https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/1872

Omoke t/a Morara Omoke Advocates v Board of Trustees, KBC Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme (Miscellaneous Reference Application E002 of 2024) [2026] KEELRC 1872 (KLR) (25 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 1872 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi Miscellaneous Reference Application E002 of 2024 K Ocharo, J June 25, 2026 Between Morara Omoke t/a Morara Omoke Advocates Applicant and Board of Trustees, KBC Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme Respondent Ruling Background 1.By a Notice of Motion Application dated 19th January 2026, expressed to be under the provisions of Article 162 of the Constitution, Sections 16 and 74 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure]Rules, the Respondent herein seeks;a.That the application be certified urgent and heard in the first instance.b.That, pending the hearing and determination of this application, there be a stay of delivery of the taxation ruling scheduled for 29th January 2026.c.That this Honourable Court be pleased to review, vary and /or set aside the ruling delivered on 30th April 2025, insofar as it determined the value of the subject matter at KES 18,421,159, for purposes of taxation.d.That the Court be pleased to substitute the said finding with an order that the value of the subject matter for purposes of taxation is approximately KES. 1, 511, 161,174.24, being the amount jointly agreed upon by the parties in ELRC Cause No. 1352 of 2018, following reconciliation.e.That the Advocate-Client Bill of Costs be re-taxed on the basis of the reconciled figure, and the correct value of the subject matter.f.The costs of this application be provided for. 2.The Application is premised upon the grounds set out on the face thereof, and those obtaining on the supporting affidavit sworn by Martin King’asia on 19th January 2026. 3.The Applicant contested the application through the Replying Affidavit, sworn by Mr. Morara Omoke on 19th February 2026, and a Further Affidavit that he swore in response to the Further Affidavit that was sworn and filed herein as a rejoinder to his said Replying Affidavit. 4.This Court gave directions that the application be canvassed by way of written submissions. The Parties obliged. Their respective submissions are on record for consideration by the Court. The Applicant 5.The Applicant states that the Respondent acted as an Advocate for them in ELRC Cause No. 1352 of 2018, Board of Trustees, KBC Staff Benefits Scheme v Kenya Broadcasting Corporation. The subject matter of the cause was unremitted pension contributions alleged to be owing by the Corporation to the Scheme. 6.Judgment was delivered on 27th April 2022 in the said cause. However, the Court did not determine the exact amount payable. It instead directed the parties to file computations, whereupon the Court would consider and adopt a final figure. 7.It is further stated that before the Court could adopt any computation or determine a final sum, the Applicant instituted Advocate-Client taxation proceedings, seeking fees based on his own unilateral computations, which the Scheme did not accept. 8.On 30th April 2025, this Court delivered a ruling in this Reference, determining that the value of the subject matter for taxation purposes as KES. 18,421, 704,159. 9.Subsequent to the delivery of the ruling of 30th April 2025, and in compliance with the directions of the trial court in the substantive suit, the Respondent and the Corporation undertook a joint reconciliation exercise in respect of the unremitted pension contributions, mutually agreed on the amount, and subsequently recorded a consent flowing therefrom, confirming the amount to be KES. 1, 511, 161, 174.24. 10.The Respondent asserts that the consent could not have been recorded earlier because a court order in effect at that time prohibited the Respondent from changing Advocates from the Applicant, who at that time no longer represented the Respondent's interests. The order was lifted on 14th January 2026, thereby enabling the parties to file their consent. 11.It is contended that the reconciliation schedule and consent were not executed jointly by the parties and represent the final, true, and undisputed position in the substantive suit. The reconciliation and consent did not exist, therefore, they could not have been placed before the court at the time of the ruling on 30th April 2025. 12.Taxation based on the erroneous figure will expose the Respondent to grossly inflated and unjustified legal costs, wholly disconnected from the actual value of the claim. The Respondent is a pension scheme holding funds in trust for members, and such disproportionate costs will irreversibly prejudice members’ benefits and may render the Scheme financially distressed. 13.The Respondent further states that, by the instant application, the Respondent is not seeking to re-argue the Reference or to invite this Court to sit on appeal from its own decision, but merely seeks reconsideration of the subject value in light of the facts that have since crystallised and been conclusively agreed. The Applicant’s Response. 14.The Applicant asserts that this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the current application, the Respondent having already preferred an appeal against the Taxation Reference Ruling by this Court. 15.The Applicant further contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application as the same is res judicata. The application seeks to reopen matters that were conclusively addressed in its ruling delivered on 18th March 2024, 27th March 2025, and 30th April 2025. This Court has since rendered itself on the introduction of new evidence at the taxation reference stage. Evidence that was not placed before, and considered by, the Taxing Officer cannot soundly be placed before the Court at this point. 16.The Applicant further contends that the Application seeks to reopen the issue of his authority to file computations on behalf of the Respondent, which issue has been settled by this Court in the taxation ruling. 17.Equally, the application requires this Court to relook at the issue of the subject matter value for purposes of taxing the Applicant’s Advocate-Client Bill of Costs, which issue was conclusively settled in the ruling. 18.The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the current application, seeing that it offends the doctrine of sub judice. The Respondent has a similar application to the instant one pending before the court in the main suit, seeking review of this Court's ruling. 19.The application is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process calculated to circumvent well laid appellate and taxation reference procedures. 20.The Applicant argues that the application should be dismissed. It has been filed with unreasonable delay, 264 days after the Ruling of this Court of 30th April, 2026. The Respondent has not given any reasonable explanation for the delay. 21.According to the Applicant, the purported consent is neither a new and important matter nor evidence for the purposes of review. This information did not exist at the time of the ruling and, as such, cannot form the basis of an application for review. 22.The Applicant states further that the purported consent between the Scheme and the Corporation is being discounted by bona fide members of the Scheme, as it appears to be an elaborate scheme to defraud the members of the Scheme by discounting the judgment sum by more than seventeen million. 23.It is further stated that a varied or modified subject matter value that sets in after an Advocate has duly rendered his services cannot be made a basis for the taxation of Advocate -Client Bill of costs. Therefore, in this matter, the Court is restricted to the value of the main suit as at the time the Applicant was rendering his services, namely, KShs. 18, 421, 704,159.00. 24.The Applicant contends that he filed the computations via the e-filing portal and submitted a printout to the Court on 19th July 2022, based on the instructions issued by the Respondent and in line with the judgment. The computations were the culmination of a series of meetings with other experts, namely actuarial scientists, accountants, auditors, and the Fund Manager [MINET], who were instructed by the Respondent to carry out the Computations. The Board of Trustees of the Respondent Scheme participated in the computations. 25.On 27th July 2022, the Corporation filed computations in the main suit indicating that the subject matter value of the main suit was 045,788.80, thereby showing the value to be above 18 million. 26.The Applicant states that contrary to the assertions by the Respondent, the ruling by Justice Wasilwa did not allow the Respondent to file a consent. The consent is filed in contempt of Justice Wasilwa's orders. The Court directed the Respondent’s Counsel to come on record and file a substantive application challenging the orders issued by Justice Maureen Onyango on 16th November 2022, which directed that further proceedings in the main suit be halted until the taxation of his costs and the payment of his legal fees. 27.He further contends that the purported consent by the Respondent and the Corporation concerns the subject matter value in respect of the main suit, arrived at after termination of his services to the Respondent, through the consent and convenience of the two. The amount cannot be used to tax his Advocate-Client Bill of costs. Allowing the application would lead to an undesirable result, namely advocates being defrauded by their clients who connive to consent to lower amounts with the opposing parties and use those consents as the subject matter value for the advocates' fees. Rejoinder by the Respondent 28.By a further affidavit sworn by Martin Nyongesa Kingasia, the Respondent asserts that the consent sum, KShs. 1,511,161,174.24 is now not merely agreed between the parties, but judicially sanctioned and binding. No order has been obtained setting aside or suspending the consent which the court adopted on 9th March 2026. 29.It is further argued that the allegation of fraud and collusion advanced by the Applicant is unsubstantiated, speculative, and unsupported by evidence. 30.The developments culminating in the consent and its adoption occurred after the ruling of the 30th April 2025. The instant application has been lodged promptly following the event. The Respondent’s submissions 31.Counsel for the Respondent identifies for issues as those that emerge for determination in the current application; whether this Court has jurisdiction ton entertain an application for review under Rule 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations [Procedure]Rules; whether the application is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, sub judice, or by the existence of an appeal; whether the Respondent/Applicant has satisfied the legal threshold for review; and whether the interests of justice demand the review sought. 32.Counsel submits that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and determine an application for review flows from the stipulations of Rule 33 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules,2016. According to counsel, the Rule is couched in permissive and expansive terms. 33.Advancing the essence of the review jurisdiction and review proceedings and orders, Counsel cites the Court of Appeal decision in Benjoh Amalgamated Limited & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited [2014] KECA 872, where it was stated;“The basic philosophy inherent in the concept of review is the acceptance of human fallibility and acknowledgement of the frailties of human nature, and sometimes the possibility of perversion that may lead to miscarriage of justice. In some jurisdictions, courts have felt the need to cull out such power in order to overcome abuse of process of the court or miscarriage of justice. In the High Court, both the Civil Procedure Act in Section 80 and the Civil Procedure Rules in Order 45 rule 1 confer the court power to review. Rule 1 of Order 45 shows the circumstances in which such review would be considered range from discovery of new and important matter or mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason, but section 80 gives the High Court greater amplitude for review.” 34.It is further submitted that jurisdiction is not an exception grudgingly exercised, but substantive statutory power intended to prevent injustice where circumstances materially change or where strict adherence to finality would occasion manifest injustice. 35.The Respondent’s Counsel cites the decision in Accredo Ag & 3 others v Steffano Ucelli & Another [2017]eKLR to buttress the point that the jurisdiction for review is only exercisable in favour of an Applicant where they have any of those three factors contemplated under the law, discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within their knowledge or could not be produced buy him at the time which the decree was passed or order made, or there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of record, or there exists sufficient reason to review the decree/order, and National Bank of Kenya Limited v Ndungu Njau [1997]eKLR for the submission that in review applications, the court is not invited to re-examine the merits of its decision, but to correct it in light of new material or sufficient reason. 36.From the authorities cited, it is therefore clear that the review jurisdiction exists to prevent the court from becoming an instrument of injustice where subsequent events or material facts fundamentally alter the justice of the decision. The Applicant’s submission that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the current application is therefore unfounded. 37.It is further submitted on behalf of the Respondent that, contrary to the Applicant’s position, the instant application is not improperly before this Court, on the ground that an appeal has been preferred against this Court’s ruling of 30th April 2025. In fact, no appeal has been filed, but only an application for leave to appeal. 38.There was a Notice of Appeal filed following the ruling, but a notice of appeal cannot constitute an appeal for the purposes of a review application. 39.On the Applicant’s assertion that the doctrine of res judicata and functus officio, Counsel submits that the assertion flows from a fundamental misconception of the scope and operation of both doctrines. Under Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, res judicata only attaches to matters that were directly and substantially in issue, and which were heard and finally determined between the parties. It cannot, as a matter of law, attach to the facts or events that had not yet occurred. The reconciliation, the recorded consent, and the lifting of the restriction on change of Advocates are all events that occurred after the ruling. They were therefore incapable of being litigated, determined, or conclusively settled in the ruling. 40.Relying on Uhuru Highway Development Ltd v Central Bank of Kenya [1996] eKLR, Counsel submits that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be invoked to shut out a party where the cause of action or material facts are distinct or have subsequently arisen. 41.The doctrine of functus officio does not operate as an absolute bar where a court is expressly empowered by statute or rules to revisit its decision. Rule 33 of this court’s procedure rules serves as a statutory exception to the doctrine. 42.On whether the instant application meets the legal threshold for granting, Counsel submits that the reconciliation exercise culminating in a consent confirming the actual unremitted pension contribution at KES. 1,511, 161,174.24, constitutes new, important, and decisive evidence for purposes of a review application which did not exist at the time of the ruling. 43.The Respondent’s position that, as this evidence did not exist at the time of the ruling, it cannot be a basis for an application for review is misplaced, and if allowed by the Court as reflecting the correct position of the law, the effect would be rendering Rule 33 of this court's Procedure Rules, sterile. An argument like the Respondent’s does not acknowledge the fact that review jurisdiction is sufficiently flexible to accommodate situations where the interests of justice demand the Court revisit its decision in light of material developments. 44.The ruling of this Court set the subject matter value at KShs. 18.4 million. This has fundamentally changed following the reconciliation undertaken and the consent, which provided a new and conclusive value. The Court is now confronted with a materially different factual matrix from the one that existed when the ruling was delivered. This development goes to the very foundation of the subject matter's value. 45.Even if the application were to fail on the above-submitted ground of discovery of new evidence or important matter, it can still be allowed under the factor ‘any other sufficient reason’. This ground for review of applications has consistently been interpreted by the courts to encompass circumstances in which subsequent events render the continued enforcement of a decision manifestly unjust or inconsistent with the true state of affairs. 46.In the circumstance now obtaining, this Court should exercise its review jurisdiction to align the taxation process with the true and now settled value of the dispute. 47.On whether the subject-matter value is frozen at the termination of instructions, Counsel submits that the Applicant’s reliance on the case of Rachier & Amollo Advocates v Noble Gases International Limited [2023] KEHC 19094 [KLR], flows from a misapprehension of the decision. In the decision, the Court endorsed the value discernible from the pleadings where no other lawful value had crystallised. 48.In the present case, which is distinguishable from the decision cited by the Respondent, which is distinguishable from the instant, no specific sum had crystallised at the time of termination of instructions. The trial Court had expressly postponed quantification pending reconciliation of accounts between parties. Now there is a lawfully ascertained value. 49.The instant application was filed promptly without undue delay once the Respondent became legally and practically capable of moving the court, after the restriction that had been imposed by the court order was lifted, and after the reconciliation was done and consent was filed. 50.Counsel argues further that this Court is enjoined to ensure that its processes yield outcomes that are fair, rational and proportionate. To retain a taxation based on a figure of 18.4 billion shillings, an amount that has since been disowned, would yield a result that is manifestly disproportionate to the true value of the dispute. A grossly inflated legal fee shall ensue to the prejudice of the pensioners. The Applicant’s Submissions. 51.Counsel for the Applicant makes his submissions under the following issues that he has identified as emerging for determination; whether this Court has jurisdiction to determine the application, whether the application is frivolous, vexatious, and an egregious abuse of the court process, whether the application raises any valid ground for the review of the taxation reference ruling, whether the consent entered into by parties to a suit after the termination of the services of an Advocate can be used as the basis for the subject matter value for taxing the terminated Advocate’s Fees; and who should bear the costs of the application. 52.It is submitted that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the current application, as the application is res judicata, sub judice, and improperly filed, as an appeal has been filed against the ruling sought to be reviewed. 53.Counsel argues that the application is res judicata, as it seeks to re-open issues that this Court conclusively addressed in its various rulings herein. In its ruling of 18th March 2024, it conclusively addressed the filing of additional evidence at the stage of proceedings in a Taxation reference, evidence that was not before the taxing officer at the time of taxation. Despite this holding, the Respondent, through their instant application, has done no more than re-invite the court to admit and consider a document that was not before the taxing officer. The consent was not before the Taxing Officer. 54.The Application raises the issue of the Applicant’s authority to file computations on behalf of the Respondent. This issue was expressly discussed and settled in paragraphs 69 and 70 of the Taxation Reference Ruling. 55.Further, this Court rendered itself on the subject matter value in the ruling. Yet again, the Respondent wants the Court to reconsider the same. On the issue, the Court is functus officio. The decision thereon can only be overturned by the Court of Appeal. 56.The Respondent has a similar application like the instant ending in the main suit, seeking review of the ruling, making this application an abuse of the court process and sub judice. 57.Counsel further submits that Rule 74 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court [Procedure] Rules prohibits the filing of an application for review where the Applicant has already commenced an appeal against the decision sought to be reviewed. To support this submission, Counsel cites the decision in Serephen Nyasani v Rispah Onsase [2018] KEELC 654 [KLR]. 58.Counsel further submits that it is undeniable that the Respondent chose to appeal the Taxation Reference Ruling over reviewing the same. It proffered an appeal in respect of the ruling by filing a notice of appeal dated 1st July 2025. The Notice of Appeal was defective as it was filed 64 days after the ruling. At the Applicant's instance, the Notice was struck out by the Court of Appeal. Its journey to the Court of Appeal having come to an end as it did, the Respondent cannot be allowed to engage this court by way of an application for review. 59.Under Civil Application Number E 293 OF 2025, filed at the Court of Appeal, the Respondent sought for leave to appeal against the Taxation Reference Ruling. The Court of Appeal declined the Application. 60.The Application is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process. The only reason why the instant application has been filed before this court yet is very clear that the Court has already pronounced itself on the taxation reference is the Respondent’s failure to succeed in any of the applications that it had filed at the Court of Appeal. It has manufacture material for purposes of this application. 61.On whether the Respondent’s application discloses a valid ground for review, Counsel submits that Section 16 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act vests this court with the authority to review its decisions. Rule 74 of the court’s Procedure Rules, the grounds on which an application for review can be entertained. The principles governing exercise of the authority is now trite. The authority is fettered, only exercisable within the set parameters of the law. To support these submissions, reliance has been placed on the Republic v Advocates Disciplinary Tribunal exparte Apollo Mboya [2019] eKLR. 62.It is further submitted that the Respondent has grounded its application on the ground of discovery of a new and important matter. This ground cannot serve as a basis for a grant of the order for review, in light of the jurisprudence in the Apollo Mboya case [supra]. The consent did not exist at the time of the ruling and therefore cannot serve as a basis for a review application. In an application for review, the Court must confine its adjudication with reference to the material that was available at the time of the initial decision. 63.Further, the subsequent decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court cannot be a basis for review. In any event, the consent was irregularly adopted by Justice Wasilwa on 9th March 2026. Reliance is placed on the Apollo case. 64.Counsel submits that a consent entered into by parties to a suit after termination of the services of an Advocate cannot be used as a basis for the subject matter value for taxing the Terminated Advocate’s fees. To support this point, Counsel places reliance on Rachier & Amollo Advocates v Noble Gases International Limited [2023] KEHC 19094 [KLR]. 65.Counsel further cites a United Kingdom decision, Gavin Edmondson Solicitors Limited [ Respondent/Cross-Appellant] v Haven Insurance Company Limited [Appellant/Cross- Respondent] [2018] UKSC 21, where it was held;“In our judgment the law is today [and in our view, has been for fully two centuries that court will intervene to protect a Solicitor’s claim on funds recovered or due to be recovered by a client or former client if [a] the paying is colluding with the client to cheat the solicitor of his fees [b] the paying party is on notice that other party’s has a claim on the funds for outstanding fees.” 66.The facts of this matter reveal that the consent, which is a misrepresentation of the correct amounts owed to the Respondent by the Corporation was entered into in collusion between the Corporation and the Respondent with the sole aim of defrauding the Applicant of his rightful dues. Analysis and Determination. 67.I have carefully considered the Respondent’s application, the grounds upon which it is premised, the affidavit in support thereof, the Replying affidavit by the Applicant, the further affidavit filed by the Respondent, and the respective submissions by the parties’ Advocates, and the following issues emerge for determination;I.Whether this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to determine the instant application;II.If the answer to [I] above is in the affirmative, the application has met the legal threshold for grant of a review application; andIII.Whether a consent entered into by parties to a suit after the termination of services on an Advocate can be the basis for the subject matter value for determining that Advocate’s legal fees. 68.Inarguably, this Court through its ruling dated 30th April 2025, rendered itself on the Taxation Reference after duly considering the parties’ respective arguments and conclusively rendered itself thereon on merit. Further, directed the Taxing Officer, other than the one who had conducted the impugned Taxation, within certain parameters that this Court held were relevant and legally applicable, and fair, in the circumstances of the matter, including the judgment in main suit. The Taxing Officer, faithfully undertook the process conclusively as directed and guided by the ruling. 69.In my view, a taxation reference is, in substance and effect appellate in nature. It is the statutory mechanism through which a superior court exercises supervisory jurisdiction over the decision of a taxing officer. Once that jurisdiction has been invoked and the superior court pronounced itself on the issues raised in the reference, its mandate is exhausted save such residual jurisdiction as the law expressly preserves. Where, upon determining the reference, the superior court remits the bill to the Taxing Officer for re-taxation within clearly defined parameters, the taxing officer’s mandate is confined to implementing those directions and nothing more. 70.Accordingly, once the taxing officer has re-taxed the bill in faithful compliance with the superior court’s directions, the superior court cannot be invited, under the guise of review, to reopen issues that were or ought to have been determined in the reference. To do so would offend the doctrine of finality of litigation and impermissibly convert the court’s limited jurisdiction into a second appellate process. 71.By reason of the foregoing premises, it is not difficult to conclude that this Court is barred by the doctrine of functus officio, to assume jurisdiction over the Respondent’s application. 72.Counsel for the Applicant submitted that the Respondent’s application herein offends the doctrine of res judicata I various ways. The Applicant’s Counsel contended that the Applicant’s reliance on the doctrine flows from a total misapprehension of the doctrine and its scope. 73.The Court in John Florence Maritime Services Limited & another v Cabinet Secretary Transport & Infrastructure & 3 others [2021] KESC 39KLR], elaborately stated of the doctrine of res judicata, its scope and purpose thus; 74.With respect to Counsel for the Respondent, I take the view that her attack on the Applicant’s Counsel’s submissions on the doctrine and how it relates to and impacts the instant application, is premised on a narrow consideration of the matters in the current application that Counsel for the Applicant regards as res judicata, and the scope of the doctrine generally, and applicability of the doctrine in application. 75.The Applicant’s argument, as I see it, was simply this. In its hitherto rulings, this Court conclusively pronounced that evidence and/or documents not before the Taxing Officer during taxation are impermissible in Taxation Reference proceedings, owing to the nature of this Court’s jurisdiction as mentioned above. This has not been challenged by the Respondent’s Counsel in any manner. Yet, despite these conclusive pronouncements, the Respondent once again invites this Court to consider a document, the consent, which was not before the initial Taxing Officer or the Taxing Officer during the re-taxation process. This is a valid legal point raised by Counsel for the Applicant, which could not afford a casual response, as was given in this matter. 76.The Counsel for the Respondent contended that the doctrine does not apply to the consent, as it was neither one of the documents nor the type of evidence that this Court addressed in its previous rulings and upon which it issued its determination. The critical aspect, in my view, is that the consent is evidence/documentation that was not presented before the Taxing Officer. Having conclusively determined the acceptability and admissibility of documents at that stage of the dispute between an Advocate and Client concerning fees payable to the former, this Court cannot be persuaded to entertain the consideration of the consent. It is immaterial that the specific document or evidence was not under review at the time the earlier decision[s] were made. 77.I have carefully considered the proceedings before the Taxing Officers, the documents filed in the Taxation Reference, and the averments made by the parties regarding the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. A single indisputable fact emerges, namely that the Respondent did not at any point indicate that it was engaged in a reconciliation exercise with the Corporation or that it had reached an agreement on the actual sum owing to the Scheme. 78.If there was indeed such a reconciliation process or agreement, nothing could have been easier than to introduce that fact through any of the many affidavits the Respondent filed during the proceedings. Having failed to do so, when they ought to have, allows the doctrine of res judicata to apply against their bid to introduce the new evidence/document. The alleged “gag order” did not in any way prevent them from engaging in any agreement process before or during the Advocate-Client bill taxation process. 79.In my view it is trite law [ and the position obtains across several jurisdictions] that an application for review of a court order or judgment is, by its very nature, a creature of statute and the applicable procedural rules. It is not an invitation to the court to revisit, reconsider, or sit on appeal over its own decision merely because a party is dissatisfied with the outcome. The jurisdiction for review is therefore neither inherent nor unfettered. It is a narrowly circumscribed jurisdiction, exercisable only within the specific parameters expressly prescribed by law. 80.In Board of Control for Cricket, India v Netaji Cricket Club, AIR 2005 SC 592, quoting Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v Most Rev. Paulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526, the Supreme Court of India observed;“Before going into the merits of the case, it is well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasise that the provision in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar to OXLVII, r 1of our Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow review on three specified grounds, namely [i] discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed [ii] mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and [iii]for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words “any other sufficient reason” must mean a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule” 81.In Accredo Ag & 3 others v Steffano Uccelli& Another [2017] eKLR, cited by Counsel for the Respondent, the Court of Appeal stated;“The aggrieved person instituting a review must satisfy the court that: a] There has been discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him after exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order made, or there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or there exists sufficient reason to review the decree/order.’’ 82.It is no doubt true that the Respondent’s application is anchored on the ground that subsequent to the ruling there became available a new and important matter or evidence, the consent, which definitively fixed the Subject Matter Value. Further, the said evidence or important matter did not exist when the taxation proceedings were conducted and when the ruling sought to be reviewed was made. 83.The Counsel for the Respondent submitted that alleged new evidence or an important matter can ground a review application only if that evidence or matter existed at the time of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed. The Respondent asserted that the provision cannot be accorded a limited application as suggested by the Applicant, as that would result in injustice in some situations. 84.In my view, the language of the ground for review is based on “the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the Applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed,’’ admits only one logical interpretation. It contemplates the discovery of evidence or a material fact that already existed at the time the impugned decision was rendered, but which, despite the Applicant’s exercise of due diligence, remained unknown or unavailable. It does not extend to evidence, events, or circumstances that come into existence only after the decision has been made. 85.The wording of the provision itself compels this interpretation. It speaks of evidence that “was not within the knowledge of the Applicant or could not be produced at the time of the order or decree. These expressions necessarily presuppose that the evidence or matter was already in existence, for one to be unaware of, or fail to produce, something that had not yet come into being. If the legislature intended subsequent events to constitute a ground of review, it would have employed language like “newly arising facts” or ‘subsequent developments.’’ Instead, it deliberately anchored the inquiry to the state of affairs existing at the time of the original decision. 86.I say so considering the philosophy underpinning the law on review. A review is not intended to provide parties with an opportunity to reopen concluded litigation whenever circumstances change after a decision. Rather, it serves the narrow purpose of correcting a decision rendered without the benefit of material evidence that existed but was not placed before the court. It enables the court to revisit its decision because it was made on an incomplete factual record, not because the factual landscape has subsequently changed. 87.To hold otherwise would fundamentally alter the character of review proceedings. Every subsequent agreement, consent, transaction, legislative amendment, or factual development affecting the parties' rights could serve as a basis for reopening final decisions. Such an approach would undermine the doctrine of finality of litigation and expose judgments to perpetual challenge. 88.The Court in the Apollo case [supra], cited by counsel for the Applicant, aptly puts it forth that while considering an application for review, the court must confine its adjudication with reference to the material, which was available at the time of the initial decision. 89.Important to point out that where rights or obligations are altered by events occurring after judgment, the law ordinarily provides other appropriate remedies depending on the nature of those events. Such subsequent developments may justify other proceedings where the law permits, but not to satisfy the statutory ground of “discovery of new and important matter or evidence for purposes of review. 90.In light of the material presented before this Court, the parties undoubtedly invite this Court to assess whether a consent entered into by the parties subsequent to the taxation of an Advocate-and-Client Bill of Costs, which may adversely affect the taxing Advocate and to which the Advocate was not a party, can legally serve as a basis for an application for review of a Taxation Reference Ruling, particularly for the purpose of reducing the Subject Matter Value. 91.A consent entered into by parties after an Advocate-and-Client Bill of Costs has already been taxed, particularly where the Advocate whose fees are affected had ceased acting for the client long before the consent was executed, cannot constitute a proper foundation for an application to review the taxation or value of the subject matter. The Advocate's entitlement to costs crystallises upon taxation on the basis of a retainer, the work undertaken, and the legal and factual circumstances prevailing at the time of taxation. Those accrued rights cannot be diluted or extinguished by a private compromise reached between the parties to which the Advocate was neither a party nor privy. 92.To hold otherwise would expose taxed costs to uncertainty and render the taxation process vulnerable to manipulation through subsequent settlements deliberately structured to diminish an Advocate’s earned fees. Such an approach would undermine the finality of taxation proceedings, erode the Advocate’s independent right to remuneration, offend the Advocate’s right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution, and offend the principle that review is confined to statutory grounds prescribed by law, not subsequent events that merely alter parties’ commercial or litigation positions. A post- taxation consent is therefore incapable, without more, of reopening a concluded taxation or furnishing sufficient reason for review of the Taxation Reference Ruling or Taxing Officer’s decision. 93.In the upshot, I find the Respondent’s application lacking in merit. It does not, inter alia, satisfy the conditions necessary for grant of an application for review. It is hereby dismissed with costs. READ, SIGNED AND DELIVERED THIS 25TH DAY OF JUNE 2026OCHARO KEBIRAJUDGE.