https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12404

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT KISUMU** **CIVIL APPEAL NO. E079 OF 2025** **MORGAN SIMWA ………………….…………………………….….. APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **BOARD MANAGEMENT FAMILY HEALTH CARE HOSPITAL …RESPONDENT** ***(Being an appeal from the Judgment of the Small Claims Court at Kisumu (Hon. G. C. Serem, Resident Magistrate/Adjudicator) delivered on 27th February 2025 in Kisumu SCCCOMM No. E1252 of 2024)*** **JUDGMENT** **BACKGROUND** 1. This appeal concerns a modest sum but raises an important question about the proper limits of an appeal from the Small Claims Court. The Appellant, Morgan Simwa, claimed Kshs. 25,000 as the unpaid balance of an oral contract for renovation works at Family Health Care Hospital. The Respondent admitted both the contract price of Kshs. 250,000 and payments totalling Kshs. 225,000, but maintained that the final Kshs. 25,000 was payable only upon completion and that a small store or shelving component had not been completed. The Small Claims Court dismissed the claim. The Appellant asks this Court to reverse that conclusion. 2. The difference between the accounts given by the parties is therefore narrow. It is not whether they contracted, whether the agreed price was Kshs. 250,000, or whether Kshs. 225,000 was paid. It is whether the balance became due because the contracted work was completed, and - at the appellate stage - whether the Adjudicator’s conclusion on that question discloses an error of law within Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act. 3. I have considered the entire record placed before the Court. The earliest document is the Respondent’s internal Kisumu Branch Executive Committee minutes of 9th March 2024. The minutes recorded approval of renovation of the pharmacy and reception at a budget not exceeding Kshs. 250,000. The description included a small store and behind the entrance door for public service. Since those were the Respondent’s internal minutes, they cannot, without more, conclusively prove every term communicated to and accepted by the Appellant. They are nevertheless contemporaneous evidence of the project the Respondent says it authorised. 4. On 21st May 2024 the Appellant issued a quotation and an invoice. The quotation was headed “Renovation of Reception and Pharmacy Shelves.” It itemised materials, pharmacy shelves and labour, giving a total of Kshs. 250,000. That document is significant in two respects. First, it confirms the admitted contract price. Secondly, while it expressly mentions shelves, it does not separately describe the disputed small store. The omission does not by itself settle the controversy because the contract was oral and the quotation may not have been an exhaustive statement of every detail. It does, however, mean that the precise scope had to be found from all the evidence rather than assumed from the Respondent’s internal minutes alone. 5. By a letter dated 28th May 2024, the Appellant requested a further Kshs. 125,000. He stated that funds had been exhausted and that payment would “enable us to complete the remaining work on time.” The letter is an admission that some work remained incomplete on 28th May 2024. Its evidential reach must be kept within that date. It does not logically prove that the works remained incomplete for all time thereafter. 6. A later request dated 8th July 2024 asked the Respondent to clear a balance of Kshs. 25,000 for the pharmacy and reception renovation. Unlike the earlier letter, the later request did not say that money was required to complete outstanding work. It supports the Appellant’s position that, by then, he regarded the contract as fully performed and the balance as due. It was, however, his own demand; it was not an acceptance note, completion certificate or other acknowledgment from the Respondent. 7. The Appellant’s advocates then issued a demand letter dated 18th September 2024 for Kshs. 25,000, together with Kshs. 5,000 stated to be advocates’ charges. The demand shows persistence of the claim but, like the letter of 8th July 2024, it does not independently prove completion. 8. The Statement of Claim was dated 28th November 2024. On the same date, the Appellant executed his witness statement and his list of witnesses and list of documents. He pleaded that the Respondent had retained him to renovate the reception and pharmacy shelves for Kshs. 250,000; that he completed the works; that the Respondent paid Kshs. 225,000; and that Kshs. 25,000 remained unpaid. He sought that sum, costs and interest. 9. The Response to Claim and counterclaim was dated 15th January 2025. The Respondent admitted the contract and the payment of Kshs. 225,000, denied that the works were complete, and alleged that the Appellant abandoned the project before constructing a small store and completing shelving. It asked that the claim be dismissed, that the Appellant be ordered to complete the works, and that it be awarded Kshs. 50,000 for alleged breach. The witness statements of Edward Marienga and Godwin Digo, and the Respondent’s lists of witnesses and documents, were also dated 15th January 2025. 10. At the hearing of the matter, the Appellant testified as CW1. He said that the oral agreement was made through a doctor and Musa Amindo; that he renovated the reception and pharmacy; that the works agreed upon were completed; and that Musa cleared him. He acknowledged that there was no written contract. He further accepted that he did not call Musa, his colleague, or another person named Jack. He explained that a bucket and poplin had been left at the premises but denied leaving working tools there. 11. Edward Marienga testified as RW1. He described himself as the Respondent’s Executive Director and said he was based at Rongai or Nairobi. He admitted the oral agreement, the contract price and payment of Kshs. 225,000. He stated that the final payment was to follow completion and that branch reports showed that a small store was incomplete. His evidence concerning the physical state of the works was substantially dependent on what had been reported to him. He explained that Musa had not attended court because he was unwell. 12. Godwin Digo testified as RW2. He said he chaired the Kisumu branch and oversaw the project. His evidence was that the Appellant failed to complete the small store or shelf. He produced the minutes of 9th March 2024 and a photograph showing items said to have been left at the premises. In cross-examination, he acknowledged the Appellant’s request of 8th July 2024 for the balance, but maintained that part of the work remained outstanding. He said the Respondent was not refusing to pay; it wanted the outstanding work completed. 13. The photograph produced by the Respondent did not, on its face, establish the dimensions or precise state of the alleged small store. Its evident relevance was that it showed tools, clothing or materials said to have been left on site. That circumstance permitted an inference consistent with unfinished work, but it did not compel that inference. Workers can leave miscellaneous materials even after substantial or complete performance. The more direct evidence for the Respondent was RW2’s assertion, based on his claimed oversight of the project, that the small store remained incomplete. 14. In the judgment delivered on 27th February 2025, the Adjudicator framed the question as whether the Respondent owed the Appellant the pleaded sum. She referred to sections 107 to 109 of the Evidence Act and to **Mbuthia Macharia versus Annah Mutua Ndwiga & another (2017) eKLR.** She found that the Appellant had not proved completion, relied on his letter of 28th May 2024 and the Respondent’s photograph, and dismissed the claim with costs. 15. The judgment’s treatment of the record was incomplete. The proposition that there was nothing after the letter of 28th May 2024 to evidence completion overlooked the request of 8th July 2024 and the Appellant’s oral testimony that he had completed the work and had been cleared by Musa. The reasons were also terse and did not analyse the respective strengths and limitations of the parties’ evidence. Those deficiencies are material to the scrutiny this Court must undertake. They do not, however, answer the distinct jurisdictional question whether the ultimate finding was unsupported by evidence, perverse, or attributed to a wrong legal principle. 16. The Adjudicator did not expressly determine the Respondent’s counterclaim for Kshs. 50,000 or its request for an order compelling completion. The Respondent did not file a cross-appeal against that omission. Accordingly, the counterclaim is not open for determination in this appeal, and nothing in this judgment should be understood as allowing it. **THE APPEAL** 1. By the Memorandum of Appeal dated 14th March 2025, the Appellant raised seven grounds: 2. The Learned Trial Magistrate/adjudicator erred and misdirected herself by relying on wrong principles when determining the matter there by dismissing the Appellant’s case herein. 3. The Learned Trial Magistrate/adjudicator erred and misdirected herself and failed to apply precedents and tenets/principles of the law applicable in the law of contract especially on the burden of proof. 4. The Learned Magistrate/adjudicator erred in law and in fact by failing to adequately the evidence and produced by the appellant and thereby arrived at a decision unsustainable in law. 5. The Learned Trial Magistrate/adjudicator erred and misdirected herself by ignoring the claimant’s submissions on record hence arriving at a wrong decision. 6. The Learned Trial Magistrate/Adjudicator erred in both law and fact in falling to appreciate the fact that the Appellant had a good case against the respondent. 7. The Learned Trial Magistrate grossly misdirected herself In treating the evidence before her superficially and consequently especially on coming to a wrong conclusion on the same. 8. The Learned Trial magistrate misapprehended the evidence on record to a material degree resulting in her arriving at a wrong conclusion. 9. The Appellant prays that the appeal be allowed, that the judgment of the Small Claims Court be set aside, and that he be awarded the costs of the appeal. **ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION** 1. Although the grounds overlap, they present five questions: first, the scope of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act; secondly, the terms of the oral contract material to payment of the balance; thirdly, the allocation and discharge of the burden of proof; fourth, whether the finding of non-completion was legally impeachable on the record; and fifth, whether the alleged failure to consider submissions vitiated the judgment. **The scope of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act** 1. Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act, Cap. 10A provides: ***“(1) A person aggrieved by the decision or an order of the Court may appeal against that decision or order to the High Court on matters of law.*** ***(2) An appeal from any decision or order referred to in subsection (1) shall be final.”*** 1. The restriction to matters of law is deliberate. It preserves the Small Claims Court as a forum for simple, prompt and proportionate adjudication, while retaining supervision for legal error. The relevant guiding principles appear in Section 3(3), which directs the Small Claims Court to adopt appropriate procedures to ensure: ***“(a) the timely disposal of all proceedings before the Court using the least expensive method;*** ***(b) equal opportunity to access judicial services under this Act;*** ***(c) fairness of process; and*** ***(d) simplicity of procedure.”*** 1. The statutory objective does not immunise a decision that rests on no evidence, applies a wrong legal test, ignores a decisive admitted fact, or reaches a conclusion no reasonable tribunal could reach. Equally, a party cannot evade Section 38 merely by describing disagreement with factual findings as “misdirection,” “misapprehension,” or an error “in law and fact.” The Court must examine the substance of each complaint. 2. In **Munya versus Kithinji & 2 others (Petition 2B of 2014) [2014] KESC 38 (KLR) (30 May 2014),** the Supreme Court analysed an appellate jurisdiction similarly confined to matters of law. At paragraphs 80 and 81, the Court identified three relevant dimensions: interpretation of law; application of law to established facts; and scrutiny of a trial conclusion alleged to be unsupported by evidence or so perverse that no reasonable tribunal could reach it. The decisive caution was: ***“it is not enough for the appellant to contend that the trial Judge would probably have arrived at a different conclusion on the evidence.”*** 1. The Supreme Court further explained at paragraph 93 that an appellate court may navigate the evidential record to test whether the conclusion is supported, but must defer to the trial court on credibility and probative value. That framework is apt here. The factual record may be examined to determine whether the Adjudicator applied the correct burden, ignored legally decisive evidence, or made an unsupported or perverse finding. It may not be reopened simply so that this Court can choose the inference it personally finds more attractive. 2. The same reasoning is reflected in **Kilonzo versus Ndolo (Civil Appeal 127 of 2018) [2023] KECA 1030 (KLR) (4 August 2023),** paragraph 21, where the Court of Appeal quoted **Makube vs Nyamiro [1983] eKLR** as follows: ***“A court on appeal will not normally interfere with the finding of fact by a trial court unless it is based on no evidence, or on a misapprehension of the evidence, or the judge is shown demonstrably to have acted on wrong principles in reaching his conclusion.”*** 1. Read against the limits imposed by Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act, grounds 1, 2 and 4 are capable of raising matters of law. Ground 1 alleges the application of wrong legal principles; ground 2 challenges the principles governing contractual liability and the burden of proof; while ground 4 alleges a failure to consider the Appellant’s legal arguments. Those grounds do not, however, become questions of law merely because they are expressed in legal language. The Appellant must identify the particular principle that was wrongly applied or disregarded and demonstrate that the error materially affected the decision. Grounds 3, 5, 6 and 7, in substance, challenge the Adjudicator’s assessment of the evidence and invite this Court to arrive at a different factual conclusion. They fall outside the ordinary scope of Section 38, except to the limited extent that the Appellant alleges that the impugned finding was based on no evidence, was unsupported by the established facts, resulted from a material misapprehension of the evidence amounting to an error of law, or was so perverse that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could have reached it. It is within those limits that the Court will examine the record and determine the appeal. **The terms of the oral contract material to payment of the balance** 1. There was no controversy that the parties made an oral contract for works, that the agreed price was Kshs. 250,000, and that Kshs. 225,000 was paid. An oral contract for this kind of service is not unenforceable merely because it was not reduced into writing. The real difficulty is evidential: the parties did not record the complete scope, the sequence of instalments, an objective completion process, or what was to happen if a minor item remained outstanding. 2. The Appellant’s claim necessarily asserted that the debt was presently due. The Respondent’s consistent answer was that the last installment became due only on completion. That answer was not an excuse. It directly defined the alleged maturity of the debt. The Appellant himself litigated on the basis that he had completed the work; he did not contend that the final Kshs. 25,000 was payable despite non-completion. 3. A court may ascertain an oral agreement from the parties’ testimony, their contemporaneous documents and their subsequent conduct, but it may not improve the bargain for either party. In **Pius Kimaiyo Langat versus Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd (Civil Appeal 48 of 2015) [2017] KECA 152 (KLR) (1 December 2017)**, at paragraph 38, the Court of Appeal emphasised: ***“We are alive to the hallowed legal maxim that it is not the business of courts to rewrite contracts between parties. They are bound by the terms of their contracts, unless coercion, fraud or undue influence are pleaded and proved. See National Bank of Kenya Ltd vs Pipeplastic Samkolit (K) Ltd [2002]2 EA 503. The primary task of the court is to construe the contract and any terms implied in it. See Megarry, J. in the case of Coco vs A. N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd. - [1969]RPC 41.”*** 1. The internal minutes of 9th March 2024 describe a small store; the Appellant’s quotation of 21st May 2024 describes reception renovation and pharmacy shelves but does not separately itemise such a store. Neither document was signed by both parties as an integrated contract. It would therefore have been wrong to treat either document, standing alone, as conclusive. The Adjudicator had to decide, from the oral and documentary evidence together, whether the small store formed part of the works communicated to and undertaken by the Appellant. 2. The record does not show that the parties agreed upon a formal completion certificate. The Appellant could not therefore be defeated merely because he lacked one. Conversely, his own assertion that Musa “cleared” him was disputed and uncorroborated by Musa. The lawful question was not whether a particular document existed, but whether, on all the credible material, the Appellant proved that he had performed the work upon which the last installment depended. 3. Neither party’s failure to call Musa, Jack or the Appellant’s colleague automatically determined the case. An adverse inference from an absent witness is not a mechanical substitute for evaluating the evidence actually called, particularly where each side referred to persons it did not produce and there was an explanation that Musa was unwell. The absences nevertheless left the tribunal with the directly conflicting accounts of CW1 and RW2, the more remote evidence of RW1, and the documentary sequence. **The allocation and discharge of the burden of proof** 1. Sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act state: “107. (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. 108. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. 109. The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.” 1. In **Mbuthia Macharia versus Annah Mutua Ndwiga & another (Civil Appeal 297 of 2015) [2017] KECA 290 (KLR) (29 September 2017)**, at paragraphs 15–16, the Court of Appeal distinguished the constant legal burden from the shifting evidential burden. Its formulation included the following: “… The legal burden is the burden of proof which remains constant throughout a trial. it is the burden of establishing the facts and contentions which will support a party’s case. If at the conclusion of the trial he has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. ***‘’14 The legal burden of proof normally rests upon the party desiring the court to take action; thus a claimant must satisfy the court or tribunal that the conditions which entitle him to an award have been satisfied. In respect of a particular allegation, the burden lies upon the party for whom substantiation of that particular allegation is an essential of his case. There may therefore be separate burdens in a case with separate issues…”*** 1. Applied here, the legal burden rested on the Appellant to establish the contractual debt he asserted. It was not enough to prove only the original price and prior payments, because those facts were admitted and did not identify when the last installment matured. On the case as pleaded and tried, the Appellant had to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the completion that made the retained sum payable. 2. The evidential burden was dynamic. The Appellant’s quotation, evidence of substantial payment, request of 8th July 2024, demand of 18th September 2024 and oral testimony of completion formed a prima facie case requiring an answer. The Respondent could not defeat it by a bare denial. It assumed an evidential burden to place before the tribunal credible material supporting its assertion that an agreed component remained incomplete. 3. The Respondent supplied such an answer through RW2’s testimony that he oversaw the project and that the small store or shelf had not been completed. The internal minutes supported the Respondent’s contention that a store was within the approved project, while the photograph and presence of items on site provided limited circumstantial support. RW1’s evidence added some context on the physical condition because he was not locally based, but it confirmed the Respondent’s consistent position that the balance was being retained pending completion. 4. Section 32 of the Small Claims Court Act modifies the strict application of evidentiary rules but does not erase the burden or civil standard of proof. So far as material, it provides: “(1) The Court shall not be bound wholly by the Rules of evidence. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the Court may admit as evidence in any proceedings before it, any oral or written testimony, record or other material that the Court considers credible or trustworthy even though the testimony, record or other material is not admissible as evidence in any other Court under the law of evidence. (3) Evidence tendered to the Court by or on behalf of a party to any proceedings may not be given on oath but that Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, require that such evidence or any part thereof be given on oath whether orally or in writing. (4) The Court may, on its own initiative, seek and receive such other evidence and make such other investigations and inquiries as it may require.” 1. That provision promotes accessibility and a practical search for reliable truth. It permits the Adjudicator to consider the minutes, photograph, letters and witness accounts without the formal rigidity of ordinary civil litigation. It does not mean that every admitted item carries equal weight; credibility and trustworthiness remain explicit statutory touchstones. Nor does it authorise entry of judgment for a claimant who has not proved that the debt is due. **Whether the finding is legally impeachable** 1. The evidence should be separated into what it established strongly, what it established only weakly, and what it did not establish at all. The letter of 28th May 2024 strongly established that works were then incomplete. It did not establish the position in July 2024. The request of 8th July 2024 and demand of 18th September 2024 strongly established that the Appellant later asserted a right to the balance. Being unilateral, they did not establish that the Respondent accepted completion. The quotation strongly established the price and broad character of the work but was equivocal on whether a small store was included. The minutes showed the Respondent’s contemporaneous project intention but did not, alone, prove that every item was communicated to the Appellant. 2. The oral evidence was correspondingly decisive. CW1 said he completed the agreed work and Musa cleared him. RW2 said he supervised the project and that the small store or shelf remained incomplete. Both versions were possible on the documentary record. The photograph was not a substitute for direct evidence of the allegedly omitted structure, but RW2’s testimony was itself evidence. The record therefore did not present an uncontroverted claim or a defence based only on speculation. 3. The Adjudicator erred factually when she reasoned as though no evidence after 28th May 2024 supported completion. The letter of 8th July 2024 existed, and CW1 expressly testified to completion. A judicial decision must address material evidence on both sides and give intelligible reasons for preferring one account. The Small Claims Court’s simplified procedure relaxes formality; it does not relax the duty of fair evaluation. 4. The consequence of that error is the critical point. An appellate court does not set aside a decision merely because a sentence in its reasons is inaccurate. It asks whether the error removed the evidential or legal foundation of the conclusion. Here it did not. Even after restoring the overlooked evidence to the balance, the Respondent’s opposing evidence remained: RW2 claimed direct oversight and identified the incomplete component; the March minutes contemporaneously referred to that component; the 28th May letter admitted incompletion at an earlier stage; and the items left on site offered limited corroboration. 5. The later demand documents did not independently certify completion, and the alleged clearance by Musa was not corroborated. A reasonable fact-finder could therefore accept RW2’s evidence and conclude that the Appellant had not proved complete performance on a balance of probabilities. A different fact-finder might attach greater weight to the quotation, the reduction of the unpaid sum to only ten per cent of the price, and the Respondent’s failure to produce Musa or Jack. The existence of that alternative assessment demonstrates evidential contest; it does not demonstrate legal perversity. 6. This distinction is decisive under Section 38. To allow the appeal, this Court would have to reassess the relative credibility of CW1 and RW2, recalibrate the weight of the minutes and photograph, and substitute its preferred inference for that of the tribunal which heard the witnesses. The court in **Munya (Supra)** forbids that exercise unless the challenged conclusion lacked evidential support or was one no reasonable tribunal could reach. The threshold is not met. 7. I also reject any suggestion that the Adjudicator impermissibly placed the entire evidential burden on the Appellant. Her reasons were compressed, but the cited sections 107 to 109 and **Mbuthia Macharia** (Supra) correctly identify the legal burden. The Appellant bore the constant burden of proving a due debt; the Respondent then adduced rebuttal evidence of incompletion. The outcome can therefore be sustained by applying the correct distinction between the legal and evidential burdens to the record. 8. The small proportion withheld - Kshs. 25,000 out of Kshs. 250,000 - might have supported an alternative case based on substantial performance, the reasonable cost of curing a minor defect, or remuneration for work accepted and retained. No such alternative cause was distinctly pleaded or proved. There was no valuation of the omitted work, evidence of its reasonable cost to complete, or contractual basis for apportioning the final instalment. The Court cannot rewrite the parties’ bargain or fashion a *quantum meruit* award on an evidential basis the parties did not present. 9. It follows that grounds 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 do not succeed. The trial reasons should have been more vast and should have acknowledged the evidence arising after 28th May 2024. Nevertheless, the applicable burden was not reversed, relevant rebuttal evidence existed, and the conclusion was within the range available to a reasonable tribunal. The identified shortcomings do not mature into an appealable error of law. **The whether the alleged failure to consider submissions vitiated the judgment** 1. Ground 4 alleges that the Adjudicator ignored the Appellant’s submissions. That ground faces a challenge. Submissions organise and explain a party’s case; they do not replace evidence required to prove a disputed fact. 2. The Court of Appeal stated in **Moi v Muriithi & another (Civil Appeal 240 of 2011) [2014] KECA 642 (KLR) (9 May 2014)**: ***“… Submissions are generally parties’ “marketing language”, each side endeavouring to convince the court that its case is the better one. Submissions, we reiterate, do not constitute evidence at all. Indeed there are many cases decided without hearing submissions but based only on evidence presented…”*** 1. A court should consider the parties’ submissions and address substantial legal propositions necessary to its decision. But it is not obliged to reproduce every argument, and failure to mention a submission is not, without demonstrated prejudice or a resulting legal error, an independent basis for setting aside a judgment. The Appellant has not identified from the available record any legal argument which, if considered, would have removed the evidential conflict or compelled judgment in his favour. Ground 4 therefore fails. 2. The appeal has exposed a real weakness in the impugned judgment: it did not acknowledge the Appellant’s request of 8th July 2024 or adequately analyse his oral evidence of later completion. This Court has corrected that omission in its review of the legal sustainability of the decision. Having done so, I am satisfied that the record still contained evidence upon which a reasonable tribunal could find that the Appellant had not proved that the final Kshs. 25,000 was due. Section 38 does not authorise a retrial of that factual contest. 3. On costs, the ordinary consequence would follow the event. I nevertheless take account of the deficient reasons below and the absence, from the material placed before this Court, of any appellate submissions or other substantive participation by the Respondent in the appeal. Justice is served by preserving the costs order made in the Small Claims Court but requiring each party to bear its own costs of this appeal. **DISPOSITION** 1. Accordingly, the final orders are: 2. The appeal is dismissed. 3. The judgment of the Small Claims Court at Kisumu delivered on 27th February 2025 in SCCCOMM No. E1252 of 2024, dismissing the Appellant’s claim, is upheld. 4. For avoidance of doubt, no order is made on the Respondent’s counterclaim because it was not determined below and no cross-appeal was filed. 5. The order as to costs made by the Small Claims Court shall remain undisturbed. 6. Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal. **HON. ALEX K. ITHUKU** **JUDGE** **DATED, DELIVERED AND SIGNED THIS 24TH DAY OF JULY 2026** **Court Assistant – Anastacia** **Ms. Nanungi for the Appellant** **The respondent did not participate** **Court** Judgment delivered in Virtual Court. Ms. Nanungi for the appellant. Respondent absent. **HON. ALEX K. ITHUKU** **JUDGE** **24/07/2026**