https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4763

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT MERU** **MISC. APPLICATION NO. E034 OF 2024** MCM ADVOCATES LLP……………………ADVOCATE/APPLICANT VERSUS WASO TRADING CO. LTD……………….…………1ST RESPONDENT ABDI GALGALO GONJOBE ………………..………2ND RESPONDENT **RULING** 1. Before me is the Chamber summons application, otherwise known as a Reference, dated the 16.06.2026, brought pursuant to **Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, 2014; and Section 51 of the Advocates Act, Chapter 16 Laws of Kenya**, and wherein the applicant has sought the following reliefs: 2. ***That the ruling and decision of the Taxing Master, Hon. Evalyne Wacera Ndegwa, delivered on the 04.06.2026, taxing the Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 27 August, 2024 at Kshs. 481,825/= be and is hereby set aside.*** 3. ***That the Honourable court be pleased to re-assess and allow the Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 27.08.2024 as drawn, based on the judicially ascertained value of the subject matter of Kshs. 3,132,000,000/=.*** 4. ***That in the alternative, the applicant’s bill of costs dated 27.08.2024 be remitted to a different taxing master for taxation in accordance with the correct principles of law.*** 5. ***That the cost of the reference be borne by the respondents****.* 6. The application is premised on various grounds. The grounds are: The Applicant was retained/engaged by the respondents; the Applicant diligently prosecuted the instructions and vindicated the interests of the respondents; the subject matter relative to the instructions had a value of Kshs. 3,132,000,000/= only; the value of the suit property was contained in the body of the amended Plaint; the value was placed before the taxing officer; the taxing officer ignored/disregarded the disclosed value; the taxing officer proceed to tax the bill of costs without regard to the provisions of Schedule 6 of the ARO; the impugned taxation ignored the settled principles of taxation; and the resultant certificate of costs reflects an error of principle. 7. In addition, the applicant has posited thus: The applicant duly protected the interests of the respondents; the dispute underpinning the instructions was complex; the applicant expended time and labor on research; the final taxation does not correspond with the efforts of the applicant and the certificate of taxation does not taken into account the nature of the dispute; and complexity of the matter. 1. The Applicant has further averred that: The applicant placed before the taxing officer previous taxation relating to the same subject suit; the previous taxation was undertaken on the basis of a valuation contained in the body of the amended plaint; the valuation in the body of the amended plaint showed Kshs. 3,132,000,000/= only; and the taxing officer disregarded the doctrine of Stare decisis. 2. The application is supported by the affidavit of one Charles M Mwalimu, Advocate. The deponent of the supporting affidavit has reiterated the grounds contained in the body of the reference. In addition, the deponent has annexed three [3] sets of documents. The documents are: Copy of the impugned ruling dated the 04.06.2026; copy of the ruling dated the 20.02.2024; and copy of the ruling of the [sic] High Court dated the 26.06.2024, respectively. 3. The respondent filed a replying affidavit in opposition to the reference. The respondents have posited that the reference does not disclose any error of principle that vitiates the ruling and the resultant certificate of taxation. In addition, the respondents have posited that the learned taxing officer correctly exercised her discretion in taxing the applicants bill of costs. In addition, it has been averred that the certificate of taxation accords with the prescription *vide* **Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order.** 4. The reference came up for directions on the 29.06.2026, whereupon the advocates for the applicant sought directions as pertains to the disposal of the reference. In addition, learned counsel for the applicant also proposed to canvass the reference by way of written submissions. 5. With the concurrence of learned counsel for the respondents, the court proceeded to and issued directions. The directions were: The reference shall be canvassed by way of written submissions; the applicant shall file and serve written submissions within 7 days from the date of the directions; and the respondents shall file and serve written submissions within 7 days from the date of service. 6. The applicant filed written submissions dated the 13.07.2026 and wherein same [applicant] has highlighted three [3] key issues. The issues are: The legal import and tenor of Advocates Client Costs; whether the learned trial Magistrate Misapprehended of the ARO relating to taxation of instruction fees; and Whether the impugned certificate of taxation is vitiated by errors of principles or otherwise. 7. Regarding the first issue, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the purpose of advocates – client bill of costs, is to enable the advocate to be duly compensated for the work done. It has been submitted that the applicant herein was engaged and retained by the respondents. In addition, it has been submitted that the applicant duly protected the interest[s] of the applicant, in a highly litigious matter. To this end, it has been posited that the applicant ought to be duly and suitably compensated for the services rendered. 8. In respect to the second issue, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the taxation of the instruction fees in contentious matters, is regulated by the provisions of **Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration order, 2014.** In this regard, it has been submitted that despite the clear guidance contained *vide* schedule 6 of the ARO, the learned taxing officer disregarded the parameters set and thus awarded an inordinately low figure on account of instruction fees. 9. Additionally, it has been submitted that the learned taxing officer disregarded the disclosed value of the suit property, which value was captured/disclosed on the face of the amended plaint. Insofar as the learned trial magistrate disregarded the disclosed value, it has been submitted that the taxing officer committed an error of principle. 10. Moreover, it has been submitted that the learned taxing officer also disregarded previous taxation, relative to the same subject matter and which previous taxation constituted proper guidance on the question of the value of the subject matter. In addition, it has also been submitted that the learned taxing officer also disregarded a ruling emanating out of a reference, which had been filed in a related matter. 11. In short, learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the taxing officer disregarded the doctrine of stare decisis. To this end, the court has been invited to impeach the certificate of taxation. 12. Lastly, it has been submitted that the award on account of the instruction fees, in the sum of Kshs. 180,000/= only, as against the figure sought, was /is inordinately low. In this regard, it has been submitted that a clear basis does exist to warrant the interference with, or impeachment of the certificate of taxation. 13. To buttress the foregoing submissions, learned counsel for the applicant has cited and referenced various decisions. The decisions are **Joreth Limited versus Kigano and Associates Advocates [2002] 1EA 92; Kariuki versus Equity Bank Limited [2022] KEHC 221 ; Kenya Airport Authority versus Otieno Ragot and company advocates [2024] KESC 44; and Peter Muthoka and another versus Ochieng and three others [2019] eKLR**, respectively. 14. Flowing from the foregoing submissions, learned counsel for the applicant has invited the court to find and hold that the reference is meritorious. The court has been implored to allow the reference; set aside the certificate of taxation; and refer the Advocate – client bill of costs to the taxing officer, for re-taxation. 15. The respondents filed written submissions dated 15.07.2026. The respondents have highlighted three [3] key issues. The issues are: Whether the applicant has demonstrated any error of principle warranting interference with the taxation; whether this court can substitute its own discretion for that of the taxing officer; whether the previous taxation proceedings arising from the same suit were binding upon the taxing officer or otherwise. 16. Regarding the first issue, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the jurisdiction of this court, while handling a reference, is circumscribed. In particular, it has been submitted that the court can only interfere with the discretion of the taxing officer, where it is shown /demonstrated that the taxing officer committed an error of principle, in the course of taxation. 17. However, it has been submitted that in respect of the subject matter, the applicant has neither established nor demonstrated any error of principle, to warrant the interference. Moreover, it has been submitted that the learned taxing officer ignored the value of the subject matter, yet no valuation report had been tendered to underpin the alleged value of the suit property. In the absence of a valuation report, it has been submitted, that the learned taxing officer was obliged to proceed and tax the instruction fees, on the basis of discretion. 18. Further, and in addition, it has been submitted that the learned taxing officer, correctly exercised her discretion and took into account relevant principles and considerations, including; the proportionality of the work done; the conduct of the proceedings; and the fact that costs must not be allowed to fetter the right of access to justice. 19. Furthermore, it has also been submitted that the applicant has not demonstrated that same duly issued and served the mandatory notice of objection to taxation, as required under the law. To this end, it has been posited that the reference before the court is therefore incompetent for want of compliance with the statutory prescriptions. 20. Secondly, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that even though this court has jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion of the taxing officer, the court cannot substitute its own discretion, in lieu of the discretion of the taxing officer. In particular, it has been submitted that the mere fact that a different taxing officer, would have reached/arrived at a different figure, does not by itself, denote an error. 1. Thirdly, it has been submitted that the previous taxations arising out of a similar matter, were neither binding upon the taxing officer, nor did such taxations, take away the discretion of the taxing officer. Moreover, it has been submitted that the previous taxation related to a different set of advocate client bill of costs. To this end, it has been submitted that the previous taxation and the consequential ruling on a reference, have no bearing on the subject matter. 2. Flowing from the foregoing, it has been submitted that the reference before the court is devoid of merits; and same ought to be dismissed. In particular, it has been submitted that no basis has been demonstrated to warrant the interference with the certificate of taxation. 3. Having reviewed the reference; the supporting affidavit thereto; the supplementary affidavit; the replying affidavit in opposition thereto; and upon consideration of the submissions by / on behalf of the respective advocates, two [2] key issues emerge for determination. The issues are: Whether the reference by the applicant is vitiated by lack of the notice of objection to taxation; and Whether the applicant has demonstrated an error of principle apparent on the face of the ruling and the certificate of taxation. 4. Regarding the first issue, I wish to point out that every applicant who is aggrieved by the ruling and the consequential certificate of taxation; and who is desirous to file a reference, is called upon to generate and serve a notice of objection to taxation. In addition, it is common ground that the notice of objection to taxation ought to be generated and lodged within 14 days from the date of the delivery of the ruling underpinning the certificate of taxation. [See Rule 11 [1] of the Advocate Remuneration Order]. 5. Additionally, it suffices to state that the notice of objection to taxation, ought to highlight or isolate the items of taxation [if at all] that are sought to be impeached. It is the notice of objection to taxation that precipitates the issuance of the reasons for taxation by the taxing officer. 6. My reading of Rule 11 [1] of the Advocates Remuneration Order, drives me to the conclusion that the purpose of the Notice of Objection to Taxation, is to enable the taxing officer to provide the reasons for taxation. The presupposition is to the effect that when the ruling on taxation is delivered, same [Ruling] is not accompanied with the reasons underpinning the taxation. 7. However, it is common ground that times have changed and the taxing officers, now generate rulings, which contain the reasons for taxation. In particular, the taxing officer in respect of the subject matter rendered a ruling and also supplied the reasons for taxation. For brevity, it is apposite to capture the title of the ruling that was delivered. 8. The title states thus: **“Ruling** **Before Hon. Evalyne Wacera Ndegwa – SRM;** **And Reasons for taxation.”** 1. The ruling under reference, apparently contained the reasons for taxation. The question that does arise, is whether there was need for the applicant to beckon for the “reasons for taxation”, yet [sic] the reasons for the taxation, had already been supplied. Surely, the notice of objection to taxation, calling for provision of reasons for taxation, would have been an exercise in vanity. 2. I do not think that the law needs to be applied in a pedantic manner. For good measure, the provisions of the law ought and must be read, in such a manner to make them accord with common sense and the lived reality. Any interpretation of the law, that is utopian or abstract, ought not to be countenanced. In addition, I wish to underscore that there are instances where the law ought not to engage with trivialities. In any event, this is an appropriate case to invoke and deploy the doctrine of **deminimis non curat lex [the law does not concern itself with trifles].** 3. To my mind, the applicant was not obligated to issue and serve the notice of objection to taxation, seeking for reasons for the taxation, yet the very reasons had already been supplied at the foot of the ruling and [sic] reasons for taxation. In my humble view, any further request for reasons, which had already been availed, would be antithetical to common sense and equity, bearing in mind, the provisions of Articles 10 [2] of the Constitution, 2010. 4. Before concluding on this issue, I hold the view that time is ripe for the Law Society of Kenya, to generate a proposal for purposes of amendment of Rule 11 [1] of the Advocate Remuneration Order, bearing in mind that the rulings underpinning taxations, ordinarily contain the reasons for taxation. In such circumstances, the seeking of reasons, which are already indorsed in the ruling, amounts to playing lottery. 5. *In a nutshell*, and taking into account that the taxing officer generated the ruling and the reasons for taxation, I am not prepared to find and hold that the failure to issue the notice of objection to taxation, vitiates the reference. In any event, the provisions of **Article 159 [2] [d] of the Constitution, 2010** suffices. 6. I now wish to turn to the second issue. The second issue relates to; Whether the learned taxing officer committed an error of principle in the course of taxation or otherwise. To begin with, I beg to warn myself that the officer imbued/vested with the mandate to undertake taxation is the taxing officer. In addition, there is no gainsaying that this court, can only interfere with the discretion of the taxing officer, on circumscribed grounds. 7. The law as pertains to the circumstances where this court can interfere with the discretion of the taxing officer, is now well settled. In the case of **First American Bank of Kenya Ltd v Shah & 2 others [2002] KEHC 1277 (KLR), the court [per Ringera – Judge as he then was] stated thus:** ***“….First, I find that on the authorities, this court cannot interfere with the taxing officer’s decision on taxation unless it is shown that either the decision was based on an error of principle, or the fee awarded was so manifestly excessive as to justify an inference that it was based on an error of principle. (See Steel & Petroleum (e.a) Ltd Vs. Uganda Sugar Factory (Supra). Of course. It would be an error of principle to take into account irrelevant factors or to omit to consider relevant factors. And according to the Advocates Remuneration Order itself, some of the relevant factors to take into account include the nature and importance of the cause or matter, the amount or value of the subject matter involved, the interest of the parties, the general conduct of the proceedings and any direction by the trial Judge. Needless to state not all the above factors may exist in any given case and it is therefore open to the Taxing Officer to consider only such factors as may exist in the actual case before him. If the court considers that the decision of the Taxing Officer discloses errors of principle, the normal practice is to remit it back to the Taxing Officer for re-assessment unless the Judge is satisfied that the error cannot materially have affected the assessment. (see Nanyuki Esso Service V Touring Cars Ltd; Steel & Petroleum (e.a.) Ltd V Uganda Sugar Factory; Thomas James Arthur V Nyeri Electricity Undertakers And Joreth V Kigano & Associates). However, the Judge does have jurisdiction and it is within his discretion to reassess the bill himself; (See Steel & Petroleum (E.A.) Ltd and Thomas James Arthur). The court is not entitled to upset a taxation because in its opinion, the amount awarded was high (See STeel Construction & Petroleum Engineering (e.a.) Ltd”*** 1. The foregoing position of the law has been reaffirmed in various decisions including by the Supreme Court in the Case of **Outa versus Okello and others [2017] eKLR.** 2. Did the taxing officer, abide by or comply with set guidelines in terms of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order? The Advocate Client Bill of costs that was placed before the taxing officer arose from the primary suit, wherein the Advocates [applicant] had been engaged /retained by the respondents. Upon retention, the applicant herein represented the respondents in a dispute, which was underpinned vide an amended plaint and wherein the value of the subject matter, was indicated to be Kes. 3,132,000,000/= only. In addition, it is also worth stating that there was also a counter claim that had been filed by the County Government of Meru, which was one of the Co-defendants. 1. Insofar as the value of the subject matter was discernable from the pleadings, it was incumbent upon the taxing officer, to take into account the value, in the pleadings. However, the value in the pleading[s] cannot be applied, where the matter in question has been determined vide judgment or settlement. In such a situation, the guiding parameter for taxation is the value, [if any], contained at the foot of the settlement or the Judgment. 2. In the case of **Peter Muthoka & another v Ochieng & 3 others [2019] KECA 597 (KLR**) , the Court of Appeal highlighted the obtaining legal position; an in particular, the stages at which the pleadings, can be deployed to guide the taxation of instruction fees. The court stated as hereunder: ***‘It seems to us quite plain that the basis for determining subject matter value for purposes of instruction fees is wholly dependent on the stage at which the fees are being taxed. Where it happens before judgment, it is the pleadings that form the basis for determining subject value. Once judgment has been entered, and for what seems to us to be an obvious reason, recourse will not be had to the pleadings since the judgment does determine conclusively the value of the subject matter as a claim, no matter how pleaded, gets its true value as adjudged by the court.*** ***Where, however, a suit is settled, then, from a literal and practical reading of the provision, the subject matter value must be sought by reference, in the first instance, to the terms of the settlement. Just as one would not start with the pleadings in the face of a judgment, it is indubitable that one cannot start with the pleadings where there is a settlement.*** 1. Guided by the holding in decision [supra], it is important to underscore that in the absence of a Judgment in respect of the primary suit, it was incumbent upon the taxing officer, to pay regard to the pleadings and to ascertain, whether the value of the subject matter was alluded to or reflected therein. The operative pleading, was the amended plaint. The amended plaint contained and reflected the value of the suit property. In addition, the fact that the instructions fees, was predicated upon the amended plaint, was clearly shown in the Advocate -client bill of costs. 2. The learned taxing officer, in her wisdom disregarded the value of the subject matter as shown in the amended plaint. The learned taxing officer, held the position that no valuation report had been filed and thus the value of the subject matter, was not ascertainable. I am afraid that the position taken by the learned taxing officer, was/is erroneous. Notably, the value [if at all] is to be discerned from the pleadings. A valuation report, is not a pleading. 3. What constitutes a pleading and which will according to the schedule, guide taxation was defined in the case of **Superior Homes (Kenya) PLC v Water Resources Authority & 9 others [2024] KECA 1102 (KLR).** The Court of Appeal defined pleadings as hereunder: “***As is trite law the contents of an affidavit constitute evidence on oath. An affidavit does not constitute a pleading. A pleading includes a summons, petition, a statement of claim or demand or a defence, a reply to a defence or counterclaim, all of which are subject to amendment, unlike an affidavit, which is evidence.”*** 1. A valuation report is not a pleading. Even if, such a valuation report was filed, same would not have founded a basis for purposes of ascertaining the instructions fees. For the avoidance of doubt, the valuation report could only inform the instruction fees, if and only if, a Judgment was rendered and the valuation report deployed by the court in ascertaining the value [if any], in the Judgment. 2. I do not understand the obsession of the learned taxing officer with a valuation report. The presence or absence of a valuation report, will not negate the value [if any] contained in the body of the pleadings. I repeat, the taxation of the instruction fees is anchored on the pleadings, settlements or Judgment, whichever, constitute[s] the latest position. 3. The other aspect which constitutes an error, is the finding of the learned taxing officer that instruction fees are not automatically pegged on the value in the pleadings, if the matter is determined summarily or without full trial. Irrespective of the stage of the proceedings, or the manner in which the trial is concluded, the benchmark for ascertaining instructions fees remains the value of the subject matter. The only consideration[s], that is provided for is by discounting certain percentages, where the suit is determined summarily; and without a full trial. 4. Additionally, it is common ground that instruction fees, is accrued, the moment the advocate[s] receives instructions. Suffice it to state that the instruction fees, is not diminished by the stage of the proceedings; or the subsequent actions [if any] taken by the advocates. 1. In the case of **Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] KECA 153 [KLR]**, the court of appeal underscored the fact that instruction fees is an independent and static item. The Court stated as hereunder: ***“By the first ground thereof the respondent states that Instruction Fee is an independent and static item, is charged once only and is not affected or determined by the stage the suit has reached. In principle that is correct.”*** 1. The learned taxing officer took into account, inter alia; the stage at which the primary suit had [sic] reached; the amount of work done by the Advocate; the conduct of the proceedings; and the time taken, in ascertaining instruction fees. The learned taxing officer, clearly misapprehend the law and the applicable principle, as posited in the decision in Joreth Limited *[supra].* 2. I also wish to point out that even though the learned taxing officer referenced the decision of the supreme court in **Kenya Airports Authority versus Otieno Ragot and Company Advocates [2024] KESC**, the learned taxing officer did not internalize or deploy the ratio [holding] contained *vide* the said decision. Quite clearly, it is one thing to reference a decision, and another thing, all together to interpret and apply the reasoning [ratio]. In this case, the principle was neither interpreted nor applied. [See the holding in the case of **Republic versus Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Ex parte Muchiri [2006] eKLR**]. 3. The fourth aspect that denotes error of principle on the part of the learned taxing officer, is the deployment of the concept of access to justice and the usage thereof, to undermine the clear provisions of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration order. I agree that every person, is entitled to partake of the right of access to justice. However, the right of access to justice, cannot be used to disenfranchise an advocate of his/her rightful instruction fees, for service[s] rendered at the instance of a Client. 1. I wish to add that a litigant, who engages/retains the services of an advocate, must be prepared to pay the requisite fees, either in terms of the retainer agreement [if any] or subject to the Advocate Remuneration Order. Simply put, the litigants must be prepared to pay for the qualitative services rendered. 2. I do not see how the right of access to justice, can be deployed, to enable a litigant to under pay, his or her duly instructed counsel. It is not lost on me that the remuneration paid to the advocate should be such that new recruits [read advocates] can be attracted to the profession. If there is underpayments [sic] on the basis of the right of access to justice, then the profession, shall be deprived of new recruits. Certainly, the legal profession will suffer; and so, will the economy. 1. The next aspect that also vitiates the impugned ruling, relates to the manner in which the learned taxing officer, with respect, [sic] plucked the figure of Kshs. 180,000/= only as being instruction fees. Suffice it to state that even in areas, where the taxing officer, is called upon to exercise discretion, the taxing officer, must first and foremost discern the benchmark, namely; the prescribed fees *vide* the advocate remuneration order. It is only then, that the taxing officer will engage with discretion, of whether to increase or decrease the instruction fees, subject to established parameters. The discretion cannot, surely, be exercised in vacuum. A figure cannot be plucked from the blues. 2. In the case of **Peter Muthoka & another v Ochieng & 3 others [2019] KECA 597 (KLR**), the Court of Appeal highlighted the manner in which a taxing officer should engage with the exercise of discretion. 3. The court stated thus: ***It is only where the value of the subject matter is neither discernible nor determinable from the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement, as the case may be, that the taxing officer is permitted to use his discretion to assess instructions fees in accordance with what he considers just bearing in mind the various elements contained in the provision we are addressing. He does have discretion as to what he considers just but that discretion kicks in only after he has engaged with the proper basis as expressly and mandatorily provided: either the pleadings, the judgment or the settlement. He has no leeway to disregard the statutorily commanded starting point. And we think, with respect, that the starting point can only be one of the three. It is not open to the taxing officer to choose one or the other or to use them in combination, the provision being expressly disjunctive as opposed to conjunctive. It is also mandatory and not permissive.*** 1. The final aspect, which also reflects an error of principle on the part of the taxing officer, relates to the disregard of the ruling of Hon. Justice Nzili delivered on 26.06.2024 and wherein the learned Judge, while handling a reference emanating from a related matter, confirmed a taxation in the sum of Kshs. 82,176,731/= only. It suffices to state that the advocate who had filed the bill of costs therein, is the one who acted for the County Government of Meru, which was one of the defendants in the matter. 2. The ruling by the learned Judge [details in terms of the preceding paragraphs] was availed to the learned taxing officer. The taxing officer neither referenced, nor considered the said ruling. A question does arise as to whether the learned taxing officer, breached the doctrine of *stare decisis* [precedents]. 3. The importance of the doctrine of Stare decisis cannot be over emphasized. I wish to cite the succinct exposition of the law in the case of **Asanyo & 3 others v Attorney-General [2020] KESC 62 (KLR).** The apex court highlighted the doctrine in the following manner: ***“In Dodhia v National & Grindlays Bank Limited and Another [1970] EA 195, Duffus, VP. expounded the principle of stare decisis stating that;“The adherence to the principle of judicial precedent or stare decisis is of utmost importance in the administration of justice in the Courts in East Africa, and thus to the conduct of the everyday affairs of its inhabitant; it provides a degree of certainty as to what is the law of the country, and is a basis on which individuals can regulate their behaviour and transactions as between themselves and also with the State. There can be no doubt that the principle of judicial precedent must be strictly adhered to by the High Courts of each of the States and that these courts must regard themselves as bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal on any question of law, just as in the former days the Court of Appeal was bound by a decision of the Privy Council, or in England as the Court of Appeal or the High Courts are bound by the decisions of the House of Lords, and of course, similarly the magistrates courts or any other inferior court in each State are bound on questions of law by the decisions of the Court of Appeal and, subject to these decisions, also to the decisions of the High Court in the particular State.”*** 1. Before concluding on this matter, I wish to address the question of equality of arms. Similarly, there is also the aspect on non-discrimination in terms of Article 27 [1] and [2] of the Constitution, 2010. It is not lost on me, that one advocate who defended the original suit walked home with a taxation in the sum of Kshs. 82,176,731/= only, whereas another counsel [a child of the same God ] is now being told that yours is 481,825/= only. 2. To my mind, there is an evident injustice. I do not think that the learned taxing officer correctly appreciated the national values and principles of governance, and more particularly, **Equity and Social Justice. [**See **Article 10 [2] of the Constitution, 2010].** **Conclusion:** 1. The applicant herein was called upon to demonstrate and establish the existence of an error of principle [if any], on the face of the ruling and the certificate of taxation. It is only the demonstration of such an error, that would found/ anchor a basis to warrant impeaching the certificate of taxation. 1. I beg to underscore, that the applicant has ably demonstrated grave errors, on the face of the certificate of taxation. The errors are self-evident. The errors run contra the established principles that guide taxation. The errors also run the risk of treating two [2] advocates, who participated in the same matter, differently. Such kind of treatment is unacceptable in the eyes of **Article 27 [1] and [2] of the Constitution, 2010.** 1. Flowing from the foregoing analysis, I find and hold that the reference before the court is meritorious. The reference constitute[s] a cry for equal treatment and equal protection under the law. The reference is equally yearning for consistency in the manner proclaimed vide **Premchand Raichand Limited and another versus Quarry Services of East Africa Limited [1972] EA 162 – clause [d]** thereof. **Final orders:** 1. Consequently, and in the premises, the final orders that commend themselves to the court are: 2. ***The Reference dated 16.06.2026 be and is hereby Allowed.*** 3. ***The Ruling of the taxing officer rendered on the 04.06.2026 and the consequential certificate of taxation, be and are hereby set aside.*** 4. ***In lieu thereof, the advocate – client bill of costs dated the 27.08.2024, be and is hereby remitted to the taxing officer for purposes of fresh taxation, taking into account, the salient features pointed out in the body of the ruling.*** 5. ***Costs of the reference be and are hereby awarded to the Applicant.*** 6. ***The costs in terms of clause [iv] be and are hereby assessed in the sum of Kshs. 30,000/= only.*** 7. It is so ordered. **DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MERU THIS 22ND DAY OF JULY, 2026** **OGUTTU MBOYA, FCIArb; CPM [MTI].** **JUDGE** In the presence of**:** Court Assistant: Zakayo Mr. Sabusaga holding brief for Mr. Mwalimu for the Applicant. Mrs. Mutegi for the Respondents