https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3204

Mbugua alias Isabella Njeri Kuria v Nganga & another (Environment and Land Case E003 of 2026) [2026] KEELC 3204 (KLR) (Environment and Land) (28 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3204 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Naivasha Environment and Land Environment and Land Case E003 of 2026 MC Oundo, J May 28, 2026 Between Isabella Njeri K Mbugua alias Isabella Njeri Kuria Plaintiff and Laban Chege Nganga 1st Defendant District Land Registrar, Naivasha 2nd Defendant Ruling 1.Contemporaneously with the Plaint dated 26th January 2026, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion Application pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1A 1B, 3A, 63 (c) and (e) of the Civil Procedure Act Cap 2l of the Laws of Kenya, Order 40 rule 1 and Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 and all enabling provisions of the law, seeking for the following orders:i.Spent.ii.Spentiii.Spentiv.That an order of temporary injunction do issue restraining the 1st Defendant whether by himself, agent and/or servants from trespassing onto, encroaching, making use of, cultivating, constructing, erecting structures onto, staying on, selling, disposing or dealing in any manner whatsoever or howsoever from interfering with the suit property known as Title Number Miti Mingi/Mbaruk Block 8/1201 (Kianjoya ‘D’) situate at Barnabas, Nakuru County measuring approximately 0.4047 Ha pending the hearing and determination of the suit.v.An order of temporary injunction do issue restraining the 1st Defendant whether by himself, agents and/or servants from threatening to kill, killing, calling, texting or in any manner whatsoever or howsoever from interfering with the personal life of the Applicant pending the hearing and determination of the suit.vi.That costs be provided for. 2.The said Notice of Motion is premised on the grounds therein as well as the Supporting Affidavit of equal date sworn by Isabella Njeri K. Mbugua Alias Isabella Njeri Kuria, the Plaintiff/Applicant herein who deposed that she is the sole legal registered owner of the suit property Title Number Miti Mingi/Mbaruk Block 8/1201 (Kianjoya ‘D’) situated at Barnabas, Nakuru County (suit property), having acquired the same from her late parents George Wanyoike Chege and Ann Nduta Wanyoike through transmission of succession cause numbers 22 and 23 of 1999, wherein she had been issued with a title deed on 11th March 2002. She explained that her late father George Wanyoike Chege had purchased the suit property from Kianjoya Enterprises Limited on 26th January 1996 at a purchase price of Kshs. 300,000/=. 3.That on 6th August 2025, she received a call from her younger brother Gathoga Wanyoike Chege informing her that he had seen her property Title Number Miti Mingi/Mbaruk Block 8/1201 (Kianjoya ‘D’) fenced of and a container placed on it. That subsequently, she had lodged a complaint and reported the matter to the Mwariki Police Station through her brothers Gathoga Wanyoike Chege and William Chege Wanyoike. That thereafter, she had immediately engaged the services of her advocate on record, who had advised that she first conduct a search at the land registry to ascertain the current status of the suit property. 4.That subsequently, on 8th August 2025, she had conducted a search whose result had come out on 19th August 2025, and she was surprised to learn that the property had changed ownership on 4th October 2011 from her name to the 1st Respondent’s name without her knowledge or consent, despite her not having sold or transferred the same to the 1st Respondent or any other person whatsoever. That she was still in possession of the original title 5.She thus deposed that the transfer of the suit property to the 1st Respondent, the conferment and registration of ownership by the 2nd Respondent, had been done illegally, unprocedurally, irregularly, unlawfully, fraudulently and/or through misrepresentation and/or corrupt scheme by the respondents herein jointly and/or severally. 6.That the 1st Respondent had subsequently trespassed on the suit property and was ready to deny her the right to own property. That on the 20th August 2025, her advocate wrote a letter to the 2nd Respondent requesting certified copies of the green card and all documents leading to the issuance of the title in the name of the 1st Respondent, wherein the 2nd Respondent referred the instant matter to the DCIO, Gilgil Sub-County, for investigation and ascertainment of ownership position. 7.That on 1st September 2025, she had received another report from her brother, Gathoga Wanyoike Chege, to the effect that the 1st Respondent had now trespassed on the suit property and caused the same to be advertised for sale. 8.On 4th September 2025, she had received a call from an unknown number, and the caller had introduced himself as Maina wa Kiragu, who had told her in Kikuyu ‘ithue tui Mungiki na ni tugukuraga”, translated in English as “…We are Mungiki, and we will kill you…”. That she immediately reached out to her advocate, who advised her to report to the police. Accordingly, on 8th September 2025, she lodged a complaint and reported the matter at Nakuru Police Station vide OB NO 47/08/09/2025, and recorded a statement to that effect. Her complaint, based on threats, was still under investigation by the DCIO, Nakuru East. 9.That on 2nd October 2025, pursuant to the directive by the 2nd Respondent, she had appeared before the DCIO, Gilgil Sub-County and recorded her statement. She, however, had not been updated on the progress of the said investigation to date. That accordingly, she was apprehensive that the 1st Respondent may proceed to dispose of the suit property to her detriment, there being no existing injunction orders against the Respondents. That she was also apprehensive of her life being in danger there being no restraining order against the Respondents and/or their agents, to her detriment. That subsequently, she was afraid that if the court does not intervene, she would not enjoy her rights as the lawful owner of the suit property which may be wasted. 10.That she had been deprived of a home to be, commercial property to be, and subjected to stress and great anxiety. 11.In response and in opposition to the Plaintiffs Application, the 1st Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection and Grounds of Opposition dated 30th January 2026, to the effect that:i.That the suit is fatally defective.ii.That the Plaintiff’s Title purportedly issued on 11th March 2002, is null and void thus cannot confer rights that can be litigated upon, for having offended the provisions of sections 55 and 82 (b) (ii) of the Law of Succession Act, prohibiting the transfer of immovable property of the estate before confirmation of Grant, the Grant of confirmation of the estate of George Wanyoike Chege having been confirmed on 8th October 2004.iii.That acquisition of land before confirmation of Grant is unlawful and does not enjoy the property rights under the constitution, thus the jurisdiction of the court cannot be invoked at the instance of such a title.iv.That a void transaction is in law a nullity. It is not only bad but incurably bad and every proceeding or perceived right which is founded on it is not only bad but incurably bad. 12.The 1st Defendant’s Grounds of Opposition dated 18th February 2026, were based on the following:i.That the application is bad in law, misconceived, incompetent and an abuse of the process of the court and is hinged on air.ii.That the application is not maintainable and is filed male fides with the mere intention of hoodwinking the Court to endorse an illegally acquired Title.iii.That the suit is fatally defective.iv.That the Plaintiff’s Title purportedly issued on 11th March, 2002 is null and void thus cannot confer rights that can be litigated upon, for having offended the provisions of section 55 and Section 82(b) (ii) of the law of Succession Act, prohibiting transfer of immovable property of the estate before confirmation of Grant , Grant of confirmation in respect the estate of George Wanyoike Chege having been confirmed on 8th October, 2004.v.That acquisition of land before confirmation of Grant is unlawful and does not enjoy property rights under the constitution, thus the jurisdiction of this honourable court cannot be invoked at the instance of such a Title.vi.That a void transaction is in law a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad, and every proceeding or perceived right which is founded on it is not only bad but incurably bad.vii.That the Plaintiff cannot use a null title to seek orders of injunction before the court.viii.That the application is without any basis at all. 13.In a rejoinder, the Plaintiff, through her further affidavit dated 7th March 2026, admitted that indeed there had been an earlier certificate of Grant in respect of the estate of George Wanyoike Chege, dated 22nd June, 2001, which Grant had been used in processing the title deed to the suit property dated 11th March 2002. That subsequently the said Grant was amended and reconfirmed on 8th October 2004. That accordingly, the provisions of section 55 and section 82(b) (ii) of the law of Succession Act are inapplicable in the circumstances as the suit property had been transmitted to her on the 11th March 2002 after confirmation of the Grant on 22nd June 2001. 14.That, in respect of the 1st Defendant’s Grounds of Opposition, he had not tendered any evidence by way of documentation to prove how he had acquired the suit property, if any, hence her title was unquestionable. That, in any case, in the unlikely event that the acquisition of title to the suit property was questionable, the same cannot be determined at the application stage, but only after the full trial. 15.The 2nd Defendant did not participate in the Application herein. 16.The Notice of Motion and the Preliminary Objection herein were canvassed in the first instance, by way of written submissions, which I shall summarize as follows: Plaintiff/Applicant’s Submissions. 17.In her submissions dated 7th March 2026, in support of her application dated 26th January 2026 and in opposition to the 1st Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 30th January 2026, the Plaintiff/Applicant summarized the factual background of the matter, reiterated the contents of her Supporting and Further Affidavits verbatim, and then outlined her issues for determination as follows:i.Whether the preliminary objection is merited.ii.Whether an injunction should be issued in terms of prayers (iv) and (v). 18.On the first issue, namely whether the 1st Defendant’s Preliminary Objection is merited, she reiterated the contents of her Further Affidavit to contend that it was not in dispute that the certificate of Grant in respect of the estate of George Wanyoike Chege had been confirmed on 22nd June, 2001, and amended on 8th October 2004. It was also undisputed that the confirmed Grant dated 22nd June, 2001, had been used to obtain her title to the suit, which was issued on 11th March 2002. The authenticity of the said title was therefore unquestionable, as it had been procured after due process. That, in any case, since the 1st Defendant had not filed a Defence to the Plaint herein, meaning that he agrees with the facts therein, save for the validity of the title deed herein, which could be determined after the full trial. She thus urged the Court to dismiss the 1st Defendant’s Preliminary Objection with costs to the Plaintiff. 19.On the second issue, namely whether an injunction should be issued in terms of prayers (iv) and (v), she relied on the principles governing the Grant of an injunction as enunciated in the landmark case of Giella Vs. Cassman Brown (1973) EA 358 and reiterated in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Nguruman Limited Vs. Jan Bonde Nielsen and 2 Others (2014) eKLR. 20.On whether she had made out a prima facie case with a probability of success, she relied on the definition from the case of Mrao Limited Vs. First American Bank of Kenya (2003) KLR 125 submitted that it was undisputed that she is the registered owner of the suit property herein, having acquired it from her late father, George Wanyoike Chege, by transmission. That it was also not in contention that the late George Wanyoike Chege had purchased the suit property from Kianjoya Enterprises Limited on 26th January 1996 at a purchase price of Kshs. 300,000/=. That, on the contrary, the 1st Defendant had not exhibited any evidence by way of documentation to prove how he had acquired the suit property, if any. 21.That further, it was not denied that the 1st Defendant had trespassed onto the suit property by having it illegally transferred into his name, fencing it off and advertising it for sale. It was also not denied that the 1st Defendant or his proxies had threatened her (Plaintiff) life. She thus submitted that it was not in dispute that she is the legally registered owner of the suit property, since she had filed documentary evidence in support thereof, and thus she is the absolute and indefeasible owner of the suit property. 22.In support of the foregoing, she relied on the decision in the case of Margaret Njeri Wachira v Eliud Waweru Njenga [2018] eKLR, to beseech the Court to consider her title document as prima facie evidence of ownership of land and conclusive evidence of proprietorship of land, which could only be challenged on grounds stipulated under the provisions of Section 26 (1) (a) and (b) of the Land Registration Act. 23.She argued that the 1st Respondent’s purported title deed, if any, was not legitimate, as it was issued after her own title. She thus urged the court to find that she is entitled to the injunction, as she had established a prima facie case with a probability of success, and her right over the suit property has apparently been infringed by the 1st Respondent. 24.On the issue of whether she had established that she would suffer irreparable loss that would not be adequately compensated by an award of damages, she relied on the meaning of irreparable injury as discussed in the Nguruman Limited’s case (supra) to submit that, in the instant case, great loss would be occasioned to her, as she had demonstrated that she had procedurally acquired the suit property from the estate of her late father and that her life was also in danger. She further submitted that the 1st Respondent had already advertised the suit property for sale, and that unless the orders sought herein were granted, the 1st Respondent may proceed to dispose of the suit property to third parties, thereby subjecting her to irreparable loss that cannot be compensated by an award of damages. 25.On the issue of where the balance of convenience lay, she submitted that it tilted in her favour. She relied on the case of Paul Gitonga Wanjau v Gathuthi Tea Factory Company Ltd & 2 Others (sic) to emphasize that she had succeeded in proving her interest in the suit property and the irreparable injury she was likely to face if denied an injunction, hence the balance of convenience tilts in her favour. That, in any event, the 1st Respondent had always been aware of her interest in the suit property; hence, his response was nothing but an afterthought and an abuse of the court process, without any justifiable reason, aimed at interfering with her rightful ownership. 26.In conclusion, she submitted that she had satisfied the pre-conditions for the grant of the injunctions sought, thus she urged the Court to allow her application dated 26th January 2026 and dismiss the 1st Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 30th January 2026 with costs. 1st Defendant/Respondent’s Submissions. 27.The 1st Defendant/Respondent, vide his submissions dated 2nd March 2026 in support of the Preliminary Objection dated 30th January 2026 and in opposition to the Plaintiff’s Application dated 26th January 2026, framed his issues for determination as follows:i.Whether the Preliminary Objection raises a pure point of law as envisaged in law; andii.Whether a suit founded on a title obtained before confirmation of the Grant is incompetent, fatally defective, and incapable of sustaining any legal rights or remedies before this Honourable Court. 28.On the first issue for determination as to whether the Preliminary Objection raises a pure point of law as envisaged in law, he relied on the definition of preliminary objection as had been explained in the case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd Vs. West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696 and David Karobia Kiiru Vs. Charles Nderitu Gitoi & Another (2018) eKLR to where it had been stated that for a preliminary objection to succeed it must:i.Raise a purely point of law.ii.Be argued on the assumption that all facts pleaded by the other side are correct.iii.It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought requires judicial discretion. 29.He argued that in the present matter, the Preliminary Objection is anchored on pure points of law:i.The illegality of the acquisition of title before confirmation of the Grant ;ii.The nullity of any transaction conducted in contravention of Sections 55 and 82(b)(ii) of the Law of Succession Act; andiii.The improper invocation of the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to enforce or protect an unlawful title. 30.That the foregoing are strictly points of law discernible from the pleadings and statutory provisions, and do not require any factual inquiry or the exercise of judicial discretion. He thus contended that the Preliminary Objection herein squarely meets the threshold set out in the Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd’s case (supra). 31.As to whether a title acquired before confirmation of Grant is null and void, he submitted that the provisions of Section 55 of the Law of Succession Act prohibit the distribution of capital assets of an estate before confirmation of Grant, while Section 82(b)(ii) expressly prohibits the sale or transfer of immovable property before confirmation of Grant. The courts have consistently held that any transaction undertaken in violation of these provisions is illegal, void ab initio and incapable of conferring enforceable rights. 32.To buttress the foregoing, he relied on the decided case of Hezron Kimeli Cheruiyot v Rusi Chepkemoi Chebochok & 3 Others [2021] KEELC 3716 (KLR), where the Court upheld a Preliminary Objection and struck out a suit where the claimant had relied on land transactions that had been undertaken after the death of the registered proprietor but before confirmation of Grant . The Court held that such dealings contravened the provisions of Sections 55 and 82(b)(ii) of the Law of Succession Act, were undertaken without legal capacity, and were therefore illegal, null and void ab initio, incapable of conferring enforceable rights. He further relied on the decision in Re Estate of Mary Wanjiru Njohi (Deceased) [2022] KEHC 16990 (KLR), where the Court had emphasised that any contract or transfer of estate property made in violation of the provisions of Sections 55 and 82 of the Law of Succession Act is invalid, null and void, and unenforceable as a matter of law. 33.On whether the transaction is null and void as a matter of law, he submitted that the Plaintiff’s cause of action is founded on a transaction that is legally null and void ab initio. He relied on Re Estate of Hezbon Onyango Nyabola (Deceased) [2023] KEHC 24835 (KLR), where the court held, while interpreting the provisions of Sections 55 and 82(b)(ii) of the Law of Succession Act, that any attempted sale of immovable property of the estate before confirmation of the Grant is null and void for all purposes and intents. The Court also explained that a purported agreement executed before confirmation of the Grant had no legal effect whatsoever because the law places an absolute restriction on dealing with estate property prior to confirmation of the Grant 34.That accordingly, the Plaintiff’s reliance on a title allegedly derived from dealings that had occurred before confirmation of Grant renders the entire foundation of her suit a nullity in law, hence no rights can be enforced by the Honourable Court on the basis of such an unlawful transaction. That in the instant case, the Plaintiff’s Title purportedly issued on 11th March, 2002 is null and void thus cannot confer rights that can be litigated upon, for having offended the provisions of section 55 and section 82(b) (ii) of the law of Succession Act, prohibiting transfer of immovable property of the estate before confirmation of Grant, the Grant in respect of the estate of George Wanyoike Chege having been confirmed on 8th October, 2004. 35.In conclusion, he submitted that the Preliminary Objection raises pure points of law; that the Plaintiff’s title is null and void for having been acquired in contravention of the provisions of Sections 55 and 82(b)(ii) the Law of Succession Act; and that a suit founded on such illegality is fatally defective and constitutes an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court. He thus prayed that the Preliminary Objection be upheld and the Plaintiff’s suit, together with the application dated 26th January 2026, be struck out with costs. Determination. 36.I have considered the Plaintiff/Applicant's application dated the 26th January 2026, the 1st Respondent’s objection to the same, the parties' submissions, the authorities cited and the applicable law. 37.The Plaintiff/Applicant brings her application dated 26th January 2026, in which she sought a temporary injunction restraining the 1st Respondent from trespassing on, selling, or developing the suit property No. Miti Mingi/Mbaruk Block 8/1201, and making death threats against her life. 38.That her father bought the land in 1996 from Kianjoya Enterprises Ltd for Ksh 300,000/=. Following her parents' deaths in 1999, she inherited the land from her father, George Wanyoike Chege, through transmission via an initial Grant dated 22nd June 2001 in Succession Cause Nos. 22 and 23 of 1999, which Grant was later amended on 8th October 2004. 39.She argued that she is the absolute, indefeasible registered owner of the land, as evidenced by her title deed dated 11th March 2002. Citing Giella Vs. Cassman Brown (1973) EA 358, she argued that she had made out a clear prima facie case with a high probability of success, as land registry records showed that she was the registered owner until a fraudulent, secret transfer to the 1st Respondent. 40.That she stood to lose her inherited ancestral property permanently if the 1st Respondent succeeded in advertising and selling it to innocent third parties. Furthermore, she also faced an active threat to her physical safety from alleged Mungiki intimidation. 41.She explicitly countered the 1st Respondent’s Preliminary Objection, arguing that there had been an initial Certificate of Grant which was confirmed on 22nd June 2001, before her title was processed in March 2002. The 2004 Grant, the 1st Respondent cited, was merely a subsequent amendment/re-confirmation. Thus, her title perfectly adhered to succession laws. 42.She critiqued the 1st Respondent's objection, stating that it rested purely on a technical point of succession law, yet he had not attached or presented any documentation showing how he allegedly acquired or came to hold a title, if any, to the land himself. 43.The 1st Respondent opposed the application seeking a temporary injunction through his Notice of Preliminary Objection and Grounds of Opposition and sought to have the entire lawsuit dismissed. 44.He contended that the Applicant/Plaintiff's title deed was a legal nullity as it violated the provisions of Sections 55 and 82(b)(ii) of the Law of Succession Act, which prohibit the distribution or transfer of immovable estate property before a Grant is legally confirmed. 45.His position was that the official confirmation of the Grant for George Wanyoike Chege’s estate did not happen until 8th October, 2004. Because the Plaintiff's title was issued on 11th March 2002 (two years prior), he argued the property was distributed illegally and without capacity. 46.He argued that because a void transaction has no legal life, the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to protect a title that was fundamentally born out of an illegality. 47.I find the issues arising herein as follows:i.Whether the 1st Respondent’s Preliminary Objection raises a pure point of law or requires factual inquiry.ii.Whether an order of interlocutory injunction should issue. 48.On the first issue for determination, a Preliminary Objection according to the decided case by the Court of Appeal in the case of Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd –v- West End Distributors Limited (1969) EA. 696 was stated to be thus: -“So far as I am aware, a Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court, or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.” 49.It is evident that a Preliminary Objection consists of pure points of law, and it is also capable of bringing the matter to an end preliminarily. Such an objection must be argued on the assumption that all facts pleaded by the opposite party are correct, and it cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought requires the exercise of judicial discretion. 50.The Supreme Court in the case of Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission v Jane Cheperenger & 2 others [2015] eKLR observed as follows:“… The true preliminary objection serves two purposes of merit: firstly, it serves as a shield for the originator of the objection—against profligate deployment of time and other resources. And secondly, it serves the public cause, of sparing scarce judicial time, so it may be committed only to deserving cases of dispute settlement. It is distinctly improper for a party to resort to the preliminary objection as a sword, for winning a case otherwise destined to be resolved judicially, and on the merits.” 51.The 1st Respondent argues that his objection is purely statutory and points to Sections 55 and 82(b)(ii) of the Law of Succession Act, which explicitly state that dealing with or transferring the immovable property of a deceased person before the confirmation of a grant is illegal and void ab initio. 52.From his perspective, the timeline speaks for itself because while the Plaintiff's title was issued on 11th March 2002, the supposed Confirmation of Grant was on 8th October 2004 and therefore if these two dates were completely undisputed and written in stone on the face of the pleadings, the Court would only need to apply the law to the timeline, making it a pure point of law. 53.This argument, however, fundamentally failed the Mukisa Biscuit test because the facts surrounding the succession timeline were disputed by the Plaintiff, who, via her rejoinder, introduced a critical new fact to the effect that there had been an earlier Certificate of Confirmation of Grant dated 22nd June, 2001, which Grant had been the legal baseline used to process her 2002 title deed. The 2004 Grant cited by the 1st Respondent was merely a subsequent amendment. This argument thus shifted the ground beneath the Preliminary Objection, forcing the Court into a deep factual dive to ascertain whether there was a validly confirmed Grant on 22nd June 2001, what was the scope and purpose of the subsequent Grant on 8th October 2004, was it an amendment, or a fresh confirmation and lastly whether the Land Registry processed the 2002 title legally based on the 2001 records or not. 54.None of these questions can be answered by looking at the law alone. They require the Court to look at evidence, examine the Land Registry's green card, review the court files of Succession Cause Nos. 22 and 23 of 1999, and potentially hear oral testimony. 55.The issues raised regarding the validity of the succession process and the legality of the 2002 title deed are deeply intertwined with the merits of the entire lawsuit. According to established legal principles, when an objection depends on the trial court's investigation and clarification of disputed timelines, it must be dismissed or deferred to a full trial. The Court cannot use an interim application to declare a registered title null and void based on a contested sequence of events. 56.Applying the principles stated in the above authorities to the current dispute reveals that while the 1st Respondent frames his objection as a pure point of law, it structurally collapses into a factual inquiry that cannot be resolved at this preliminary stage. The 1st Respondent’s preliminary objections do not raise a pure point of law but require a detailed factual inquiry and are herein dismissed. 57.On the second issue for determination as to whether this court should grant the Applicant the interlocutory injunctive orders sought, the principles to be considered by this court are well settled in the case of Giella vs. Cassman Brown [1973] EA 358, which sets out the three-pillar test that the Applicant needs to satisfy for the grant of an interlocutory injunction as follows;i.Is there a serious issue to be tried (prima facie case)?ii.Will the Applicant suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted?iii.Which party will suffer the greater harm from granting or refusing the remedy pending a decision on the merits? (Often called "balance of convenience"). 58.A prima facie case was described in the case of Mrao vs First American Bank of Kenya Limited & 2 Others (2003) KLR 125, as follows:“a prima facie case in a Civil Application includes but is not confined to a ‘genuine and arguable case’. It is a case which, on the material presented to the Court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.” 59.At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not required to determine the ultimate validity of the competing titles. As seen earlier, the court needs only to determine that, on the surface, the party seeking an injunction has a right that has been or is at risk of being violated. The Applicant need not prove ownership; it suffices to demonstrate a genuine and honest dispute over the existence of the claimed right. 60.Lord Diplock in American Cyanamid Co. vs Ethicon Limited (1975) 1 ALL ER 504; (1975) A.C. 396 HL at 510 observed as follows;“It is no part of the Court's function at this stage of the litigation to try and resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial.” 61.To determine whether the Applicant is entitled to the temporary injunctions, I have evaluated her application against the landmark test established in Giella v. Cassman (supra) and in Mrao Ltd (supra), wherein an analysis of the competing facts and statutory provisions, the Applicant has presented a paper trail establishing her historical, legal connection to the land to the effect that her late father purchased the property from Kianjoya Enterprises Limited on 26th January 1996, for Ksh 300,000/=. Following her parents' deaths in 1999, she inherited the land from her father, George Wanyoike Chege, through an initial Grant dated 22nd June 2001 in Succession Cause Nos. 22 and 23 of 1999, under which she was registered as proprietor of the suit land on 11th March 2002. 62.The 1st Respondent has argued and asserted that the Plaintiff/Applicant's title was illegally and unlawfully procured and therefore cannot be deserving of protection under the law. However, there is no evidence that the Government has recalled and/or revoked the title. Both the Land Registration Act at Section 26 (1) that provides for the indefeasibility of title, and Article 40(6) of the constitution envisage that where a registered title is impugned on the grounds set out in the provisions, that due process would be followed to have such title revoked, cancelled and/or annulled. The courts have, in a series of recent cases, held that due process must be followed before a registered title can be revoked on the ground that it was fraudulently or irregularly issued. 63.The Plaintiff/Applicant, having demonstrated that she was the registered owner of the suit properties wherein she had been issued with a title, prima facie her title is indefeasible and the burden shifts to the 1st Respondent to show or demonstrate that the title is challengeable within the provisions of the law. 64.Quite clearly, it is not possible to make a final determination at this interlocutory stage on the validity of the Plaintiff/Applicant's title, but the mere proof that she holds duly registered certificates of title, which on the face of it was properly acquired, is sufficient to lead the court to hold that she has established a prima facie case. 65.On whether the Plaintiff/Applicant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted? The Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited v. Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others (2014) eKLR, held as follows:“…… An injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy or the injury or harm is such a nature that monetary compensation, of whatever amount, will never be adequate remedy……“………..the court must further be satisfied that the injury the Respondent will suffer in the event the injunction is not Granted will be irreparable. In other words, if damages recoverable in law is an adequate remedy and the Respondent is capable of paying no interlocutory order of injunction should normally be Granted however strong the Applicant’s claim may appear at that stage.” 66.An irreparable injury is one that cannot be adequately atoned for by damages. It means that a subsequent monetary award would not put the Plaintiff back in the position she would have been in had the injury not occurred. An evaluation of the facts demonstrates that the Applicant faces a double threat of irreparable injury, one to her immovable property rights and a far more severe, irreversible threat to her personal safety and human life. 67.The Applicant states that the 1st Respondent has already trespassed on the property, fenced it off, placed a container therein and, crucially, advertised the land for sale to the general public. If the Court does not grant an injunction, the 1st Respondent is in a position to sell the property to an innocent third-party purchaser, thereby permanently alienating the Applicant's ancestral property, inherited from her late parents, and cannot be compensated merely by calculating its market value in damages. 68.Secondly, the Applicant is apprehensive as there has been an irreversible threat to her life after she received an explicit death threat via telephone from an individual identifying with an outlawed criminal gang: “ithue tui mungiki na ni tugukuraga” (meaning “We are Mungiki and we will kill you”) on 4th September 2025, a matter which she reported at Nakuru Police Station vide OB NO 47/08/09/2025 and is currently under active investigation by the DCIO Nakuru East. 69.There is no injury more absolute, permanent, or irreparable than the loss of human life. Damages cannot compensate for a dead person. Because the death threat is directly tied to her insistence on claiming her land, refusing to issue a restraining order against the 1st Respondent and their proxies poses a direct, immediate, and potentially fatal risk to her bodily integrity and life, which are protected under Article 26 of the constitution of Kenya. 70.I therefore find that the Applicant has also satisfied the requirement of proving that she will suffer severe, irreparable injury that no amount of monetary damages can ever repair. 71.On the final hurdle as to where the balance of convenience lies, the court would naturally make a determination as to which party will suffer the greater harm if the injunction is either denied or issued. If the Applicant has a strong case on the merits or there is significant irreparable harm, it may influence the balance in favour of granting an injunction. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Nguruman Limited (supra) clarified that the balance of convenience involves a comparative assessment of the hardships. The Court must weigh the injury the Plaintiff will suffer if the injunction is refused against the injury the 1st Respondent will suffer if it is granted, and determine which path serves the interest of justice. If the scales are evenly balanced, the Court’s duty is to preserve the status quo pending a full trial. 72.However, in this case, I find that the balance of convenience tilts heavily and unequivocally in favour of the Plaintiff/Applicant. Although the 1st Respondent argues that he should be permitted to remain on the land, citing the 2011 registration, he has neither annexed a title nor stated how he acquired the land and therefore has come to court seeking equity with unclean hands. 73.A comparative analysis of the hardships shows that the 1st Respondent will suffer minor, temporary inconvenience by having his development plans paused, temporarily, until he proves his title, if any, is authentic at trial. He suffers no permanent loss of property rights, whereas the Plaintiff faces the immediate, chaotic risk of her land being sold off to third parties, permanently altering the property's legal and physical state, total loss of her inheritance, and a direct risk to her life. Therefore, the balance of convenience heavily dictates that the Court must intervene, step in as a shield, and grant the temporary injunctions to preserve the subject matter of the suit and protect the Applicant until the truth can be fully unravelled at trial. To this effect it is directed as follows:i.An order of temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the 1st Defendant/Respondent, whether by himself, his agents, servants, proxies, or anyone acting on his behalf, from trespassing onto, encroaching upon, making use of, cultivating, erecting structures or a container onto, staying on, selling, advertising for sale, transferring, or dealing with the suit property known as Title Number: Miti Mingi/Mbaruk Block 8/1201 (Kianjoya ‘D’) situated at Barnabas, Nakuru County, in any manner whatsoever pending the full hearing and determination of this suit.ii.An order of temporary injunction is hereby issued restraining the 1st Defendant/Respondent, whether by himself, his agents, servants, or proxies, from calling, texting, tracking, threatening the life of, or in any manner whatsoever interfering with the personal life, peace, and security of the Plaintiff/Applicant pending the hearing and determination of this suit.iii.The costs of the Preliminary Objection and the Notice of Motion Application are awarded to the Plaintiff/Applicant.iv.Parties to comply with the provisions of Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules within the next 21 days for the hearing of the main suit herein. DATED AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS AT NAIVASHA THIS 28TH DAY OF MAY 2026.M.C. OUNDOENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT– JUDGE