Muange v Kenya School of Law & another (Appeal E034 of 2026) [2026] KELEAT 11 (KLR) (29 May 2026) (Judgment)

 # REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE TRIBUNAL OF KENYA AT NAIROBI COUNTY COURT NAME: LEGAL EDUCATION APPEALS TRIBUNAL CASE NUMBER: LEAA/E034/2026 EVERLYNE VS KENYA SCHOOL OF LAW AND COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION # JUDGMENT ## A. Introduction and Background 1. The Appellant, **EVERLYNE KAII MUANGE**, instituted this appeal before the Tribunal against the **KENYA SCHOOL OF LAW** as the Respondent and the **COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION** as an Interested Party, vide a Memorandum of Appeal dated **2nd February 2026,** seeking the following orders: 1. That this Honourable Tribunal be pleased to certify the instant appeal asbeing urgent and direct that the same be heard on priority basis; 2. An order setting aside and quashing the decision of the respondentmade on 27th December 2025 and 27th January 2026; 3. A declaration be and is hereby made that the Appellant is qualified foradmission into the Advocates Training Program by dint of the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations 2016; * 1. A declaration recognizing the Appellant’s Prior Relevant Learning; 2. An order compelling the Respondent to admit the Appellant to theAdvocates Training Program (A.T.P) for the academic year 2026/2027, (if practicable). 3. An order in the alternative to (v) compelling the Respondent to admit theAppellant to the Advocates Training Program (A.T.P) for the academic year 2027/2028; * 1. An order awarding costs of the Appeal to the Appellant; 2. An order granting such further or consequential orders as thisHonourable Tribunal may deem fit in the interests of justice. 1. The Appeal is premised on the following grounds: - 2. **THAT** the Respondent herein erred in fact and in law in denying the appellant admission into the Advocates Training Program (ATP)for the year 2026/2027 on the basis that the appellant did not meet the minimum requirement of a mean grade C+ in Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education. 3. **THAT** the Respondent herein erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the applicability and/or relevance of the Applicant’s prior relevant learning and in turn denying the applicant admission into the Advocates Training Program (ATP) for the year 2026/2027; 4. **THAT** the respondent herein erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the Appellant’s Appeal on meritorious grounds and consequently denying the Appellant admission into the Advocates Training Program (ATP) for the year 2026/2027 5. **THAT** the respondent herein erred in law in failing to recognize and apply the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016 to which the appellant is/ was entitled to derive a benefit from thereby arriving at a decision that was legally untenable. 6. **THAT** the respondent failed to consider the appellants application and subsequent appeal with regard to the weight of the material placed before it leading to an unconscionable and erroneous decision. 7. **THAT** the respondent erred in law and fact in failing to consider that the applicability of the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016 created a legitimate expectation toward admission into the Advocates Training Program thereby arriving at an unreasonable and unfair decision. 8. The Appellant through her Supporting Affidavit dated **2nd February 2026,** avers that she sat for her Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education in 2015 and scored a mean grade of **‘C’ with a grade of ‘B’ in English**. She avers that she applied to Mount Kenya University for her Diploma and graduated in 15th July 2016. She was admitted to Mount Kenya University on the 17thMay 2016 to pursue a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree and graduated on 22nd July 2022. She contends that she applied for the Advocate Training Programme (ATP) at Kenya School of Law and on 27th December 2025, and was rejected by the Respondent on grounds that she did not have mean grade of C+ (plus) in KCSE. She claims that she appealed against the said decisions and cited several grounds including the relevance and applicability of her prior relevant learning leading up to her being conferred upon her aforementioned Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree vide a letter dated 9th January 2026. She claims that Respondent replied to her appeal in letters dated 27th January 2026 reiterated that she had not satisfied the minimum requirements for admission into an LL.B program. She claims that the rejection of her application and denial of her appeal and consequent denial of admission into the Advocates Training Program for the academic year 2026/2027 was made in reliance on erroneous and/ or nonexistent provision(s). She further claims that the eligibility criteria to the Advocates Training Program cannot be resolved by sole reference to the Kenya School of Law Act (Cap. 16C) Laws of Kenya as the same has been established by subsidiary legislation to the Legal Education Act, 2012. She avers that her eligibility criteria to the Advocates Training Program is set by the Council of Legal Education as established under the Legal Education Act, 2012 and more specifically the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations 2016 which were in force at the time of my admission into the LL.B Program. She further claims that the Respondent’s denial of admission to the Advocates Training Program (A.T.P) amounts to an unjust violation of her right to education. Lastly, the Appellant claims that unless the Tribunal grants the orders sought in this appeal, she will be unfairly precluded from attending the ATP 2026/2027, and/or all other subsequent years in perpetually and when no prejudice will be suffered by the Respondent if the orders sought are granted. 9. The Respondent filed its Replying Affidavit dated **2nd March 2026,** sworn by **LAWRENCE NDIRANGU**, an Academic Services Officer at the Respondent institution. The Respondent averred that matters concerning admission to its Advocates Training Programme are exclusively governed by Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act, Cap 16C. The Respondent also challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter, arguing that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes arising under the Legal Education Act 2012. Additionally, the Respondent stated that upon reviewing the Appellant’s application for admission to the ATP, he was found ineligible under Section 16, read together with Paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule of the Kenya School of Law Act, Cap 16C. The Respondent emphasized that Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act, 2012, as read with Paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule, sets the minimum admission requirement for the ATP as a mean grade of C+ (plus) in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education, with a minimum grade of B (plain) in English or Kiswahili, which the Appellant did not meet. The Respondent further averred that the Kenya School of Law Act, Cap 16C, does not provide for academic progression as a basis for admission. 10. The Interested Party filed its Replying Affidavit dated **5th March 2026**, sworn by, a **PROF. BUSALILE, JACK MWIMALI**, Chief Executive Officer of the Interested Party, Council of Legal Education. 11. The Appellant filed her supplementary affidavit on 16th March 2026. **B. Submissions** ## Appellant’s Submissions 1. The Appellant submits that this Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction todetermine this appeal pursuant to **Section 31(1) of the Legal Education Act 2012.** She submits that the said provision empowers this Tribunal to deal with any matter relating to the Legal Education Act 2012. She relies on the following cases **Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR, Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others [2012] KESC 8 (KLR), Engineers Boards of Kenya v Jesse Waweru Wahome & others & 5 others [2015] KECA 1 (KLR) and Kenya School of Law v Gachoki & 2 others; Council of Legal Education (Interested Party) [2024] KEHC 528 (KLR).** 2. On whether the instant appeal is merited, the Appellant submits that heradmission to Advocates Training Program (A.T.P) cannot be considered solely with reference to the Section 16 and the Second Schedule of the Kenya School of Law Act given the Interested Party’s settled mandate. She avers that Section 8 (1)(a) of the legal Education Act empowers the Interested Party herein to inter alia regulate legal education and training in Kenya offered by legal education providers. 3. The Appellant submits that the Interested party is empowered to formulaterules and/or regulations governing its mandate as aforesaid and that the interested party formulated the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016 which commenced in 2016. She purports that Paragraph 6(1)(c) of the Third Schedule, Part II of the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016 allows for admission into the Respondent’s Advocates Training Program on proof of academic progression in accordance with Paragraph 3 and 4 of the Third Schedule. among other considerations factored in when obtaining a degree certificate. 4. The Appellant submits that she is entitled to benefit from been admissioninto LL.B program during the applicability of the above regulations. She further claims that applied for a Diploma in Law in accordance with the laws in force at that time then was admitted into the Bachelor of Laws program since she was not able to secure direct admission into the LL.B program and graduated on or around December 2022 5. The Appellant submits that she has demonstrated that on the basis of theher aforesaid qualifications, she falls within the ambit of the **Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations 2016.** She further relies on the following cases **Authority of Mrima J. in Petition No. E250 of 2021; Allan Mbondo Kioko & 21 others -Vs- Kenya School of Law & Another (2022),** where the court held that where parties obtained their degrees by way of academic progression (such as in the instant appeal), then, the equation of their achievements ought to have been done. 6. She submits that her actions culminating into her being conferred upon adegree in law as aforesaid are sufficient to demonstrate legitimate expectation. 7. The Appellant submits that matters relating to admission into theAdvocates Training program are not exclusively governed by Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act. In support of this position, the Appellant relies on **Chelangat v Kenya School of Law; Council of Legal Education (Interested Party) (Appeal E005 of 2024) [2024] KELEAT 669 (KLR),** where the Tribunal recognised the applicability of the doctrine of crystallised actions and the non-retrospective application of the declaration of invalidity of **the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016.** 8. The Appellant further submits that the Respondent was a party in theChelangat decision and was therefore aware, or ought to have been aware, of the Tribunal’s position regarding admission criteria and the need to recognise crystallised actions. She relies on **Syoki v Kenya School of Law & another [2025] KEHC 1767 (KLR)** to contend that the doctrine of crystallised actions has since been affirmed by the High Court, particularly in circumstances where a party had already taken steps towards career progression before Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016 were declared void. 9. The Appellant submits that the above authorities are binding andeffectively negate the Respondent’s argument that admission into the advocates training programme. She further contends that the Respondent acted in bad faith by refusing to recognise the change in eligibility criteria and by failing to apply the doctrines of crystallised actions and non-retrospective application of the invalidated regulations. The Appellant argues that the Respondent ignored the guidance issued by the Tribunal in Chelangat v Kenya School of Law without providing any reasonable explanation for such refusal. 10. The Appellant further urges the Tribunal to find that matters relating toadmission into the Advocates Training Programme are not exclusively governed by Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act. 11. The Appellant submits that, since she secured admission to the Bachelor ofLaws degree programme in 2016, before the regulations were invalidated on 30th January 2018, she is entitled to derive a benefit from the doctrine/principle of a crystalized action, and the crystallized action is her admission to undertake the LLB degree in 2016, before the said regulations were invalidated. 12. The Appellant further submits that, paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule ofthe Kenya School of Law Act admitted of more than one interpretation before the Court of Appeal clarified the position. She argues that, in line with the principle of legal certainty and the constitutional right to education, she is entitled to benefit from an interpretation favourable to her, particularly one that does not limit her access to legal education. The Appellant contends that when the provision is read together with the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016, she qualifies for admission. 13. The Appellant also submits that academic progression was a relevantfactor which the Respondent failed to consider, relying on **Otinga v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Education (supra) and Kenya School of Law v Akomo**. She contends that her diploma qualification constituted prior learning in law within the meaning of **Section 22(1) of the Legal Education Act as read together with Part 1 of the Second Schedule and the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016.** 14. The Appellant further submits that the Interested Party as the regulator oflegal education acknowledged prior learning in law as a valid consideration for admission into the Advocates Training Programme. 15. The Appellant submits that the Interested Party was properly joined inthese proceedings owing to its statutory mandate within the legal education framework in Kenya. Relying on **Otinga v Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Education**, the Appellant contends that the Council of Legal Education was joined as an interested Party because of its regulatory role in legal education. 16. The Appellant submits that the Interested Party misconstrued the basis ofits joinder by alleging that the Appellant sought to attach liability against it arising from the Respondent’s decision denying admission into the Advocates Training Programme. The Appellant argues that no liability is being attributed to the Interested Party, but rather its participation is necessary in view of its statutory function under Section 8(3) of the Legal education Act. 17. Lastly, the Appellant submits that the costs should be borne by theRespondent ## Respondent’s submissions 1. The Respondent contends that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdictionover a matter that is outside the scope of the Legal Education Act as expressly conferred by Section 31 of the Act. They further submit that Section 30 flows from section 29 which established LEAT, spells out its purpose and specifies the membership and crucially, section 31 grants the Tribunal jurisdiction on any matter relating to this Act and that these sections do not expressly confer upon the Tribunal power to adjudicate matters that are outside the scope. To buttress this position, the Respondent relied on the following authorities: **Bakeries Limited vs. Rent Restriction Tribunal and Kiriti Raval Nairobi HCMCC No. 246 of 1981; and Ex Parte Mayfair Bakeries Limited vs. Rent Restriction Tribunal and Kirit Raval, Nairobi HCMCC No. 246 of1981, Law Society of Kenya v Centre for Human Rights and Democracy & 13 others [2013]; Samuel Kamau Macharia Case; Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" vs. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR.** 2. The Respondent contends that the process of and admission to theRespondent’s Advocates Training Programme (ATP) is exclusively provided for under **section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act No. 26 of 2012** and is further required by its establishing act; the Kenya School of Law Act, to consider applications for admission to the ATP and once satisfied that the applicant is qualified, admit the applicant to the School which is provided in section 17 of the Kenya School of Law Act. 3. The Respondent claims that the Appellant have by their own admissioncomplied with sub **section 17(1)** but have moved this tribunal to effectively arrogate the duty and powers of the respondent provided in **17(2).** 4. The Respondent claims that the Appellant’s appeal essentially asks for theTribunal to grant her admission to the school and thereby arrogate the statutory duties of the school and relies in the case of **Kenya Pipeline Company Limited vs. Hyosung Ebara Company Limited & 2 others** **[2012] eKLR.** They further submit that the question of the jurisdiction of this Tribunal in matters of admission criteria was most recently considered by the **Honourable Justice Andayi in HCCA/E002/2023 Kenya School of Law Vs Isaiah Munoru Mucheke.** 1. On whether there was a double standard in admission qualifications andwhether the criteria were discriminatory or justifiable, the Respondent submitted that it is a rule of practice to adhere to the ordinary meaning of words used in legal provisions. The Respondent invited the Tribunal to avoid the consequences of a literal interpretation of the wording of a statute when such an interpretation would lead to a manifest absurdity or to a result that is obnoxious to principles of public policy, in this instance, unfair discrimination. In support of this position, the Respondent cited Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Appeal No. E472 of 2021. 2. Additionally, the Respondent contended that no legitimate expectation hadbeen created in favour of the Appellant. 3. On whether the procedure to refuse admission was illegal or unreasonable,the Respondent submitted that its actions were in line with Article 47(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to fair administrative action. 4. On whether academic progression is applicable to the Appellant, theRespondent submitted that the **Kenya School of Law Act, 2012,** as amended by **the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 18 of 2014,** does not provide for academic progression as a basis for admission to the ATP. 5. The Respondent cited the recent **Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal E625 of 2023: Stephen Otinga Nikita v The Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Education & 3 Others (Supra),** and submitted that regulatory bodies set minimum standards and are obliged to comply with minimum standards established, but are not barred from setting higher standards for themselves. It invited the Tribunal to find that it could not have been the intention of the court to effectively disband the school’s programmes causing its mandate to be unachievable. 6. The Respondent claims that the prayers of the original petition in Otingacase (supra) should be considered the Respondent quotes the prayer. A declaration be and is hereby issued that pursuant to section 8(3)(a) of the Legal Education Act, No. 27 of 2012, it is the exclusive mandate of the Council of Legal Education to make Regulations in respect of requirements for the admission of persons seeking to enrol in all legal education programmes including the Advocates Training Programme. They further submit that the Court of Appeal in Richard Otene Akomo agreed with the said determination that nothing in the KSL Act mandates it to make regulations on matters provided for in the Legal Education Act and no evidence of Appellant making such regulations. 7. The Respondent quotes another prayer and submits that the framing of thesaid prayer establishes a threshold which must be tested and met for the declaration of an inconsistency is made. They submit that an inconsistency would only arise if sections 16 and the second schedule met this threshold, which they quote, “in so far as they purport to prescribe requirements for admission of persons seeking to enrol in legal education programmes such as the Advocates Training Programme. 8. The Respondent submits that the Court of Appeal in Richard Otene Akomoagreed that nothing in the KSL Act mandated it to make regulations on matters for in the Legal Education Act and no evidence of Appellant making such regulations. 9. The Respondent submits that the declaration in order declaring the KenyaSchool of Law Act inconsistent, null and void for violating the mandate of the Council of Legal Education under Section 8(3)(C) of the Legal Education Act to formulate a system for recognising prior learning and end experience in law to facilitate progression in legal education from lower levels of learning to higher levels can only apply where it has been demonstrated that the Appellant has formulated its own regulations for progression from lower to higher progression. The Respondent avers that no such regulations attributable to the Appellant have been presented in this matter for consideration. 10. The Respondent invites the Tribunal to find that the judgment in **Stephen Otinga must be contextualised and read with Richard Otene.** The Respondent submits that it’s their submission that the two judgements are not in conflict rather define the boundaries within which the Appellant can determine its admission criteria. ## Interested Party’s Submissions 1. On the First issue, the Interested Party submits that they acknowledge thebinding authority of the Court of Appeal's decision in **Otinga case (supra),** which declared Section 16 and the Second Schedule of the Kenya School of Law Act CAP 16C unconstitutional. They claim that the legal effect of this nullification is precise and specific: it removed the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) mean grade and specific subject grades as a mandatory qualification, a stand-alone filter for admission to the Advocates Training Programme (ATP). They submit that this nullification, however, was not a blanket invalidation of all admission criteria, nor did it constitute a positive order to admit any particular candidate. Its effect was to delete one unconstitutional barrier, not to automatically construct a bridge over all remaining regulatory requirements for every applicant. The further claim that Appellant KCSE results can no longer be cited as a lawful basis for exclusion and corrects a historical injustice in the application process and that removal of an invalid disqualifier merely returns the Appellant to the starting line of the evaluation process; it does not award her the finish line and he must still, like every other candidate, affirmatively satisfy all other valid and extant requirements prescribed by the law. 2. They contend that the Court of Appeal's Judgement addressed an unfairpre-tertiary academic barrier; it did not and could not touch upon the legitimate tertiary-level curricular standards necessary to ensure a candidate possesses the foundational knowledge to succeed in the intensive ATP. 3. Interested Party argues that the legal effect of the nullification is toredirect the focus of the inquiry from an irrelevant secondary school grade to the relevant post-secondary school curriculum. Accordingly, the issue before the Tribunal reframed from whether the Appellant attained a Grade C+ in KCSE? to whether the Appellant undertake a relevant progression Diploma in Law. The Interested Party maintains that the Appellant’s case failed on this issue, as he had not placed before the Tribunal sufficient evidence to this new, proper question in the affirmative. 4. Interested Party submits that the Appellant’s argument erroneouslyassumed that the nullification of the KCSE clause invalidated the entirety of the Respondent’s decision-making process, thereby creating a legal vacuum that ought to be resolved in the Appellant’s favour. They contend that this assumption is fundamentally misconceived. Interested Party argued that, as a matter of administrative law, where a decision is founded on multiple grounds, and one ground is subsequently found to be unlawful, the decision maker or reviewing tribunal is entitled to sustain the decision on any other lawful and evidentially supported ground. In this regard, the Interested Party maintains that a valid and independent ground existed, namely the Appellant’s failure to demonstrate sufficient compliance with the requirements for attaining a Diploma. 5. According to the Interested Party the judgment protected the Appellant'sright to be considered without reference to her KCSE and it did not guarantee her admission, nor did it absolve her of the duty to prove she meets the professional and educational standards that lawfully remain. It was submitted that the legal effect of the Court of Appeal's nullification is purely eliminative. It removed a specific, unjust obstacle, and it did not create a new entitlement, nor did it alter the fundamental architecture of legal education prerequisites. 6. They claim that the Appellant's case is fundamentally unsupported byevidence. They contend that the Appellant was inviting the Tribunal to make a finding of statutory compliance in an evidential vacuum, which the Tribunal could not lawfully do. The Interested Party maintains that the only logical, lawful, and just conclusion is that the Appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proving her Diploma meets the core curriculum requirements. On that basis, and independently of the nullified KCSE issue, the Interested Party urged that the Appeal is without merit, and should be dismissed with costs. 7. In the second issue on whether the Academic Progression is relevant to thelaw, the Tribunal was invited to be guided by the binding precedent of the ***Court of Appeal in Kenya School of Law v Akomo & 41 others (Civil Appeal E472 of 2021) [2022] KECA 1132 (KLR) (21 October 2022).*** In that decision, the Court of Appeal rendered an authoritative interpretation of ***Section 8(3)(c)*** of the ***Legal Education Act,*** which is central to the Appellant's case. The Court of Appeal held *that “The wording in Part C above is clear as it is, that prior learning and experience in law is what ought to be considered in formulating a system that would see the progression in legal education.”* That this case establishes the foundational principle that for any prior qualification to constitute relevant "progression" toward legal training, it must be intrinsically and substantively legal in nature. 8. The Court of Appeal further clarified this principle with definitiveexamples, stating: "*We do not think a degree in aeronautics or a diploma in interior design for instance, can be termed as progression towards studying law. Indeed, the only closer aspect contemplated was experience and learning in law culminating in a diploma in law or related course in law."* The Interested Party submits that this pronouncement is not obiter; it is the core of the Court's reasoning, and it establishes a bright-line rule: a generic "diploma" is insufficient. To be recognized for progression, the diploma must be a "diploma in law or related course in law," meaning its curriculum must be demonstrably and predominantly legal. 9. The Interested Party submits that while the Appellant's subsequentacademic and professional achievements, including an MBA, a BBA, a diploma in insurance, and various certifications, are undoubtedly commendable, they do not constitute the "academic progression" contemplated under the Legal Education Act CAP16B for the purposes of admission to the Advocates Training Programme. They aver that the statutory framework and binding jurisprudence, as established in **Kenya School of Law v Akomo**, are unequivocal: progression or legal experience. 10. In light of the foregoing, and guided by the binding authority in **Kenya School of Law v Akomo,** the Interested Party has urged the Tribunal to find that the Appellant had not demonstrated that her Diploma constituted the requisite "prior learning... in law." To rule otherwise would be to disregard a clear precedent of the Court of Appeal and to accept an unverified assertion in place of the substantive proof of legal learning that the law demands. 11. On the third issue, the Interested Party contended that the appeal againstit was founded on a fundamental and legally untenable confusion between the distinct statutory mandates and legal personalities of the Interested Party and the Respondent. It was averred that the Appellant had improperly sought to attribute liability to the Interested Party for the alleged denial of admission to the Kenya School of Law, which, in the Interested Party’s view, constituted a classic case of misjoinder, arising from a fundamental misapprehension of Kenya's legal education architecture. They asserted that this error was fatal to their case. 12. The Interested Party submits that the Kenyan legal framework establishedthe Interested Party and Respondent as separate and distinct bodies corporate, each with perpetual succession, a common seal, and independent legal personality. It was contended that this separation is statutorily grounded, with the Interested Party established under Section 4 of the Legal Education Act, Cap16B, and the Respondent established under section 3 of the of the Kenya School of Law Act, CAP 16C. 13. It was further submitted that the statutory mandates of these two entitiesare diametrically different and deliberately separated by Parliament. The Interested Party’s core function, under *Section 8(1) of the Legal Education Act, CAP 16B*, is to regulate legal education and training in Kenya, a regulatory and standard setting function. In contrast, the Respondent’s function, under ***Section 4 of the KSL Act,*** is the provision of professional legal training, an operational, service-delivery mandate. The interested Party asserts that this distinction was central to the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Otinga, wherein the Court invalidated Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act on the basis that it encroached upon the Interested Party’s regulatory domain. It was contended that, at paragraph 43, the court held that the Legal Education Act is the framework of legal education and training in Kenya, including training in ATP, and that its provisions apply to all legal training in Kenya. The Interested Party maintains that this ruling reinforced the Interested Party’s supremacy in setting the framework, but it did not, and could not, merge the two entities or make the Interested Party the operator of the Respondent. 14. Interested Party further avers that the impugned act, the admission of theAppellant to the Advocates Training Programme, was an operational decision squarely within the purview of the Respondent’s mandate to "provide training." It was contended that decisions on when to advertise, how to admit, and who to admit is a day-to-day administrative function of the training provider, not the regulator. The Interested Party’s asserts that its role, as per ***Otinga,*** is to prescribe the standards for admission, and that it would be illogical to hold the regulator liable for an independent contractor's operational decisions, especially when their relationship is statutory, not hierarchical. 15. It is submitted that a challenge to the act of admission properly liesagainst the Respondent as the actor, whereas a challenge to the substance of the admission rules lies against the Interested Party as the rule maker. 16. Interested Party further contend that the doctrine of vicarious liabilitydoes not apply, as no employer-employee or analogous relationship exists between the two entities. It was averred that the Interested Party does not employ the Director of the Respondent, KSL; it does not dictate his daily operations, and that the two bodies are separate legal persons created by separate Acts of Parliament, accountable to different governance structures. The Interested Party maintains that its function is one of oversight rather than control. 17. Interested Party also submit that its ongoing process to develop newregulations, as outlined in its affidavit, constitutes the lawful exercise of its proper, post-Otinga mandate. It was contended that the Court of Appeal in Otinga directed the Interested Party to formulate the regulatory framework, and that it would be unjust to enjoin it for the alleged actions of another statutory body during the transitional period preceding the gazettement of new regulations. 18. The Interested Party asserts that its role, as affirmed by the Court ofAppeal, is to formulate the system while the Respondent’s role is to function within it. It was contended that the Petition alleges a failure in the Respondent’s function. The Interested Party maintains that the constitutional and statutory scheme provides clear remedies against the Respondent for that functional failure, and that no remedy lies against the Interested Party simply because the Appellant is dissatisfied with the pace at which a new system is being formulated, especially when that process is ongoing and lawful. 19. On the fourth and final issue submitted by the Interested Party, on theissue of costs, they contend that the award of costs as anchored in section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act is discretional. It was averred that the statute vests the court with full power to determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and out of what property such costs shall be satisfied. 20. The Interested Party further rely on the decision **in R V Rosemary Wairimu Munene, Exparte Applicant V Ihururu Dairy Farmers Cooperative Society JR No. 6 of 2014,** wherein the court recognized that the objective of awarding costs is not to penalise the unsuccessful party nor to compensate the successful party for the inconvenience of litigation. 21. The Interested Party also cite the **English Court of Appeal decision In Scherer V Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] IWLR 615,** which set out the principles for the award of costs. It was contended that the Court held, inter alia, that the general rule is that costs follow the event, that the judge retains an unfettered discretion to make such order as to costs as justice may require; that a successful party has reasonable expectation, but no absolute right, to costs; and that such discretion must be exercised judicially, in accordance with established principles and the facts of the case. It was further contended that the discretion must be grounded on relevant considerations connected with the litigation and that where a party wholly fails to establish the necessary ingredients for the relief sought, it would be difficult to justify an order for costs in their favour. 22. The Interested Party maintains that, in exercising its discretion, theTribunal should be guided by the indemnity principle and the general rule that costs follow the event, and urged the Tribunal to exercise its discretion appropriately in the circumstances of the case. ## C. Analysis and Determination 60. The Tribunal has considered the issues raised by both the Parties and has narrowed them down to the following issues for determination: - 1. Whether this Honourable Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear anddetermine this appeal? 2. Whether the Appellant meets the requisite qualifications for admissionto the Advocates Training Programme? 3. Whether the Appeal suffers from a fatal misjoinder of parties? **i. Whether this Honourable Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine this appeal?** 1. In the Respondent’s submissions, they extensively challenge thejurisdiction of this Tribunal to hear and determine this Appeal. 2. Referring to the well-established principles articulated in **Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR,** the Tribunal concedes that Jurisdiction is the foundation of a court’s authority and without it, a court cannot lawfully proceed with a matter. Accordingly, the Tribunal must first determine its jurisdiction before adjudicating on other substantive issues in this appeal. 3. The Tribunal relies on the case of, **Kenya School of Law v Gachoki & 2 others; Council of Legal Education (Interested Party) (Civil Appeal E062 of 2022) [2024] KEHC 528 (KLR) (Civ) (31 January 2024) (Judgment), where Justice Majanja** held: ***“On my part, I do not see any reason to depart from the settled position on jurisdiction. Section 31(1) of Legal Education Act grants the Tribunal jurisdiction to inquire into, “… any matter relating to this Act,’’ which is an all-encompassing clause that that affirms the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to deal with matters concerning legal education arising not only within the Act itself but also from the Kenya School of Law Act under which the KSL is guided by and applies the provisions of the Legal Education Act.”*** 4. The Tribunal finds that this appeal involves a hybrid dispute arising underboth the Kenya School of Law Act, 2012 and the Legal Education Act, 2012, thereby falling within its jurisdiction as conferred by **Section 31(1) of the Legal Education Act**. **In Republic v Kenya School of Law & 2 Others Ex Parte Kgaborone Tsholofelo Wekesa, Justice Mativo** held that: 5. ***“The preamble to the Legal Education Act provides that it is an Actof Parliament to provide for the establishment of the Council of Legal Education; the establishment of the Legal Education Appeals Tribunal; the regulation and licensing of legal education providers and for connected purposes. Section 31 of the act provides for the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. A reading of the section leaves me with no doubt that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is to determine an appeal made to it in writing by any party or a reference made to it by the Council or by any committee or officer of the Council, on any matter relating to the Act. The ex parte applicant's dispute distilled above in my view squarely falls within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.”*** 6. As the Tribunal reiterates again that it has put to rest this critical matteron jurisdiction, it makes reference to its past similar decided cases; **Samuel Mbugua Ndung’u v Kenya School of Law & Council of Legal Education (Appeal No. E008 of 2024),** where it has held, ‘*We therefore find that the tribunal is well vested with jurisdiction to hear and determine the present Appeal’*. 7. As a result of the foregoing, and in order to save on precious judicial time,this Tribunal does not find it necessary to further deliberate on this matter. It takes the firm stand that it has the necessary jurisdiction to hear and determine this Appeal. **ii. Whether the Appellant meets the requisite qualifications for admission to the Advocates Training Programme?** 1. The Appellant contends that her eligibility for admission to the AdvocatesProgramme is governed by the **Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016, as amended. S**he further invokes the doctrine of crystallization, relying on **Syoki v Kenya School of Law & another** and that her eligibility for admission to the Advocates Training Programme crystallised under that regime, and that she therefore satisfies the statutory and regulatory criteria entitling her to admission. 2. This Tribunal considers the period of operation of **the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016, Legal Notice No. 15 of 2016.** The regulations were gazetted on 6th February 2016 and consequently were declared invalid on 30th January 2018, by Hon. Justice Maureen Odero in the High Court at Nakuru in ***Petition No. 20 of 2016 – Javan Kiche Otieno & Another v Council of Legal Education & Another.*** 3. The Tribunal stands guided by the Court of Appeal decision in ***Javan Kiche Case (Supra)*** where at **paragraph 47** it was held*;- “Consequently, it is explicit that a court having declared a piece of legislation or a section of an act to be unconstitutional, that act or law becomes a nullity from the date of inception or enactment and not from the date of judgment. But it will not be applicable to actions already crystallized whilst the expunged law was in force"* 4. Guided by the ***Javan Kiche Case (supra)*** the Tribunal holds that in applying the doctrine of crystallized action, one must have been admitted into an LLB program based on certain regulations and if those regulations are subsequently declared legally invalid, the actions of individuals who relied on them would be deemed to have crystallized and should not be undone. For the Appellant in this matter to successfully rely on the doctrine of crystallized action, her admission to the LLB degree should fall in between 6th February 2016 and 30th January 2018 when the 2016 rules subsisted. 5. The Appellant having been admitted to the LLB degree in 17th May 2016,this Tribunal therefore finds that as at the time the Appellant was applying for admission into the LL.B **Programme in 2016, the Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016** were existent and thus the Doctrine of crystallization can be applied. 6. The Respondent claims that the Appellant does not qualify to be admittedto the Advocates Training Programme (ATP) by reason of academic progression because the applicable law, which is the ***Kenya School of Law Act 2012,*** as amended by ***Statute Law Miscellaneous Amendments Act (No. 18 of 2014)*** does not provide for academic progression. 7. The central issue for determination by this Tribunal is the precise legaleffect of the Court of Appeal’s in ***Otinga Case (supra***) nullification of Section 16 and the Second Schedule to the Kenya School of Law Act on the Appellant’s application, and whether such nullification automatically entitles the Appellant to admission to the Advocates Training Programme. 8. This tribunal has in its recent decisions in the case of ***Caroline Kathure Kiruki v. Kenya School of Law and Council of Legal Education (LEEA No. E003 of 2025)*** *and* ***Samuel Mbugua Ndung’u v. The Kenya School of Law and Council of Legal Education (LEEA No. E008 of 2024),*** considered the cumulative effect of the Court of Appeal’s pronouncement in ***Otinga case***, on admissions to ATP. In both decisions, the Tribunal affirmed the binding authority of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in ***Otinga***and acknowledged the legal pathway it has created for individuals who, but for the impugned provisions of **Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act**, would have been deemed inadmissible to the ATP. 9. Considering the facts in the instant case are strikingly similar to those inthe cases of ***Kiruki and Ndung'u (Supra),*** the Tribunal finds merit in the Appellant’s argument that the Respondent's reliance on the now-invalidated Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act as the sole basis for denying admission is no longer tenable. We, therefore, find that to the extent the Respondent relied on provisions that have since been declared unconstitutional, the resultant administrative decision is rendered unlawful. 10. In being **Civil Appeal No 472 of 2022 Kenya School of Law vs. Otene Richard Akomo & 41 others** the Court of Appeal addressed itself on the issue of academic progression by stating that the progression must be along the lines of studying law and no other disciplines. The Appellant contends that he undertook a diploma in law, and therefore he falls squarely within the description of academic progression adopted in the Court of Appeal decision. 11. The Tribunal finds that the applicable law here would be the **Legal Education Act, 2012 and The Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016,** and thus there is academic progression. 12. Under the **Legal Education (Accreditation and Quality Assurance) Regulations, 2016**, the eligibility criteria for a Diploma in Law is found is under the **Third Schedule Part II, Paragraph 3,4,6**; **3. *Certificate Programme*** (1) The minimum admission requirements to a certificate legal education programme shall be—(a) a mean grade of C- (Minus) in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education examination or its equivalent with at least a C (Plain) in English or Kiswahili; **4 *Diploma Programme*** (1) The minimum admission requirements to a diploma legal education programme shall be— (a)a mean grade of C (Plain) in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education examination or its equivalent with at least a C+ (Plus) in English or Kiswahili; **Paragraph 6** ATP programme under thereof, *(1) The minimum requirements for admission to the Advocates’ Training* *Programme shall be—* *(a)a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) degree from a recognised university;* *(c)proof of academic progression in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Schedule;* 80. The Tribunal finds that the Appellant has met all the requirements from the above provision. **iii. Whether the Appeal suffers from a fatal misjoinder of parties** 1. The law on interested parties is now settled. Black’s Law Dictionarydefines an interested party as “a party who has recognizable stake and therefore a standing in a matter.” **In *Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Mumo Matemu & 5 Others [2014] eKLR***defined an interested party as*” ...one who has a stake in the proceedings, though he or she was not party to the cause ab initio. He or she is one who will be affected by the decision of the Court when it is made, either way. Such a person feels that his or her interest will not be well articulated unless he himself or she herself appears in the proceedings, and champions his or her cause...”* 2. Further, *Order 1 Rule 10(2)* of the Civil Procedure Rules grants the Court discretion to add ant party whose presence before the court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. In **Kenya Medical Laboratory Technicians and Technologists Board & 6 others v Attorney General & 4 others [2017] eKLR** where the court held that the test is whether the intended interested party has an identifiable stake, legal interest, or duty in the proceedings. 3. The Interested Party is established under **Section 4 of the Legal Education Act. Section 8** of the said Act mandates it to regulate legal education and training in Kenya, supervise legal education providers, and set and enforce standards relating to legal education programmes. More specifically, **Section 8(3)(a)** obligates the Interested Party to make regulations in respect of requirements for admission of persons seeking to enrol in legal education programmes, while **Section 8(3)(c)** requires it to formulate a system recognizing prior learning and academic progression in legal education. 4. The Tribunal further notes that **Section 22 of the Legal Education Act** expressly recognizes certificate and diploma courses in law. No evidence was placed before this Tribunal to demonstrate that the Interested Party has abolished or invalidated the diploma in law pathway or academic progression contemplated under the Act. Consequently, students undertaking diploma and subsequent degree programmes in law are entitled to legitimately expect that the legal education framework established and regulated by the Interested Party will guide and facilitate their progression into professional legal training, subject to compliance with the applicable law. 5. On the other hand, the Respondent, established under **Section 3 of the Kenya School of Law Act**, is mandated under **Section 4** thereof to provide professional legal training and train persons to become advocates under the Advocates Act. The Respondent is therefore the institution directly responsible for the administration and implementation of the Advocates Training Programme. 6. It is therefore correct, as submitted by the Interested Party that theRespondent and the Interested Party are distinct statutory bodies with separate legal mandates. However, this distinction does not extinguish the Interested Party’s statutory responsibility in relation to the regulatory framework governing admission into legal education programmes, including the ATP. 7. This position was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in **Kenya School of Law v Otene Richard Akomo & 41 others [2021] KECA 608 (KLR),** where the Court held that the Council of Legal Education bears the duty of regulating admissions into legal education programmes and ensuring compliance with admission requirements at the point of entry. The Court observed that the Council has the power to make regulations relating to admission and to ensure that legal education providers comply with those standards. 8. This Tribunal therefore finds that while the operational decision onadmission into the ATP may be undertaken by the Respondent, the interested Party remains central to the statutory and regulatory framework governing legal education and admission criteria. 9. The Tribunal further notes that although there is no evidence that leave ofCourt was sought before the Interested Party was joined in these proceedings, such omission is not fatal. In **Kenya Ports Authority V Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Limited (2012) eKLR, Mwongo J** held that procedural technicality is a lapse in form that does not go to the root of the suit. Equally, **Order 1 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules** expressly provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. 10. Further, **Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules of 2010,** which introduces the concept of a “necessary” party. This rule confers upon the court the discretionary power to mandate the inclusion of individuals whose presence is considered indispensable for the effective and comprehensive adjudication of the issues entangled in the lawsuit. In **Habiba W. Ramadhan & 7 others v Mary Njeri Gitiba (2017) eKLR; Nairobi High Court ELC Case No. 119 of 2014** the Court stated as follows; *“As already observed by the Court, under Order 1 Rule 10(2) the Court has discretion to order joinder of any party to a suit at any stage of the proceedings so long as the presence of that party before the Court is necessary in order to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions in dispute....”* 1. The Tribunal is persuaded that the Interested Party has a clear statutorystake, legal interest and regulatory duty in matters concerning admission into legal education programmes and the ATP. Its presence before the Tribunal is therefore necessary to enable the Tribunal effectually and completely adjudicate upon all the issues in controversy. 2. Consequently, this Tribunal finds and holds that although the Appellant isthe one who joined the Interested Party to these proceedings ***suo motu*** andnotwithstanding that the procedure adopted in such joinder may have been irregular, the same does not amount to a fatal misjoinder of parties. The Interested Party has a clear statutory mandate under Section 8 of the Legal Education Act in relation to the regulation of legal education and admission requirements into legal education programmes, including matters touching on the Advocates Training Programme. The Tribunal therefore satisfies that the Interested Party is a necessary party to these proceedings whose presence is essential for the effectual and complete adjudication of the issues in controversy. **D. DISPOSITION** 1. That being the case, the appeal succeeds to the extent that Section 16 andthe Second Schedule of the KSL Act that the Respondent relied upon to reject the Appellant’s application has since been rendered null and void, and unconstitutional by the Court of Appeal in ***Otinga case (Supra).*** 2. It Is hereby ordered: - 1. That the appeal by the Appellant, **EVERLYNE KAII MUANGE** against the **Respondent's** decision dated **27th December 2025 and 27th January 2026** denying the Appellant admission into the ATP Programme is hereby quashed. 2. That pursuant to **Section 35 of the Legal Education Act, 2012** a declaration is issued that the Appellant is eligible for admission to the Advocates Training Programme by dint of ***Regulation 5(c) of the Council of Legal Education (Kenya School of Law) Regulations, 2009***, and the Respondent is ordered to admit the Appellant, **EVERLYNE KAII MUANGE,** to the Advocates Training Programme forthwith. 3. That each party to bear own costs of the appeal. 4. That a party aggrieved is at liberty to appeal to the High Court undersection 38 (1) of the Legal Education Act, 2012 on a point of law. It is so ordered by the Legal Education Appeals Tribunal. HON. JULIANA NJIRIRI - CHAIR HON. JOSHUA NGULU- MEMBER HON. FELIX OKETCH - MEMBER HON. MOSES MUNOKO – MEMBER HON. GODANA YATANI – MEMBER DATED AT NAIROBI THIS………29TH .….…. DAY OF…...MAY……………...2026 SIGNED BY/FOR: | | | --- | | **★ THE JUDICIARY OF KENYA ★** **HON. JULIANA WAMAITHA NJIRIRI** **VINCENT GODANA YATANI** **FELIX OTIENO OKETCH** **MOSES SITATI MUNOKO JOSHUA MBINDA NGULU** Legal Education Appeals Tribunal Legal Education Appeals Tribunal Date: 2026-06-04 12:45:07 |