https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3951

Mutua v Ole Leina & 2 others (Environment and Land Appeal E001 of 2026) [2026] KEELC 3951 (KLR) (30 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3951 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Voi Environment and Land Appeal E001 of 2026 EK Wabwoto, J June 30, 2026 Between Moki Mutua Appellant and Moses Ole Leina 1st Respondent Registrar Of Lands, Taita Taveta 2nd Respondent District Land & Adjudication Officer, Taita Taveta 3rd Respondent (Being an appeal from the judgment of Hon. C.K. Kithinji, SPM, delivered on 11th December 2025 in the Senior Resident Magistrate’s Court at Taveta in Civil Suit No. 1 of 2018) Judgment 1.The appellant, Moki Mutua who appears on the record variously as Muoki Mutua, Muki Mutua and Muoki Mutai was the 1st defendant in the suit before the Senior Resident Magistrate’s Court at Taveta, being Civil Suit No. 1 of 2018. The 1st respondent, Moses Ole Leina, was the plaintiff. The 2nd and 3rd respondents, the Registrar of Lands, Taita Taveta, and the District Land and Adjudication Officer, Taita Taveta, were joined as the 2nd and 3rd defendants on the application of the 1st defendant and were represented at the trial by the Hon. Attorney General. 2.By a judgment delivered on 11th December 2025, Hon. C.K. Kithinji, SPM, entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff. The trial court declared the plaintiff the proprietor of Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178, ordered the eviction of the appellant from the parcel, awarded mesne profits, and granted the plaintiff the costs of the suit. The trial court granted the appellant a thirty-day stay of execution in respect of the mesne profits to enable him to prosecute this appeal. 3.Being aggrieved, the appellant moved this court by a Memorandum of Appeal dated 7th January 2026 on thirteen grounds. The dispute and the proceedings below 4.The suit property is Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178, measuring approximately 0.197 hectares, situate at California Estate within Taveta Sub-County, Taita Taveta County. The parcel forms part of the former settlement land of Hon. Basil Criticos, which was sold to various purchasers through Agro Development Company Limited. 5.The suit was commenced in 2018 by plaint, later amended. It had a long and chequered procedural history, marked by numerous adjournments over a period in excess of seven years. By a ruling delivered on 3rd August 2023, Hon. D.M. Ndungi, PM, deemed the amended plaint, which had been filed without prior leave, to be duly filed, invoking Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution. The hearing proceeded in 2025 and judgment followed on 11th December 2025. 6.At an interlocutory stage, by a ruling delivered on 30th November 2019, Hon. G.K. Kimang’a, SRM, granted a temporary injunction restraining the appellant from continuing developments on the suit land pending the hearing of the suit, having observed that both parties had annexed title documents to the same parcel and that the question of the rightful owner called for a full hearing. 7.The plaintiff’s case was opened and prosecuted through a single witness, PW1. The plaintiff, Moses Ole Leina, did not himself testify. PW1, recorded as Pamela Awuor Majuma, testified that she is the wife of the plaintiff and that she attended court in respect of her husband’s matter, the dispute having begun in 2003. She produced the plaintiff’s documents, namely: a copy of the identity card of Pamela Awuor Majuma (PEx 1); an official search dated 27th February 2025 (PEx 2); a judgment dated 3rd February 2005 (PEx 3); a copy of an acknowledgment (PEx 4); a letter dated 28th June 2005 from the High Court registry at Mombasa (PEx 5); the title deed for Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178 (PEx 6); a ruling dated 3rd June 2014 (PEx 7); and photographs of the suit property (PEx 8). Her case, in substance, was that the suit land had been adjudged to belong to the plaintiff in earlier litigation between the parties, in which the trial court had visited the land and established that the land in dispute was the same land the appellant claimed as his own. 8.The appellant gave evidence as DW1. He testified that he is a retired county employee residing at California, Taveta; that he learnt of the sale of the said land at a public announcement; that he purchased the suit parcel from Agro Development Company Limited; that a deposit of Kshs. 4,000 was paid and a sale agreement executed; and that title deeds for the parcels he had purchased, Plots 177 and 178, were subsequently issued to him. He produced: the title deed for Plot 178 (DEx 1); the title deed for Plot 175, belonging to his neighbour (DEx 2); the title deed for Plot 177 (DEx 3); the list of original landowners in the Taveta Settlement Scheme Phase 1 from Agro Development Company Limited (DEx 4); a letter from Hon. Basil Criticos through the company’s Managing Director (DEx 5); the sale agreement between himself and the company (DEx 6); and the receipt for the deposit of Kshs. 4,000 (DEx 7). His case was that the earlier litigation between the parties, Taveta SRMCC No. 42 of 2002, concerned a different parcel, Plot 182, and that the plaintiff had never proved that Plot 182 is the parcel now known as Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178. The grounds of appeal 9.The Memorandum of Appeal advances thirteen grounds. In summary, the appellant complains that the trial court erred in law and in fact in: finding that the suit property belonged to the 1st respondent without cogent documentary evidence, and that the 1st respondent proved his case on a balance of probabilities (grounds 1, 2 and 11); finding that the 1st respondent’s title to Phase 1/178 was lawfully and validly acquired (ground 3); equating Plot 182, the subject of Taveta SRMCC No. 42 of 2002, with Phase 1/178, and misapprehending the judgment and facts of that earlier case, including by relying on a surveyor’s report used in it (grounds 4 to 7); disregarding evidence that the 1st respondent’s allotment letter and title deed were issued on the same date, said to evidence fraud, and treating an official search as conclusive of validity (grounds 8 to 10); and failing to evaluate the evidence as a whole, introducing extraneous material, descending into the arena, and adopting a biased approach (grounds 12 and 13). 10.The appellant has distilled the thirteen grounds into the following questions: who is the legitimate owner of the suit property; who, as between the parties, established an unbroken chain of ownership of the suit land; and who should bear the costs of the appeal. Submissions 11.The appellant filed written submissions dated 8th June 2026 through Machora Motuka & Company Advocates. The thrust of the submissions is that, the appellant’s title having been challenged, the burden lay on the 1st respondent to prove a good root of title and an unbroken chain of ownership, and that he failed to do so; that the 1st respondent did not testify and his witness conceded that she had no document proving that the former Plot 182 is the present Phase 1/178; and that the appellant, by contrast, traced his title step by step from its root in Agro Development Company Limited, through a sale agreement, a receipt and the scheme’s list of original owners, to the issued title deed. The appellant relied on Munyu Maina v Hiram Gathiha Maina [2013] eKLR; Presbyterian Foundation v Kibera Siranga Self Help Group Nursery School [2023] KECA 371 (KLR); section 107 of the Evidence Act;North End Trading Company Limited v City Council of Nairobi [2019] eKLR; Raila Amolo Odinga & Another v IEBC & 2 Others [2017] eKLR on the shifting evidential burden; Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93; and Kenya Ports Authority v Kuston (Kenya) Limited [2009] 2 EA 212 on the mandate of a first appellate court. 12.The 1st respondent filed written submissions dated 9th June 2026 through John Bwire & Associates Advocates. His position, in summary, is that ownership of the suit land as between the parties was conclusively settled in the earlier litigation, Taveta SRMCC No. 42 of 2002, in which, after a hearing and a site visit, the trial court found the 1st respondent to be the owner of the parcel then known as Plot No. 182, granted a permanent injunction against the appellant and awarded the 1st respondent costs; that the appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed summarily by the High Court at Mombasa on 28th June 2005; and that the 1st respondent was thereafter registered as proprietor of the suit property, now known as Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178, on 8th August 2013. The 1st respondent contends that Plot No. 182 and Phase 1/178 are one and the same parcel; that the appellant himself testified that the parties have only ever been in dispute over a single parcel of land, being that which was the subject of the earlier suit; and that there is no rule requiring that a parcel be registered under the same number used at allocation. He relies on his certificate of title and an official search dated 27th February 2025 as proof of ownership, invoking sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, and submits that the appellant, having alleged that the 1st respondent’s title was fraudulently acquired, failed to prove fraud to the heightened standard required by Emfil Limited v Registrar of Titles Mombasa & 2 Others [2014] eKLR. He further submits that the appellant is a trespasser on the suit land within the meaning of Charles Ogejo Ochieng v Geoffrey Okumu [1995] eKLR; that the 1st respondent is entitled to a permanent injunction on the principles in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358; and that, applying Nguruman Limited v Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR and Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93, this court ought not to interfere with the findings of the trial court. He prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs and that the 1st respondent’s proprietary rights under Article 40 of the Constitution be upheld. Issues for determination 13.Having considered the record, the grounds of appeal and the submissions, the issues that fall for determination are;i.Whether the 1st respondent proved, on a balance of probabilities, that he is the lawful proprietor of Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178 and that he holds a good root of title to it, which question subsumes whether Plot 182, the subject of Taveta SRMCC No. 42 of 2002, is the parcel now known as Phase 1/178;ii.Whether the earlier litigation between the parties determined the ownership of the suit land so as to bind the appellant;iii.Whether the trial court erred in its evaluation of the evidence, relied on extraneous material, or was biased; andiv.What orders, including as to costs, should issue. Analysis and determination 14.This being a first appeal, the duty of this court is well settled. The court is obliged to reconsider, re-evaluate and re-analyse the entire evidence on record afresh and to draw its own independent conclusions, while bearing in mind that, unlike the trial court, it neither saw nor heard the witnesses and must make due allowance for that disadvantage: Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123; Peters v Sunday Post Ltd [1958] EA 424; and Kenya Ports Authority v Kuston (Kenya) Limited [2009] 2 EA 212, on which the appellant relies. The court is equally enjoined to subject the evidence to a fresh and exhaustive scrutiny rather than merely adopt the findings of the trial court: Abok James Odera t/a A.J. Odera & Associates v John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates [2013] eKLR. I approach the appeal in that light, remaining nonetheless slow to disturb findings that turn purely on the credibility of witnesses whom the trial magistrate saw and heard. (i) Ownership, root of title and the identity of the parcels 15.The starting point is the nature of the dispute. On the record, both the 1st respondent, as plaintiff, and the appellant, as 1st defendant, laid claim to one and the same parcel, Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178, and each produced a title deed to it – the 1st respondent as PEx 6 and the appellant as DEx 1. This was the very feature that moved Hon. Kimang’a, SRM, to grant the interlocutory injunction on 30th November 2019. Where two persons hold competing title documents to the same parcel, the dispute cannot be resolved merely by a party brandishing the instrument of title; one of the two titles must necessarily be bad, and the court must inquire into the respective roots of title to determine which is good. 16.The governing principles are not in doubt. By section 107 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving a fact lies on the party who asserts it; a plaintiff who comes to court asserting ownership must prove that ownership. By section 26 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, a certificate of title is prima facie evidence of proprietorship, but that protection does not avail a title shown to have been procured through fraud or misrepresentation to which the proprietor is proved to be a party, or through a corrupt scheme, or otherwise unprocedurally or illegally. Where a registered proprietor’s root of title is challenged, it is not enough to dangle the instrument of title; the proprietor must go behind the instrument and prove the legality and regularity of the acquisition, and an unbroken chain of devolution. As the Court of Appeal held in Munyu Maina v Hiram Gathiha Maina [2013] eKLR:“… when a registered proprietor’s root of title is under challenge, it is not sufficient to dangle the instrument of title as proof of ownership. It is this instrument that is under challenge and the registered proprietor must go beyond the instrument and prove the legality of how he acquired the title and show that the acquisition was legal, formal and free from any encumbrances …” 17.The same principle is reflected in Presbyterian Foundation v Kibera Siranga Self Help Group Nursery School [2023] KECA 371 (KLR), where the court emphasised that, in a contest of competing interests, each party must give evidence of title starting with a good root of title and an unbroken chain of ownership. 18.Each party’s title being challenged by the other, each bore the burden of demonstrating the root and chain of his own title. I examine each in turn. 19.The appellant’s case as to the root of his title was, on the record, a documented one. He testified that the suit land formed part of the former Basil Criticos estate, which was sold through Agro Development Company Limited; that, following a public advertisement, he applied and paid a deposit of Kshs. 4,000; and that a sale agreement was executed in his favour. He produced the receipt (DEx 7), a letter from the company (DEx 5), the sale agreement (DEx 6), and, significantly, the scheme’s list of original allottees from Agro Development Company Limited (DEx 4), in which, he testified, he appears as the purchaser of Plots 177 and 178. He produced the title deeds for Plots 178 and 177 (DEx 1 and DEx 3), and that of his neighbour for Plot 175 (DEx 2), consistently with the same list. That evidence, taken together, traces the appellant’s title from its root in the settlement scheme to the issued title, and constitutes a chain of the kind contemplated in Munyu Maina and Presbyterian Foundation cases. 20.The 1st respondent’s case stood on a different footing. He did not testify. His case was prosecuted entirely through PW1, who described herself as his wife. While a party is at liberty to call witnesses, the difficulty here is twofold. First, the 1st respondent’s own knowledge of the transactions by which he is said to have acquired the suit land was not placed before the court; PW1 frankly conceded under cross-examination that she was not schooled to answer on the documents and that much of what she related had been told to her by her husband. As was observed in North End Trading Company Limited v City Council of Nairobi [2019] eKLR, pleadings are not evidence, and assertions that are not spoken to by a witness with knowledge and tested in cross-examination remain bare averments of no probative value. 21.Secondly, and more fundamentally, the 1st respondent did not prove the root of his title to Phase 1/178 at all. His case, as developed through PW1, did not explain how he came to acquire Phase 1/178 from the settlement scheme. Instead, his claim to the parcel rested almost entirely on the earlier litigation between the parties Taveta SRMCC No. 42 of 2002 (the judgment dated 3rd February 2005, PEx 3, and the ruling dated 3rd June 2014, PEx 7) which he relied upon as having established his ownership. 22.That reliance gives rise to the pivotal question in this appeal: whether the parcel that was the subject of the earlier litigation, Plot 182, is the parcel now known as Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178. The 1st respondent’s whole case depends on the two being one and the same; the appellant’s case is that they are distinct. The identity of the two parcels is a question of fact, and the burden of proving it lay on the 1st respondent, who asserted it (section 107 of the Evidence Act). 23.On a re-evaluation of the record, I am unable to find that the 1st respondent discharged that burden. PW1 conceded in cross-examination that she had no document proving that the former Plot 182 is the present Phase 1/178. The 1st respondent produced no adjudication register, no green card, no letter from the survey or adjudication office, and no document from Agro Development Company Limited or the Ministry of Lands establishing that the parcel numbered 182 was renumbered as, or otherwise corresponds to, parcel 178. The nexus between the two numbers the foundation of the entire claim was asserted but not proved. 24.The 1st respondent sought to bridge that gap by relying on a site visit said to have been conducted in the earlier proceedings, at which, PW1 testified, the learned magistrate established that the land in dispute was the same land the appellant claimed. But a finding made on a locus in quo inspection in a different suit cannot, without more, be transposed into this suit to prove the identity of the parcels. If the survey report and findings of the court in Taveta SRMCC No. 42 of 2002 were to be relied on in this suit, they had to be produced and proved in this suit and subjected to cross-examination; they could not simply be imported. To the extent that the trial court founded its conclusion that Plot 182 is Phase 1/178 upon material generated in the earlier case but not properly produced and tested in this one, that was, with respect, a misdirection going to grounds 4 to 7 of the appeal. 25.I have not overlooked the 1st respondent’s reliance, in this connection, on the appellant’s own evidence and on the ruling of 3rd June 2014 (PEx 7). The 1st respondent submits that the appellant admitted that the parties have only ever been in dispute over a single parcel, and that PEx 7 records the 1st respondent as holding a fresh letter of allotment for Plot 178 in place of the former Plot 182, which “no longer exists”. Two things may be said. First, an acknowledgement that the parties have long been locked in a single, continuing dispute is not the same as an admission that the parcel numbered 182 is, as a matter of survey and fact, the very parcel numbered 178. The appellant’s consistent case was that the two are distinct, and he was entitled to put the 1st respondent to proof of their identity. Secondly, PEx 7 does not, on examination, advance the 1st respondent on this question. That ruling records the 1st respondent’s own assertion that he held an allotment letter showing Plot 178; it embodies no independent determination, by survey or otherwise, that 182 became 178. On the contrary, the court in 2014 observed that the former suit land “no longer existed” under its old number and directed that a fresh suit be filed which is the suit now under appeal. The renumbering upon which the 1st respondent’s entire claim turns thus remained, even on his own exhibit, a matter of assertion and not of proof; the 1st respondent, who bore the burden, neither testified to it himself nor produced the adjudication or survey records that alone could have established it. (ii)Res judicata and the earlier litigation 26.It is convenient to deal here with the doctrine of res judicata, which underlies the 1st respondent’s reliance on the earlier judgment. By section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, a matter directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, heard and finally decided by a competent court, may not be re-agitated. Had it been proved that the earlier litigation concerned the very parcel now in dispute, there would have been much force in the contention that the question of ownership as between these parties was already settled, and that the appellant could not re-open it. But the doctrine can operate upon the suit land only if the suit land is shown to be the same land that was previously litigated. Since the identity of Plot 182 with Phase 1/178 was not established, the earlier judgment cannot, on the record as re-evaluated, be deployed to prove the 1st respondent’s ownership of Phase 1/178. The very precondition of the estoppel sameness of the subject matter was not made out. I am alive to the consequence of this conclusion. Had the 1st respondent established, by the adjudication or survey records, that Plot 182 and Phase 1/178 are one and the same parcel, the judgment in Taveta SRMCC No. 42 of 2002 and the summary dismissal of the appellant’s appeal by the High Court at Mombasa on 28th June 2005 would have been decisive: the appellant would have been estopped from re-opening the question of ownership, and any title he later obtained over land already adjudged to belong to the 1st respondent would have been liable to impeachment. That conclusion does not arise, because the indispensable factual foundation for it – the identity of the two parcels – was not proved. (iii) The official search, the same-date allegation and the conduct of the trial 27.It follows from the foregoing that, as between the parties and on the record placed before this court, the 1st respondent did not prove either a good root of title to Phase 1/178 or the identity of that parcel with the parcel earlier litigated, whereas the appellant traced his title to its root in the settlement scheme. The 1st respondent therefore failed to discharge the burden that lay on him under section 107 of the Evidence Act, and the evidential burden never shifted to the appellant in the manner described in Raila Amolo Odinga & Another v IEBC & 2 Others [2017] eKLR. The finding of the trial court that the suit property belongs to the 1st respondent cannot, on this re-evaluation, be supported. Grounds 1, 2, 3 and 11 succeed. 28.As to ground 9, an official search (PEx 2) reflects the current state of the register; it is evidence of what is registered, not proof that the registration was lawfully procured where the root of title is in issue. A search could not, by itself, validate the 1st respondent’s title or condemn the appellant’s as a duplicate, and to the extent the trial court treated it as conclusive, that too was a misdirection. Ground 9 succeeds. 29.The appellant’s ground 8 that the issuance of the 1st respondent’s allotment letter and title deed on the same date is, of itself, evidence of fraud and forgery does not persuade me. The appellant’s own evidence (DW1) was that, in this settlement scheme, titles were processed and collected together upon the strength of allotment letters at or about the same time. The coincidence of dates therefore appears to be a feature of the scheme’s titling process generally rather than a badge of fraud peculiar to the 1st respondent. Fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, and the same-date point, standing alone, falls short. Ground 8 fails; this does not, however, affect the outcome, the appeal succeeding on the failure of proof addressed above. 30.The 1st respondent’s reliance on sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, and on his certificate of title and official search, does not carry him further. The protection those provisions afford a registered proprietor is, by the express terms of section 26(1), prima facie only, and it yields where the root of title is challenged and shown to be wanting. For the reasons already given, the 1st respondent did not establish the lawful root of his own title to Phase 1/178. Equally, in so far as the 1st respondent’s case was that the appellant’s title is a fraudulently obtained duplicate procured in collusion with officers of the 2nd and 3rd respondents, that allegation attracts the very standard of strict proof restated in Emfil Limited v Registrar of Titles Mombasa & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, upon which the 1st respondent himself relies. No such fraud or collusion was proved against the appellant. The Emfil standard, in truth, defeats the unproven allegations of fraud advanced by each side against the other, and the contest accordingly falls to be resolved, as it has been, upon the respective roots of title. 31.It follows that the 1st respondent’s claims in trespass and for a permanent injunction cannot succeed, for both presuppose that he is the owner of, or person in lawful possession of, the suit land. As Charles Ogejo Ochieng v Geoffrey Okumu [1995] eKLR relied on by the 1st respondent makes plain, trespass is an injury to a possessory right, and the proper claimant is the person who holds the title to the land or is in lawful possession of it; where the party sued holds the registered title, an action in trespass against him will not lie. On the record before me, it is the appellant who holds the registered title to Phase 1/178. The threshold for a permanent injunction in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358 is, for the same reason, not met. Nor does the principle in Mbogo & Another v Shah [1968] EA 93 and Nguruman Limited v Nielsen & 2 Others [2014]eKLR, that an appellate court will be slow to interfere with an exercise of discretion, assist the 1st respondent. That principle governs appeals against discretionary and interlocutory orders, such as the grant or refusal of an injunction; it has no application to a first appeal from a final judgment delivered after a full trial, where the duty of this court is the re-evaluative one already described. 32.As to ground 13, I do not find that the record establishes bias, or that the trial magistrate descended into the arena. The complaint is, in truth, better understood as the evidentiary misdirection already identified the reliance, to establish the identity of the parcels, on material from the earlier case not properly produced and tested in this suit. That is an error of approach, not evidence of partiality. Ground 13 succeeds only to that limited extent. (iv) Disposition and costs 33.For the reasons given, the appeal succeeds. The 1st respondent did not prove his case to the required standard, and the judgment in his favour cannot stand. 34.The appellant invited the court to set aside the trial judgment, dismiss the 1st respondent’s suit, and grant him the reliefs sought in his defence and counterclaim, all with costs. The first two of those orders follow from my findings, as does the discharge of the orders of eviction and mesne profits made against him. In so far as the appellant sought, by way of counterclaim, a declaration that he is the lawful proprietor of Phase 1/178, that relief is consonant with my findings and with his proved and undisturbed registration. I am, however, slow to make any positive order cancelling or rectifying the 1st respondent’s competing title in these appellate proceedings. The cancellation or rectification of a registered title engages the 2nd and 3rd respondents as the registering authorities and is best pursued, if the parties be so advised, through the appropriate originating process in which those authorities and any affected person may be fully heard. The dismissal of the 1st respondent’s suit and the setting aside of the decree below are, for present purposes, sufficient to vindicate the appellant’s title and possession. 35.On costs, costs follow the event. The appellant, having succeeded, is entitled to the costs of this appeal and of the suit in the lower court as against the 1st respondent. I make no order as to costs against the 2nd and 3rd respondents. Final orders 36.In the result, I make the following orders:i.The appeal is allowed.ii.The judgment and decree of the Senior Resident Magistrate’s Court at Taveta in Civil Suit No. 1 of 2018, delivered on 11th December 2025, are set aside in their entirety.iii.The 1st respondent’s (plaintiff’s) suit in the lower court is dismissed.iv.It is declared that the appellant, Moki Mutua, is the registered proprietor of Taveta/Taveta Scheme Phase 1/178. The court makes no order for the cancellation or rectification of the 1st respondent’s competing title, that question being left to be pursued, if the parties be so advised, through the appropriate process in which the 2nd and 3rd respondents and any affected person may be heard.v.The 1st respondent shall bear the costs of this appeal and of the suit in the lower court. DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED at Voi this 30th day of June 2026.E.K. WABWOTOJUDGEIn the presence of:Mr. Motuka for the AppellantMs. Indesia for the 1st RespondentN/A for the 2nd and 3rd RespondentsCourt Assistant; Joseph Letisia.