https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/11321

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **MILIMANI LAW COURTS** **CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION** **MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO E014 OF 2025** **TAXATION REFERENCE** **BETWEEN** **MULONDO & COMPANY ADVOCATES LLP………………………………………………..ADVOCATE/APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **LANDMARK FREIGHT SERVICES LIMITED. CLIENT RESPONDENT** ***(Being a Reference from the Ruling of the Taxing Master, Hon R.K. Onkoba, at Nairobi delivered on March 11, 2025, in High Court Constitutional Petition No. E663 of 2024 formerly Milimani HC Commercial and Tax Miscellaneous Application 673 of 2023)*** **MULONDO & COMPANY ADVOCATES** **LLP ……………………………………………..PETITIONER/APPLICANT** **-VERSUS-** **LANDMARK FREIGHT SERVICES LIMITED ….....…... RESPONDENT** **RULING ON A REFERENCE DATED 25TH MARCH, 2025** 1. The Reference filed vide Chamber Summons is dated 25th March 2025 and is brought under Sections 1A, 3B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Paragraph Rule 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. The Applicant / Advocate seeks the following ORDERS: - 2. ***The decision of the Taxing Master in the Constitutional Petition No. E663 of 2024, delivered on 11th March 2025, concerning the Amended Advocate - Client Bill of Cost dated March 26, 2024, be set aside in its entirety and taxed afresh by this Honourable Court.*** 3. ***That in the alternative, the Honourable Court be pleased to order that the Applicant’s Amended Advocate- Client Bill of Cost in its entirety be taxed afresh by another Taxing Master.*** 4. ***That the costs of these proceedings be determined by this Honourable Court; and awarded to the Applicant*** 5. The genesis of this advocate-client fee dispute traces back to ***Nairobi High Court Constitutional Petition No. 290 of 2018, Landmark Freight Services Limited v Kenya Bureau of Standards & 4 Others*** where the Respondent (Landmark) was initially represented by M/s Prof. Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates. This Court *(differently constituted - Hon. Weldon Korir, J.)* ultimately ordered the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) to lift seizure notices and release a massive consignment of brown sugar to the Respondent after finding it fit for human consumption. Aggrieved by this determination, KEBS preferred an appeal vide ***Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019.No. 578 of 2019*** involving a multi-agency dispute with the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) and others. 6. The Applicant/ Advocate herein was subsequently instructed by the Respondent. Client to take over conduct of the matter and oppose the substantive appeal. Over the course of the engagement, the Applicant not only came on record but also entered into structured out-of-court alternative dispute resolution negotiations with KEBS. These processes culminated in a final Settlement Deed dated 5th May 2023, under which the Respondent secured a global settlement sum of Kshs. 670,000,000. 7. The facts indicate that on 4th May 4, 2023, exactly one day prior to the formal execution of the Deed of Settlement, the Respondent instructed another advocate who filed a Notice of Change of Advocates, thereby unceremoniously terminating the Applicant’s instructions. The Applicant subsequently filed its Bill of Costs to recover professional fees. 8. On 11th March 2025, the Taxing Master Hon. R.K. Onkoba delivered a Ruling on the Applicant’s Amended Advocate-Client Bill of Costs which sought Kshs. 47,620,722.66. The Taxing Master however, rejected the settlement value as the basis for calculating fees, capped the basic instruction fee at Kshs. 100,000, and struck out the getting-up fees entirely. The heavy reduction of the fees which entailed certifying the final costs at only Kshs. 417,307.06 taxing off over Kshs. 47.2 million was based on the several findings. 9. The Taxing Master ruled that because the case had not substantively proceeded in court and was yet to be formally concluded, its complexity could not be deciphered and therefore, the instructions fees were capped at Kshs. 100,000/= which was a reduction from the requested Kshs. 19,650,000. 10. The taxing Master did not calculate instructions fees based on the Kshs. 670,000,000 settlement value, stating that the negotiation minutes were *"without prejudice"* and could not be relied upon. 11. On getting-up fees, the entire requested sum of Kshs. 6,550,000 was taxed off on account that it had not been properly certified under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. Various meeting preparations and negotiation items were completely taxed off as they were not provided for under the Remuneration Order. 12. Aggrieved by this reduction, Mulondo & Company Advocates LLP filed the Chamber Summons application seeking to have the Taxing Master’s decision set aside in its entirety and the bill taxed afresh. Supported by an Affidavit sworn by Vincent Mulondo and written submissions from Morara Omoke Advocates, the Applicant raises several grounds. 13. The Applicant argues that under ***paragraph 1(b) of Schedule 6(A) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order*** and established case law in ***Peter Muthoka & another v Ochieng & 3 others [2019] eKLR***, where a suit is settled, the instruction fees must legally be computed proportionally based on the value of that settlement, in this case, Kshs. 670,000,000, rather than falling back on basic scales. 14. The Applicant contends that KEBS is a public body, making the negotiation minutes public records under the Evidence Act. Disregarding them as private or confidential violates the Applicant’s right to a fair hearing and ignores the significant "donkey work" done to secure the settlement. 15. The Applicant states that the Taxing Master erred by completely throwing out the getting-up fees, failing to award statutory interest at 14% per annum and disregarding extensive preparation and legal research. The Applicant also claims that the Taxing Master failed to give proper consideration to the substantial material because the ruling was written in a hurried manner on the very morning of its delivery. 16. The Respondent filed **a Replying Affidavit** sworn by **Samuel Mburu Kamau** on **25th July 2025** in which he gives a history of the dispute and states that Justice W. Korir’s Rulings in 2019 centred on the disputed sugar consignment seized by the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS). That initially, the court noted contradictions in expert testimony from KEBS witness Clarkson Ogembo Nyambok and ordered a simplified report. After recalling the witness for clarification, Justice Korir ruled on 29th July 2019, that the sugar met East African standards once margins of error were considered. Consequently, KEBS was directed to lift the seizure and release the sugar. 17. It is averred that KEBS, dissatisfied with the High Court’s order, pursued relief in the Court of Appeal. That on 25th October 2019, the appellate court granted a stay of execution, reasoning that releasing potentially expired or harmful sugar before the appeal would undermine public health and render the appeal nugatory. Later, on 8th May 2020, Lady Justice F. Sichale allowed KEBS to file its Notice of Appeal out of time, citing administrative delays caused by the absence of a substantive Managing Director following an arrest. That accordingly this extension underscored the court’s willingness to balance procedural compliance with practical realities in safeguarding institutional interests. 18. The Respondent deposes that the dispute later shifted to legal fees in ***High Court Petition No. E663 of 2024*** and ***Misc. App No. E014 of 2025***. That Mulondo & Company Advocates LLP sought Kshs. 47.6 million for representing Landmark Freight Services Limited in Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019. However, on 11th March 2025, Taxing Master Hon. R.K. Onkoba reduced the claim to Kshs. 417,307.06, capping instruction fees at Kshs. 100,000 since the appeal was never concluded, excluding *“Without Prejudice”* settlement minutes, and rejecting getting up fees. 19. The Respondent asserts that the Taxing Master's decision was correct and lacks any error of principle because: Instruction Fees: Capping the instruction fees at Kshs 100,000 was justified because Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019 was never substantively concluded, meaning its legal complexity could not be fully ascertained. Furthermore, minutes of settlement meetings relied upon by the Applicant to show a high subject matter value were confidential and legally barred from court reliance. 20. The Respondent contended that Getting Up Fees were properly taxed off because the Court of Appeal had never certified the case as complex or weighty, a requirement under ***Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) (Amendment) Order, 2014***. The Respondent dismisses the Applicant's claims that the Taxing Master wrote the ruling too hurriedly as an absurd, uncalled-for direct attack falling outside the court's jurisdiction. 21. In a rejoinder, the Applicant filed a further affidavit dated 16th October 2025 sworn by Vincent Mulondo stating that, while the underlying dispute started under Prof. Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates in ***Petition No. 290 of 2018***, the Applicant took over and handled the subsequent appeal in ***Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019*** and structured negotiations. 22. The Applicant contends that its role went beyond merely opposing the appeal because they filed pleadings, attended mentions, advised the client, and actively initiated and led the negotiation process between January and May 2023. 23. The Applicant avers that the Respondent unilaterally terminated the instructions on 4th May 2023, exactly one day before the final Deed of Settlement was signed. The Applicant contends that this was a deliberate attempt to evade paying rightful professional fees for fully completed work. 24. The Applicant highlights the fact that the subject matter value was Kshs. 670,000,000 which should have been the basis for Instruction Fees. It is contended that the Taxing Master erred in principle by ignoring clear evidence of the subject matter’s value because the final, direct outcome of the Applicant’s representation was a Kshs. 670,000,000 settlement paid to the Respondent. 25. The Respondent argued that the negotiation minutes were *"without prejudice"* and inadmissible. The Applicant counters that once the parties executed and acted upon the final Deed of Settlement dated 5th May 2023, the confidentiality cloak was lifted, making the documents admissible to prove value. 26. The Applicant rejects the argument that the appeal was not concluded. Relying on judicial precedents in ***Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] EA 92 and Peter Muthoka & Another v Ochieng & 3 others [2019] eKLR***, they assert instruction fees are fully earned once substantial work is rendered and that a negotiated settlement constitutes a logical conclusion. 27. The Applicant clarifies that pointing out the Taxing Master’s procedural irregularities is not a personal attack, but a legitimate critique falling under the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. That the Respondent’s technical objections to admitting negotiation records are labelled as a breach of ***Article 50(1) and Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution***, which mandate that disputes be resolved on substantive merits rather than procedural technicalities. 28. It is asserted that the Respondent has fully received the Kshs. 670,000,000 but refuses to pay corresponding legal fees, which constitutes unjust enrichment at the expense of the Applicant’s labour. Accordingly, the Court should find merit in this Reference, set aside the Tax Master’s Ruling of 11th March 2025 and reassess instruction fees based on the ascertained value of the subject matter of Kshs. 670,000,000. 29. The matter was canvassed by written submissions which I have keenly read and considered. 30. The Applicant’s submissions are dated 8th September 2025. In summation, the Applicant argues that the Taxing Master committed a fatal error in principle by ignoring a signed Deed of Settlement dated 5th May 2023, which granted the Respondent a global settlement sum of Kshs. 670,000,000 following protracted litigation and out-of-court negotiations against the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) in ***Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019***. Highlighting that the Respondent unceremoniously terminated their services just one day before the settlement was formally executed, the Applicant insists they are legally entitled to scale fees calculated directly from that Kshs. 670,000,000 subject matter value. They claim full basic instruction fees enhanced for complexity, getting-up fees for their preparatory work, alternative dispute resolution negotiation rates, a mandatory 50% statutory advocate-client increment, VAT, disbursements, and 14% annual interest. Consequently, the Applicant requests the Court to set aside the impugned ruling and either reassess the Bill of Costs as drawn or remit it to a different Taxing Officer for fresh assessment. 31. The Respondent’s submissions are dated 28th November 2025. The Respondent urges the High Court to dismiss the Applicant’s Chamber Summons Application with costs, asserting that the Taxing Master, Hon. R.K. Onkoba, correctly applied the law and committed no error of principle in her taxation ruling of 11th March 2025. The Respondent argues that the underlying suit, ***Nairobi High Court Constitutional Petition No. 290 of 2018***, primarily sought declaratory, injunctive and judicial review orders with no ascertainable financial subject matter value, meaning the Taxing Master properly exercised her statutory discretion under ***Schedule 6*** on appeals to increase the default instruction fee from Kshs 25,200 to Kshs 100,000. 32. Furthermore, the Respondent maintains that the Applicant’s reliance on a purported Kshs 670,000,000 settlement is completely legally untenable because the negotiation minutes were inadmissible due to being conducted on a confidential "Without Prejudice" basis. Additionally, they emphasize that those minutes referenced entirely different case numbers and had no bearing on ***Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019,*** which forms the basis of these taxation proceedings and remains pending without a final judgment to indicate any complexity or novelty. 33. Finally, the Respondent defends the complete striking off of the claimed Kshs 6,550,000 getting-up fees, citing ***Schedule 6 paragraph 3*** and ***National Bank of Kenya vs. Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR,*** that such fees are strictly conditional upon the Court of Appeal formally certifying the case as complex and weighty at the conclusion of a hearing. **Analysis and Determination** 1. Having considered the respective parties’ positions, the main issue for my determination is whether the Application has merit and can be allowed. 2. The principles governing references from a Taxing Officer’s decision are well-settled. Court taxation is an exercise of judicial discretion. The Court will not disturb a Taxing Master’s assessment purely on questions of quantum unless it is demonstrated that the decision was driven by an error of principle, or that the final award is so manifestly excessive or inordinately low as to imply such an error and occasion a miscarriage of justice. 3. The powers vested in this Court in a reference as stated in **Joreth Limited v Kigano & Associates [2002] KECA 153 (KLR)** are as follows: ***“A High Court judge when hearing such an objection is not sitting in his capacity as a judge exercising his appellate jurisdiction as, say, would be the case when he hears an appeal against the decision of a magistrate. The taxing officer whilst taxing a bill of costs is carrying out his functions as such only. He is an officer of the superior court appointed to Tax bills of costs.”*** 1. The principles upon which this Court can overturn the decision of a Taxing Officer are spelt out in the case of **Peter Muthoka & another v Ochieng & 3 others [2019] KECA 597 (KLR)** as follows: ***“It is not lost to us, as we address that single issue, that matters of quantum of taxation properly belong in the province and competence of taxing masters. They fall within their discretion and so the High Court upon a reference will be slow to interfere with them. It is not a wild and unaccountable discretion, however, because it is at its core and by definition a judicial discretion to be exercised, not capriciously at a whim, but on settled principles. When it is shown that there was a misdirection on some matter resulting in a wrong decision, or it is manifest from the case as a whole that the discretion was improperly exercised, resulting in mis-justice, to borrow the holding in MBOGO -vs- SHAH (Supra), then the decision though discretionary, may properly be interfered with. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENYA -vs- PROF. ANYANG’ NYONG’O & 10 OTHERS, EACJ App. No. 1 OF 2009”*** 1. In an earlier case of **First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 64); (Civil Suit 2255 of 2000) [2002] KEHC 1277 (KLR) (Civ) (25 April 2002) (Ruling),** Ringera J (as he then was) held thus: - ***“…. First, I find that on the authorities, this court cannot interfere with the taxing officer’s decision on taxation unless it is shown that either the decision was based on an error of principle, or the fee awarded was so manifestly excessive as to justify an inference that it was based on an error of principle. (See Steel & Petroleum (E.A) Ltd Vs. Uganda Sugar Factory (Supra). Of course. It would be an error of principle to take into account irrelevant factors or to omit to consider relevant factors. And according to the Advocates Remuneration Order itself, some of the relevant factors to take into account include the nature and importance of the cause or matter, the amount or value of the subject matter involved, the interest of the parties, the general conduct of the proceedings and any direction by the trial Judge. Needless to state not all the above factors may exist in any given case, and it is therefore open to the Taxing Officer to consider only such factors as may exist in the actual case before him. If the court considers that the decision of the Taxing Officer discloses errors of principle, the normal practice is to remit it back to the Taxing Officer for re-assessment unless the Judge is satisfied that the error cannot materially have affected the assessment. (see Nanyuki Esso Service V Touring Cars Ltd; Steel & Petroleum (E.A.) Ltd V Uganda Sugar Factory; Thomas James Arthur V Nyeri Electricity Undertakers and Joreth V Kigano & Associates). However, the Judge does have jurisdiction, and it is within his discretion to reassess the bill himself; (See Steel & Petroleum (E.A.) Ltd and Thomas James Arthur). The court is not entitled to upset a taxation because in its opinion, the amount awarded was high (See Steel Construction & Petroleum Engineering (E.A.) Ltd. The other general principle is that it is within the discretion of the Taxing Officer to increase or reduce the instruction fees and that the amount of the increase or reduction is discretionary. (See Thomas James Arthur V Nyeri Electricity Undertakers) …..”*** 1. Similarly, Ojwang J. (as he then was) in ***Republic v Ministry of Agriculture & 2 others Ex parte Muchiri W’njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR***, held *inter alia*: ***“The taxation of costs is not a mathematical exercise; it is entirely a matter of opinion based on experience. A Court will not, therefore, interfere with the award of a taxing officer, particularly where he is an officer of great experience, merely because it thinks the award somewhat too high or too low; it will only interfere if it thinks the award so high or so low as to amount to an injustice to one party or the other…. The court cannot interfere with the taxing officer’s decision on taxation unless it is shown that either the decision was based on an error of principle, or the fee awarded was manifestly excessive as to justify an interference that it was based on an error of principle.”*** 1. From the above, an error of principle includes a failure to take into account mandatory relevant factors, considering completely irrelevant factors, or misapplying the clear statutory provisions of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. It is within this restrictive scope that this Court reviews the impugned ruling. 2. This Court notes that there was no agreement in writing under section 45 of the Advocates Act for fees between the Advocate and the Client. 3. On instructions fees, the Taxing Master capped the Applicant’s instruction fees at Kshs. 100,000 on the grounds that ***Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019*** was never substantively argued to a final judgment in court, making its complexity unquantifiable; that the original petition sought declaratory and injunctive public law remedies without a specific, liquid subject matter; and that the minutes of the negotiation sessions were marked *"Without Prejudice"* and were thus inadmissible. 4. The Respondent argued in support of this position, adding that the negotiation minutes cited two entirely separate appeal numbers Civil Appeal No. 288 of 2019 and Civil Appeal No. 087 of 2022 but that the subject matter of the suit before the Court being Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019 was explicitly omitted. Conversely, the Applicant argues that the starting point for determining the value of a subject matter under **Schedule 6(A)(1)(b) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order** is disjunctive and it must be derived from either the pleadings, the judgment, or the settlement. 5. The Applicant relies on the locus classicus case of ***Peter Muthoka*** and ***Joreth Limited v Kigano & Associates [2002] EA 92*** which mandate that where a matter is settled, the terms of the settlement override the pleadings as the definitive guide to value. 6. I have considered the provisions of ***Schedule 6 B*** of the Advocates Remuneration Order which provides: ***A — PARTY AND PARTY COSTS*** 1. ***Instruction fees*** ***Subject as hereinafter provided, the fees for instructions shall be as follows—*** ***…..*** ***The fees for instructions in suits shall be as follows, unless the taxing officer in his discretion shall increase or (unless otherwise provided) reduce it—*** ***(j) Constitutional petitions and prerogative orders*** ***To present or oppose an application for a Constitutional and Prerogative Orders such fee as the taxing master in the exercise of his discretion and taking into consideration the nature and importance of the petition or application, the complexity of the matter and the difficulty or novelty of the question raised, the amount or value of the subject matter, the time expended by the advocate—*** 1. ***where the matter is not complex or opposed such sum as may be reasonable but not less than 45,000*** 2. ***where the matter is opposed and found to satisfy the criteria set out above, such sum as may reasonable but not less than 100,000*** 3. ***to present or oppose application for setting aside arbitral award 50,000*** ***B - ADVOCATE AND CLIENT COSTS*** ***As between advocate and client the minimum fee shall be—*** ***(a) the fees prescribed in A above, increased by 50%; or*** ***(b) the fees ordered by the court, increased by 50%; or*** ***(c) the fees agreed by the parties under paragraph 57 of this order increased by 50%; as the case may be, such increase to include all proper attendances on the client and all necessary correspondences.*** 1. In SC **Petition (Appl.) No. E024 of 2023 and Applications Nos. E030, E034 & E038 of 2024 Nairobi Bottlers Limited vs. Mark Ndumia Ndungu and Coca Cola Central, East &West Africa Limited** the Supreme Court set out the guiding principles for taxation as follows: - ***“[8] This Court, in the case of Fredrick Otieno Outa v Jared Otieno Odoto & 3 Others SC Petition No 6 of 2014; [2023] KESC 75 (KLR) highlighted the following principles to be considered in an application for setting aside a taxation decision:*** ***“(11) A certificate of taxation will be set aside, and a single Judge can only interfere with the taxing officer’s decision on taxation if;*** ***a. there is an error of principle committed by the taxing officer;*** ***b. the fee awarded is shown to be manifestly excessive or is so high as to confine access to the court to the wealthy;(and I may add, conversely, if the award is so manifestly deficient as to amount to an injustice to one party).*** ***c. the court is satisfied that the successful litigant is entitled to fair reimbursement for the costs he has incurred, (and I may add, the award must not be regarded as a punishment of the defeated party but as a recompense to the successful party for the expenses to which he had been subjected by the other party); and*** ***d. the award proposed is so far as practicable, consistent with previous awards in similar cases.*** ***To these general principles, I may add that;*** 1. ***There is no mathematical formula to be used by the taxing officer to arrive at a precise figure because each case must be considered and decided on its own peculiar circumstances,*** 2. ***Although the taxing officer exercises unfettered judicial discretion in matters of taxation that discretion must be exercised judicially, not whimsically,*** 3. ***The single Judge will normally not interfere with the decision of the taxing officer merely because the Judge believes he would have awarded a differe*nt figure had he been in the taxing officer’s shoes.”** 4. The Supreme Court further gave guidance on how to assess instructions fees which forms the crux of this Reference: - ***“[9] Bearing these principles in mind, I turn to the reference. Starting with the value of the subject matter. The Taxing Officer handled the issue as follows:*** ***“[9] The last issue for determination is on what really constitutes the value of the subject matter in this case. Counsel for the 1st respondent has submitted at length on this issue and posited that the value of the subject matter is Ksh.8,888,367,426.00. This figure, they submit, was the petitioner’s own calculation hence they ought to be bound by it. In rebuttal, the petitioner has argued that this was merely an approximation of what the petitioner would have incurred in compliance with the final orders of the High Court had the Supreme Court not granted the conservatory orders. According to the Petitioner, the claim before the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court was on the issue of breach and or violation of consumer rights as enshrined under Article 46 of the Constitution and nothing turned on the value of the subject matter.*** ***[10] I have perused the entire court record, and I must agree with the petitioner that the petition before the High Court did not have any quantifiable value. The footprints of Kshs.8,888,367,426.00 found their way in these proceedings at stage of seeking conservatory orders.”*** ***[10] It has to be restated that the genesis of this Reference is a constitutional petition that originated from the High Court through the Court of Appeal up to this Court and concerned the appellant/respondent’s omission in displaying the nutritional value, storage directions, customer care email address and phone number on the Coca Cola, Fanta, Krest, Stoney and Sprite glass bottles as it does on its plastic bottles and how this constituted a violation of consumer rights under Article 46(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution. The High Court and the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the 1st respondent and issued declarations that the appellant/respondent’s omission constituted a violation of the consumer rights under Article 46(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution and that the omission amounted to discrimination and unequal treatment of consumers contrary to Article 27(2), (4) and (5) of the Constitution. The Court issued a mandatory injunction directing the appellant/respondent to provide the nutritional information storage directions and customer care mobile number and email address on all of their Coca Cola, Fanta, Krest, Stoney and Sprite brands glass bottles within six (6) months of the date of delivery of the High Court judgment.*** ***[11] Therefore, I agree with the Taxing Officer that the subject matter is not discernible either from the Judgment or settled consent and the figure put forward of Kshs.8.8 billion emanated from the conservatory proceedings. It is thus my finding that the Taxing Officer was well guided by the Court’s decision in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot and Company Advocates (Petition E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR) where the Court held as follows:*** ***“57. Whilst the determination of the value of subject matter from a judgment and settlement of the parties is quite straight forward, the determination from pleadings is not. The determination of the value of the subject matter, may be difficult, for instance, where the pleadings/suit is struck out at a preliminary stage, such as in this case, and the value can only be determined/ascertained upon the conclusion of a trial. …..*** ***59. We are of a considered opinion that a claim in a suit which is struck out at the preliminary stage does not ipso facto render that claim or amount pleaded therein without more the value of the subject matter. The position still remains that the amount therein has not been ascertained or determined, and as such, it cannot be applied as the value of a subject matter in a disputed taxation. The application of such a claim or amount as the value of the subject matter would go against the rationale that the fees/costs paid to an advocate and a successful party should be reasonable.” [Emphasis added]*** ***[12] Now turning to item No. 1 being the instruction fees, I am guided by Paragraph 9 (2) of the Third Schedule to the effect that the fees allowed for instructions to appeal or to oppose an appeal is the discretion of the taxing officer and shall be such sum as he shall consider reasonable, having regard to the amount involved in the appeal, its nature, importance and difficulty, the interest of the parties, the other costs to be allowed, the general conduct of the proceedings, the person to bear the costs and all other relevant circumstances; and shall include all the work done in connection with the appeal, including attendances, correspondence, perusals, and consulting authorities. The absolute least is that fees must be commensurate to work done, and it will amount to unjust enrichment if it is not awarded for this purpose.*** ***[13] After examination of various matters previously taxed, the Taxing Officer arrived at the following decision:*** ***“[13] I have already found that there is no known value of the subject matter. In SC Petition No. 16 of 2019 Non-Governmental Organisations Coordination Board Vs. Eric Gitari & 5 Others that dealt with the rights of the LGBTIQ community, the petitioner had sought instruction fee of Kshs.25,000,000/= but I taxed it at Kshs.5,000,000/= having considered the complexity of the matter, the industry involved and other relevant factors. In SC Application No. E042 of 2023 Symbion Kenya Limited Vs. Goodison Sixty-One Schools Limited, a matter involving arbitration, Kshs.36,367,945.33 had been sought under instruction fee but I taxed instruction fee at Kshs.1,000,000/=. In SC Petition No. 6 of 2017 Fredrick Outa Vs. Jared O. Okello & Others that sought for instruction fee of Kshs.10,000,000/=, I taxed it at Ksh.6,000,000/= but on review, it was reviewed to Kshs.1,000,000/=. [14] Having sufficiently alluded to my previous decisions, I hereby tax item 1 at Ksh.1,000,000/= (One Million Shillings) considering that the petition’s life was cut short at its infancy stage vide the Ruling delivered on 10th November 2023. Ksh.89,000,000/= is taxed off.”*** ***[14] It is acknowledged that the subject matter revolved around constitutional issues on consumer protection. However, the appeal was struck out at a preliminary stage and, therefore, was not heard. I am further guided by the principles set out earlier in this Ruling, including the fact that taxation is not a mathematical exercise, but a discretionary process and a single Judge will not normally interfere with the decision of the Taxing Officer just because they would have awarded a different figure. Additionally, taking into account that the novelty and complexity of the matter were not determined and further considering the range of costs awarded in other matters, I am of the view that the sum awarded by the Taxing Officer was reasonable in the circumstances, and I therefore decline to interfere with the Taxing Officer’s decision. [15] On the instruction fees for Applications Nos. E030, E034 and E038 of 2023 the Taxing Officer reasoned as follows:*** ***“[18] On items 1, the 1st respondent seeks Ksh.500,000/- as instruction fee. This has been opposed by the petitioner on the basis that the same is exaggerated and contrary to the Third Schedule which provides as Kshs.1000/- as instruction fee to oppose an application. I have read Paragraph 9(1) of the Supreme Court Third Schedule, and I agree with the petition that the fee to be allowed for instruction to make, support or oppose any application shall be such sum as the taxing master shall consider reasonable by shall not be less than one thousand shillings. …*** ***[19] However, considering the nature of the dispute and the industry involved in opposing the same, awarding Ksh. 1,000/- will not be fair representation of the work done by counsel …..*** ***[20] In view of my previous decisions referred to herein and bearing in mind that the three applications herein were dealt with simultaneously and the appeal struck out for having been filed out of time, I am of the of 2024 view that this taxation ought not to appear as a punishment to the Petitioner for failure to file the appeal in time but rather appease the victor with a reasonable order of cost. In SC Petition (Application) No. 6 of 2016 Manchester Outfitters Suiting Division Limited now called King Woollen Mills Limited & Another Vs. Standard Chartered Financial Services Limited & Another, the Supreme Court awarded costs of a nominal amount of Kshs.20,000/=. Furthermore, the 1st respondent is equally being compensated with other costs in the main petition.”*** ***[16] I find that it is evident the Taxing Officer, in arriving at the instructions fees for the three applications, took into account Paragraph 9(1) of the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Rules, 2020 alongside the relevant principles of taxation. Paragraph 9(1) of the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Rules, 2020 provides as follows:*** ***“The fee to be allowed for instruction to make, support or oppose any application shall be such sum as the taxing officer shall consider reasonable but shall not be less than one thousand shillings.”*** ***[17] By awarding a sum reflective of the work involved while ensuring that the outcome neither penalized the appellant/respondent nor unduly favoured the 1st respondent/applicant, it is my considered finding that the Taxing Officer adhered to the principles of fairness and proportionality. This measured approach underscores the critical balance between compensating legal efforts and discouraging excessive claims.*** ***[18] Having evaluated the matter holistically, I find no justification to interfere with the decision of the Taxing Officer. The sums awarded were both reasonable and fair compensation, aligning with the legal framework and the underlying objective of cost taxation. Consequently, the award on instruction fees for Applications Nos. E030, E034 and E038 of 2023 is upheld.”*** 1. In the above Supreme Court decision, the apex Court recognized as follows, regarding instructions fees in Constitutional petitions: ***[11] Therefore, I agree with the Taxing Officer that the subject matter is not discernible either from the Judgment or settled consent and the figure put forward of Kshs.8.8 billion emanated from the conservatory proceedings.*** 1. In other words, where the subject matter can be discernible from the judgment or settled consent, then the instructions fees should be based on that settled consent, where the settled consent has quantifiable amount or is a liquidated sum. 2. The Respondent argued, and the taxing master agreed with those arguments that the negotiation records remain inadmissible under the *"Without Prejudice"* or confidentiality privilege. As to whether that finding is sound, I will assess this point from a statutory point and judicial pronouncements. 3. **Section 23(1) of the Evidence Act** render such letters generally inadmissible as follows: ***In civil cases no admission may be proved if it is made either upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given or in circumstances from which the Court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given.*** 1. In **Geoloy Investments Ltd V Behal t/a Krishan Behal & Sons [2002] 2KLR 447** Mwera J. captured the rationale of the rule as follows ***“The rubric “without prejudice” has been used over*** ***ages particularly in correspondence between counsel for litigating parties to facilitate free and uninhibited negotiations to explore settlements of dispute. Until such time as there is a definite agreement on the issues at hand, such correspondence cannot be used as evidence against any of the parties. The rubric simply means “I make you an offer, if you do not accept it, this letter is not to be used against me. Or I make you an offer which you may accept or not, as you like, but if you do not accept it, my having made it is to have no effect at all”. It is a privilege that is jealously guarded by the courts otherwise parties and their legal advisers would find it difficult to narrow down issues in dispute or to reach out of court settlements”.*** 1. See also in **Oceanbulk Shipping and Trading SA V TMT Asia Ltd and 3 Others [2010] UKSC 44.** 2. In **Unilever PLC V the Protector & Gamble [2000] IWLR 2436 at 2448 – 2449**, the Court stated as follows: ***“…the without prejudice rule is founded partly in public policy and partly in the agreement of the parties. They show that the protection of admissions against interest is the most important practical effect of the rule. But to dissect out identifiable admissions and withhold protection from the rest of without prejudice communications (except for a special reason) would not only create huge practical difficulties but would be contrary to the underlying objective of giving protection to the parties in the words of Lord Griffiths in Rush & Tompkins [at p 1300] ‘to speak freely about all issues in the litigation both factual and legal when seeking compromise and, for the purpose of establishing a basis of compromise, admitting certain facts’. Parties cannot speak freely at a without prejudice meeting if they must constantly monitor every sentence, with lawyers or patent agents sitting at their shoulders as minders.”*** 1. In **Walker V Wilsher [1889] 23 QBD 335 at 337,** Lindley L J defined the words “without prejudice” as follows: ***“I think they mean without prejudice to the position of the writer of the letter if the terms he proposes are not accepted. If the terms proposed in the letter are accepted, a complete contract is established, and the letter, although written without prejudice, operates to alter the old state of things and to establish a new one.”*** 1. The above position was fortified by the decision in **Lochab Transport Ltd V Kenya Arab Orient Insurance Ltd [1986] eKLR**, where the Court observed that: ***“… if an offer is made “without prejudice” evidence cannot be given on this offer. If this offer is accepted is accepted a contract is concluded and one can give evidence of the contract and give evidence of that ‘without prejudice’ letter”.*** 1. The foregoing decisions lay it bare that the *“without prejudice”* rule is grounded on public policy to promote free negotiations in the settlement of disputes as opposed to litigation and should litigation be resorted to, the rule excludes all correspondence exchanged in the course of seeking a settlement where a settlement is reached resolving the dispute. 2. In **Rush and Tomkins Ltd V Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280** the court acknowledged that the “*without prejudice”* rule is not without qualification. Lord Griffiths captured the rule as follows: ***“The rule applies to exclude all negotiations genuinely aimed at settlement whether oral or in writing from being given in evidence. A competent solicitor will always head any negotiating correspondence ‘without prejudice' to make clear beyond doubt that in the event of negotiations being unsuccessful, they are not to be referred to in at the subsequent trial. However, the application of the rule is not dependent upon the use of the phrase "without prejudice' and if it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that the parties were seeking to compromise the action, evidence of the content of those negotiations will, as a general rule, not be admissible at the trial and cannot be used to establish an admission or partial admission…*** ***I believe that the question has to be looked at more broadly and resolved by balancing two different public interests namely the public interest in promoting settlements and the public interest in full discovery between parties to litigation. However, these cases show that the rule is not absolute and resort may be had to the 'without prejudice’ material for a variety of reasons when the justice of the case requires it....”*** 1. This issue of admissibility of *‘without prejudice’* communication was also considered by the Court of Appeal in **Heineken East Africa Imports Co. Ltd & Another V Maxim Ltd [2024] KECA 625 (KLR)** where the Court expressed itself as follows: - ***“…It is notable that the contents of a communication made "without prejudice" are only admissible in certain exceptional circumstances, including when there has been a binding agreement between the parties arising out of it, or for the purpose of deciding whether such an agreement has been reached, and to the fact that such communication have been made is also admissible to show that negotiations have taken place, but not its contents, which are otherwise not admissible. With due respect to counsel, the circumstances they rely on to admit the letter dated 26th January 2016 are events that took place before the said letter was written and do not fall within these exceptions.*** ***Any doubts, conflicts, differing interpretations with regard to the “without prejudice” notice of termination must in the circumstances therefore be construed against the originator of the notice”.*** 1. Thus, the protective cloak of *"without prejudice"* confidentiality is lifted the moment negotiations crystallize into a final, binding agreement, as was in the instant case where, once the Deed of Settlement was fully executed on 5th May 2023 and the Respondent admittedly received the fruits of that settlement, being Kshs. 670,000,000, those background negotiations and outcomes became fully admissible as historical facts of record and the Advocate could rely on the same to compute his legal fees. 2. As stated above, the primary purpose of the without prejudice privilege is to protect parties from having their concessions used against them if negotiations fail. However, once a final settlement is reached, the privilege lifts for specific purposes. 3. In this case, for proving the Agreement, in that, the **e**vidence of the negotiations and the resulting deed is fully admissible to prove that a binding contract was formed and to determine its essential terms. 4. Second, the advocate was entitled to establish that he performed the work retained by the client and that could only be done by submitting those out of court settlement notes to demonstrate the exact nature, scope, and successful outcome of the legal services that he rendered. 5. Third is that where an advocate sues or files a bill of costs against his own client or seeks enforcement based on a settlement, the negotiation notes serve as critical proof of the value of the subject matter especially if the advocate’s instruction fees are scaled or based on the complexity and final value of the settlement, the negotiation trail explicitly verifies the sums involved. 6. Fourth, is that the notes act as an itemized log of the hours spent, the legal strategies deployed and the specific tasks completed to secure the deed. 7. Finally, if a fee agreement was contingent upon a successful resolution, the notes coupled with the deed prove that the contingency condition was met.therefore, to deny the disclosure during taxation is to deny the advocate his just entitlement, since the client never alleged fraud or impropriety on the part of the advocate and more so, the material in issue may only be disclosed to the court or taxing master for the specific purpose of assessing or enforcing fees and not for purposes of reopening the litigation on the merits of the original dispute. 8. I therefore find that it was an error of principle to find that the out of court negotiations that led to a Settlement Deed were inadmissible in the circumstances of this case as supported by the decisions that I have cited above. 9. I have also considered the Respondent’s isolation of Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019 from the global settlement. However, my finding is that the execution of a comprehensive Deed of Settlement was explicitly designed to finally settle all pending legal claims regarding the seized sugar consignment, of which Civil Appeal No. 578 of 2019 was the central case holding up the release of the cargo. Accordingly, the Respondent’s arguments are unsustainable. 10. Therefore, I find that the Taxing Master erred in principle by holding that because the appeal did not reach a formal judicial judgment, it was yet to be concluded. Instructions fees do not depend on the conclusion of a matter; instead, they become payable at the onset of instructing counsel. Additionally, an amicable out-of-court settlement is a legally valid and final mechanism for the termination of a suit or proceedings. 11. In **First American Bank of Kenya Ltd V Gulab P Shah & 2 Others (2002) eKLR** , the court held: ***“. . . full instructions fees to defend a suit is earned the moment a defense has been filed and the subsequent progress of the matter is irrelevant to that item of fees….”*** 1. On items under E, which involved negotiations between KEBS and the respondent, the taxing master disallowed the items on the ground that they are not provided for under the Advocates Remuneration Order. 2. Rule 16 of the Advocates Remuneration Order provides: ***16. Discretion of taxing officer*** ***Notwithstanding anything contained in this Order, on every taxation the taxing officer may allow all such costs, charges and expenses as authorized in this Order as shall appear to him to have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for defending the rights of any party, but, save as against the party who incurred the same, no costs shall be allowed which appear to the taxing officer to have been incurred or increased through overcaution, negligence or mistake, or by payment of special charges or expenses to witnesses or other persons, or by other unusual expenses.*** 1. In the case of **Vipul Premchand Haria vs Kilonzo & Co Advocates [2020] eKLR,** the Court of Appeal outlined the nature of the taxing officer’s discretion thus: ***“Once the client was dissatisfied with the bill, it fell upon the taxing master to tax it. Such taxation, much as it lies in the taxing officer’s discretion, is governed by clear principles. In other words, the discretion is a judicial one to be judicially and judiciously exercised. It is not to be exercised whimsically or capriciously in accordance with personal inclination. And the matters the taxing officer takes into consideration should be apparent from the reasons that she gives for her decision. It is those reasons that give an indication whether or not the discretion reposed in the taxing officer was properly exercised.”*** 1. Again, the proper exercise of discretion by the taxing officers was restated in **Kamunyori & Company Advocates vs. Development Bank Of Kenya Limited (2015) Civil Appeal 206 of 2006,** inwhich the Court of Appeal stated: ***“.. failure to ascertain the correct subject matter in a suit for the purpose of taxation is an error of principle. So too, failure to ascribe the correct value to the subject matter is an error of principle. Authorities on taxation show that a Judge will normally not interfere with the Taxing Officer’s decision on taxation unless it is based on an error of principle. Where it is shown that the sum awarded was so manifestly excessive as to justify interference, an error of principle can be inferred. If instructions fee is arrived at on the wrong principles, it will be set aside”*** 1. In**Havi & Company Advocates v Purma Holdings Limited & 2 others (Miscellaneous Civil Cause E032 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 3690 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes) (18 April 2024) (Ruling),**E.Maina J stated: ***“It is also instructive that in assessing the instructions fees the taxing officer is required to give due allowance for the other charges raised under the schedule. Such other charges would be attendances, drawing, copies, perusal and other disbursements.”*** 1. In my humble view, it is not correct to say that the out of court negotiations work that the advocate was engaged in with the express instructions of the client was part of the work done by the advocate in the matter and it is covered under Rule 16 which was not considered by the taxing master. 2. The law obligates the Taxing Master to take into account other factors which may affect the fairness of an award of costs. Accordingly, I find that the taxing master erred in principle in dismissing the items under section E of the Advocate/ client Bill of Costs.in so doing, she failed to exercise discretion under Rule 16 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. 3. More so, the Constitution recognizes alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation, negotiation, conciliation, among others, under Article 159 (2) ( c) and therefore to dismiss the items is suggestive that an advocate did not play any role in the negotiations which led to the Deed of settlement of the dispute, contrary to the evidence availed to Court. 4. Based on the foregoing, the proper subject matter value for the taxation of the instruction fees was Kshs. 670,000,000 and by entirely disregarding this figure, the Taxing Master applied wrong principles. 5. I have also considered the taxation on Getting-Up Fees, Excluded Items, and Statutory Interest, I note that the Taxing Master struck off the Applicant’s entire claim for getting-up fees being Kshs. 6,550,000 on the premise that the Court of Appeal had not formally certified the case as complex or weighty under Schedule 6. 6. The Respondent supports this position, citing the case of ***National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR,*** which predicates getting-up fees upon a certificate granted by the court at the conclusion of a full hearing. 7. This Court notes that the appellate court normally issues a certificate of complexity after a full hearing, however, the abrupt termination of a brief due to an out-of-court settlement prevented such an opportunity to certify the matter. 8. Therefore, whereas the advocate was not entitled to item since there was no such certification as required under Schedule 6A (3) of the Advocates Remuneration Order cited, the finding that since the matter was yet to be concluded, the novelty and complexity of the matter if any, cannot be deciphered at this stage, was erroneous, considering that she awarded item under E dated 21/02/2023 on drawing a legal opinion on out of court settlement which was not opposed. 9. I also note that there is no evidence that the taxing Master called for the trial and appellate court files for perusal to assess whether there was a certificate certifying the matter to be complex or not. That said, since the instructions fees was capped at Kshs. 100,000, the Taxing Master’s baseline for computing any prospective getting-up fees fraction, even if it was allowable was completely diverted. 10. The Applicant also laments that the Taxing Master completely neglected to render individual rulings or provide any mathematical rationale for taxing off specific items under Section B -Drawings, Copies, and Service, disbursements, and statutory interest. A Taxing Master holds a mandatory, non-discretionary constitutional and statutory obligation to pass a reasoned verdict on every single itemized line presented in a Bill of Costs, giving reasons for allowing and or rejecting each of the items. This was the holding in ***Truth Justice & Reconciliation Commission v Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya & another [2014] eKLR***, in which the court cited the Ugandan ***Court of Appeal decision in Makula International v Cardinal Nsubuga & Another [1982] HCB 11*** that: ***“The taxing officer should, in taxing a bill, first find the appropriate scale fee in schedule VI, and then consider whether the basic fee should be increased or reduced. He must give reasons for deciding that the basic fee should be increased or decreased. When he has decided that the scale should be exceeded, he does not arrive at a figure which he awards by multiplying the scale fee by a multiplication factor, but places what he considers a fair value upon the work or responsibility involved. Lastly, he taxes the instruction fee, either by awarding the basic fee or by increasing or decreasing it.”*** 1. Naikuni J in **Gikaria t/a Anthony Gikaria & Company Advocates v Samchi Telecommunications Limited (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Case E008 of 2025) [2025] KEELC 18295 (KLR) (13 November 2025) (Ruling)** stated thus: ***“Again, the mechanics of this formula were explained by H. Waweru, J in the case of “Kenya Tea Development Agency – Versus - J.M. Njenga & Co Advocates [2011] eKLR” when he expressed himself thus:*** ***“ ....... the taxing master did not look at each item in the party and party bill in order to know what was properly due to the Respondent. Had he done so, he would have noted that the instruction fee awarded in the party and party bill of costs was Kshs.4,540,000/=. He would then have increased this sum by one - half in order to arrive at the correct award for instruction fee for the Respondent.”*** 1. In the case of **Philip Muchiri Mugo –Versus- Mbeu Kithakwa[2016]eKLR,** the court relied on the general principles applicable in award of costs as enunciated in the Canadian case of Reese –Versus - Alberta when it stated: ***“While the discretion of costs of a law suit is always in the discretion of the court, the exercise of that discretion must be consistent with established principles and practice....,the costs recoverable are those fees fixed for the steps in the proceeding by a schedule of fees....plus, reasonable disbursements....”*** 1. In the case of ***Joreth Limited – Versus - Kigano & Associates*** (Supra), the court held as follows: ***“We would at this stage point out that the value of the subject matter of a suit for the purposes of Taxation of a Bill of Costs ought to be determined from the Pleadings, Judgment or Settlement (if such be the case), but if the same is not so ascertainable, the Taxing Officer is entitled to use his discretion to assess such instruction fee as he considers just, taking into account, amongst other matters, the nature and the importance of the cause or the matter, the interest of the parties, general conduct of the proceedings, any direction by the trial Judge and all other relevant circumstances.”*** 1. the above decisions support the proposition that each item must be assessed and reasons given for allowing or disallowing. However, in this case, the taxing master allowed the items under B and in my view, stating that they were drawn to scale. There is absolutely no reason to demand that she should have given reasons for allowing those items 9-19 of the Bill of Costs. I find no basis for the objection 2. The applicant further challenges the failure to consider interest under ***Rule 7 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order*** which was the last item in the Bill of Costs. 3. The basis for interest at 14% per annum on the itemised Bill of Costs is Rule 7 of the Advocates remuneration order which stipulates: ***7. Interest may be charged*** ***An advocate may charge interest at 14 per cent per annum on his disbursements and costs, whether by scale or otherwise, from the expiration of one month from the delivery of his bill to the client, provided that such claim for interest is raised before the amount of the bill shall have been paid or tendered in full.*** 1. This provision has been interpreted severally by this Court with guidance from the Court of Appeal. The interest is never awarded automatically. Ther emus be proof that the advocate served the client with an itemised bill and indicated in that bill that unless the fees is settled, then the advocate is entitled to charge the interest upon expiry of one month of the date of service or delivery of that Bill to the Client. 2. It is not enough to claim for interest in the filed Bill of Costs or at the time of applying for Judgment to be entered on the certificate of costs under section 52 of the Advocates Act. There must have been a demand for it. ***“ In Prof Tom Ojienda & Associates v County Government of Nairobi (Judicial Review Miscellaneous Application E027 of 2020) [2025] KEHC 6123 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (13 May 2025) (Ruling) this Court citing the Court of Appeal decisions on this aspect stated as follows:*** ***In Lubulellah & Associates Advocates v N K Brothers Ltd [supra], the Court of Appeal held that: “Where an advocate seeks to recover interest on his fees, he must have demanded for the same in the bill served on the client.” In Musyoka & Wambua Advocates v Rustam Hira Advocate [2006] eKLR, the court struck out a claim for interest not previously demanded in the bill, holding it was an afterthought and not compliant with Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order.*** ***The Court of Appeal has recently addressed this issue of whether an advocate can claim interest on taxed costs when no prior demand was made before filing the bill of costs. In the case of Otieno, Ragot & Company Advocates v. Kenindia Assurance Co. Ltd (Civil Appeal 129 of 2019), [2023] KECA 1398 (KLR) (24 November 2023) (Judgment)the court held that an advocate cannot charge the 14% per annum interest under Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order without notifying the client. The court emphasized that it was incumbent upon the advocate to put the client on notice that they intended to claim interest at the point at which the bill of costs was drawn. It follows that an advocate is barred from springing up a claim for 14% interest during taxation or judgment application if it was not demanded in the original bill served to the client. To hold otherwise would amount to procedural unfairness and violate the clear requirements of the Advocates Remuneration Order. In Amondi & Company Advocates v. County Government of Kisumu (Miscellaneous Application 73 of 2020), the Court reiterated that Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Rules is clear that interest is chargeable at 14% per annum from the expiration of one month from the delivery of the bill to the client. However, the court also noted that interest does not become automatically chargeable after the lapse of one month; it is only chargeable provided that such claim for interest was raised before the amount of the bill has been paid or tendered in full. The above decisions highlight the necessity for advocates to provide clear notice to clients regarding the intention to charge interest on costs and to adhere to the procedural requirements set out in the Advocates Remuneration Order.”*** 1. I note that the taxing master completely left out this item in the assessment and ruling which is impugned. I have not seen any bill which was served on the client with a notification that the advocate would charge the interest under Rule 7. This is even after I called for the file in Misc Appl E663 of 2024 filed before the Commercial and Tax Division. 2. I reiterate that the item is only awardable upon proof of demand for it. Having said that the taxing master should not have ignored it. She should have given reasons for disallowing it, not completely ignoring it. To that extend, she fell into an error of principle in failing to consider the item. 3. Accordingly, it is my finding that the Taxing Master’s ruling dated 11th March 2025, has fundamental errors of principle which call for this Court’s intervention. I find merit in the Reference and hereby allow it. Consequently, this Court issues the following orders: 4. ***The reference is hereby allowed to the extent stated in the Ruling.*** 5. ***The ruling of the Taxing Master, Hon. R.K. Onkoba, delivered on 11th March 2025, in High Court Petition No. E663 of 2024, is set aside.*** 6. ***The Applicant’s Amended Advocate-Client Bill of Costs dated 26th March 2024, is remitted back to the Taxing Master Hon Onkoba for a fresh taxation taking into account the findings in this Ruling.*** 7. ***Each party shall bear their own costs of the Reference.*** 8. It is so ordered. **Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 10th Day of July, 2026** **R.E. ABURILI** **JUDGE**