Monda v Attorney General & 8 others (Constitutional Petition E068 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 12571 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (9 July 2026) (Judgment)

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION** **CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. E 068 OF 2026** **IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 2, 3, 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 40, 47, 48, 50 & 258 OF CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010** AND **IN THE MATTER OF SYTEMIC ROAD CARNAGE, MOB VIOLENCE, AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY ARISING FROM UNREGULATED MOTORCYCLE (BODA BODA)** BETWEEN **ROGERS MONDA…………………………………………..……PETITIONER** AND **THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL…………………………...1ST RESPONDENT** **THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE………………….2ND RESPONDENT** **THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE……….…..3RD RESPONDENT** **THE NATIONAL TRANSPORT AND** **SAFETY AUTHORITY (NTSA)…………………………4TH RESPONDENT** **THE CABINET SECRETARY, MINISTRY** **OF TRANSPORT…………………………………………5TH RESPONDENT** **THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAIROBI……....6TH RESPONDENT** **MATATU OWNERS ASSOCIATION…………………...7TH RESPONDENT** **BODA BODA SAFETY ASSOCIATION OF KENYA..…8TH RESPONDENT** **ASSOCIATION OF KENYA INSURERS (AKI)………...9TH RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** **BACKGROUND** 1. This Petition dated 2nd February 2026 and supported by the affidavit of the Petitioner sworn on the same date is brought under Articles 2, 3, 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 40, 47, 48,50 and 258 of the Constitution, challenges what the Petitioner terms as a systemic and constitutionally significant failure by National and County authorities to regulate the (motorcycle transport *(boda boda)* sector. The Petition asserts that unchecked motorcycle operations have produced escalating road carnage, mob violence, sexual assaults, and widespread destruction of property. The Petitioner is an Advocate of the High Court, and presents against the Attorney-General, National Police Service, Inspector-General, NTSA, Cabinet Secretary for Transport, and Nairobi County Government, alongside key sector associations, seeking enforcement, of minimum constitutional standards. The Petition is framed as a public interest action on behalf of millions of Kenyan road users exposed to predictable and preventable harm. 2. The Petitioner outlines specific failures; non-enforcement of licensing, training, and safety requirements; failure to implement the 2022 presidential directive to re-register riders; absence of identification systems; failure to regulate violent associations; delayed or absent police response; collapsed prosecutions despite video evidence; and failure to implement deterrent frameworks such as mandatory insurance, tracking systems, or rapid response protocols. The Petitioner argues that these omissions breach the State’s positive obligations under Articles 21 and 244, rendering the State complicit by omission in ongoing rights violations. 3. The Petition cites comparative jurisdictions; Rwanda’s cooperative model, Uganda’s digital plates, Bogotá’s passenger restrictions, Lagos’ commercial motorcycle bans, and Brazil’s professionalization of riders, to demonstrate feasible regulatory pathways. It asserts that Kenya’s failure to adopt similar accountability structures has enabled anonymity-driven violence. The Petition is stated to be brought in good faith, emphasizing the existential threat posed by *boda boda* impunity to public safety, constitutional governance, and the rule of law. 4. The Petitioner seeks declarations that State failures violate multiple constitutional rights ( namely Article 26, right to life; Article 28 Right to Human Dignity; Article 29 Right to Security of the Person; Article 40 Right to Property; Article 27 Equality and Equal Protection of the Law; Article 47 Fair Administrative Action; Article 48 Access to Justice; Articles 2 and 10 National Values and Principles of Governance and Supremacy of the Constitution and rule of law), and orders of mandamus compelling NTSA, Police, and the Ministry of Transport to implement comprehensive reforms within fixed timelines. These include national rider identification systems, compulsory training and licensing, insurance enforcement, rapid response protocols, deregistration of violent associations, and quarterly compliance reporting. The Petition seeks no personal damages, only systemic reform to restore safety, dignity, and constitutional order on Kenyan roads. 5. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Respondents *vide* grounds of opposition dated 16th March 2026 contend that the Petition is fundamentally defective, asserting that it fails the **Anarita Karimi Njeru** **v Republic [1979] KLR 154** precision requirement by not pleading with constitutional exactitude the rights allegedly violated or the manner of violation. They argue that the Petition improperly invites constitutional adjudication where ordinary criminal processes suffice, invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and insisting the matter is not ripe for constitutional intervention. The Respondents maintain that no factual or legal basis has been shown to justify judicial interference with police investigative functions. They assert therefore that the Petition is devoid of merit. 6. The 6th Respondent opposes the Petition and has filed Replying Affidavit sworn by Eva W. Wairiuko, Acting Chief Officer for Security and Compliance, Nairobi City County, on 10 March 2026. She affirms that motorcycle regulation in Nairobi requires a multisectoral approach and outlines the County’s existing legal and administrative framework, including the Nairobi City County (Motorcycle Taxi (Boda Boda) Permit Regulations), 2025, enacted and implemented to structure operations, enhance traceability, and enforce compliance. She explains that the County has established a *Boda Boda* Enforcement Unit of sixty seven officers mandated to regulate traffic flow, enforce county regulations, register operators in SACCOS, ensure uniform and identification compliance, and conduct crackdowns on riders violating traffic and nuisance laws. These measures, she asserts, are anchored in statute and supported by documented enforcement actions, training sessions, and public awareness campaigns. 7. She emphasizes that the County’s mandate is circumscribed by law, while it can regulate parking, permits, and nuisance offences, it cannot arrest or prosecute criminal offences such as arson or malicious damage, which fall exclusively under the National Police Service pursuant to the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution. She stresses that the Petitioner’s demands exceed the County’s lawful powers and would expose it to ultra vires challenges. The affidavit details the County’s operational systems, impound records, charge sheets, enforcement reports, and zonal color coding, to demonstrate ongoing, structured regulatory efforts aimed at improving safety and accountability within Nairobi’s boda boda sector. 8. Finally, the deponent urges the Court to recognize that Nairobi City County has taken substantial, legally grounded steps to regulate motorcycle operations, and that any effective solution must involve coordinated action across national and county agencies. She maintains that the County’s measures are both continuous and impactful, and that the Petition should be evaluated with due regard to the constitutional limits of county authority and the multisectoral nature of *boda boda* regulation. 9. The Petition was canvassed via written submissions **SUMMARY OF THE PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS** 1. The Petitioner’s written submissions frame the matter as a constitutional emergency, asserting that the State, despite full knowledge of persistent death, mob violence, sexual assault, and destruction of property linked to unregulated *boda boda* operations, has failed to act, thereby breaching Articles 2, 10, 21, 26, 28, 29, 40, 47, 27 and 48 of the Constitution. He argues that the crisis is not a mere policy lapse but a systemic collapse of enforcement mechanisms, producing daily fatalities, organized mob attacks, and a parallel vigilante justice system. The Petitioner submits that the Court must determine whether such sustained regulatory failure amounts to a constitutional violation warranting structural and supervisory relief. 2. The Petitioner that his standing under Articles 22 and 258, is **supported by Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2013] eKLR**, which endorses a liberal approach to *locus standi* in matters of public interest. The Petitioner highlights his personal experience as a Nairobi Road user and his public interest motivation to protect millions exposed to daily harm. He stresses that the Petition seeks no personal benefit but systemic reform to restore constitutional order, dignity, and safety on Kenyan roads, following years of State inaction despite official acknowledgments and presidential directives. 3. **Whether the Respondents have violated Articles 26, 28, 29, 40, 27, 47, 48, 10 and 2 of the constitution through systemic failure to regulate and enforce the law** The Petition frames this as the central constitutional question: whether sustained, officially acknowledged regulatory collapse amounts to a violation of rights. The Petitioner grounds this inquiry in the transformative nature of the 2010 Constitution, citing **Senate of the Republic of Kenya & 4 others v Speaker of the National Assembly & another; Attorney General & 7 others (Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR**, which directs courts to interpret the Constitution in a manner that advances its values and purposes. The Petitioner argues that the State’s positive obligations under Article 21(1) require proactive protection of life, dignity, security, property, equality, fair administrative action, and access to justice. He relies on **Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Kenya Airports Authority & 2 others; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (Amicus Curiae) [2021] KESC 3 (KLR)** to assert that omissions, where foreseeable harm persists despite regulatory authority, constitute constitutional violations. The Petition’s extensive factual matrix (road fatalities, mob violence, arson, sexual assaults) is presented as evidence of systemic failure engaging Articles 26, 28, 29, 40, 27, 47, 48, 10 and 2. 1. **Whether the state has a positive constitutional obligation to protect citizens from foreseeable and recurring harm arising from unregulated motorcycle operations** The Petitioner submits that the State’s duty is not merely to refrain from violating rights but to take reasonable measures to prevent violations by private actors. He anchors this in Article 21(1) and international law incorporated under Article 2(6). The due diligence doctrine is central to this issue, supported by **Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1988)**, which held that a State is responsible for private violence where it fails to prevent, investigate, or punish foreseeable harm. The Petitioner also cites **Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 245/02**) and **Opuz v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 33401/02)** to demonstrate that State inaction in the face of known patterns of violence engages constitutional responsibility. The Petition argues that years of KNBS and NTSA data, ministerial statements, and the presidential directive of 8 March 2022 establish foreseeability, and that failure to act constitutes breach of positive obligations. 1. **Whether this honourable court has jurisdiction to issue structural interdicts and supervisory orders to compel compliance with constitutional obligations** The Petitioner submits that Articles 165(3)(b), 165(3)(d)(ii), and 23(1) confer jurisdiction upon the High Court to interpret the Constitution and enforce rights. Article 23(3) empowers the Court to grant “appropriate relief,” including declarations, injunctions, conservatory orders, judicial review, and other remedies. The Petitioner relies on **Mitu-Bell Welfare Society (supra)**, where the Supreme Court affirmed that structural interdicts and supervisory orders are permissible and sometimes necessary to remedy systemic violations. He argues that the nature of the crisis, nationwide, recurrent, and institutional, requires structural relief such as coordinated enforcement frameworks, mandatory reporting, and timelines for compliance. The Petition asserts that such remedies fall squarely within the Court’s constitutional mandate. 1. **Whether the Reliefs Sought Offend the Doctrine of Separation of Powers** In response to the assertion by the respondents that the prayers sought offend the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Petitioner counters that separation of powers does not immunize State organs from constitutional scrutiny. The Petitioner relies on **Kenya National Examination Council v Republic Ex Parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 others [1997] eKLR** to argue that an order of mandamus is available to compel performance of public duties. He submits that the Court is not being asked to run police operations or legislate policy, but to enforce constitutional obligations, a role expressly contemplated by Articles 23 and 165. ### ****Whether the Petition has been pleaded with reasonable precision and meets the standard in Anarita Karimi Njeru V Republic [1979] KLR 154**** The Respondents challenge the Petition on grounds of lack of exactitude. The Petitioner responds that **Anarita Karimi Njeru Case** requires only “reasonable precision,” not technical perfection. He cites **Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General & 2 others [2012] eKLR** to emphasize substance over form. The Petition’s detailed factual allegations, specific incidents of arson, lynching, sexual assault, statistical data, official acknowledgments, and judicial decisions, are presented as exceeding the required standard. The Petitioner notes that the Respondents have not denied any factual allegation, which he argues amounts to admission. ### ****Whether the Petitioner Is Entitled to the Reliefs Sought**** The Petitioner submits that he has demonstrated violations on a balance of probabilities, citing **Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR** for the standard of proof. He argues that the Respondents’ silence on the factual record, combined with overwhelming evidence of systemic harm, supports the granting of structural and supervisory relief. He further argues that public interest litigation should not attract punitive costs, relying on Mumo Matemu (supra) to affirm the legitimacy of public interest litigants. The Petitioner concludes that constitutional fidelity, justice, and public safety require the Court’s intervention. **SUMMARY OF THE 1ST, 2ND, 3RD AND 5TH SUBMISSIONS** 1. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Respondents contend that although the Petitioner invokes a wide constellation of constitutional provisions, Articles 2, 3, 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 40, 47, 48, 50 and 258, he fails to meet the precision threshold long embedded in Kenyan constitutional jurisprudence. They rely on **Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR**, which reaffirmed the**Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (1979) KLR 154** standard requiring a petitioner to articulate, with clarity, the specific right violated and the manner of violation. The Respondents argue that the Petitioner merely gestures toward constitutional injury without demonstrating the factual nexus between alleged state omissions and the claimed infringements. In their view, the Petition is constitutionally hollow, lacking the evidentiary and analytical scaffolding necessary to sustain judicial intervention. 2. The Respondents further invoke the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, urging the Court to decline adjudication where ordinary statutory mechanisms provide adequate remedies. Citing *U***huru Muigai Kenyatta v Nairobi Star Publication Limited (2013) eKLR** and **John Harun Mwau v Peter Gastrow & 3 others (2014)** *eKLR*, they submit that not every societal ill warrants constitutional litigation, and that courts should refrain from constitutional pronouncements where alternative legal pathways exist. They argue that the Petitioner’s grievances, mob violence, vehicle arson, road carnage, and alleged selective enforcement, fall squarely within the ambit of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap 75, the Penal Code, the Traffic Act Cap 403, and the National Transport and Safety Authority (Operation of Motorcycles) Regulations 2022. In their assessment, the Petition is not ripe for constitutional adjudication because the Petitioner has bypassed ordinary enforcement and prosecutorial channels. 3. On the question of mandamus and judicial oversight of policing, the Respondents emphasize the constitutional insulation of investigative discretion. They rely on **Kipoki Oreu Tasur v Inspector General of Police & 5 others (2014) eKLR**, where the Court underscored that the criminal justice system must operate without undue interference except in the clearest cases of rights violations. They also cite **Republic v Commissioner of Police & another ex parte Michael Monari & another [2012] eKLR**, in which the Court affirmed that police are duty‑bound to investigate complaints and need only establish reasonable suspicion before preferring charges. The Respondents argue that the Petitioner has not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances warranting judicial intrusion into operational policing, nor shown that the police have abdicated their constitutional mandate. 4. Ultimately, the Respondents submit that the Petitioner has not discharged the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities and that the sweeping structural orders sought, Standard Operating Procedures for accident response, guaranteed response times, regulatory timelines, insurance schemes, and quarterly reporting obligations, are unwarranted, ungrounded, and unsupported by evidence. They urge the Court to dismiss both the Petition and the accompanying application with costs, asserting that constitutional litigation cannot be used to circumvent existing statutory remedies or to micromanage executive and policing functions **SUMMARY OF THE 6TH RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS** 1. The 6th Respondent, the County Government of Nairobi, asserts that the Petition, though framed as a constitutional grievance, rests on a misunderstanding of the distinct constitutional and statutory mandates allocated to national and county institutions. They emphasize that Nairobi City County has already exercised its legislative authority under Article 185(2) by enacting **The Nairobi City County (Motorcycle Taxi (BodaBoda) Permit Regulations, 2025) (Kenya Gazette Supplement No.26),** and has operationalized these regulations through a specialized *Boda Boda* Enforcement Unit of sixty‑seven officers. The Respondent underscores that the Petitioner’s demands would compel the County to commit illegality by assuming criminal law enforcement powers constitutionally reserved for national policing agencies. 2. Invoking the doctrine of separation of powers, the 6th Respondent relies on **Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR; In the Matter of the Speaker of the Senate & another [2013] eKLR, Nyando Power Techniques Ltd v Nairobi City Council & Another (2016) eKLR,** and **Republic v Kenya Maritime Authority & 2 Others (2021) KEHC 309 (KLR)** to argue that courts must not displace constitutionally assigned functions or supervise executive reporting structures outside the constitutional design. They stress that Article 183(3) requires the County Executive Committee to report to the County Assembly, not the Judiciary, and that Article 185(5) vests oversight authority exclusively in the Assembly. The Respondent further cites **International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC)** to reinforce that courts may not usurp policy‑laden, polycentric functions entrusted to other branches. In their view, the Petitioner seeks to rewrite constitutional architecture by directing the County Executive to file operational reports in court, a remedy incompatible with Chapter 11’s devolution framework. 3. The 6th Respondent concludes that Nairobi City County has fully discharged its lawful mandate and that the Petition lacks a legal foundation for imposing additional obligations on the County and should therefore be dismissed. 4. On costs, they rely on Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act and authorities including **Reid, Hewitt & Co v Joseph AIR 1918 Cal 717, Myres v Defries (1880) 5 Ex D 180; Harun Mutwiri v Nairobi City County Government [2018] eKLR, Kenya Union of Commercial, Food and Allied Workers v Bidco Africa Limited & Another [2015] eKLR**, **Hussein Muhumed Sirat v Attorney General & Another [2017] eKLR,** and **Machakos ELC Pet No. 6 of 2013 Party of Independent Candidate of Kenya & another v Mutula Kilonzo & 2 others [2013] eKLR,** affirming that costs follow the event and should be awarded to the successful party 5. On the 2nd issue, it is submitted that the ‘Petition challenges the powers of the respondents on revoking the election results of the Petitioners and replacing the elected trustees with ones appointed by itself’. The Petitioners submit that the Petition is not an election dispute as alleged. 6. In this regard it is asserted that the respondents contravened Article 2(2) on the limit of exercise of state authority and reference made in the decision of Affordable **Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others (2005) ZA CC3; 2006(3) SA 247 (CC).** **SUMMARY PETITIONER REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS** 1. In response to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Respondents’ submissions the Petitioner submits that the Respondents’ reliance on **Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KLR 154** and **Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR** is misplaced, as the Petition as framed meets the threshold. He reiterated that the Respondents have not denied the factual basis of the Petition, and this therefore constitutes admission. He further argues that constitutional avoidance is inapplicable, distinguishing **Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta v Nairobi Star Publication Limited [2013] eKLR and John Harun Mwau v Peter Gastrow & 3 others [2014] eKLR** as cases concerning individual disputes resolvable through ordinary processes, whereas the present Petition concerns systemic institutional failure. 2. He invokes **Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Kenya Airports Authority & 2 others [2021] KESC 3 (KLR)** to affirm that courts must grant effective remedies for structural violations, and relies on **Kenya National Examination Council v Republic Ex Parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 others [1997] eKLR** to demonstrate that mandamus lies to compel institutional performance of public duties. 3. In rejoinder to the 6th Respondent, the Petitioner submits the 6th respondent has mischaracterized the Petition and thereby avoids constitutional responsibility. He argues that Articles 2, 10 and 21(1) impose obligations on all State organs, and that the 6th Respondent’s own evidence (regulations, enforcement units, zoning systems) demonstrates regulatory capacity that has failed to prevent persistent violence, thereby amounting to violations of Articles 26, 29, 40 and 47. He contends that separation of powers cannot be summoned to shield inaction, citing **Satrose Ayuma & 11 others v Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme & 2 others [2013] eKLR and Mitu-Bell (supra)** to affirm the Court’s authority to issue supervisory and structural relief under Articles 23 and 165. 4. On costs, he submits that public interest litigation should not be punished, distinguishing the Respondent’s reliance on “costs follow the event” jurisprudence. **ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION** 1. Having considered the pleadings and submissions filed herein, I frame the issues for determination to be 1. Whether the Petition is justiciable?? 2. If the answer to (a) is in the affirmative, whether the Petition is merited? 3. Arising from (a) and (b) above what are the consequential orders ***Whether the Petition is justiciable?*** 1. The respondents have challenged the competence of the Petition on two fronts. First, that it fails the Precision test as articulated in the **Anarita Karimi Njeru case (supra)** and that secondly that it runs afoul of the constitutional avoidance doctrine. 2. As stated by the Court in the **Sat v Director of Public Prosecutions & 4 others [2024] KEHC 2131 (KLR)**, these are threshold issues that must be addressed at the preliminary stage prior to the Court considering the Petition on its merit. Both issues touch on the jurisdiction of the Court and as stated in **Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR,** the Court must resolve them at the outset. 3. In constitutional litigation, precision is not a procedural formality; it is a constitutional imperative. As the Court stated in **Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KLR 154**, a petitioner must set out **with a reasonable degree of precision** the constitutional provisions alleged to be infringed, the facts constituting the infringement, and the way the infringement occurred. This requirement has endured across decades of jurisprudence because it safeguards both fairness and judicial integrity. 4. The Court’s role is not to roam through broad grievances in search of constitutional injury. It is to adjudicate specific claims anchored in identifiable facts and clearly pleaded violations. Without this clarity, constitutional adjudication becomes speculative; respondents are left to guess at the case they must meet, and the Court risks issuing orders untethered to pleaded facts. 5. Thus, the precision requirement is non‑negotiable. Where a petition fails to articulate the alleged violations with the clarity demanded by **Anarita Karimi Njeru (Supra)** and reaffirmed in **Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR,** the petition cannot stand. The Court will not, and cannot, grant constitutional relief based on generalized assertions or undifferentiated complaints. Failure to comply with the precision doctrine occasions dismissal, not as a matter of technicality, but as a matter of constitutional fidelity 6. I do not for a moment trivialize the gravity of the matters raised. The narrative presented, of escalating road carnage, mob violence, and institutional paralysis, is deeply unsettling. It speaks to a national challenge that demands sober reflection. But constitutional adjudication is not driven by the magnitude of public concern alone. It is driven by the disciplined method the Constitution requires; a petitioner must demonstrate, with clarity, that the harm alleged is traceable to specific acts or omissions of the Respondents, and that those acts or omissions amount to violations of identifiable constitutional provisions. It is here that the Petition falters. 7. In **Legal Advice Center t/a Kituo Cha Sheria v Director General of the National Intelligence Service & 5 others [2026] KEHC 9098 (KLR)** the Court reiterated that where a party failed to discharge the evidentiary burden under Section 107 and Section 109 of the Evidence Act, that Petition was destined to fail. The Court cited the Supreme Court decision in **Gwer & 5 Others v Kenya Medical Research Institute & 3 Others [2020] KESC 66 (KLR)** which affirmed this principle. In that case as in the current case the Petitioners relied on newspaper cutting, the Court in finding that there were of inconsequential probative value relied on the decision in **Andrew Omtata Okoiti & 5 Others v AG & 2 Others [2010] eKLR,** where the court stated, **This case however, can hardly go far because the petitioners have solely relied on newspaper cuttings in discharging their evidentiary burden which approach is rather flawed. The probative value of such cuttings is not in line with the requirements of the Evidence Act and most importantly, their probative value points to the direction of hearsay, which then impugns their admissibility. Without diluting the existing principles on the discharge of evidentiary burden, an allegation of such weight cannot be founded on opinion pieces written by authors who most likely sourced their information from 3rd parties.** 1. This Petition will fail for the same reason. The precision doctrine articulated in the **Anarita Karimi Njeru Case** is not an abstract ritual; it ensures fairness to respondents and coherence in judicial reasoning. That standard is exacting because constitutional remedies are exacting. And in this case, the Petition does not hit the bull’s‑eye. Without that precision, the Court is left with a constellation of grievances but no constitutional map. The Petition identifies a crisis, but it does not anchor that crisis in the structured pleading demanded by **Anarita Karimi Njeru**. In constitutional litigation, that omission is not merely a defect, it is fatal. 2. Accordingly, there is no route available to this Court to consider the other issues identified for determination. 3. The final orders are therefore that 1. The Petition is dismissed in its entirety. 2. As this Petition was presented in the public interest, there shall be no order as to costs. It is so ordered **SIGNED, DATED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 9TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.** **P .M NYAUNDI** **JUDGE** **In the Presence of** Fardosa Court Assistant Masaku for 6th Respondent Rukiya for 1st, 2nd 3rd, & 5th Respondent Ms. Leitoro for Respondent