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Muema v Republic (Criminal Appeal E008 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 12011 (KLR) (31 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 12011 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Makueni Criminal Appeal E008 of 2024 MW Mutuku, J July 31, 2026 Between Stephen Nzomo Muema Appellant and Republic Respondent (Being an appeal from the Judgment of the trial court, Hon. B.N IRERI (SPM) in Makindu MCSO No. E021 of 2020) Judgment 1.The appellant was charged with defilement contrary to Section 8(1) as read with Section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act. 2.The particulars of the offence were that the appellant, on the 21st March 2020 , at [Particulars Withheld] village, Nzaui Sub County within Makueni County, the appellant caused his penis to penetrate the penis of MT a child aged 6 years. 3.The appellant was charged with an Alternative Count of committing an indecent act with a child contrary to section 11(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. The particulars of the offence were that the appellant, on 21st March 2020 at [Particulars Withheld] village, Nzaiu Sub County within Makueni County, the appellant intentionally and unlawfully touched the vagina of MT, a child aged 6 years. 4.The appellant was convicted of the offence of defilement and was sentenced to 30 years. 5.The appellant was aggrieved by the conviction and filed this appeal. He set out the following grounds of appeal:a.That the prosecution case is replete with monumental inconsistencies and contradictions which would have attracted acquittal verdict.b.That the trial court erred in both law and facts by failing to conduct holistic scrutiny of the whole evidence on record to base its conviction and sentence.c.That the appellant cannot recall all that transpired during the trial hence pleads with the court to supply him with the lower court proceedings and judgment transcript.d.That upon receipt of the transcript , the appellant prays that if need be that he be allowed to file additional, supplementary, substituted or amended grounds of appeal pursuant to Section 350(v) of the C.P.C. 6.When the trial started de novo, PW2, MM is the victim minor told the court in her that on the material day, she and her brother DM had been send to the shop by their grandmother. That they met the appellant whom she described as Nzomo, and that the appellant send her brother to buy Big G, and potatoes and left her in company of the appellant. That after her brother left for the shop, the appellant removed her pant, and that he also removed his clothes. 7.The victim went on to describe how the appellant removed his penis and while he lay her on the ground, he inserted his penis in her vagina. She experienced pain, and he asked her not to report him to the mother. When she got home, she told the grandmother whatever had transpired, and she examined her. She was later taken to the hospital by her mother, where she was examined by the doctor and treated. The victim stated that she knew the appellant very well, and that he stayed at a place known as Kwa Makonge. In cross examination, the victim maintained that it was the appellant who has sexually assaulted her. That she knew him well because he used visit her uncle’s place, where he used to take beer. 8.DM Pw3 is the brother to victim. He confirmed to the court that he and the victim had been send by their grandmother to the shop to buy vegetables. That they met the appellant who he knew well as Nzomo. The appellant gave DM Ksh 20 to go and buy something from the shop, and let the sister in company of the appellant. When he came back, he did not find them where he had left them. Later, the sister told him that the accused had defiled her. They also informed their grandmother who called their mother and the victim was taken to the hospital. 9.AK is the mother to the victim. She was called on phone by one Miteu, who informed her about the incident. She proceeded home and later escorted her daughter to the police station and later to the hospital for treatment. She also produced a birth notification in respect of the minor, which showed that the minor was born on 22nd March 2014. 10.Andrew Mwalali is the local Assistant chief. He was informed about the alleged incident by the retired chief. He went to the home of Penina Makonge where the appellant worked, caused his arrest and escorted him to Matiliku police post, where he handed him over to the police. He did not witness the offence. 11.The case was investigated by Corporal Musili. He took over investigations from the initial investigation officer, and in the course of investigations, he established that the victim had been send to the shop. That the appellant send the brother to buy a match box, and that is when he lured the victim to a nearby shamba and defiled her. He produced the birth notification of the victim. Later the appellant was charged with the offence before the court. 12.Tabitha Muoki is clinical officer based at Matiliku Sub County hospital. She produced the medical documents in respect of the victim. She told the court that the victim was taken to the hospital for examination on 22nd March 2020, and that she alleged to have been sexually assaulted. Upon examination, there was a bruise on 5 O’clock on the external genitalia approximately 2cm long. There was no discharge and there was minimal blood on the external vaginal wall. The hymen was intact, and the conclusion drawn by the doctor was attempted defilement. 13.Placed on his defence, the appellant gave an unsworn statement. He denied the offence, and told the court that on 21st March 2020 he was at his place of work. On 22nd March 2020, he woke up and went to graze, and at around 2 p.m, he saw the assistant chief in company of two people. He was arrested and escorted to police station on allegations of having defiled a child. He urged the court to dismiss the case. Submissions 14.The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions which I have considered. The appellant maintained that the prosecution case was full of contradictions and urged the court to acquit him. The Appellant also argued that his rights under Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution were violated. 15.On the other hand, the respondent submitted that the prosecution had proved their case beyond reasonable doubt, and urged the court to uphold the conviction and sentence. Analysis 16.This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reevaluate and assess the evidence and make its own conclusions. It must, however, keep at the back of its mind that a trial court, unlike the appellate court, had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses and hearing their evidence firsthand. The Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in Pandya vs Republic [1957] EA 336 held as follows:-“On a first appeal from a conviction by a Judge or magistrate sitting without a jury the appellant is entitled to have the appellate court’s own consideration and views of the evidence as a whole and its own decision thereon. It has the duty to rehear the case and reconsider the witnesses before the Judge or magistrate with such other material as it may have decided to admit. The appellate court must then make up its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it. When the question arises which witness is to be believed rather than another and that question turns on manner and demeanor, the appellate court must be guided by the impression made on the judge or magistrate who saw the witness but there may be other circumstances, quite apart from manner and demeanor which may show whether a statement is credible or not which may warrant a court different.” 17.On a first appeal, the appellant is entitled to a fresh and exhaustive reevaluation of the evidence on record, with the appellate court drawing its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. In the case of Okeno v Republic, the East Africa Court of Appeal stated on the duty of the court on a first appeal:An appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination (Pandya v. R., [1957] E. A. 336) and to the appellate court's own decision on the evidence. The first appellate court must itself weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own conclusions. (Shantilal M. Ruwala v. R., [1957] E.A. 570). It is not the function of a first appellate court merely to scrutinize the evidence to see if there was some evidence to support the lower court's findings and conclusions; it must make its own findings and draw its own conclusions. Only then can it decide whether the magistrate's findings should be supported. In doing so, it should make allowance for the fact that the trial court has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, see Peters v. Sunday Post, [1958] E. A. 424. 18.The legal burden is the burden of proof is on the prosecution and remains constant throughout. According to established principles, burden of proof rests upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. This burden does not shift to the accused, save in a few exceptional statutory instances where the law expressly provides otherwise. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 17, paras 13 and 14: The legal burden is the burden of proof which remains constant throughout a trial; it is the burden of establishing the facts and contentions which will support a party’s case. If at the conclusion of the trial he has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. The legal burden of proof normally rests upon the party desiring the court to take action; thus a claimant must satisfy the court or tribunal that the conditions which entitle him to an award have been satisfied. In respect of a particular allegation, the burden lies upon the party for whom substantiation of that particular allegation is an essential of his case. There may therefore be separate burdens in a case of with separate issues. 19.Brennan J, addressed the standard of proof required in Criminal cases the case of Re Winship 397 US 358 {1970}, at page 36164 that:The accused, during a criminal prosecution, has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction…Moreover use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. 20.Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. Lord Denning in Miller vs. Ministry of Pensions, [1947] 2 ALL ER 372 had this to say:That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence of course it is possible, but not in the least probable, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice. 21.The Court is obliged to conduct a fresh and thorough examination of the evidence, reassess the credibility of witnesses, and evaluate any conflicting testimony to reach its own independent conclusions. Throughout this exercise, the legal burden of proof remains unchanged, resting entirely on the prosecution to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Only by meticulously scrutinizing all the evidence, while adhering strictly to the statutory framework, can the Court ensure that the appellant is afforded a full and fair reevaluation of the case. 22.Courts dealing with criminal matters must always remain mindful of the high standard of proof required and the serious consequences that a conviction imposes on an accused. The caution has regard to the nature of criminal offences, whose consequences extend beyond the individual to society at large. 23. A conviction and sentence as a sexual offender carries a lifelong stigma for the accused. It also leaves indelible scars on the victim. Conviction must thus be justified based on indisputable evidence given to the required standards. This is what the former Chief Justice Mohamed of Namibia had in mind in addressing sexual offences in S v Chapman 1997 (2) SA CR 3 (A) at 55:‘Rape is a serious offence, constituting as it does a humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy, the dignity and the person of the victim. The rights to dignity, to privacy and the integrity of every person are basic to the ethos of the constitution and to any defensible civilization.’ 24.It is with this background that the court must first analyse the evidence and the proceedings. Then it must address the issues and make findings on each of the issues. The appeal raises only two issues, that is:i)Whether the offence was proved to the required standards.ii)Whether the trial court failed to comply with the provision of Article 50(2) (g) and (h) of the Kenyan Constitution 2010. 25.The first issue is the question of proof of the offence of defilement. The law under which the appellant was charged is provided under Section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act as follows:8.(1)A person who commits an act which causes penetration with a child is guilty of an offence termed defilement.(2)A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child aged eleven years or less shall upon conviction be sentenced to imprisonment for life.(3)A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child between the age of twelve and fifteen years is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than twenty years.(4)A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child between the age of sixteen and eighteen years is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than fifteen years.(5)…(8)The provisions of subsection (5) shall not apply if the accused person is related to such child within the prohibited degrees of blood or affinity. 26.On the other hand, the appellant was charged with an alternative count under Section 11 of the Sexual Offences Act, which provides as follows:(1)Any person who commits an indecent act with a child is guilty of the offence of committing an indecent act with a child and is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years.(2)It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) if it is proved that such child deceived the accused person into believing that such child was over the age of eighteen years at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, and the accused person reasonably believed that the child was over the age of eighteen years.(3)The belief referred to in subsection (2) is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including the steps the accused person took to ascertain the age of the complainant.(4)Where the person charged with an offence under this Act is below the age of eighteen years, the court may upon conviction, sentence the accused person in accordance with the provisions of the Borstal Institutions Act (Cap. 92) and the Children's Act (Cap. 141)(5)The provisions of subsection (2) shall not apply if the accused person is related to such child within the prohibited degrees of blood or affinity. 27.In the case of Charles Wamukoya Karani v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 2013, it was held that the essential elements constituting the offence of defilement are the age of the complainant, proof of penetration, and positive identification of the assailant. These key ingredients of the offence of defilement, were similarly elucidated in the case of George Opondo Olunga v Republic [2016] eKLR are;a.Proof of the age of the complainant,b.Proof of penetration andc.Proof that the appellant was the perpetrator of the offence. 28.The Court of Appeal in Edwin Nyambogo Onsongo vs. Republic (2016)eKLR stated as follows in respect of proving the age of a victim in cases of defilement:... The question of proof of age has finally been settled by recent decisions of this court to the effect that it can be proved by documents, evidence such as a birth certificate, baptism card or by oral evidence of the child if the child is sufficiently intelligent or the evidence of the parents or guardian or medical evidence, among other credible forms of proof. We think that what ought to be stressed is that whatever the nature of evidence preferred in proof of the victim’s age, it has to be credible and reliable. 29.While addressing the question of age of the victims in the Sexual Offenses Act, the court in Kaingu Elias Kasomo vs. Republic, Malindi, the Court of Appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 504 of 2010 stated as follows:Age of the victim of the sexual assault under the Sexual Offences Act is a critical component. It forms part of the charge which must be proved the same way as penetration in the cases of rape and defilement. It is therefore essential that the same be proved by credible evidence for the sentence to be imposed will be dependent on the age of the victim. 30.It is only when there is evidence of doubtful origin that a doctor can determine the age scientifically. In the case of Francis Omuroni Vs Uganda Court of Appeal No. 2/2000, the court held that:In defilement cases, medical evidence is paramount in determining the age of the victim. The doctor is the only person who could professionally determine the age of the victim in the absence of any other evidence. Apart from Medical evidence age may also be proved by birth certificate, the victim’s parents or guardian and by observation and common sense. 31.In this case, the minor testified and gave unshakeable evidence on how the offence occurred. The mother to the victim identified the birth notification as proof that the victim was born on 22nd March 2014. The alleged offence took place on 21st March 2020. As such, as at the date of the offence the victim was aged six years. To this extent, I find that this element has been proved to the required standards. 32.On identification, in Anjoroni v Republic 1980 KLR 59 the court held thus:“Recognition of an assailant is mere satisfactory, mere assenting, and mere variable than identification of a stranger because it depends upon the personal knowledge of the assailant in some form or other” 33.The minor testified and identified the appellant as the perpetrator. Her evidence was that as she walked in company of her brother DM, they met the appellant, who she knew very well. The offence took place during the day, and the complainant stated that she knew him by name, and that she also knew where he worked and lived. Further that she was a frequent visitor at their home where he used to frequent, as he would patronize the uncles home where the uncle brewed liquor. The minor did not just do identification but recognition. The court is satisfied that the appellant was recognized by the minor. 34.The last issue is penetration. The medical evidence showed there was penetration. The minor herself testified on what happened to her. The complainant told the court that when the appellant inserted his penis inside her vagina, she experienced pain, and that when she went home, she told her grandmother what had happened. It is worthy of note that the mother to the victim took her to hospital on the same day, and that the medical officer noted that there were bruises on the vagina and minimal bleeding. This evidence was corroborated by the evidence of the medical officer, who filled the p3 form. 35.The medical officer gave evidence on the injuries the minor suffered. These were very consistent with the oral evidence given by the Victim. He noted that there was bleeding on the genital, and there were fresh bruises. The opinion of the medical officer was that there was partial penetration of attempted defilement. 36.Section 2(1) of the Sexual Offences Act defines penetration as:“The partial or complete insertion of the genital organs of a person into the genital organ of another person.” 37.In the case of Mark Oiruri Mose v Republic [2013] KECA 67 (KLR), the Court of Appeal [Onyango Otieno, Azangalala & Kantai JJ.A ] held as follows:“Many times, the attacker does not fully complete the sexual act during commission of the offence. That is the main reason why the law does not require that evidence of spermatozoa be availed. So long as there is penetration whether only on the surface, the ingredient of the offence is demonstrated, and penetration need not be deep inside the girl’s organ.” 38.It is thus not a defence that the injuries were not serious or the penetration was not complete. The medical opinion is that there was evidence of partial penetration. The penetration was thus proved. However, guided by the holding in the above cited case wherein the Court of Appeal observed that so long as there is penetration whether only on the surface, the ingredient of the offence is demonstrated, and penetration need not be deep inside the girl’s organ, and looking at the medical evidence presented, the evidence is proof that there was penetration. This is supported by the presence of bruises and bleeding on the vaginal wall. I thus find that the trial magistrate erred in convicting for the alternative charge of indecent assault, and find that the prosecution proved the charge of devilment to the required standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. I thus enter a finding of guilt on the charge of defilement contrary to Section 8(1) as read with Section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act. 39.The second issue is whether there were grave contradictions in the prosecution case, which the trail magistrate ignored or failed to consider hence erred in finding the accused guilty of the charge of defilement. I have looked at the proceedings and the submissions by the appellant, and I find that the appellant has not demonstrated there were any contradictions and inconsistencies that affected or in any way weakened the prosecution case. In his cross examination, and in their evidence in chief, the prosecution witnesses were constituent, truthful and unshaken. 40.In the submissions filed in court, the appellant raised issues that had not been raised in his grounds of appeal which I will nonetheless consider. The appellant submitted that there was a mistrial due to non-compliance with article 50(2) (g) and (h) of the Constitution. The said article provides as follows:(g)to choose, and be represented by, an advocate, and to be informed of this right promptly;(h)to have an advocate assigned to the accused person by the State and at State expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; 41.The Court of Appeal in Manyeso v Republic [2023] KECA 827 (KLR) held thus:The appellant did not raise the issue of legal representation either in the trial court and the High Court. The appellant participated in the trial and cross-examined the witnesses, and it was not evident that he suffered ny or any substantial injustice. The appellant’s rights to a fair trial on under articles 50(2) (g) and 50(2) (h) of the Constitution were not violated. 42.The question of legal representation was not raised at all in the lower court. The appellant dealt with the matter effectively. It is only that the case was overwhelming. There is no demonstration of the appellant suffering any substantial injustice. Looking at cross examination, the appellant was able to effectively raise all questions and there was no evidence that the situation could change. However the most important aspect is that the appellant chose not to exercise his right. 43.The appellant further in his submissions stated that then court erred by failing to comply with section 200 of the C.P.C. I have looked at the record at find that particular section of the law was complied with, and that the trial court gave directions to the effect that the matter would proceed de novo. The fact that the trial magistrate described the complainant as Pw 2, and that the grandmother who had testified as PW 1 was not recalled does not negate the fact that the trail magistrate complied with the law. 44.Now turning to the appellant’s defence, the appellant in his evidence only gave evidence in respect to the date of his arrest. He did not tell the court about his whereabouts on the date of the offence. The trial magistrate noted in his judgment that in he had considered the defence, which I find was mere denial. The trial magistrate was thus right in dismissing the appellant’s defence 45.Upon perusal of the judgment of the lower court dated 1st February 2024, I find that the learned trail magistrate found the accused guilty and convicted him of the alternative charge of indecent assault, and later proceeded to sentence him on account of defilement under Section 8(2) to 30 years imprisonment. 46.The powers of this Court are circumscribed by Section 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which permits a first appellate court to confirm, reverse, or vary any finding, sentence, or order of the trial court. The section reads as follows:382.subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of an error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during the trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless the error, omission or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice:Provided that in determining whether an error, omission or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the question whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. 47.Within these boundaries, the Court is obliged to conduct a fresh and thorough examination of the evidence, reassess the credibility of witnesses, and evaluate any conflicting testimony to reach its own independent conclusions. Throughout this exercise, the legal burden of proof remains unchanged, resting entirely on the prosecution to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Only by meticulously scrutinizing all the evidence, while adhering strictly to the statutory framework, can the Court ensure that the appellant is afforded a full and fair reevaluation of the case. 48.I have reevaluated the evidence on recorded and find that all the ingredients of the charge of defilement have been proved by the prosecution. The medical evidence is that there was partial penetration, and minimal bleeding on the walls of the vagina of the victim. I thus find that the trial magistrate erred, and I hereby set aside the conviction on the alternative charge and convict the appellant on the charge of defilement contrary to Section 8(1) as read with Section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act. 49.Regarding sentence, I note that the court meted out a sentence of 30 years, for the offence of defilement yet in the body of his judgment, he convicted the appellant for the alternative charge of indecent assault. This is a grave error on the part of the trial magistrate. The minimum mandatory sentence provided under section 8(2) of the sexual offences act is life sentence. There is no other sentence provided. 50.The question of such sentences was addressed in the case of Republic v Mwangi; Initiative for Strategic Litigation in Africa (ISLA) & 3 others (Amicus Curiae) [2024] KESC 34 (KLR), where the Supreme Court, [MK Koome, CJ, MK Ibrahim, SC Wanjala, N Ndungu & I Lenaola, SCJJ] posited as follows:11.Mandatory sentences and minimum sentences as punishment in law have been commonly prescribed by legislatures worldwide but recently, various apex courts of several countries such as Canada, the USA, Australia, and South Africa as well as the European Court of Human Rights have struck down both mandatory life imprisonment as well as minimum sentences in an effort to move towards the approach of proportionality in punishment based on the actual crime committed12.Before Kenyan courts could determine whether or not the prevailing trends and decisions were persuasive, there ought to be a proper case filed, presented and fully argued before the High Court and escalated through the appropriate channels on the constitutional validity or otherwise of minimum sentences or mandatory sentences other than for the offence of murder. That was the Supreme Court’s approach and direction in Muruatetu which had to remain binding to all courts below.13.The Court of Appeal failed to identify with precision the provisions of the Sexual Offences Act it was declaring unconstitutional, left its declaration of unconstitutionality ambiguous, vague and bereft of specificity. That approach was problematic in the realm of criminal law because such a declaration would have grave effect on other convicted and sentenced persons who were charged with the same offence. Inconsistency in sentences for the same offences would also create mistrust and unfairness in the criminal justice system. Yet the fundamental issue of the constitutionality of the minimum sentence may not have been properly filed and fully argued before the superior courts below. 51.Further, the same court delivered its decision in Republic v Manyeso [2025] KESC 16 (KLR), where is stated as follows: Paragraph 11 to 14 of the Muruatetu directions are very clear that the decision in the Muruatetu case did not invalidate mandatory sentences or minimum sentences in the Penal Code, Sexual Offences Act or any other statute. Further, that the Muruatetu case cannot be said to be the authority for stating that all provisions of the law prescribing minimum sentences are inconsistent with the Constitution. Paragraphs 93 to 97 of the Muruatetu decision are also explicit that it is not for the court to define what constitutes a life sentence. While we appreciated that a life sentence could mean a certain minimum or maximum time to be set by a judicial officer, this court made the following recommendations to the Attorney General to develop legislation on what constitutes a life sentence:“94.We recognize that although the Judiciary released elaborate and comprehensive Sentencing Policy Guidelines in 2016, there are no specific provisions for the sentence of life imprisonment, because it is an indeterminate sentence. Nevertheless, we are in agreement with the High Court decision in Jackson Wangui, supra, which found that it is not for the court to define what constitutes a life sentence or what number of years must first be served by a prisoner on life sentence before they are considered on parole. This is a function within the realm of the Legislature.95.We also acknowledge that in Kenya and internationally, sentencing should not only be used for the purpose of retribution, it is also for the rehabilitation of the prisoner as well as for the protection of civilians who may be harmed by some prisoners. We find the comparative jurisprudence with regard to the indeterminate life sentence is compelling. We find that a life sentence should not necessarily mean the natural life of the prisoner; it could also mean a certain minimum or maximum time to be set by the relevant judicial officer along established parameters of criminal responsibility, retribution, rehabilitation and recidivism.96.We therefore recommend that the Attorney General and Parliament commence an enquiry and develop legislation on the definition of ‘what constitutes a life sentence’; this may include a minimum number of years to be served before a prisoner is considered for parole or remission, or provision for prisoners under specific circumstances to serve whole life sentences. This will be in tandem with the objectives of sentencing. 52.This court having found the appellant guilty of the main charge of defilement contrary to Section 8(1) as read with Section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act, the sentence is hereby enhanced to the mandatory life sentence. Determination 53.In the circumstances, I make the following orders: -a.The Appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.b.The conviction on the Alternative Count of committing an indecent act with a child contrary to section 11(1) of the Sexual Offences Act is set aside. And substituted with conviction on the charge of defilement contrary to Section 8(1) as read with Section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act.c.The sentence is substituted to life imprisonment.c.Right of appeal 14 days.d.The file is closed. DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED ON THIS 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2026.JUDGEMENT DELIVERED THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAMS ONLINE PLATFORM.MARTHA MUTUKU.JUDGEIn the presence of: -Miss for the State.Appellant in person.