https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8449

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MAKUENI** **HCCA NO. E013/2024** **MOMBASA CEMENT LIMITED………………………………APPELLANT** **-VERSUS-** **ESTHER NJERI WATHAIA (Suing as the administrator of** **the estate of JOHN KAMAU NJERI (Deceased)…………. RESPONDENT** (Being an appeal from the Judgement and Decree of the Principal Magistrate’s Court at Kilungu (Hon Geno L. Okwengu (SRM)) delivered on 12th day of February 2024 in Civil Suit No E067 of 2021) **JUDGEMENT** 1. This appeal arises from the judgement and decree of the Principal Magistrates court at Kilungu by Hon Geno L. Okwengu, Resident Magistrate delivered on the 12th day of February 2024 in Civil Case No E067 of 2021. The genesis of the underlying dispute was a road traffic accident that occurred on or about 17th September 2022 along Nairobi- Mombasa road at Old DC area. 2. The plaintiff, Esther Njeri Wathiai (now the respondent in this appeal) in her plaint dated 20th February 2023, averred that on or about 17th September 2022, the deceased was lawfully driving motor vehicle **KBD 496P** along Nairobi-Mombasa Road at Old DC area, when the defendant’s (now the appellant) authorized driver, controlled and/or drove motor vehicle registration number **KDA 590Q** so carelessly and or negligently, at a very high speed that he lost control causing the said motor vehicle to collide onto motor vehicle registration **KBD 496P** extensively damaging it. As a result of the said accident the deceased sustained severe bodily injuries, endured a lot of pain and eventually succumbed to the injuries on 17th September 2022. 3. The Appellant robustly defended the suit via a statement of defence dated 4th day of March 2023 whereby they denied all the allegations of negligence and alternatively sought to cast the entirety of the blame to the Respondent. 4. During the trial, the Respondent testified and led oral evidence as the only witness, while the Appellant elected to close their case on 31st August 2023 without tendering any evidence in rebuttal. 5. In determining the matter, the learned trial magistrate delivered a brief judgment in which he found the defendant (now the appellant) liable at the ratio of 90:10% in favour of the plaintiff (now the respondent). The court proceeded to assess damages under the respective heads and awarded general damages under the Law Reform Act, comprising Kshs. 70,000/= for pain and suffering and Kshs. 100,000/= for loss of expectation of life. Under the Fatal Accidents Act, the court awarded Kshs. 3,873,690/= for loss of dependency, together with special damages of Kshs. 34,550/=. 6. The trial court thus arrived at a gross award of Kshs 4,078,240/=, from which it deducted 10% contributory negligence resulting in a net award of Kshs 3,623,871/= in favour of the Plaintiff (now the respondent). That determination now forms the subject of this appeal, the appellant being aggrieved by the quantum of damages assessed. This dissatisfaction culminated in the filing of the present appeal, following the grant of leave to appeal out of time. 7. The Appellant's case is anchored on four primary grounds articulated in the Memorandum of Appeal dated 21st February 2024 and amplified in the written submissions dated 8th October 2025. The Appellant contends that the learned trial Magistrate fell into error both in law and fact in the assessment of damages, particularly by awarding Kshs. 70,000/= for pain and suffering, which is said to be excessive in the circumstances. The Appellant further faults the trial court for failing to properly apply the established principles governing the assessment of loss of dependency, thereby arriving at an inordinately high award. Additionally, the Appellant asserts that the learned magistrate failed to adequately consider its submissions on quantum and instead placed undue reliance on the Respondent's submissions, resulting in an erroneous determination. 8. The Appellant challenges the award of Kshs. 70,000/= for pain and suffering, arguing that the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by making an award that was excessive in the circumstances. The Appellant submits that the evidence before the trial court, including the Police Abstract, Death Certificate, and the Respondent's testimony, showed that the deceased died instantly at the scene of the accident. Consequently, the Appellant contends that the award made under this head was not justified. 9. To fortify this position, the Appellant relies on the decision in **Janet Kathambi v Charity Kanja Njiru [2021] eKLR,** where the court upheld an award of Kshs. 10,000/= for pain and suffering in circumstances where death occurred immediately after the accident. The Appellant therefore urges this Court to interfere with the award made by the trial court and substitute it with an award of Kshs. 10,000/=, which it contends is more consistent with established judicial precedent. 10. The Appellant further takes issue with the award of Kshs. 3,873,690/= for loss of dependency, arguing that the learned trial Magistrate failed to apply the settled principles governing assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act. It is submitted that the trial court erroneously adopted a dependency ratio of one-half despite the uncontroverted evidence that the deceased was unmarried, had no children, and that the Respondent was the sole dependant disclosed in both the pleadings and the Chief's letter produced before the court. 11. The Appellant invokes Section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Act and submits that only legally recognized dependants are entitled to benefit from an award under the Act. In the circumstances of the present case, the Appellant maintains that a dependency ratio of one-third would have been appropriate and that the ratio adopted by the trial court resulted in an inflated and erroneous assessment of damages. 12. The Appellant nevertheless concedes that the multiplier of twenty years adopted by the learned trial Magistrate was reasonable, given that the deceased was aged thirty-seven years at the time of his demise. However, the Appellant challenges the multiplicand of Kshs. 32,280.75, arguing that there was no documentary evidence whatsoever to substantiate the claim that the deceased earned Kshs. 40,000/= per month as a driver. 13. According to the Appellant, the Respondent failed to produce pay slips, employment records, bank statements, M-Pesa statements, or any other documentary proof of earnings. Consequently, the Appellant submits that the trial court ought to have resorted to the applicable minimum wage prescribed under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2022, which it contends was Kshs. 8,109.90 for a general labourer in the area where the deceased resided. 14. In the premises, the Appellant maintains that the awards made by the trial court were excessive, unsupported by the evidence, and arrived at in disregard of settled legal principles. The Appellant consequently urges this Court to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned awards under the heads of pain and suffering and loss of dependency, substitute them with appropriate awards, and grant the costs of both the appeal and the proceedings before the subordinate court. 15. The Respondent opposed the appeal through written submissions dated 26th September 2025, urging this Court to uphold the trial court's assessment of damages and dismiss the appeal with costs. The Respondent submits that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the learned trial Magistrate acted on any wrong principle of law or that the awards made were so inordinately high as to warrant interference by an appellate court. 16. In support of this proposition, the Respondent places reliance on the decision in **Gitobu Imanyara & 2 Others v Attorney General [2016] eKLR**, wherein the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the principle that an appellate court ought not to interfere with an award of damages unless it is shown that the trial court acted on wrong principles or arrived at an award that was so excessively high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. 17. With regard to the award of Kshs. 70,000/= for pain and suffering, the Respondent submits that the same was neither excessive nor inordinately high in the circumstances. Reliance is placed on **Mercy Muriuki & Another v Samuel Mwangi Nduati & Another (Suing as the Legal Administrator of the Estate of the Late Robert Mwangi) [2019] eKLR,** where the court observed that awards for pain and suffering generally range between Kshs. 10,000/= and Kshs. 100,000/= depending on the circumstances of each case. 18. The Respondent further cites **Retco East Africa Limited v Josephine Kwamboka Nyachaki & Another [2021] eKLR,** where the court awarded Kshs. 100,000/= under the head of pain and suffering in comparable circumstances. On that basis, the Respondent maintains that the award of Kshs. 70,000/= fell well within the conventional range and cannot be said to be excessive. 19. On the claim for loss of dependency, the Respondent supports the multiplicand of Kshs. 32,280.75 adopted by the trial court, submitting that there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that the deceased was employed as a driver at the time of his death. The Respondent points to the death certificate, which identified the deceased's occupation as that of a driver, and argues that the document constituted prima facie evidence of the truth of its contents. 20. To reinforce this position, the Respondent relies on **Mbae (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Koome Mbae (Deceased)) v Mugambi (Sued as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Duncan Mwega Micheni (Deceased)) Civil Appeal E019 of 2022 [2024] KEHC 3376 (KLR),** where the High Court upheld a trial court's finding regarding a deceased person's occupation on the basis of information contained in a death certificate and other evidence placed before the court. 21. The Respondent further submits that the learned trial Magistrate properly exercised his discretion in adopting a dependency ratio of one-half, having considered the evidence that the deceased financially supported his aged mother. The Respondent argues that the dependency ratio adopted was consistent with prevailing judicial practice in cases involving unmarried deceased persons without children. 22. In support of this argument, reliance is placed on **Joseph Ndirangu Thuo & Another v Kamau Ngugi (Suing as the Legal Administrators of the Estate of Peter Waweru) [2019] eKLR,** where the court adopted a dependency ratio of one-half in respect of an unmarried deceased person. The Respondent also cites **Jesse Gichuru Wanyama & Another v Videlis Auma Wanyama & Another (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of Wiston Siro Maloba) [2021] KEHC 1616 (KLR),** in which a similar ratio was upheld on appeal. 23. The Respondent therefore contends that the learned trial Magistrate considered the relevant evidence, applicable legal principles, and persuasive authorities in arriving at the impugned awards. It is submitted that the Appellant has not established any basis upon which this Court can properly interfere with the exercise of the trial court's discretion. 24. In the premises, the Respondent urges this Court to find that the awards made by the trial court were fair, reasonable, and supported by both the evidence and applicable legal principles. Consequently, the Respondent prays that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety with costs. **Issues for Determination** 1. Having considered the pleadings, as well as the submissions on record, the issues that fall for this Court’s determination are: i. Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding Kshs. 70,000/= for pain and suffering in the circumstances of the case; ii. Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in adopting a multiplicand of Kshs. 32,280.75 in the assessment of loss of dependency; iii. Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in adopting a dependency ratio of one-half (1/2) in the assessment of loss of dependency; **Analysis and Determination** 1. As a first appellate court, this Court is guided by the well-settled principle articulated in **Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Company Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123** and re-affirmed in **Kenya Ports Authority v Kuston (Kenya) Limited [2009] 2 EA 212.** Effectively, it is the mandatory duty of the appellate court to subject the entire lower court record to a fresh and independent evaluation, to re-examine the oral and documentary evidence, and to draw the appellate court’s own conclusions. In doing so, the appellate court remains cognizant of the fact that the appellate court neither saw nor heard the witnesses first-hand, and must make due allowance for the trial court’s observations on demeanor, unless the record reveals an error in principle or a clear misapprehension of the probabilities of the case. 2. The Court now turns to the first issue for determination, namely, whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding Kshs. 70,000/= for pain and suffering in the circumstances of this case. 3. The Appellant’s case is that the award was excessive and not supported by the evidence on record. It is submitted that the deceased died instantly at the scene of the accident, as demonstrated by the Police Abstract, the Death Certificate, and the Respondent’s own testimony. On that basis, it is contended that there was no evidential basis for anything beyond a nominal award, and that the proper figure ought to have been Kshs. 10,000/= in line with awards made in cases of instantaneous death. Reliance is placed on **Janet Kathambi v Charity Kanja Njiru [2021] eKLR,** where the court upheld a nominal award in similar circumstances. 4. The Respondent, however, supports the award and submits that it falls within the conventional range recognised by courts. Reliance is placed on **Mercy Muriuki & Another v Samuel Mwangi Nduati & Another [2019] eKLR,** where the court held that awards under this head are conventional in nature and generally range between Kshs. 10,000/= and Kshs. 100,000/= depending on whether death was instantaneous or preceded by some degree of suffering. Further reliance is placed on **Retco East Africa Limited v Josephine Kwamboka Nyachaki & Another [2021] eKLR.** 5. On the guiding principles for interference with an award of damages, reliance is placed on **Kemfro Africa t/a Meru Express Services v A.M. Lubia & Another (1987) KLR 27** as cited with approval in **Nihon Complex Ltd & Thomas Njoroge Kirima v Joseph Kiplagat Towett (2019) eKLR,** where the Court set out the circumstances under which an appellate court may interfere with an award, namely where the trial court took into account an irrelevant factor, failed to consider a relevant one, or arrived at an award that is inordinately high or low as to represent an erroneous estimate. 6. In**Hyder Nthenya Musili & Another v China Wuyi Limited & Another (2017) eKLR***,* the Court stated that damages under the Law Reform Act for pain and suffering are only recoverable where the deceased endured pain as a result of the injuries sustained prior to death. The Court further held that the generally accepted principle is that only very nominal damages are awardable where death follows immediately after the accident. It was also affirmed that the conventional award for loss of expectation of life is Kshs. 100,000/=, while for pain and suffering the awards range from Kshs. 10,000/= upwards, with higher awards being reserved for cases where there is evidence that the deceased experienced prolonged pain before death. 7. Further guidance is found in **Put Sarajevo Gen. Engineering Company Ltd v Esther W. Njeri & 2 Others [2014] eKLR**, where it was held that where death is instantaneous, there is no evidential basis for a substantial award under pain and suffering and only nominal damages are ordinarily justified. 8. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the deceased died at the scene of the accident. The Police Abstract, the Death Certificate, and the Respondent’s testimony confirm that death occurred on the same date and on the spot. It is however noted that in the Plaint, the Respondent initially pleaded that the deceased endured a lot of pain and eventually succumbed to the injuries. However, during oral testimony, the Respondent stated unequivocally that the deceased died on the spot. This inconsistency leaves the allegation of conscious pain prior to death, unsubstantiated on the evidential record. There is no material indicating that the deceased survived for any appreciable period or endured conscious pain prior to death. The case therefore falls squarely within the category of instantaneous death where only nominal damages are ordinarily justified. 9. In such circumstances, the proper approach is that only a nominal award is justified under this head. While the conventional range provides judicial guidance, the lower end is ordinarily applicable where death is immediate and unsupported by evidence of conscious suffering. 10. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the award of Kshs. 70,000/= was not justified on the evidence as presented. The learned magistrate, in exercising discretion under this head, failed to properly apply the governing principles in light of the undisputed evidence of instantaneous death, thereby arriving at an award that is inordinately high and not reflective of the evidential record. 11. This court thus will interfere with the trial court’s award of Kshs. 70,000/- and reduce it to a nominal award of Kshs. 10,000/- as is usually awarded in such circumstances of instantaneous deaths. 12. The Court now turns to the second issue as framed, namely whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in adopting a multiplicand of Kshs. 32,280.75 in the assessment of loss of dependency. 13. The Appellant contends that the learned trial magistrate erred in applying a multiplicand of Kshs. 32,280.75 in computing the award under the head of loss of dependency. The Appellant concedes that the multiplier of 20 years adopted by the trial court was reasonable and appropriate, given the deceased's age of 37 years at the time of death. 14. It is submitted that although the Respondent alleged that the deceased was employed as a driver earning Kshs. 40,000/= per month, no documentary evidence was adduced in support of that claim. The Respondent further conceded that she did not possess payslips, an employment contract, M-Pesa statements, or any other material proof of the deceased's income or occupation. In the absence of evidence proving the deceased's actual income, the Appellant argues that the trial court ought to have reverted to the applicable minimum wage under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2022. Under the relevant wage schedule, the minimum wage for a general labourer in all other areas, including Oloitoktok where the deceased resided as per the Death Certificate, was Kshs. 8,109.90. 15. On the other hand, the Respondent submitted before the trial court that the appropriate multiplicand was Kshs. 32,280.75, being the minimum wage applicable to a driver. The Respondent maintained that the deceased was working as a driver at the time of his death as reflected in the death certificate and corroborated by the testimony of PW1. 16. The Respondent urged the Court to find that the trial court did not err in accepting that the deceased was a driver, since the same is endorsed in the death certificate, a government-issued document which constitutes prima facie evidence of the truth of its contents. Reliance was placed on **Mbae (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Koome Mbae - Deceased) v Muambi (Sued as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Duncan Mwera Micheni - Deceased) Civil Appeal No. E019 of 2022 [2024] KEHC 3376 (KLR),** where the Court upheld reliance on entries contained in a death certificate in the absence of contradictory evidence. 17. This Court is further guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal in **Jacob Ayiga Maruja & Another v Simeon Obayo [2005] eKLR,** where the Court held as follows: “We do not subscribe to the view that the only way to prove the profession of a person must be by the production of certificates and that the only way of proving earnings is equally the production of documents. That kind of stand would do a lot of injustice to very many Kenyans who are even illiterate, keep no records and yet earn their livelihood in various ways. If documentary evidence is available, that is well and good. But we reject any contention that only documentary evidence can prove these things.” 1. The Court of Appeal emphasized that proof of occupation and earnings is not strictly dependent on documentary evidence and that courts must consider the realities of informal employment where records are often unavailable. 2. In the present case, it is evident that the Court was faced with a situation where there was no strict documentary proof of the deceased's earnings. It is not disputed that the deceased had no verifiable income on record. In **Roger Dainty v Mwinyi Omar Haji & Another, Mombasa Civil Appeal No. 59 of 2004 [2004] eKLR,** the Court of Appeal observed that: “To ascertain the reasonable multiplier or multiplicand in each case, the court would have to consider such relevant factors as the income or prospective income of the deceased, the kind of work the deceased was engaged in, the prospects of promotion and his expectation of working life.” 1. From the foregoing, it is clear that in determining the appropriate multiplicand, a court is entitled to consider not only actual income but also probable or prospective income, considering the nature of the deceased's occupation and the surrounding circumstances as well as prospective upward mobility in their work place. The concept of income in this context is therefore not confined to strictly proved earnings but extends to reasonable and probable earnings within the deceased's occupational category. 2. Accordingly, this Court finds that the learned trial magistrate was entitled to accept that the deceased was a driver and to resort to the minimum wage approach in the absence of strict proof of earnings. However, such discretion must be exercised within the confines of the applicable statutory wage scales. 3. In the present case, while the death certificate and the testimony of PW1 established that the deceased was a driver, no evidence was tendered to demonstrate that he was engaged as a heavy commercial vehicle driver so as to justify the application of the higher wage band of Kshs. 32,280.75 at the time. In the absence of such evidence, the proper and legally sustainable approach would have been to apply the minimum wage applicable to a driver in “all other areas,” namely Kshs. 22,415.82 per month under the Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2024. 4. Accordingly, this Court finds that the learned trial magistrate did not err in law in accepting that the deceased was a driver and in resorting to the minimum wage approach. However, the Court erred in adopting a multiplicand of Kshs. 32,280.75, there being no evidence that the deceased was a heavy commercial vehicle driver. The applicable multiplicand would and I find, was therefore Kshs. 22,415.82 per month. To that extent, the appeal on this issue succeeds. 5. The Court now turns to the third issue, namely whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in adopting a dependency ratio of one-half (½) in the assessment of loss of dependency. 6. The Appellant submits that under Section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Act, claims under the Act are strictly for the benefit of the deceased’s immediate family, namely the spouse, parent, and child. It is further submitted that dependency must be strictly proved and cannot be presumed beyond the recognised legal framework. 7. Counsel for the Appellant contends that it is trite law that where the deceased was married with dependants, courts generally adopt a dependency ratio of 2/3, whereas where the deceased was unmarried and had no children, a ratio of 1/3 is usually applied. He further states that in the present case, it is submitted that the evidence on record including the pleadings and the chief’s letter clearly demonstrated that the deceased was unmarried, had no children, and the only identified dependant was his mother. It is therefore argued that the learned trial magistrate misdirected himself by adopting a dependency ratio of half instead of the more appropriate of one third, as supported by settled principles and the evidence on record. 8. The Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in adopting a dependency ratio of a half. It is submitted that the deceased provided financial support to his aged mother, who was the sole dependant. 9. To reinforce the argument, reliance is placed on authorities where courts have upheld a dependency ratio of ½ even in cases involving unmarried deceased persons, particularly where there is clear evidence of financial support to a parent. Counsel cites, among others, **Joseh Ndirangu Thuo & Another v Kamau Ndirangu Suin as the legal administrators of the estate of Peter Waweru (2019) eKLR,** Jesse Gichuru Wanyama & Another v Videlis Auma Wanyama & Another (2021) eKLR, and Douglas King’ua Wambui v Elizabeth Nyeri Obuong (2018) eKLR, where comparable findings were upheld. 10. The case of James Mulandi v Lochab Brothers Limited, Civil Appeal No. 136 of 2014 (2020) eKLR, was cited where Odunga J. held that: “I appreciate the views expressed in Marko Mwenda v Bernard Mugambi & Another (Nairobi HCCC No. 2343 of 1993) that: ‘Like in every African child, the deceased child is expected to continue assisting her parents financially many years into the unknown future.’ However, in this case account must be taken of the fact that the deceased was unmarried and there was a possibility that he would, with time, marry and have his own family. Accordingly, whereas parents have an expectation of being assisted by their children, a 2/3rd dependency ratio is on the higher side. However, being unmarried it is not unreasonable to assume that he could have been contributing to his parents ½ of his income. Accordingly, I adopt the one-half as the dependency ratio.” 1. It is clear that opinion is divided among High Court judges on whether the dependency ratio, where the deceased is unmarried, ought to be ½ or 1/3. I have reviewed other cases where dependency ratio for unmarried persons was considered. In Joseph Ndirangu Thuo & Another v Kamau Ngugi (Suing as legal representative and administrator of the estate of Peter Waweru (2019) eKLR*,* Mwongo J. used a dependency ratio of ½ for an unmarried lady *and ci*ted the cases of Mary Kerubo Mabuka v Newton Mucheke Mburu & 3 others (2006) eKLRwhere the court used a dependency ratio of ½ on a 26-year-old unmarried lady; Alice O. Alukwe v Akamba Public Road Services Ltd (2013) eKLRwhere the court used a dependency ratio of ½ on an unmarried lady aged 24 years; and Lucy Wambui Kihoro (Suing as Personal Representative of Deceased, Douglas Kinyua Wambui) v Elizabeth Njeri Obuong [2015] eKLR where the Court similarly used a dependency ratio of ½ on an unmarried son aged 30 years. 2. The guiding factor in determining the dependency ratio where the deceased is unmarried is the re-statement by the Court of Appeal in **Dickson Taabu Ogutu (supra)** that: “The extent to which the family is being supported must depend on the circumstances of each case. To ascertain it the judge will analyze the available evidence as to how much the deceased earned and how much he spent on his family. There can be no rule or principle in such a situation.” 1. On the other hand, courts have apportioned a dependency ratio of 1/3, which has, over time, been enhanced to 1/2 owing to the evolving rigours of life. Therefore, given that in this case the deceased was unmarried with only his mother as a dependant, a dependency ratio of 1/2 is fitting by my calculations. 2. I am guided in this respect by, among others, Steve Ongingo & Another v Susan Adongo Otieno & Another (2018) eKLR where Cherere J. applied a dependency ratio of one-half (½) in respect of an unmarried person, as well as Attorney General v Savinah Francis (Suing as the personal representative of the estate of Peter Muse Muema (2020) eKLR where Ong’udi J. similarly used a dependency ratio of one-half (½) in respect of an unmarried person. 3. Guided by these authorities, and considering that the deceased herein was unmarried and his mother was the sole dependant, the Court finds that a dependency ratio of ½ appropriately reflects the level of dependency proved and strikes a fair balance between strict proof and practical realities. 4. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. The dependency ratio of one-half (½) adopted by the learned trial magistrate is hereby upheld. **Disposition** 1. Accordingly, and for the reasons set out in this judgment, the Court makes the following orders: i. The appeal on the award of Kshs. 70,000/= for pain and suffering is hereby allowed and set aside. The said award is substituted with an award of Kshs. 10,000/=. ii. The appeal on the multiplicand is partially allowed. The trial court’s adoption of Kshs. 32,280.75 is set aside and substituted with a multiplicand of Kshs. 22,415.82 per month. iii. The appeal on the dependency ratio is dismissed. The dependency ratio of one-half (½) adopted by the trial court is hereby upheld. Thus, calculated as: Loss of dependency: 22,415.82 × 12 × ½ × 20 = Kshs 2,689,898.40cts (Subject to liability ratio of 90;10% as found by trial court) iv. Interest on the total award shall accrue at court rates from the date of the judgment of the trial court, being 12th June 2026, until payment in full v. The Respondents shall bear the costs of this appeal only as the costs of the proceedings in the lower court had been awarded to them to be borne by the appellant. Right of appeal 30 days. Dated, Signed and virtually delivered via TEAMS at Nairobi on this 12thday of June, 2026. **HON. R. A. OGANYO, MRS.** **JUDGE.** In the Presence of: Court Assistant: E, Sana. Counsel for Appellant; Miss Achieng Counsel for Respondent: Miss Mwende