for the issuance of an order of Certiorari to quash the Tribunal's ruling delivered on 19th December 2025. 50.With regard to the remedy of Prohibition, the Court of Appeal in Kenya National Examinations Council Vs Republic ex parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 Others [1997] eKLR stated that the order looks to the future and issues to prevent the implementation or continuation of an unlawful decision or process. Having found that the impugned ruling was reached through a procedurally unfair process, it follows that its implementation would perpetuate the violation already occasioned to the Ex Parte Applicant. Consequently, an order of Prohibition is equally available to restrain the enforcement or implementation of the impugned ruling. 51.I am therefore satisfied that the Ex Parte Applicant has established sufficient grounds for the grant of the judicial review remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition sought in the Notice of Motion dated 5th January 2026. Final OrdersAccordingly, the Court makes the following orders:a.The Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16th February 2026 be and is hereby dismissed.b.An order of Certiorari be and is hereby issued removing into this Court and quashing the ruling/order of the Business Premises Rent Tribunal delivered on 19th December 2025 in BPRT/E1256/2025 – Pauline Mwikali Kieleko Vs Isabella Njeri Wachira.c.An order of Prohibition be and is hereby issued prohibiting the implementation, enforcement or execution of the said ruling/order delivered on 19th December 2025 in BPRT/E1256/2025.d.The Ex Parte Applicant shall have the costs of the Notice of Motion dated 5th January 2026.It is so Ordered DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI ON THIS 15TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026.MOHAMMED N. KULLOWJUDGEJudgment delivered in the presence of: -Mr. Mutuma for the Ex- Parte ApplicantN/A for 1st RespondentMr. Ngatia for 2nd RespondentMr. Murithi for the Interested PartyPhilomena W. Court Assistant