https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3748

Mutungi v Mutungi & 5 others (Environment and Land Case E002 of 2026) [2026] KEELC 3748 (KLR) (Environment and Land) (18 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3748 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Naivasha Environment and Land Environment and Land Case E002 of 2026 MC Oundo, J June 18, 2026 Between Miriamu Nduku Mutungi Plaintiff and Abdallah Adam Mutungi 1st Defendant The Land Adjudication Officer, Gilgil Bondeni Adjudication Section 2nd Defendant The Chairman, Land Adjudication Committee, Gilgil Bondeni Area 3rd Defendant The Chief, Gilgil Town, Gilgil sub-County, Nakuru County 4th Defendant The Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Public Works, Housing and Urban Development 5th Defendant The Honourable Attorney General 6th Defendant Ruling 1.Through a Notice of Motion Application dated 19th December 2025, brought pursuant to the provisions of Articles 22, 23, 27, 40 & 60 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Sections 1A, 1B, 3A & 63(c) of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 40 Rules 1, 2 & 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and all enabling provisions of the law, the Plaintiff/Applicant sought orders of a temporary injunction restraining the Defendants/Respondents from finalizing or concluding the land adjudication and allocation process in Gilgil Bondeni Area to her exclusion, pending the hearing and determination of this suit. 2.In response to the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Application, the 1st Respondent filed a Preliminary Objection dated 27th February 2026, raising the following grounds of objection:i.That the suit is statutorily barred and incompetent by virtue of Section 30(1) of the Land Adjudication Act (Cap 284, Laws of Kenya because whereas the Plaintiff’s pleadings expressly admit that the dispute concerns land under the ongoing adjudication process in Gilgil Bondeni Adjudication Section, yet she has not obtained the mandatory written consent of the Land Adjudication Officer prior to filing this suit. Consequently, this Honourable Court is expressly barred by statute from entertaining the proceedings, thereby depriving it of jurisdiction ab initio.ii.That the suit offends the doctrine of exhaustion as the Plaintiff has bypassed the mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms provided under the Land Adjudication Act (Cap 284), including the adjudication committee, arbitration board, and objection procedures established under the Act.The Plaintiff has therefore prematurely invoked the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court contrary to the principle laid down.iii.That the Plaintiff has improperly attempted to cloak a statutory adjudication dispute as a constitutional claim in order to circumvent the mandatory statutory procedure under the Land Adjudication Act. It is trite law that constitutional litigation cannot be invoked to bypass clear statutory procedures.iv.That by instituting the present proceedings in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Land Adjudication Act, the Plaintiff has rendered the entire suit premature, incompetent, and an abuse of the court process, and the same is liable to be struck out in limine.v.That by reason of the foregoing, this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and in accordance with the settled principle that jurisdiction is everything, the Court must down its tools.vi.That the 1st Defendant/Respondent shall therefore pray that:a.The Plaintiff’s suit be struck out in limine for want of jurisdiction.b.The Court finds that the proceedings are statutorily barred under Section 30 of the Land Adjudication Act.c.Costs of the suit and the Preliminary Objection be awarded to the 1st Defendant/Respondent. 3.The Preliminary Objection was disposed of by way of Written Submissions herein summarized. 1st Defendant’s Submissions: 4.Vide its submissions dated 30th February 2026 in support of the Preliminary Objection dated 27th February 2026, the 1st Defendant outlined the following issues for resolution arguing that the court lacks jurisdiction ab initio (from the beginning) because the Plaintiff bypassed mandatory statutory land laws and attempted to disguise a regular land dispute as a constitutional petitioni.Whether the Preliminary Objection raises pure points of law.ii.Whether the suit is statutorily barred under Section 30 of the Land Adjudication Act.iii.Whether the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust mandatory statutory dispute resolution mechanisms.iv.Whether the attempt to frame the dispute as a constitutional claim can cure the jurisdictional defect.v.Whether the suit should be struck out for want of jurisdiction. 5.On the first issue for determination, the 1st Defendant argued that his objection was properly before the court because it did not require investigating new facts, but relied strictly on the Plaintiff's own admission that the land is under adjudication, thus testing whether she met the legal prerequisites to sue. 6.That, based on the requisites of a preliminary objection, the pure points of law herein were:i.Whether the land is in an active adjudication section.ii.Whether the required statutory consent was obtained.iii.Whether lacking that consent strips the court of its jurisdiction. 7.He cited Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 as an authority that established the classic definition of a preliminary objection as a pure point of law argued on the assumption that the opponent's facts are correct and the case in Oraro v Mbaja [2005] eKLR, which had emphasized that a preliminary objection must be strictly confined to pure questions of law. 8.On the second issue for determination as to whether the suit is statutorily barred under Section 30 of the Land Adjudication Act, the 1st Defendant contended that Section 30(1) of the Land Adjudication Act acts as an absolute block, stopping courts from hearing any cases concerning land within an active adjudication zone unless prior written consent has been granted. 9.Whereas the Plaintiff had openly pleaded that the Gilgil Bondeni Area was an active adjudication section, yet she failed to get the mandatory written consent from the 2nd Defendant (the Land Adjudication Officer). The letter dated 24th September 2025 (Annexure MN-2) was sent to the Chairman of the Committee, not to the Adjudication Officer, an omission that was legally fatal. 10.The 1st Defendant relied on the decisions in;SUBPARA i.Mohamed Sharif Iderus v Mohamed Ali Hussein [2021] KEELC 3289 (KLR), where it had been held that Section 30(1) creates an absolute bar, and proceedings filed without the adjudication officer's written consent were a nullity ab initio.ii.Musyemi & 3 others v Mwarogo & 3 others [2025] KEELC 1183 (KLR), where the Court struck out a suit in limine for violating Section 30(1).iii.Joseph Nyaga Kanyua v Shadrack Mithi Mwiti [2018] eKLR, which reinforced that without the Adjudication Officer's consent, the court has zero jurisdiction to entertain the suit.iv.Samuel Miki Waweru v Jane Njeri Richu [2007] eKLR where the Court of Appeal clarified that Section 30 protects the statutory adjudication process from premature court interference; skipping it completely removes judicial jurisdiction.v.David Muthama v Moses Mutisya [2019] eKLR, which reaffirmed that courts cannot assume jurisdiction over active adjudication lands without written consent. 11.On the third issue as to whether the Plaintiff failed to exhaust mandatory statutory remedies, 1st Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff jumped the gun by running straight to the Environment and Land Court (ELC) before using the custom dispute resolution channels designed by Parliament. The Land Adjudication Act provides a structured, hierarchical process for grievances (Adjudication Committees → Arbitration Boards → Objections before the Adjudication Officer → Final Appeals to the Minister under Section 29,) and therefore rushing to court bypasses this sequence, hence breaking the doctrine of exhaustion. He cited the decisions in:i.Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] KECA 42 (KLR), the landmark Court of Appeal case establishing that where a statute provides a specific remedy mechanism, that procedure must be followed strictly.ii.Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru v Samuel Munga Henry [2015] eKLR, where the Supreme Court held that courts must defer to alternative, specialized dispute resolution mechanisms set up by statutes.iii.Republic v National Environment Management Authority Ex parte Sound Equipment Ltd [2011] eKLR, which confirmed that failing to exhaust statutory steps makes a court suit premature and legally incompetent. 12.On the fourth issue for determination as to whether framing the matter as a constitutional claim cures the defect, the 1st Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs had used ‘’constitutional camouflage’’ to disguise a normal land boundary or allocation dispute when citing gender discrimination pursuant to Articles 27, 40, and 60, to claim a constitutional violation. He submitted that constitutional litigation cannot be used as a backdoor trick (subterfuge) to evade strict statutory requirements. Although the ELC handles constitutional issues under Article 162(2)(b), it remained bound by statutory ousters like Section 30. He cited the decisions in:i.Ole Pere & another v District Land Adjudication and Settlement Officer, Narok South & 24 others [2025] KECA 113 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that litigants cannot invoke Articles 22 or 23 of the Constitution to bypass clear statutory mechanisms.ii.Albert Chaurembo Mumba v Maurice Munyao [2019] eKLR, where the Supreme Court held that the exhaustion doctrine requires resolving disputes through statutory systems before approaching the courts.iii.International Centre for Policy and Conflict v Attorney General [2013] eKLR, which held that constitutional jurisdiction should not be activated when an adequate, specialized statutory remedy is readily available. 13.Lastly, the 1st Defendant submitted that because the Plaintiff failed to get statutory consent and to exhaust local remedies, the court should ‘’down its tools’’ because the suit lacked a reasonable cause of action, was highly premature, and constituted an abuse of the court process under Civil Procedure rules. Once a statutory bar is proven, the court loses all legal authority over the matter. He cited the case of Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, where it was held that Jurisdiction is everything, and without it, a court cannot take a single step forward and must down its tools immediately. The 1st Defendant sought that the court uphold its Preliminary Objection in its entirety and strike the Plaintiff's entire suit for want of jurisdiction with costs. Plaintiff’s Submissions. 14.The Plaintiff’s submissions dated 25th March 2026 in opposition to the 1st Defendant/Respondent’s Preliminary Objection dated 27th February 2026 were anchored on the following issues for determination, arguing that the Preliminary Objection is legally improper because it relies on disputed facts requiring evidence. She asserted that the court’s constitutional jurisdiction cannot be overridden by a regular statute, especially when severe constitutional violations, such as gender discrimination, were at the heart of the case.i.Whether the threshold for a Preliminary Objection has been met.ii.Whether the Honourable Court has jurisdiction.iii.Whether the Plaintiff/Applicant’s suit is barred by Section 30(1) of the Land Adjudication Act.iv.Whether the doctrine of exhaustion applies.v.Whether the Plaintiff/Applicant is circumventing statutory procedures.vi.Whether the suit is an abuse of the court process 15.On the first issue for determination as to whether the threshold for a Preliminary Objection had been met, the Plaintiff argued that the 1st Defendant’s objection failed the basic legal definition of a preliminary objection because it was not based on a pure, undisputed point of law. A proper preliminary objection did not require the court to investigate or verify contested facts. The 1st Defendant's objection forces the court to investigate factual and evidentiary matters, such as:i.Whether the Plaintiff actually tried to use local adjudication channels.ii.Whether the adjudication authorities acted in a discriminatory manner.iii.Whether the local channels were reasonably accessible to her. Because these require the court to look at evidence, they cannot be decided at this early stage. 16.She then cited the case in Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission (IEBC) v Jane Cheperenger & 2 Others [2015] KESC, where the Supreme Court of Kenya had reinforced that a preliminary objection cannot be sustained if it requires the court to ascertain or evaluate contested facts. 17.On the second issue for determination on whether the court had jurisdiction, the Plaintiff strongly asserted that the Environment and Land Court (ELC) had full authority to hear this matter, and that a basic Act of Parliament cannot strip away a power given by the Constitution. The court’s jurisdiction was directly anchored in Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the ELC Act, meaning it was fully empowered to hear any matter connected to the environment and land. Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Constitution declares that any law inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency. Therefore, to the extent that Section 30(1) of the Land Adjudication Act tried to completely block or oust the court’s constitutional power, that statutory section was unconstitutional, null, and void. She relied on the following authorities:i.Moffat Kamau & 9 others v Aelous Kenya Limited & 9 others [2016] KEELC 565 (KLR), which emphasized that the ELC has broad power under the Constitution and the ELC Act to hear any matter related to environment and land.ii.Samuel Kamau Macharia v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR: where the Supreme Court held that a court's jurisdiction flows from the Constitution, legislation, or both, establishing a hierarchy of legal authority. 18.On the third issue for determination as to whether the suit is barred by Section 30(1) of the Land Adjudication Act, the Plaintiff's argument was that the word ‘’shall’’ used in Section 30(1) was not an absolute rule and therefore must be interpreted contextually on a case-by-case basis. If interpreting it literally would block a citizen's fundamental right of access to justice, the strict rule must bend to ensure fairness. She cited the case in The Matter of Council of Governors & 47 Others (Reference No. 3 of 2019) [2020] KESC 65 (KLR): where the Supreme Court underscored that words like ‘’shall’’ to be interpreted using a purposive and contextual approach rather than a rigid, mechanical, literal reading. 19.On the fourth and fifth issues for determination as to whether the Doctrine of Exhaustion Applies and whether she was Circumventing Statutory Procedures, the Plaintiff argued that she did not ‘’jump the queue’’ or disguise a regular land case as a constitutional petition. She contended that the statutory boards are completely powerless to resolve her specific grievances. That the true core (gravamen) of her lawsuit was not a basic boundary or demarcation line, but an active violation of her fundamental constitutional rights. That she was specifically challenging the gender-based discrimination in land allocation under Article 27 (equality and non-discrimination) and Article 60(1)(f) (equitable access to land) where standard administrative bodies under the Act, like the Arbitration Board (Section 22), were unequipped and incompetent to handle complex constitutional interpretations. She cited the decision in RH Devani Company Limited v Kenya Power & Lighting Company [2023] KEHC 1922 (KLR), in support of her argument that statutory tribunals lack the legal jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the Constitution. 20.Lastly, as to whether the suit was an abuse of the court process, the Plaintiff submitted that this suit was brought in good faith and with clean hands as a genuine cry for help. That an abuse of court process legally requires a showing of bad faith, improper motives, or malice, none of which exist here. Before coming to court, she had made genuine, documented efforts to resolve the matter locally. She reached out to the local adjudication committee, engaged the local administration, and issued a formal notice of intention to sue; therefore, the court was her forum of last resort. She relied on the decision in the case of Muchanga Investments Ltd v Safaris Unlimited (Africa) Ltd & 2 others [2009] KECA 453 (KLR) where the Court of Appeal adopted regional jurisprudence in the Nigerian case of Attahiro v Bagudo [1998] 3 NWLL pt 545 page 656, to confirm that an abuse of process fundamentally required an element of malice or improper intent. She sought that, because the 1st Defendant's objection relied on disputed facts and attempted to unconstitutionally oust the court's powers, the said Preliminary Objection dated 27th February 2026 be dismissed with costs, to allow the main suit to proceed to a full hearing. Determination. 21.I have considered the Applicant’s application, the Respondents' Response, the submissions, cited authorities and the applicable law. Briefly, the Applicant brings her application under various constitutional provisions (Articles 22, 23, 27, 40 & 60) and civil procedure laws, seeking a temporary injunction to stop the Defendants from finishing or wrapping up the land adjudication and allocation process in the Gilgil Bondeni area so that she is not excluded from the land allocation while the main court case is waiting to be heard and decided. 22.The 1st Defendant’s response was that the entire lawsuit should be struck out in limine as it was legally barred by virtue of Section 30 of the Land Adjudication Act and that he be awarded costs. 23.Based on the competing submissions of both parties, I find the issues arising therein as follows:i.Whether the suit is statutorily barred by Section 30(1) of the Land Adjudication Act.ii.Whether the 1st Defendant’s Objection qualifies as a Preliminary Objection. 24.The 1st Defendant argues that his objection is purely statutory and points to Section 30 of the Land Adjudication Act, which bars anybody from instituting a suit concerning land in an adjudication section without the written consent of the Adjudication Officer. 25.Section 90 of the Fair Administrative Action Act provides for the Doctrine of Exhaustion as follows; –(1)Subject to subsection (2), a person who is aggrieved by an administrative action may, without unreasonable delay, apply for judicial review of any administrative action to the High Court or to a subordinate court upon which original jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Article 22(3) of the Constitution.(2)The High Court or a subordinate court under subsection (1) shall not review an administrative action or decision under this Act unless the mechanisms including internal mechanisms for appeal or review and all remedies available under any other written law are first exhausted.(3)The High Court or a subordinate Court shall, if it is not satisfied that the remedies referred to in subsection (2) have been exhausted, direct that applicant shall first exhaust such remedy before instituting proceedings under sub-section (1).(4)Notwithstanding subsection (3), the High Court or a subordinate Court may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the applicant, exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any remedy if the court considers such exemption to be in the interest of justice.(5)A person aggrieved by an order made in the exercise of the judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court may appeal to the Court of Appeal.’’ 26.The Doctrine of Exhaustion is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition as follows –“exhaustion of remedies. The doctrine that, if an administrative remedy is provided by statute, a claimant must seek relief first from the administrative body before judicial relief is available. The Doctrine’s purpose is to maintain comity between the courts and administrative agencies and to ensure that courts will not be burdened by cases in which juridical relief is unnecessary’’ 27.Section 30(1) of the Land Adjudication Act provides as follows:“Except with the consent in writing of the adjudication officer, no person shall institute, and no court shall entertain, any civil proceedings concerning an interest in land in an adjudication section until the adjudication register for that adjudication section has become final in all respects under Section 29(3) of this Act.” 28.The Plaintiff explicitly pleaded that the subject land is within the Gilgil Bondeni Adjudication Section and therefore sought an injunction restraining the Defendants/Respondents from finalizing or concluding the land adjudication and allocation process to her exclusion. 29.The statutory interpretation of the word ‘’shall’’ under Section 30(1) of the act is generally construed as mandatory and prohibitive, leaving no room for judicial discretion, as it exists for a public policy reason, which is to protect the integrity of the ongoing public land demarcation process. If anyone could rush to court mid-process, it would cause chaotic parallel proceedings, tying up public land officers in endless injunctions and stalling community land titles indefinitely. 30.In Ole Pere & another v District Land Adjudication and Settlement Officer, Narok South & 24 others; Pere & another (Interested Parties) (Civil Appeal 79 of 2019) [2025] KECA 113 (KLR) (24 January 2025) (Judgment), the Court of Appeal siting in Nakuru had at paragraph 33 had observed as follows:“Having concluded as herein above, we find no reason to determine the merits or otherwise of the appeal, save to underscore that the failure to obtain consent as required by Section 31 (1) (sic) of the Land Adjudication Act was fatal to the appellants’ case because the mandatory requirements of the said Section cannot be cured by filing a constitutional petition as happened in this case.” 31.I have perused the Plaintiffs' pleadings and find that no consent from the adjudication officer was filed and or attached, and therefore, because of the nature of the dispute, which is purely that of ascertainment of rights and interest in land, and there having been no consent from the adjudication officer as required, I find that it legally strips the court of jurisdiction. 32.Indeed, in a persuasive case in Kilusi Julius Sile & 60 others versus Chairperson, Oloirien Adjudication section “B” Committee & 3 Others (2016) eKLR Mutungi J (now retorted) held that: -“it is patently clear that the courts have held they have no jurisdiction to deal with a dispute where the process of adjudication is ongoing unless the adjudication officer has under section 30(1) of the Act given his consent for the party to institute court proceedings. No such consent was granted by the Adjudication Officer to the petitioners to enable these proceedings to be brought. In the present matter there is no doubt that the process of adjudication is ongoing and that the Adjudication register has not been closed and/or published. The court in the premises cannot properly get seized of this matter. It lacks jurisdiction to deal with the matter.” 33.The Plaintiff/Applicants’ grievance is that she is being entirely left out and excluded from the ongoing land adjudication and allocation process within the Gilgil Bondeni Area. She fears that if the Defendants (the local adjudication committees and officers) are allowed to finalize and wrap up the allocation process, her rights to the land will be permanently extinguished, making it impossible for her to recover her rightful property. She claims that the adjudication authorities are acting in a discriminatory manner, specifically locking her out of land ownership based on her gender, thereby violating her constitutional right to equality and non-discrimination. 34.The Land Adjudication Act provides a structured, hierarchical process for grievances wherein there are Adjudication Committees, Arbitration Boards, followed by objections before the Adjudication Officer and then Appeals to the Minister under Section 29 of the Act. The Plaintiff’s first point of entry, I find, was the court, for which she had bypassed this sequence. 35.The Court of Appeal, through various decisions, has cautioned courts against expanding their jurisdiction to hear and determine matters over which it otherwise lacks jurisdiction. Litigants are also warned against drafting their pleadings with the intent to bypass dispute resolution mechanisms provided under the Statute. 36.The doctrine of exhaustion was aptly captured by the Supreme Court of Kenya in the Case of NGOs Co-ordination Board v EG & 4 others; Katiba Institute (Amicus Curiae) (Petition 16 of 2019) [2023] KESC 17 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (24 February 2023) (Judgment) (with dissent - MK Ibrahim & W Ouko, SCJJ) where it had held as follows :“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was settled by this court in the case of Albert Chaurembo Mumba & 7 others (sued on their own behalf and on behalf of predecessors and or successors in title in their capacities as the Registered Trustees of Kenya Ports Authority Pensions Scheme) v Maurice Munyao & 148 others (suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the plaintiffs and other Members/Beneficiaries of the Kenya Ports Authority Pensions Scheme) SC petition No 3 of 2016; [2019] eKLR. This court stated as follows at paragraph 118:“……. Even where superior courts had jurisdiction to determine profound questions of law, the first opportunity had to be given to relevant persons, bodies, tribunals or any other quasi- judicial authorities and organs to deal with the dispute as provided for in the relevant parent statute". 37.The principle laid down is that where a specialized statutory mechanism exists, the first opportunity has to be given to the relevant persons, bodies, tribunals or any other quasi-judicial authorities and organs to deal with the dispute as provided for in the relevant parent statute. 38.Although the Plaintiff has asked the court to disregard the provisions of Section 30 of the Land adjudication Act citing that what is before court is a suit based on constitutional violations, I note that what runs through the Plaintiffs suit/Application is a grievance of the process by which the entire Adjudication process is being undertaken and which grievance she was obliged to articulate in the first instance as provided for by the provisions of Section 29 and 30 of the Land adjudication Act. Indeed, as stated by the court of Appeal in Kibos Distillers Limited & 4 others v Benson Ambuti Adega & 3 others [2020] KECA 875 (KLR), a party or litigant cannot be allowed to confer jurisdiction on a court or to oust jurisdiction of a competent organ through the art and craft of drafting of pleadings. 39.A Preliminary Objection, according to the decided case by the Court of Appeal in the case of Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd –v- West End Distributors Limited (1969) EA. 696 was stated to be thus: -“So far as I am aware, a Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court, or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.” 40.The Supreme Court in the case of Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission v Jane Cheperenger & 2 others [2015] eKLR observed as follows:“… The true preliminary objection serves two purposes of merit: firstly, it serves as a shield for the originator of the objection—against profligate deployment of time and other resources. And secondly, it serves the public cause, of sparing scarce judicial time, so it may be committed only to deserving cases of dispute settlement. It is distinctly improper for a party to resort to the preliminary objection as a sword, for winning a case otherwise destined to be resolved judicially, and on the merits.” 41.It is evident that a Preliminary Objection consists of pure points of law, and it is also capable of bringing the matter to an end preliminarily. Such an objection must be argued on the assumption that all facts pleaded by the opposite party are correct, and it cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought requires the exercise of judicial discretion 42.This said and done, I find that the preliminary objection raised by the 1st Defendant is merited and the same is upheld. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff’s application and the entire suit are hereby struck out for non-compliance with Section 30 of the Land Adjudication Act.Costs are awarded to the 1st Defendant. DATED AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS AT NAIVASHA THIS 18TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.M.C. OUNDOENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT– JUDGE