[2005] KEHC 3364 (KLR)
The court found that the applicant had not satisfied the first requirement for the grant of an interlocutory injunction as set out in Giella v Cassman Brown, namely, establishing a prima facie case with a probability of success. The issues raised regarding the validity of the respondents' titles and allegations of...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2005] KEHC 3364 (KLR)
- Parties
- Plaintiff: Municipal Council of Garissa; Defendant: Adenkehir Aden; Defendant: Mohamed Mahat Kuno Sunkuri; Defendant: Abdi Hassan Abubakar
- Court
- High Court
- Court Station
- High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts)
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Civil Case 1294 of 2004
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Case / Interlocutory Application for Injunction
- Outcome
- Interlocutory injunction refused; status quo to be maintained pending hearing.
- Judges
- PJ Ransley
- Legal Topics
- Injunctive Relief, Public Land Disputes, Fraudulent Title Acquisition, Registered Land Act, Balance of Convenience
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Municipal Council of Garissa
Plaintiff
Adenkehir Aden
Defendant
Mohamed Mahat Kuno Sunkuri
Defendant
Abdi Hassan Abubakar
Defendant
Procedural Posture
Civil Case / Interlocutory Application for Injunction
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case with a probability of success to warrant the grant of an injunction.
- 2 Whether damages would be an adequate remedy for the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted.
- 3 Whether the balance of convenience favors the grant or refusal of the injunction.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the applicant had not satisfied the first requirement for the grant of an interlocutory injunction as set out in Giella v Cassman Brown, namely, establishing a prima facie case with a probability of success. The issues raised regarding the validity of the respondents' titles and allegations of fraud could only be determined at a full hearing. However, given the importance of the matter and the fact that the suit land had been substantially developed, the court ordered that the status quo be maintained pending the hearing and determination of the suit. Neither party was to take any further action in relation to the suit premises until the case was heard. Costs were...
Court Disposition
Interlocutory injunction refused; status quo to be maintained pending hearing.
Orders
- Status quo to be maintained until the hearing of the case; neither party to take any action in relation to the suit premises.
- Case to be set down for hearing on a priority basis.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
32 paragraphs
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI
CIVIL DIVISION
CIVIL CASE 1294 OF 2004
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF GARISSA …………......…….…………….. PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
ADENKEHIR ADEN ……………………………..….....……….... 1ST DEFENDANT
MOHAMED MAHAT KUNO SUNKURI …………......…………. 2ND DEFEDNANT
ABDI HASSAN ABUBAKAR ……………………….....…….….. 3RD DEFENDANT
RULING
By its Chamber Summons of the 19. 11. 2004 the Applicant seeks an injunction in the terms of prayer 2 of the Chamber Summons in the following terms: -
(2) “The Defendants/Respondents, their employees, agents and or servants be restrained by way of an injunction from occupying, developing, fencing or erecting structures or buildings on L.R. numbers Garissa Township/Block/314, Garissa Township Block 1/315 and Garissa Township Block 1/316 and or interfering with the authorized use of the land as a Bus Park or the development of the land as a Bus Park.”
The grounds on which the application are based is that the land in question is public land and was originally known as Garissa Block 1/106 which had been wrongly acquired by the Respondents after the original piece of land had been unlawfully sub-divided.
Annexed to the supporting affidavit to the application is a certificate of lease in respect of Garissa Township Block 1/315 in favour of the first Respondent, a certificate of lease in a respect of Garissa Township Block 1/316 in favour of the second Respondent, as well as a lease from the County Council of Garissa in respect of plot 316 in favour of the second Respondent.
The third Respondent is stated in the Plaint to be the owner of Garissa Township Block 1/314.
In all cases the Applicant alleges that the title documents are invalid null and void ab initio and it is for this reason that it seeks the injunction prayed for.
The Respondent also say that they have certificate of title registered under the provisions of Registered Land Act (The Act) and have indefeasible titles to the land by virtue of section 28 of the Act, which says that the right of a proprietor shall not be liable to be defeated except as provided in the Act (The Act).
Section 143 (1) and (2) states: -
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the court may order rectification of the register by directing that any registration be cancelled or amended where it is satisfied that any registration (other than a first registration) has been obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake.
(2) The register shall not be rectified so as affect the title of a proprietor who is in possession and acquired the land lease or charge for valuable consideration, unless such proprietor had knowledge of the omission, fraud or mistake in consequence of which the rectification is sought, or caused such omission fraud or mistake or substantially contributed to it by his act, neglect or default.
In the Plaint the Plaintiff alleges the titles obtained by the Respondent were acquired by fraud of which particulars are given and seeks declarations that the acquisition of the title deeds was fraudulent and as such they are void ab initio and that they are not the registered proprietors of the registered piece of land.
In order to succeed the Applicant must show that it has a prima facie case with a probability of success that damages would not be an adequate remedy and if in doubt on which side the balance of convenience falls.
If the Plaintiff is correct in its contentions, damages would not be an adequate remedy. This is because the suit premises were allocated to be the bus park for Garissa Town and if they have been wrongly allocated to the Respondents the town would suffer the loss of Bus Park as a result.
Mr. Mwangii for the Applicant submitted that the land in which the bus park was intended to be was land vested in the Municipal Council of Garissa. That as such the Garissa County Council, which issued the said titile, documents had no right to do so as the said land from which these were created did not belong to it and that in any event the titles having been issued by way of lease to the Respondents this presupposes that the lessor had title to issue the leases in which event if the issue of the title was not a first registration and the Plaintiff is entitled to rely on section 143 of the Act referred to above.
Mr. Ahmednasir for the Respondent referred to section 115 (1) of the constitution, which states that “All Trust Land shall vest in the County Council within whose area of jurisdiction it is situated”
It was his submission that the Applicant was not therefore the owner of the land but was vested in the county council of Garissa.
Undoubtedly prima facie the Respondent are the registered owner of the said piece of land and the onus is on the Applicant to show they were acquired through fraudulent dealings.
From a common sense point of view for a local authority to give away public land for private development is abuse of its power, which there has been much said, in the recent time. However the determination of these matters is not a matter for me in an application of this kind but to be decided on a full hearing of the case.
I do not think the Applicant have satisfied the first leg of the case of Giella and Cassman Brown. To determine the issues raised can only be done at a full hearing of the case. In view however of its importance I will set the case down for hearing on a priority basis. The balance of convenience fall in favour of the Applicant with the provision that the relief it seeks now is a matter for the past as the parcel of the land have been substantially developed. I therefore order that the status quo remain until the hearing of this case, which means neither party can do anything in connection with or relating to the suit premises until the suit is heard. Costs will be in the cause.
Dated and delivered at Nairobi this 23rd day of June 2005
P.J. RANSLEY
JUDGE