Murango v Ng’ongo & 8 others (Constitutional Petition E015 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 13002 (KLR) (20 August 2026) (Ruling)

Murango v Ng’ongo & 8 others (Constitutional Petition E015 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 13002 (KLR) (20 August 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 13002 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Kerugoya Constitutional Petition E015 of 2026 EM Muriithi, J August 20, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF: THE ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION OF THE CONSTITUTION UNDER ARTICLES 10(2), 118 (1) (b), 210, 225,226 (1)(2) AND 227(1)(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTIONS 4,7 AND 9 OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRAT IVE ACT NO. 4 OF 2015 AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY CUSTOMS MANAGEMENT ACT, 2004 AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE GAZETTE NO. 10061 PUBLISHED ON THE 6TH JULY 2026 Between Hon. James Kamau Murango Petitioner and Hon. John Mbadi Ng’ongo, The Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury and Planning 1st Respondent The Cabinet Secretary, Agriculture And Livestock Development 2nd Respondent Agriculture And Food Authority 3rd Respondent Dr. Lilian Nyawanda, Commissioner For Customs & Border Control 4th Respondent The Honourable Attorney General 5th Respondent Kenya National Trading Corporation 6th Respondent Mr. Humphrey Wattanga Commissioner General, Kra 7th Respondent and Ahero Rice Farmers Ass’ciation 1st Intended Interested Party Soufianne Bakkal 2nd Intended Interested Party Ruling Introduction 1.An application for recusal of a judge is an extremely serious matter, with which no Court, and no party, should trifle. In this regard, the Court accepts, respectfully, the view of Warsame, J. as he then was in Alliance Media Kenya Limited v. Monier 2000 Limited and Njoroge Reguru, HCCC No. 370 of 2007, [Alliance Media Kenya Limited v Monier 2000 Limited & another [2007] KEHC 2518 (KLR)] cited by the applicants, where the Court considered an application for disqualification of an arbitrator on the grounds of likely bias and said as follows:“My view of the matter is as follows: That no doubt disqualification is a serious matter, which must be taken seriously. The seriousness of seeking disqualification is a true reflection or testimony that one party either by design, default and/or genuinely has no faith in the determination of his case by a particular judicial officer.In the Republic vs Honourable Jackson Mwalulu & others Civil Application No.310/2004, (unreported) the Court of Appeal held;“that being the position as I see it when the courts in this country are faced with such proceedings as this (i.e. proceedings for the disqualification of the judge) it is necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. The test is objective and the facts constituting bias must be specifically established. It is my view that where any such allegation is made, the court must carefully scrutinize the affidavits on either side, remembering that when some litigants lose their cases before a court or quasi-judicial tribunal they are unable or unwilling to see the correctness of the verdict and are apt to attribute that verdict to a bias in the mind of the judge, magistrate or Tribunal”.And in Musiara Ltd vs William Ole Ntimama, Civil Appeal No.271/2003 (2004) K.L.R., the Court of appeal again held;“If bias is indeed established, there has been breach of natural justice. The need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice makes it imperative that there should be a remedy….In our view the past relationship between Shah JA and the respondent cannot be regarded by a fair minded and informed observer as raising a possibility of bias nor was it capable of affecting the approach and the decision of the learned judge. Moreover, full disclosure was made before the motion was called to hearing and the applicant unequivocally stated that it had no objection to the learned judge presiding over the proceedings. It is instructive to note that the complaint was only resurrected after the applicant lost”.In my understanding the issue of disqualification is a very intricate and delicate matter. It is intricate because the attack is made against a person who is supposed to be the pillar and fountain of justice. In my view justice is deeply rooted in the public having confidence and trust in the determination of disputes before court. It is of paramount importance to ensure, that the confidence of the public is not eroded by the refusal of judges to disqualify themselves when an application has been made. I am aware and appreciate the sentiment expressed by his Lordship Tunoi JA in Mwalulu case that bad or irritant litigants might be more inclined to explain the weakness of their case on their perception or assumption against the presiding judge. Although I must say that if a presiding judge has been attributed to have certain wickedness, which make him/her unfit to preside over the case of a complainant, it is essential for him to consider an exist point, so that his wickedness is not an excuse for a loosing litigant.The problem may be elsewhere but, it is my humble view that as judges we should avoid the temptation to be over protective of a litigant raising a plea on disqualification. Let it be known that the integrity, independence and impartiality of the particular judge or the judges at large would be held intact or in high esteem if we readily accede to a request for disqualification. Of late there has been a tendency that a plea for disqualification directed against a particular judge is a collateral attack on the integrity of that particular judge or the judges at large. We must endeavour, as we always do to weigh the scales of justice. My position has been against the stringent and strict measures which has been laid down against disqualification. I think we should readily disqualify ourselves if it would serve the interest of justice and uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice. I am therefore advocating for a liberal approach that even in certain types of cases involving parties who are regularly in the court corridors over one or similar disputes, the judges should exercise the option to disqualification. The only way to cement public confidence is to discourage judges to clinging to a matter no matter the gravity or otherwise of the allegations involved. I appreciate that sometimes parties or their counsel would make scurrilous abuse or would levy unfounded allegations against learned judges who have nothing to do with the complaint. However even in such circumstances the judges must try with utmost care to balance the situation and if possible allocate the matter or dispute to another judge.Of course if a party makes constant applications seeking disqualification, then the conclusion is that he is either shopping for a particular court or that he is prompted by malice or attempts to gain some mileage out of the delay. It is such situations, which must be deprecated and frown at.As was rightly pointed by all the Advocates, the test to be applied is an objective test and the onus of establishing it rests upon the applicant. In my view where there is a reasonable or apparent apprehension of danger of bias, the court is employed to intervene. Usually the court is concerned with the likelihood, impression or perception of bias or possible partiality. It is essential to understand that apprehensions do strongly at times lead to a risk or danger of possible bias or lack of impartiality. Perhaps it is important at this juncture to note that what is intended to be achieved is to avoid or overcome the feeling and fear that the court is likely to be biased. In my view the satisfaction and confidence of the litigants must always be maintained up to the delivery and determination of the dispute.In order not to undermine the impartiality and independence of the judges, it is necessary to dispel appearance of bias, since actual bias is not a consideration for disqualification. It is therefore my view that in determining whether was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at the mind of the trial judge but it looks at the impression which could be given to other right minded people faced with the facts and circumstances of the allegations made against the judge. Even if he was impartial as he could be, nevertheless if right minded persons would think that in the circumstances, there was/is a real danger or possibility of bias on his part, then he must give way.” 2.The Court shall, therefore, in minute detail examine the contextual circumstances of this case, all which are in the public in this suit and related suits, through the court’s Central Tracking System (CTS). The application for recusal 3.By the Notice of Motion dated 7/8/2026 for recusal of this court, the applicant sought specific reliefs as follows:“Notice of Motion(Under Articles 10 and 159 of the Constitution, Regulations 20 (1) and 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020, and all other enabling provisions of the Law)Take notice that on the 13th day of August, 2026 at 2.30 PM or so soon thereafter (as directed by this Honourable Court on 6th August, 2026), the Attorney-General shall move this Honourable Court for the following:1.That the Honourable Justice Edward M. Muriithi, Judge of the High Court sitting at Kerugoya High Court, be pleased to recuse himself from conducting further proceedings in this matter.2.That upon recusal, the Honourable Judge be pleased to transmit this file to the Presiding Judge of the High Court for re-allocation to, and hearing by any other Judge apart from the Honourable Justice Edward M. Muriithi.3.That this Honourable Court do issue any other orders it considers necessary to ensure that the ends of justice are served.” 4.The application was based on two grounds set out in the application as follows:“Grounds:(1)The Honourable Judge has exhibited bias against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Respondents in the conduct of the proceedings herein.(2)The recusal of the Honourable Judge is necessary to safeguard fairness, objectivity and due process in the conduct of the proceedings, thus assuring confidence to all parties and the public in hearing and determination of the Petition and all Applications filed thereunder.” 5.The application was supported by the supporting affidavit of the CS Agriculture sworn on 7/8/2026 as follows:“Supporting AffidavitI, Sen. Mutahi Kagwe, EGH of Post Office Box Number 30028-00100, Nairobi within the Republic of Kenya do hereby make oath and state as follows: -1.That I am the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, the 2nd Respondent herein hence competent to swear this affidavit.2.That I have been made aware of the proceedings conducted herein, the submissions by parties herein, and the directions and orders that have been issued by this Honourable Court in respect to the matter herein.3.That having read and comprehended the totality of the proceedings and in consultation with the State Counsel on record, it is apparent that the Honourable Justice Edward M. Muriithi, Judge of the High Court sitting in Kerugoya High Court, for reasons that are not readily determinable, has in conduct of the proceedings herein repeatedly exhibited bias against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Respondents by favouring the Petitioner.4.That in one instance, the Honourable Judge vide a Ruling dated 5th August, 2026 which was solely meant to determine the merit of the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 22nd July, 2026 and filed by the Attorney-General, while dismissing the Objection went on a frolic of his own by venturing into questions regarding the certification of the Petition as raising substantial questions of law under Article 165(4) of the Constitution without an application on record, contrary to the trite principle of law that parties are bound by their pleadings.5.That further, the Honourable Judge, in the same Ruling, without Application and without hearing Counsel for the Respondents, purported to extend interim orders granted exparte on 21st July, 2026 notwithstanding that the orders had since lapsed when the Petitioner failed to apply for their extension when the matter came up before the Honourable Judge for inter partes directions on 28th July, 2026.6.That the Honourable Judge has in two previous Court appearances attempted to extend the Orders, notwithstanding the fact that they had lapsed on 28th July, 2026. The extensions were only dropped upon heated objection by the State Counsel on record characterised by back and forth from the Court and the Applicant.7.That the above instances demonstrate bias on the part of the Judge in three respects, that is:(a)By own motion raising an application for certification (without legal basis), arguing it/making prejudicial and conclusive comments on it, and inviting parties to submit on it with a view to making a determination on it, the Honourable Judge took the position of an Applicant, Applicant’s Advocate/prosecutor and a Judge, contrary to the rules of natural justice that one cannot be a judge on own cause;(b)By making comments that the Conservatory orders were merited and proceeding to grant them exparte, without the benefit of hearing submissions from the Respondents, and only granting the Respondents an opportunity to apply for either review or setting aside, meant that the Honourable Judge had already made up his mind that the Orders were merited and that the purported scheduling of a hearing date for interpartes hearing of the Application was only meant to hoodwink parties and hide the cloud of bias, which in any event had already become evident; and(c)Having determined that the Petition raised substantial questions of law justifying certification under Article 165(4) of the Constitution for empanelment of uneven number of judges by the Honourable Chief Justice, it was remiss of the Honourable Judge to schedule the hearing of an application for conservatory orders. This amounted to fixing the bench and denying them an opportunity to conduct the proceedings assigned to it, upon certification.8.That had the hearing proceeded as scheduled, and noting the evident bias on the part of the Honourable Judge, the Honourable Judge could have granted the conservatory orders sought, and noting the bureaucracy involved in the empanelment of a bench, and further noting the intervening Court vacation, the public interest which was sought to be safeguarded by the Gazette Notice in terms of addressing the imminent food insecurity situation in the country, could have been frustrated noting that impugned Gazette Notice is time bound.9.That having demonstrated bias, public confidence in the administration of justice requires that the Honourable Judge must withdraw from the case. It is no answer for the Honourable Judge to say that he is in fact impartial and that he will abide by his judicial oath. The purpose of the disqualification is to preserve the administration of justice from any suspicion of the partiality.10.That the right to fair hearing is non-derogable under Article 25 of the Constitution.11.That in light of the foregoing, it is imperative that the Honourable Judge recuses himself from further conduct of the proceedings herein in order to safeguard fairness, objectivity and due process in the conduct of the proceedings, thus assuring confidence to all parties and the public in hearing and determination of the Petition and all Applications filed thereunder.” Responses 6.The Petitioner filed an elaborate affidavit sworn on 11/8/2026 refuting any basis for bias or imputation of bias on the Court as follows:“ Replying Affidavit(In Petitioner's opposition to the Notice of Motion for recusal dated 71h August 2026)I, Hon. James Kamau Murango, an adult of sound mind, Senator, Kirinyaga County in the Republic of Kenya, do hereby make oath and state as follows:1.That I am the Petitioner herein and am competent to swear this affidavit. What I depose to concerning the orders, rulings and directions of this Honourable Court is within my own knowledge, being matters appearing on the face of the record, which record I have read. What I depose to concerning what was said in the course of the several hearings is upon information given to me by my Advocates on record, who appeared at each of them, and which information I verily believe to be true.2.That I have read and understood the Notice of Motion dated 7th August 2026 and the supporting affidavit of Sen. Mutahi Kagwe, EGH sworn on the same date, and I oppose the application in its entirety. a. The central complaint rests on a confusion of two different orders3.That the gravamen of the application, appearing at paragraphs 5, 6 and 7(b) of the deponent's affidavit, is that this Honourable Court extended interim orders which had lapsed, and did so without any application and without hearing Counsel for the Respondents. That complaint proceeds upon a confusion of two distinct orders made at two different times and in two different ways. It is necessary to set out the sequence.4.That on 21" July 2026 this Honourable Court issued an interim order upon prayer 2 of the Notice of Motion dated 2Oth July 2026. That order was made ex parte in the first instance, as the Motion itself sought and as the Rules permit, and it was expressed to endure pending the inter partes hearing of the Motion.5.That on 28'" July 2026 the matter came before this Honourable Court for interpartes directions. No order extending the interim order of 21st July 2026 was made on that date.6.That on 30'" July 2026 the matter came before this Honourable Court again. My Advocate, Mr. Musyoki, applied for the interim orders to be extended. Mr. Kaumba, appearing for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Respondents, objected immediately, and objected upon precisely the ground now advanced in this application, namely that the orders had not been extended on 28""July 2026 and had lapsed. The point was argued between counsel. The Petitioner's position was that whatever the position as to the earlier order, the status quo ought to be maintained pending the hearing of the Motion, This Honourable Court agreed with that position and directed that the status quo be maintained. Mr. Kaumba conceded and did not persist in his objection.7.That it follows that from 30th July 2026 what subsisted was not the ex parte interim order of 21" July 2026, What subsisted was a distinct order that the status quo be maintained, made interpartes, upon an application by the Petitioner, after argument on the very question of lapse, and with the concession of Counsel for the Respondents.8.That at paragraph [59] of the Ruling of 5th August 2026 on the Preliminary Objection the Court directed that the status quo be maintained by extension until the hearing fixed for 6th August 2026.9.That the orders of 5th August 2026 therefore extended the status quo order of 30th July 2026. They did not revive or extend the lapsed ex parte order of 21th July 2026. The deponent has treated the two as though they were the same order, and the whole of ground (c) at paragraph 5 of his affidavit depends upon that treatment.10.That once the two orders are distinguished, each limb of the complaint fails. It is not correct that the extension was made without any application, because the Petitioner applied on 30th July 2026. It is not correct that it was made without hearing Counsel for the Respondents, because Mr. Kaumba was heard at length on that date and upon this very point. And it is not correct that the Court acted upon orders which had lapsed, because what it extended was an order made after, and in full knowledge of, the lapse which Mr. Kaumba had drawn to in; attention.11.That the position is in truth the opposite of that contended for. The Attorney-General now alleges bias in respect of an order to which his own Counsel conceded, having raised the identical objection, having had it fully argued, and having elected not to press it. He has taken the only valid path available in the face of a court order and ruling. Filed a Notice of Appeal.12.That this also explains paragraph 6 of the deponent's affidavit, which states that the Honourable Judge attempted on two previous occasions to extend the orders and that the extensions were dropped upon heated objection by State Counsel. That is a garbled account of what occurred on 28th and 30th July 2026. On 28th July 2026 no extension was made. On 30th July 2026 the objection was raised, argued and then conceded, and the Court made a status quo order. On neither occasion did the Court act in the face of a maintained objection.13.That further, the complaint that the extension offended the right to fair hearing under Article 25 of the Constitution cannot stand alongside the fact that the Respondents were heard upon it.Counsel for the Respondents was present, raised the objection, argued it and conceded it. A party who is heard, and who concedes, has not been denied a hearing. b. The complaint concerning certification14.That at ground (b) of paragraph 5 of his affidavit the deponent complains that this Honourable Court went on a frolic of its own by venturing into the question of certification under Article 165(4) of the Constitution without an application on record, contrary to the principle that parties are bound by their pleadings. At paragraph 7(c) he complains that, having determined that the Petition raises substantial questions of law justifying certification, it was remiss of the Court to schedule the hearing of the conservatory application, and that this amounted to fixing the bench.15.That the first answer is that no certification has been made. At paragraph [57J of the Ruling of 5th August 2026 this Honourable Court stated that it deemed it appropriate to consider reference of the Petition to a panel of an uneven number of judges. At paragraph [58] it fixed a hearing for submissions on the question whether the Petition should be certified as raising a substantial question of law. The question was left open, and remains open.16.That the second answer is that the Court directed that the parties be heard before any order under Article 165(4) is made. The hearing which the deponent complains was scheduled is that hearing. The Attorney-General therefore complains of being given the very opportunity to be heard which he says he was denied.17.That the third answer is that, even had this Honourable Court certified the Petition, it would have been entitled to do so upon its own motion. Article 165(4) of the Constitution speaks of a matter certified by the court. The power is conferred upon the court itself and is not made to depend upon the application of a party. I am advised by my Advocates that it has repeatedly been held by the High Court and by the Court of Appeal that the jurisdiction under Article 165(4) may be invoked either upon the application of a party or by the court on its own motion where the circumstances call for it, and that this Honourable Court referred to that authority in the very Ruling complained of.18.That the principle that parties are bound by their pleadings governs the case which a party is required to meet. It does not confine a court in the exercise of a power which the Constitution confers upon the court itself, and it has never been understood to do so.19.That the fourth answer is that certification confers no advantage upon either party. Its only effect is to move the Petition from a single judge to a bench of an uneven number of judges, not fewer than three, assigned by the Hon. the Chief Justice. Certification would therefore have removed the Honourable Judge from the conduct of this matter, which is precisely the relief the Attorney-General now seeks by this application. A Judge who proposes to refer a matter away from himself, to a larger bench of judges he does not select, is not thereby favouring one party against another.20.That the fifth answer is that the Respondents themselves describe this Petition in the very terms which make certification appropriate. Throughout these proceedings the Attorney-General has asserted that the matter concerns an imminent national food insecurity situation, that it is attended by grave public interest, that the impugned Gazette Notice is time bound, and that there is a serious risk of conflicting rulings and judgments across several courts seized of its constitutionality. A matter which the Respondents characterise in those terms is the paradigm of one raising a substantial question of law of general public importance. The Attorney-General cannot describe the Petition in that way and at the same time contend that a Court which considers referring it to an expanded bench has exhibited bias.21.That certification would in any event serve the Attorney-General's own stated objective. His Preliminary Objection dated nod July 2026 and his Notice of Motion dated 6thAugust 2026 were both founded upon the risk of conflicting decisions between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, and both sought consolidation of the several petitions. At paragraph [511 of the Ruling this Honourable Court observed that if consistency in constitutional adjudication is truly the objective, the petitions pending before the courts may be placed before the expanded bench.22.That, the two complaints cannot stand together. Ground (b) is that certification ought never to have been raised. Paragraph 7(c) is that, certification having been raised, this Honourable Court ought not to have listed the conservatory application for hearing. The Attorney-General thus complains both that the Court considered reference and that it did not treat reference as concluded. A party who advances contradictory complaints has not demonstrated bias; he has demonstrated dissatisfaction.23.That finally, all parties attending on 5th after the ruling on the Preliminary Objection and considering the Courts views on certification, and on acceptance of Mr. Ochieng's suggestion that parties consider consenting to certification, consented to certification save for the AG who sought time to confer with his Clients. Given the misgivings of the AG, and despite the fact that all other parties consented, the Court directed that he would hear the parties on certification including the proposed interested parties as officers of the Court. In the face of an absolute majority of the parties agreeing to certification and the court nevertheless insisting on hearing views, which in the circumstances could only be those of the AG in the contrary, prior to making any decision on certification, the AG's claim of bias and not being heard is patently dishonest. c. The remaining complaints misstate the record24.That at paragraph 7(b) the deponent asserts that this Honourable Court made comments that the conservatory orders were merited and proceeded to grant them ex parte. It did not. The Notice of Motion dated 20th July 2026 has not been heard and has not been determined, which is why this Honourable Court fixed it for inter partes hearing. What issued on 21" July 2026 was interim relief pending that hearing, which is what the Motion sought and what the Rules provide for.25.That the deponent goes further and describes the fixing of the inter partes hearing as having been meant only to hoodwink the parties and to conceal a cloud of bias. That is an allegation of deliberate deception on the part of a Judge of the High Court. It is made without a single particular, and it is made in respect of the very step by which the Respondents were to be given their hearing.26.That the Ruling of 5th August 2026 does not disclose a closed mind. At paragraph [551 this Honourable Court recorded that if the Gazette Notice is validated at the hearing the importers will have their property right to import duty-free immediately crystallized, and that any conservatory orders may be lifted for sufficient cause shown. A Court which records that the Respondents may succeed, and that any order against them may be lifted, has not decided the matter against them.27.That on 6th August 2026 the Notice of Motion dated 20th July 2026 was stood over. My Advocate, Mr. Muge, applied orally for the status quo to be maintained, and this Honourable Court declined the application upon the ground that the question of the status quo was itself in issue between the parties and would not be determined without hearing. The Court then directed the Attorney-General to file a formal application for recusal and fixed it for 13th August 2026. I, the Petitioner, obtained nothing that I sought on that date. If anything, I should be the party complaining. d. No ground for recusal is disclosed28.That the application is expressed to be brought under Regulations 20(1) and 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, 2020, and I am advised by my Advocates as follows in respect of each.29.That Regulation 20 is concerned with conflict of interest. It addresses situations in which a judge's personal interests conflict or appear to conflict with his official duties, and the holding by a judge of shares or other interests in a company, partnership or other body. No personal interest of the Honourable Judge is alleged anywhere in the application, and the Regulation accordingly has no application to it.30.That Regulation 21(1) permits recusal in proceedings in which a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, where the judge falls within one of eight enumerated situations. Those situations are being a party; being a material witness; having personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts; having actual bias or prejudice concerning a party; having a personal interest or a relationship with a person having such an interest; having previously acted as counsel for a party in the same matter; being precluded on account of any other sufficient reason; and the judge or a family member having an economic interest in the outcome. Each is concerned with a matter standing outside the act of adjudication. I am advised that the two requirements are cumulative, and that Regulation 21(2) requires any recusal to rest upon specific grounds recorded in writing.31.That every complaint in the application concerns a ruling, a direction or the listing of a matter. Not one concerns any circumstance of the character which the Regulation contemplates.32.That insofar as reliance is placed upon actual bias or prejudice concerning a party, that ground requires bias which is actual, which is proved, and which is directed at a party. The Attorney-General has disclaimed it. At paragraph 9 of his affidavit the deponent states that it is no answer for the Honourable Judge to say that he is in fact impartial, and that the purpose of disqualification is to preserve the administration of justice from any suspicion of partiality. At paragraph 3 he alleges bias for reasons that are not readily determinable. A case founded upon suspicion, and upon reasons which the party advancing them cannot identify, is not a case of actual bias.33.That nor is anything alleged against the Respondents as parties. What is complained of is the Honourable Judge's view of issues, being the question of certification, the interim order and the listing of applications for hearing. No interest, relationship, animus or predisposition towards the Respondents is suggested anywhere in the application.34.That insofar as reliance is placed upon the residual ground of any other sufficient reason, I am advised that a residual ground appearing at the end of an enumerated list takes its meaning from the specific grounds which precede it, and that the word precluded denotes a disability which prevents a judge from sitting rather than a criticism of the manner in which he has sat. Were that ground to bear the meaning for which the Attorney-General must contend, every litigant dissatisfied with an interlocutory ruling would be entitled to apply for the recusal of the judge who made it, the specific grounds would be rendered redundant, and the appellate process would be displaced by an application to the very judge complained of. e. Dissatisfaction with rulings is not a valid ground of bias35.That I am advised that the test in applications of this kind is objective, being whether a fair minded and informed observer, having considered all the circumstances, would conclude that there is a real possibility of bias. A judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden of displacing that presumption rests upon the party alleging bias.36.That the observer postulated by that test is an informed observer, and is taken to know the whole of the record rather than the parts which the applicant selects. Such an observer would know that on 30th July 2026 the order complained of was made with the concession of the Respondents' own Counsel, that at paragraph [55] of the Ruling this Honourable Court preserved the Respondents' position, that on 6th August 2026 it refused the Petitioner's application, and that in the connected proceedings in HCCHRPET No. E009 of 2025 it permitted the duty-free importation which the rice farmers had gone to court to restrain.37.That I am further advised that courts approach applications of this kind conscious that a litigant who does not obtain the orders he seeks is apt to attribute the result to bias in the mind of the judge, and that for that reason the facts said to constitute bias must be specifically alleged and established rather than inferred from an adverse outcome. In this application no fact constituting bias is alleged. What is alleged is that this Honourable Court decided as it did.38.That I am also advised that an application founded upon a judge's own rulings asks him in substance to sit in appeal from himself, and that the remedy of a party who says that a ruling is wrong is an appeal. Were recusal available upon such grounds, a party dissatisfied with a decision could obtain a different judge in the expectation of a different result, and the public would come to believe that the outcome of a case depends upon which judge hears it rather than upon the law.39.That the Attorney-General has in fact taken the appellate route. He filed a Notice of Appeal dated 5th August 2026 against the whole of the Ruling of the same date, and bespoke the proceedings and the certified Ruling and Order by letter of that date. The three particulars of bias at paragraph 7 of the deponent's affidavit are, in substance, the three grounds of dissatisfaction pleaded at paragraph 5 as the grounds of that intended appeal. They are appeal grounds, and they are being run twice.40.That I am further advised that a judge is under a duty to sit and to determine the cases before him, that the corollary of that duty is an obligation not to withdraw without valid reason, and that recusal granted upon complaints of this character would invite litigants to select the judge who is to hear them and encourage forum shopping. f. The attorney-general has approbated and now reprobates41.That the Attorney-General has appeared before this Honourable Court, through Counsel, at every hearing of this Petition, and at no point prior to 7th August 2026 was any complaint of bias raised or any application for recusal intimated.42.That on 6th August 2026, after the Ruling which is now said to demonstrate bias and after the Notice of Appeal against it had been filed, the Attorney-General filed a Notice of Motion asking this same Honourable Judge to stay these proceedings. He thereby invited the Honourable Judge to determine a contested application in his favour. I am advised that a party who does so cannot, when that invitation is not accepted or, as in this case is pending, contend that the same judge is disqualified from acting. g. Regulation 21 (3)(b)43.That Regulation 21(3)(b) provides that a judge may not recuse himself where, because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice. I am advised that this provision is prohibitory rather than permissive, and that recusal is itself the failure to act, the act required of this Honourable Court being the hearing and determination of the Notice of Motion dated 20th July 2026.44.That the urgency is not in dispute between the parties, because the Attorney-General asserts it himself. At paragraph 8 of his affidavit the deponent relies upon the bureaucracy involved in the empanelment of a bench, upon the intervening Court vacation, and upon the fact that the impugned Gazette Notice is time bound. This Honourable Court has separately held, at paragraph [54] of the Ruling of 5th August 2026, that the irreversibility of duty-free importation calls for suspension of implementation pending consideration of the challenge to validity.45.That Gazette Notice No. 10061 authorises the duty-free importation of 490,000 metric tonnes of Grade 1 Milled White Rice on or before 30'h November 2026. Clearance under it commenced on or about 17th July 2026 and continues. Since 6th August 2026 there is no order of any court restraining it, and the Petitioner's Motion remains unheard.46.That prayer 2 of the present application asks that upon recusal the file be transmitted to the Presiding Judge for re-allocation to another Judge. No time is specified for that re-allocation, and this Honourable Court is presently in recess. A Judge to whom the file were re-allocated would come to it without the history of the connected proceedings in HCCHRPET No. E009 of 2025, in which this Honourable Court has since 19th August 2025 delivered a series of rulings, established a monitoring, evaluation and review framework, and received the evidence of the parties upon local production and the mop-up of locally grown rice.47.That recusal would therefore create an interval of unknown duration in which no court is seized of the Motion and no order restrains importation. If the importation is completed within that interval the Petition is defeated whatever its merits, and the harm which this Honourable Court has held to be irreversible will have been suffered in full. I am advised that this is a serious miscarriage of justice within the meaning of the Regulation.48.That I note respectfully that this Honourable Court indicated on 6th August 2026 that the Motion would be heard immediately if the recusal application fails, and the Petitioner is grateful for that indication. It does nor, however, meet the difficulty, being contingent both upon the recusal application being dismissed and upon its being determined without further delay, neither of which lies within the Petitioner's control. h. The interim prayers remain undetermined49.That no fresh application is required to guard against that risk, because the relief is already sought on the record. Prayer 2 of the Notice of Motion dated 20th July 2026 seeks an interim conservatory order restraining the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th Respondents, their agents and servants, from importing, clearing, releasing or in any manner dealing with any consignment of rice under Gazette Notice No. 10061, pending the hearing and determination of that Motion inter partes. Prayer 3 is framed in the same terms as to time.50.That those prayers were not argued on 6th August 2026, when the Motion was stood over, and they have never been determined. The order of 21st July 2026 was an order made upon prayer 2. Its expiry exhausted the order but not the prayer, which awaits determination together with the rest of the Motion.51.That the Petitioner accordingly asks that prayers 2 and 3 be granted pending the inter partes hearing of the Motion. That is not new relief. It is the relief which this Honourable Court granted on 21st July 2026, upon a prayer which remains live, in a Motion which remains pending.52.That what this Honourable Court declined on 6'" August 2026 was an oral application made from the bar. What is now before it is different, being pleaded prayers supported by the affidavit filed with the Motion, upon which this Honourable Court has already once been satisfied that interim relief should issue.53.That if the interim prayers are granted, the risk of a serious miscarriage of justice is averted and the impediment to recusal under Regulation 2 I(3)(b) falls away. If they are not granted, that impediment stands.54.That I am advised that this Honourable Court retains jurisdiction to determine the interim prayers notwithstanding the pendency of the recusal application, and that Rule 23(1) of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013 requires a Judge before whom a petition is presented to hear and determine an application for conservatory or interim orders, despite any provision to the contrary. 1. Prayer55.That I respectfully pray that this Honourable Court be pleased to dismiss the Notice of Motion dated 7th August 2026 with costs, to grant prayers 2 and 3 of the Notice of Motion dated 20d, July2026, and thereafter to hear and determine that Motion.” 7.The 4 & 7 Respondents and the Intended Interested Parties did not file any responses or attend the hearing of the application for recusal. Submissions 8.The Counsel for the parties made their respective submissions on the application as follows:“Mr. KaumbaNotice of Motion dated 7/8/2026 seeks orders-1.Recusal from further conduct of teh proceedings.2.Transmit the file to the principal Judge of the high Court to appoint another judge.The grounds of the application are two.1.The 1,2,3,5, &6 Respondents feel that the proceedings as so far conducted manifested actual bias and there is an attempt to advance and favour the interests of the petitioners. It impacts negatively on the fairness of the matter. The Respondents and the public have lost confidence in this court conducting the proceedings with the objectivity required. I have not filed an application for judge or judicial officer to recuse in my 16 years of practice. I am reluctantly prosecuting this application but I am enjoined as an officer of the court to advance teh course of the justice so that justice in the matter may be dispensed.I pray that the court be guided by Rai v. Rai (2013) eKLR at paragraph 10 & 11 of Ibrahim SCJ. That the Court will fearlessly guard it with inconvenience of the court. R v. Golf (1993) that the purpose of disqualification is to preserve decision from any impartiality perception.Supporting Affidavit of Senator Mutahi Kagwe[The application] - It is purely on proceedings as so far conducted and we are not privy on any external influence or external factor that might have contributed.We are saying that the proceedings on their face value demonstrate bias.The context is that the Court on 21/7/2026 – the court considered the Notice of motion and ex parte conservatory orders were granted. At Order No. 3 status quo obtaining was ordered for seven days only.Order No. 2 that the application be served for hearing inter partes on 28/7/2026. It is the date which marked the end of the status quo conservatory order.In response to the application, we raised a Preliminary Objection (P.O.) dated 22/7/2026 and objected on the single ground that the petition was sub-judice. On 28/7/2026, the Court directed that the P.O. be heard first. Upon hearing on the scheduled date, the court reserved the Ruling on the P.O.Subsequent proceedings demonstrate how the court became biased against the respondents.On 28/7/2026, there was no prayer for extension of the orders. The implication was that the order granted ex parte lapsed on 28/7/2026. Any subsequent proceedings were to be taken inter partes when the application was served.Why did the court 3 times attempted to extend the order which had lapsed? and only downing tools when Counsel Kaumba for the respondents raised objection? If the ruling was on the P.O. on which basis or legal standing did the Court consider application for conservatory order, granted it exparte and made comments that the failure to would make harm irreversible?Petition No. E009 of 2025. The Court granted and sustained importation of duty-free rice as given in Gazette Notice noting the public interest.Was it a case of bias? The grant of conservatory order, the court went ahead and raised an application for certification which none of the parties had raised. The Court had made a firm finding that the application raised substantial issues.There is no order for suo moto and no law fro certification of substantial question. Mutunga Rules. The Mutunga Rules are silent and the Court cannot through craft purport to amend the rules to enable the court to act suo moto.Replying Affidavit of the PetitionersIt is a question of the conscience of teh court. It is for the Court to act with objectivity. I invite the Court to consider my application and make a ruling on it. The Court should make a finding that there is manifest bias and recuse itself. If the application is dismissed, we can proceed with the application before the Court.Mr. KamauI have nothing to add.Mr. Musyoki for the respondentsPetition No. E009 of 2025.I have persied Mr. Kaumba’s application. It has no merit because it is a by-product of frivolous and time-buying tactic. If Mr. Kaumba is dissatisfied by the Ruling of the Court [he ought to appeal]It has not been shown that there is any bias.Grounds for application for recusal as declared by Rawal v. JSC are two – actual bias – The application is brought for actual bias. It is defined where the court benefits directly or indirectly from the proceedings in the matter.Personal bias - Must be shown to exist – Charles Wamwere v. R (1992) eKLR. There must be shown a personal prejudice or bias. There is no demonstration in fact and truth that there is personal bias or prejudice.i.How the court arrived at the interim order being extended.ii.It is painted as if the court went on a frolic of its own on the Preliminary Objection.Both submissions are inaccurate. Prayer 2 interim orders was granted for 7 days. On 27.7.2026, the matter was coming up for inter-parties directions. The petitioner did not seek that interim orders be extended. However, on 30.7.2026 we applied for interim orders to be extended.Mr. Kaumba objected on the ground now in the current application before this court. The point was argued and the petitioners argued that the status quo be maintained. The court agreed. Mr. Kaumba conceded. On 30.7.2026, the heard Mr. Kaumba’s objection for extension of interim orders. Order for status quo to be maintained by extension of interim orders until 6.8.2026. The orders are different and distinguished. The order did not extend the last orders. There was no need for application for extension.it is not correct that it is given without hearing or that it acted on orders that had lapsed. But where is the bias on the court in granting the extension of status quo. The counsel raised the issue of conservatory order when arguing his P.O. we responded that status quo should be maintained pending hearing of the application.Certification of substantial question in law and evidence of bias.It is a fair decision the issue of certification has no imperative or it cannot stand as bias. Let the applicant appeal if they are not happy with the ruling. If there was bias, a 3 judge bench would be able to settle the issue once and for all. There is no actual bias in the fact of 3 judge bench. The respondent cannot accuse the court in trying to reach just decisions. We pray that importation should not go on pursuant to order of 30.7.2026.Certification of substantial question … court has invited submissions and that is fair. Shollei v JSC Supreme Court – it is not proper when objection is delaying tactic. The court has given direction for hearing of application. The court has given opportunity for the hearing every single week of the vacation. I pray that the applicant allows that the matter proceed to hearing on the importation question for importation of rice. This court has set parameters for importation of rice. Let the application be heard inter-parties for conservatory orders.Mr. MugeCertification of substantial question. At paragraph 57 of the ruling the court deemed it fit to consider with the light of parties to submit. Then the question is for submission for the parties to be heard. There is no bias in a determination that has not been made. Mr. Ochieng had agreed by consent to refer to 3 judge bench. Art 165 (4) gives the power to the court. Nubian Rights case by Odunga J. The court held that power may be applied for by the parties or by the court on its own motion. This court cited that very authority. The court has the power granted by the constitution. The grounds of certification in the constitution it has effect of removing the case from this court to a bench of 3 judges. A judge who proposes to send from himself to a 3 judge bench cannot be said to be bias. It is said there is public interest. There are serious questions of law. The petition should be referred to an expanded bench.I pray that each Judge had a duty. A judge should not withdraw without a valid reason.Regulations of the code provide that a judge may not recuse himself where failure to act would lead to injustice with regard to conservatory orders. It is urgent at par 8 of the affidavit of applicant shows the urgent. At par. 54 of the ruling pointed to irreversibility of the act of allowing importation. The importation may be continuing for all we know. There is no time specified for the transfer to the principal judge for the appointment of another judge. Another judge would require to update himself on the matter.Miscarriage of justiceInterim prayers of 30.7.2026.Mr. Kaumba in reply1.It is not a contest between the petitioner and the respondent. It is for the court to determine a just decision.2.A party who failed to extend orders cannot accuse me of relying delaying tactics.3.Test on recusalRai v Rai Supreme Court at para. 13 and 14 per Ibrahim SCG. – A double possibility test where there real possibility of bias – fair minded observer will be convinced that there is ground of bias in the conduct of the proceeding.4.Parties are bound by their pleadings – Odinga v IEBC 2017 Supreme Court at 332 – 3. Parties must be bound by their pleadings. For proper consideration and in-order to do justice, we cannot afford close our eyes. Section 23 is not unconstitutional. The respondents were not able to give representation when the order was extended. Whether there was irreversibility we did not have opportunity to make submissions on the application for sub-judice. Petition E009 of 2025 the question never arose and public interest dictated implementation of the gazette notice. Certification of substantial question of law. 3 judge bench does not answer to the prejudice. The court is on vacation and empanelment of a bench is …. It will take time before the determination of the application. The prejudice is that ex-parte order granted would last 2 -3 months. The harm shall have been done. The public interest for importation of rice shall be affected. I request that application be …. With necessary urgent. The issue of extension of orders is not before court.Mr. KamauI urge the court to be guided by Alliance Media V Njoroge Regeru by Warsame J. in 2007 KEHC 2518 KLR. It is far more important to secure that the confidence of court is not eroded. I support submissions of Mr. Kauma. Determination 9.The questions for determination are whether there has been proved actual bias on the part of the Court, and in the alternative whether it is proved that on the facts of the case, a likelihood of bias may be inferred, to justify the recusal of the court. 10.This Court is familiar with the principles for consideration on an application for recusal having determined a similar Petition No. E004 of 2026, Victor Okoth Onunga v. The Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury & Economic Planning & 6 others, and setting out the principles for recusal as follows:“The test for recusal on ground of bias12.The principles for recusal of a court are set out in body of case-law authorities cited by the Counsel for the parties, with thanks. In the Rai case [Rai & 3 others v Rai & 4 others [2013] KESC 20 (KLR)] relied on by both Counsel for the parties, the Supreme Court’s binding authority sets the law on recusal as follows:“6.Recusal, as a general principle, has been much practised in the history of the East African judiciaries, even though its ethical dimensions have not always been taken into account. The term is thus defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (2004) [p.1303]:“Removal of oneself as judge or policy maker in a particular matter, [especially] because of a conflict of interest.”7.From this definition, it is evident that the circumstances calling for recusal, for a Judge, are by no means cast in stone. Perception of fairness, of conviction, of moral authority to hear the matter, is the proper test of whether or not the non-participation of the judicial officer is called for. The object in view, in the recusal of a judicial officer, is that justice as between the parties be uncompromised; that the due process of law be realized, and be seen to have had its role; that the profile of the rule of law in the matter in question, be seen to have remained uncompromised.8.It is an insightful perception in the common law tradition, that the justice of a case does not always rest on the straight lines cut by statutory prescriptions, and the judicial discretion in its delicate profile, is critical to equitable outcomes. This is what Sir David Maxwell Fyfe meant when he attributed to Lord Atkin a “constructive intuition which operates after learning and analysis are exhausted” [in G. Lewis, Lord Atkin (London: Butterworths, 1983), p. 166]. It is precisely such delicate elements of judicial fairness that will also feature in the judgment as to whether or not the recusal of a Judge, particularly in the case of a collegiate Bench, is of any materiality, in a given case.9.Different jurisdictions make provisions, through statute or practice directions, for certain grounds for the recusal or disqualification of Judges hearing matters in Court. The most common examples, in this regard are: where the judicial officer is a party; or related to a party; or is a material witness; or has a financial interest in the outcome of the case; or had previously acted as counsel for a party.10.In R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.1) [2000] 1 A.C. 6, the English House of Lords [now the Supreme Court] had just rendered a judgment when it became known that a member of the collegiate Bench involved, was an unpaid director and chairman of Amnesty International Charity Limited, an organization set up and controlled by Amnesty International; and the same member’s wife was also employed by Amnesty International. In the said judgment, it had been held that General Pinochet, the former Chilean Head of State, was not immune from arrest and extradition, in relation to crimes against humanity which he was alleged to have committed while in office. The House of Lords, at the commencement of the hearing, had given permission for Amnesty International to join in as intervener. A newly constituted Bench of five Judges held unanimously that the earlier judgment must be set aside, because one of the members of the Bench should have been disqualified from hearing the case; as that member had had an interest in the outcome of the proceedings.11.In an American case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 671 F. 3d 1052 (9th Circ. February 7, 2012) it was held that the test for establishing a Judge’s impartiality is the perception of a reasonable person, this being a “well-informed, thoughtful observer who understands all the facts”, and who has “examined the record and the law”; and thus, “unsubstantiated suspicion of personal bias or prejudice” will not suffice.1. 2.Such a broad test is adopted too in South African Defence Force and Others v. Monnig and Others (1992) (3) SA 482 (A), p.491:“The recusal right is derived from one of a number of rules of natural justice designed to ensure that a person accused before a court of law should have a fair trial.””13.In Gachagua & 11 others v Speaker, National Assembly of Kenya & 7 others [2024] KEHC 13655 (KLR) a three-judge bench of the High Court held as follows:"The circumstances under which a judge or judicial officer should recuse themselves from a case required a high threshold. Those instances must be approached objectively, with careful consideration, rather than in a simplistic or routine manner. Recusal directly impacted the administration of justice and a judge should not withdraw from a case simply for convenience sake. That high threshold served to protect the judiciary from being manipulated by parties who may otherwise sought to undermine the judicial process by frivolously raising recusal applications in an attempt to secure a more favorable forum."..."Since all judicial officers took an oath to serve and administer justice, it was implied that there was a duty to sit imposed on judges by the value and principle of the rule of law. Judges should therefore only recuse themselves from a matter in clear cases where a case for recusal has been made out. To do otherwise would amount to an abdication of duty.""The test for bias is objective and is framed around the question of whether a reasonable and informed observer, knowing all the relevant facts, would have a legitimate apprehension that a judge is not impartial."14.In Shollei & another v Judicial Service Commission & another [2018] KESC 42 (KLR) (para. 25, cited by the 1st interested Party was a concurring opinion of Ibrahim SCJ) expounding as follows:"[25]Tied to the constitutional argument above, is the doctrine of the duty of a judge to sit. Though not profound in our jurisdiction, every judge has a duty to sit, in a matter which he duly should sit. So that recusal should not be used to cripple a judge from sitting to hear a matter. This duty to sit is buttressed by the fact that every judge takes an oath of office: “to serve impartially; and to protect, administer and defend the Constitution.” It is a doctrine that recognizes that having taken the oath of office, a judge is capable of rising above any prejudices, save for those rare cases when he has to recuse himself. The doctrine also safeguards the parties’ right to have their cases heard and determined before a court of law.[26]In respect of this doctrine of a judge’s duty to sit, Justice Rolston F. Nelson; of the Caribbean Court of Justice in his treatise – “Judicial Continuing Education Workshop: Recusal, Contempt of Court and Judicial Ethics; May 4, 2012; observed:“A judge who has to decide an issue of self-recusal has to do a balancing exercise. On the one hand, the judge must consider that self-recusal aims at maintaining the appearance of impartiality and instilling public confidence in the administration of justice. On the other hand, a judge has a duty to sit in the cases assigned to him or her and may only refuse to hear a case for an extremely good reason”15.In Galaxy Paints Company Limited vs Falcon Guards Limited [1999] KECA 136 (KLR) cited by the intended 1st Interested Party, the Court of Appeal (Kwach, Tunoi & Lakha JJA)” emphasised a qualification based on a duty to sit principle as an antidote for possible forum shopping, as follows:"Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.""As we have said elsewhere this practice is nothing but an attempt to shop around for Judges favourable to their cause. It is strongly deprecated."16.In Jan Bonde Nielson v Herman Philipus Steyn & 2 others [2014] KEHC 7288 (KLR), cited by the applicant, the Court (F. Gikonyo, J.) cited the Court of Appeal in R v. Jackson Mwalulu & Others (2004) eKLR when considering whether prejudice had been established in the case and held as follows:“[5]Although none of the counsels quoted any judicial decisions-and I do not blame any one of them, for the application was made orally and without notice to the other parties- counsels eminently submitted on the legal dimensions governing recusal of a judge from hearing a case. That notwithstanding, there is nothing wrong for a judge to ascertain the law even if it is from his own industry. The law on this subject is so well settled that it cannot be called upon to justify itself, and there are copious judicial authorities on the subject which I do not wish to multiply. Except to state that the appropriate test to be applied in determining an application for disqualification was laid down by the Court of Appeal in R v DAVID MAKALI AND OTHERS C.A CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO NAI 4 AND 5 OF 1995 (UNREPORTED), and reinforced in subsequent cases. See R v JACKSON MWALULU & OTHERS C.A. CIVIL APPLICATION NO NAI 310 OF 2004 (Unreported) where the Court of Appeal stated that:-“When courts are faced with such proceedings for disqualification of a judge, it is necessary to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for assuming the possibility of a bias and whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice. The test is objective and the facts constituting bias must be specifically alleged and established’’.[6]That position of the law in Kenya was accordingly guided by the principle set out in METROPOLITAN PROPERTIES CO., LTD v LANNON (1969) 1 QB 577, [1968] 3 All ER 304, [1968] 3 WLR 694 that:-"Also in a case where the bias is being alleged against a court or judge it is not the likelihood that the court or judge could or did favour one side at the expense of the other that is important, it is that any person looking at what the court or judge has done, will have the impression in the circumstances of the case, that there was real likelihood of bias."….A preconceived judgment formed without a factual basis, a strong bias.[9].... I repeat for the sake of clarity that the applicant ought to have established such material facts that attend personal inclination or prejudice on the part of the judge towards a party on some extrajudicial reasons or that the observation amounted to a preconceived judgment formed without a factual basis. By establishing those facts, he will have shown that real likelihood of bias would occur as the matters complained of are capable of creating a reasonable doubt in the minds of the public about the fairness in the administration of justice in this particular case-which criterion goes beyond mere apprehension or belief or desire of the party into a more concrete and cogent grounds based on proven judge’s interest, pre-disposition or prejudice in the case. The facts being pleaded for recusal are not anywhere near satisfaction of this test, and so nothing that precludes the judge from hearing this case. Accordingly, the application for recusal lacks merit.[10]However, on my own discretion, I transmit this file to the head of the division for re-allocation to, and hearing by any other judge in the division apart from myself. It is so ordered.”17.In the course of preparing this ruling, this court recalled a similar decision of Charles Koigi Wamwere & 2 others v Republic [1992] KEHC 104 (KLR, where the Court (Bosire, J. as he then was) after considering the relevant caselaw authorities summed up the issues of the test for recusal for bias as being upon an objective test and the onus is on the applicant to prove bias on a standard of proof on a balance of probabilities, as follows:“I have read the authorities they cited, notably, Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.S.) Ltd –v- Lannon & Others (1969) IQB 577;The King –v- Sussex Justices [1924] IKB 256; R –v- Justices of Sounderland [1901] 2 KQ 356; Maina Wa Kinyatti –v- R. Criminal Appeal No.60 of 1983 (unreported); In The Application by M.S. Patel [1913 – 14] 5 KLR 66; R –v- Hashimu [1968] EA 658, and John Brown Shilenje –v- [1980] KLR 132, amongst others. It is quite clear to me that the test is objective. The jurisdiction to disqualify oneself from a case is derived from the common law. It is a discretionary jurisdiction. It must, therefore, be exercised on the basis of facts and sound legal principles. The test to be employed must of necessity be objective.In the Australian case of The Queen –v- Watson; Ex Parte Armstrong [1976] 136 C.L.R 248, the High Court of Australia, after going through several English and Australian decisions came to the conclusion that the test is objective – that is to say there must be circumstances which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the trial Court did or would favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other. That is what Lord Dannin, M.R. said in the Metropolitan Properties Co, case.The same issue came for consideration and decision in a later Australian case of Raybos Australia Property Ltd & Another –v- Tectran Corporation Property Ltd & Others [1986] 6 NSWLR 272. The Court after going through both English and Australian cases, among them the one I cited earlier, held, that it is the actually of bias or the existence of grounds for reasonable apprehension of it which requires this disqualification of a Judge from sitting in a particular case.So the test to me appears to be this. An applicant who alleges bias must either prove bias or grounds which suggest bias or raise a reasonable apprehension of it. It is not what the accused thinks. It is what any reasonable man observing the conduct of proceedings is likely to conclude.An issue was also raised as to the standard of proof. The issue was resolved by the Maina Wa Kinyatti case (above). It is proof on a balance of probabilities.So the position of the matter as I understand it is that a judge is duty bound to disqualify himself if by objective standards, and on a balance of probabilities it has been shown either that he was biased or that grounds exist for a reasonable apprehension of it. That is a duty a judge has to exercise for the interests of justice.The duty to disqualify oneself is however, matched by an equal duty not to disqualify oneself. The Court in the Australian case of Raybos Australia Property Ltd & Another –v- Tectran Corporation Proerty Ltrd (supra) while emphasizing the principle of law that justice must be seen to be done held – relying on the holding in Re Renaud, Ex Parte CJL [1986] 60 AL J.R. 528; that:“Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a Judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour,”The decision is persuasive. I adopt that reasoning in this case.In summary the position is as follows, at least as I understand it. The onus is onus is on the applicant to establish the actuality of bias or grounds for reasonable apprehension of it. The application for a Judge to disqualify himself is not a light matter. So although the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities, reasonable grounds must be established in support of the suggestion of bias. The Judge against whom bias has been suggested, has a duty to disqualify himself when such grounds have been established or shown to exist. The Judge has an equal and matched duty not to disqualify himself because of the wider interests of justice, if a reasonably good case has not been made out or does not exist.”18.Bosire, J. further underlined the need for justice to be seen to be done even in cases where recusal is not justified on the grounds of bias:“However, there is also the requirement of justice that it must not only be done but it must be seen to be done. .... I have no doubt in my mind that hitherto the courts have done justice to the accused’s case. However, the remarks I have made in this ruling when considered objectively may, although they need not, cause the accused persons feel apprehensive that I might not dispassionately try their case. In light of that likely and probable fear and in the interests of justice I consider and rule that this case be continued by another judge. It is ordered that this case be mentioned before the Duty Judge on 2nd November 1992 for further orders.” Allegation of actual bias 11.The correct provision for recusal is Regulation 21 of The Judicial Service (Code of Conduct And Ethics) Regulations, Legal Notice 102 of 2020, as follows:“21.Recusal(1)A judge may recuse himself or herself in any proceedings in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned where the judge—(a)is a party to the proceedings;(b)was, or is a material witness in the matter in controversy;(c)has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;(d)has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party;(e)has a personal interest or is in a relationship with a person who has a personal interest in the outcome of the matter;(f)had previously acted as a counsel for a party in the same matter;(g)is precluded from hearing the matter on account of any other sufficient reason; or(h)or a member of the judge’s family has economic or other interest in the outcome of the matter in question.(2)Recusal by a judge shall be based on specific grounds to be recorded in writing as part of the proceedings.(3)A judge may not recuse himself or herself if—(a)no other judge can deal with the case; or(b)because of urgent circumstances, failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice;(c)the merits of the application for recusal have been considered by a plural bench of judges, and recusal held to be unnecessary.(4)In the case of a collegiate bench, the decision to dispense with the disqualification of any judge shall be made by the bench.” 12.In this case, no evidence of actual bias in the sense of a personal interest of the judge in the case is alleged. The provision for recusal under Regulation 21 (3) (b) in urgent cases where failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice is designed to curb courts too freely recusing themselves from a matter irrespective of adverse consequences on the justice of the case. The provision for under Regulation 21 (3) (b) does not arise does not apply here, where recusal is sought of the Court upon an allegation of bias by a party. 13.However, it is contended that bias is evident in the manner of the conduct of the proceedings by the Court in this petition. It is asserted that from the conduct of the Court in the matter, there is demonstrated actual bias. The impugned conduct of the court is urged at paragraph 7 of the Supporting Affidavit as follows:“(a)By own motion raising an application for certification (without legal basis), arguing it/making prejudicial and conclusive comments on it, and inviting parties to submit on it with a view to making a determination on it, the Honourable Judge took the position of an Applicant, Applicant’s Advocate/prosecutor and a Judge, contrary to the rules of natural justice that one cannot be a judge on own cause;(b)By making comments that the Conservatory orders were merited and proceeding to grant them exparte, without the benefit of hearing submissions from the Respondents, and only granting the Respondents an opportunity to apply for either review or setting aside, meant that the Honourable Judge had already made up his mind that the Orders were merited and that the purported scheduling of a hearing date for interpartes hearing of the Application was only meant to hoodwink parties and hide the cloud of bias, which in any event had already become evident; and(c)Having determined that the Petition raised substantial questions of law justifying certification under Article 165(4) of the Constitution for empanelment of uneven number of judges by the Honourable Chief Justice, it was remiss of the Honourable Judge to schedule the hearing of an application for conservatory orders. This amounted to fixing the bench and denying them an opportunity to conduct the proceedings assigned to it, upon certification.” 14.No actual bias is proved by any personal interest of the judge in the subject matter or by actual favouritism of the one party against the other. Bias may not be inferred from the conduct of the court set out in the applicant’s supporting affidavit as there is complete answer to all the questions raised by the applicant as demonstrating bias. The answer is an innocuous desire by the Court, which is consistent with the inherent power of the Court to ensure justice in a given matter, by preserving the status quo on the dispute until the matter is considered by the court or by the proposed enhanced bench of judges, if that be the way to go, an issue which the court could of its own motion take and on which the Court invited representation by counsel for the parties. 15.The Court did hear representation from the Respondents as to their objection to the grant or extension of conservatory orders, so it not correct that the Court made the status quo order without hearing the Respondents. Counsel for the Respondent in urging his Preliminary Objection opposed the extension of the conservatory orders urging that the orders had already lapsed as shown in relevant parts of the Counsel’s submissions in chief and in reply, as follows:“30/7/2026Mr. Kaumba....If the Court disagrees [with the submissions on Preliminary Objection on sub-judice and abuse of process], we pray that the same be transferred to Kisumu to be consolidated for hearing with the 3 other petitions.To avoid 2 different decisions of court of concurrent jurisdiction.The Kisumu Court directed the implementation [of the Gazette Notice No. 10061 of 2026] to proceed on condition that there is transparency. This Court has granted orders which we consider have lapsed as they were not extended after the seven (7) days.....Orders in petitions conflicting.The orders conflict. The order her was granted exparte at ex parte stage. At ex parte stage, the Courts in Nairobi and Kisumu declined to give ex parte orders and directed inter partes hearing. It only ordered the directions.The proceedings proceeded ex parte and different orders were issued. The Court should transfer the Petition to Kisumu for consolidation or for hearing alongside the other petitions. There is no prejudice.” 16.The Court reserved ruling on the Preliminary Objection for 4/8/2026 and extended the interim order because it made no sense in justice that the status quo in the matter should be disturbed in the short duration of four days the Court would take to deliver its ruling. The Ruling was delivered on 5/8/2026. 17.The Court in its ruling on the Preliminary Objection delivered on 5/8/2026 gave its view as to the basis for issuance of ex parte orders generally and in this particular case noting the issue of the adverse effect of the duty-free rice importation and observed that the Court may consider the issue of conservatory orders at any time before or after the proposed enlarged Bench. Hence the extension of the order for status quo only to the date of hearing representations as to the certification of the matter as raising substantial question of law for determination by an uneven bench of judges appointed by the Chief Justice in accordance with article 165(4) of the Constitution. 18.The court’s ruling on the Preliminary Objection, therefore, included an order for status quo to be maintained as follows:“Status quo to be maintained in the meantime.52.In the NIIMS case, the Court said as regards conservatory orders that:“27.For avoidance of doubt the application for conservatory orders pending hearing in this petition is yet to be heard and determined and it will be upon the bench as empanelled to decide the manner of its disposal. In my view the decision whether or not to grant conservatory orders may be made at any point in the proceedings and the fact that the court earlier on declined to issue the same does not bar the court in reconsidering its earlier decision if circumstances require it to do so. I therefore cannot say, assuming that is the position, that the mere fact that the Judge in the Nairobi petitions, declined to grant conservatory orders, necessarily bars the empanelled bench from revisiting the issue in light of the new developments assuming that this matter will be referred to the same bench.”53.On account of its urgency, an application for conservatory orders may be heard, and granted ex parte. Rule 23 of the Mutunga Rules on procedure in constitutional litigation provides that:“23.Conservatory or interim orders(1)Despite any provision to the contrary, a Judge before whom a petition under rule 4 is presented shall hear and determine an application for conservatory or interim orders.(2)Service of the application in sub rule (1) may be dispensed with, with leave of the Court.(3)The orders issued in sub-rule (1) shall be personally served on the respondent or the advocate on record or with leave of the Court, by substituted service within such time as may be limited by the Court.”54.By analogy of the criminal process, the Court suspends a sentence of death because of the irreversibility of the execution of the sentence. In the same way, the irreversibility of execution of importation duty-free of rice under the impugned Gazette Notice calls for suspension of the implementation pending consideration by the Court of the challenge on its validity of the authorising Gazette Notice. 55.Irreversability is the basis of grant of conservatory orders. It is simply an issue of responding to the irreversibility of the effect of duty-free imports on the farm and consumer prices and profitability of the rice production to the farmers so that the Petition which seeks to invalidate the Gazette Notice authorizing the importation is not rendered nugatory. If, however, the Gazette Notice whose authority to issue by the Government is asserted in public interest is validated at hearing, the importers will have their property right to import duty-free immediately crystallized. The conservatory orders may also for sufficient cause shown be lifted. Orders56.Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, this court finds that the Preliminary Objection on sub judice raised by Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 22/7/2026 is without merit and it is dismissed.57.However, the Court deems it appropriate to consider reference of the Petition to a panel of an uneven number of judges to be appointed by the Hon. The Chief Justice. The Court shall, consequently, fix the matter for submissions on the issue whether this petition shall be certified by this court as raising a substantial question of law in terms of Article 165 (4) of the Constitution.58.Hearing of submissions in terms of Article 165(4) of the Constitution to be taken, on the basis of urgency shown by all the parties, on Thursday 6/8/2026 at 2.30pm.59.Status quo to be maintained by extension of the interim order until then. Order accordingly.” 19.The Court only sought to hold the matters as they stood before the impugned Gazette Notice so that the issue could be fully canvassed by the Court as constituted or as proposed to be constituted by reference to an uneven Bench. The Respondents could yet again at the hearing persuade the Court as to the urgency of the need for importation of the duty -free rice in the interests of securing right to availability of food at reasonable prices, on the basis of food production projections for the current season. Before such hearing and determination, the Court deemed it fit, in the interest of justice, to hold the status quo. Call to consider certification of substantial question of law 20.The Mutunga Rules [The Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, Legal Notice 117 of 2013] are silent on the issue of certification of substantial question of law justify appointment of an uneven bench of judges. The Court dealt with this matter in the Ruling of 5/8/2026 clearly pointing to the power to act suo moto and citing persuasive caselaw thereon as shown in the Ruling. 21.The Rules however, reserve the inherent power of the Court to do justice under Rule 3 (8) as follows:“Nothing in these rules shall limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.” 22.The question is whether the proposed by the Court to consider, with submissions of the parties, of Certification of substantial question of law as evidence of bias? There is clearly no merit in the suggestion that the court went on its own frolic unmoved by any party to the prejudice of the respondents. The Court not made any determination on the certification issue and it is awaiting such representations as the parties may wish to make before making a decision thereon. The Court has the constitutional mandate under Article 165(4) of the Constitution to certify substantial questions of law and to refer such disputes to the Hon. Chief for appo8untment of an uneven bench. 23.Being apparently a matter of sufficient public interest across the divide of the Petitioners and the Respondents, the Court proposed to consider whether to certify the dispute as one involving a substantial question of law for determination by an uneven bench of judges in accordance with article 165 (4) of the Constitution. For that consideration, the Court invited representation from the parties pursuant to judicial practice of hearing the parties before a decision is taken, although the decision ultimately lies with Court and as held in the NIIMS case, [Okiya Omtata Okoiti & 4 others v Attorney General & others [2019] KEHC 9110 (KLR)], it could be exercised on application of any party or on the court own motion; a discretion to be exercise judicially. 24.The Court’s ruling of 5/8/2026 adverted to this judicial practice as follows:“Reference of substantial question of law to an uneven bench of the Court46.This Court is enjoined to deliver just and fair determination of disputes and respectfully considers, prima facie, that the question whether the property rights of rice farmers, the Executive Government’s interest in fostering right to food and food security by duty-free imports and the property rights acquired by successful awardees of import licences may converge in a constitutional framework. It would appear that this apparent intersection (or conflict) of rights caused by the Cabinet Minister for Treasury in repeatedly publishing the Gazette Notices subject of the constitutional challenge herein and in other suits gives rise to questions in terms of Article 165(4) whether it was a valid exercise of authority within the meaning of the Constitution and whether the Gazette authority to import rice duty-free infringes upon the farmers’ right to property through resultant price drops affecting the marketability and profitability returns of the local farmers’ rice growing activity. The existence of multiple suits on the question in this case raises the spoils for the uneven bench.47.Article 165(4) of the Constitution is in the following terms:“(4)Any matter certified by the court as raising a substantial question of law under clause (3) (b) or (d) shall be heard by an uneven number of judges, being not less than three, assigned by the Chief Justice.”48.However, as regards the procedure for moving the Court for certification of a substantial question of law under Article 165(4), the Mutunga Rules are quiet and this court would agree that the issue may be raised by application of a party or by the Court on its own motion.49.In the National Integrated Identity Management System (NIIMS) case (Machakos Petition No. 7 of 2019, Okiya Omtata Okoiti & 4 Others V. The Hon Attorney General & OTHERS), Odunga, J. (as he then was) certified a substantial question and referred the Petition therein for empanelment of uneven bench, and observed as follows:“18.In my view since the factors to be considered in certifying a matter under Article 165(4) are not exclusive and the doors are not closed as to what factors the court ought to consider, to paraphrase Bagmall, J in Crowcher vs. Crowcher [1972] 1 WLR 425, 430 , the jurisdiction under Article 165(4) jurisdiction is not past child-bearing age; however, its progeny must be legitimate and it is well that this should be so; otherwise no lawyer could safely advice his client and every petition would call for certification.19.In my view, one of the factors to be considered is the effect of having parallel proceedings having a bearing on each other. That is clearly a question of general public importance since the public need to have certainty as regards the determination of courts of concomitant jurisdiction so that they are not left wondering whether decisions depend on particular presiding officers of the court rather than the law.20.Although the petitioners have submitted that this court ought not, in the absence of an application made pursuant to Article 165(4) of the Constitution invoke the powers thereunder, this court has held before that such powers can either invoked on an application of the parties or by the court on own motion where the circumstances call for it.”50.However, in both situations, in my view, the parties should be heard before an order is made under Article 165(4) of the Constitution and reference made to the Hon the Chief Justice for purposes of empanelment of an uneven bench of the Court.51.Consequently, the Court shall take submissions on the issue of certification of the petition as raising a substantial question of law and reference to the Chief Justice for empanelment of an uneven bench. If the true objective of the proposed transfer and consolidation of the Petition with the petitions in Kisumu is, as urged by the 1st Intended Interested Party, to “promote consistency in constitutional adjudication, conserve judicial time, reduce litigation costs and facilitate the just, expeditious and proportionate determination of the dispute which has been narrowed down to the Gazette Notice No. 10061 of 6th day of July 2026” there should be no opposition the empanelment of an uneven bench to resolve the issues, and indeed the petitions now pending before the courts may be placed before the expanded bench as happened in the NIIMS case.” No conflict of interest demonstrated 25.Although the Notice of Motion for recusal herein dated 7/8/2026 was also expressed to be brought under Regulation 20 (1) of The Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations, Legal Notice 102 of 2020, on conflict of interest, no ground or evidence of conflict of interest has been established. Regulation 20 of the Code provides as follows:“20.Conflict of interest1.A judge shall use the best efforts to avoid being in situations where personal interests conflict or appear to conflict with the judge’s official duties.2.A judge may hold shares or have any other interest in a company, partnership or other body, directly or through another person, if holding those shares, or having that interest, does not amount to a conflict of interest such as will compromise the judge’s performance. Objective standard of the reasonable man 26.The background of the dispute in this petition, apart from the recent petitions on the Gazette Notice No.10061 of 2026 which were the reason for the Preliminary Objection (P.O.) and application for transfer of the present petition, at least two other petitions - Petition No. E009 of 2025 and orders made therein and Petition No. E004 of 2026 in which the Court disqualified itself. The latter two petitions challenged similar Gazette Notices previously issued by the 1st Respondent, namely Gazette Notice 10353 of 26/7/2025 and Gazette Notice No. 262 of 2/1/2026, both petitions pending hearing and determination before the courts. 27.In accordance with the test for bias on the fair minded and informed observer, the informed reasonable man’s objective standard, a reasonable man who is informed of the progress of the Petitions before this court on the question of validity of the duty-free rice and the orders for phased importation quotas made by the Court from time to time in Petition No. E009 of 2025 would conclude that, having previously made orders allowing the duty-free importation by the Respondents as challenged herein, there can be no valid imputation of bias against the Respondents, and the orders for the holding of the status quo were to achieve the protection of the interests of all the parties in the matter awaiting full hearing of the application on which the court sought to give directions. 28.If the rice importation sought to be stayed by the Petition was implemented in the meantime, there may be no use in pursuing the Petition. However, if the Respondents demonstrated need to make the immediate importation of the quota in the impugned Gazette Notice, or part thereof, during the pendency of the application or the Petition, the Court would give appropriate directions as it has done previously in Petition No. E009 of 2025. Before that could be done, and after hearing the Respondent’s Counsel, as shown above, the Court directed maintenance of the status quo, an issue which would be further considered at the Submissions on the proposed certification of substantial question of law to which event the order for status quo was extended. 29.This Court can say no more to demonstrate utmost good faith in the proceedings of the Court so far. Conclusion 30.The Court had simple logic in mind: The issue of the Treasury Cabinet Secretary’s power to authorize duty-free-importation of rice is before the Courts in several suits including Petition No.E009 of 2025 where two Gazette Notices Nos. 10353 of 26th July 2025 and Gazette No. 262 of 2nd January 2026 and the present petition challenging Gazette No. 10061 of 6th July 2026 and which seeks consolidation with Petition No. E009 of 2025 now pending hearing before this Court. 31.It is in the interest of all the partis concerned that the issue of the authority to issue and implement the Gazette Notice on duty free-importation of rice be judicially determined. It is reasonable that while that judicial process towards a determination is underway, the status quo meaning the state of affairs before the gazettement of the authority for duty-free importation is maintained to avoid the Petitions being rendered nugatory. 32.If the authority giver demonstrated urgency and need to effect the importation scheme before the determination of the validity of the authority based, as it is urged, on public interest in securing food availability at reasonable prices, the Court would entertain such representation as happened in the phased importation quotas allowed in Petition No. E009 of 2025. Hence the observation of the Court about the ability of the uneven bench of judges being able to review a matter and grant a conservatory order which may not have been granted by the single judge, as adverted to by Odunga, J. (as he then was) in the NIIMS case. 33.That was the objective of the Court in the directions it gave in the Ruling of 5/8/2026, and it in no way sought to favour or disfavour any party in the Petition. It only sought to have the dispute determined by an enhanced bench of court and in the brief period before the matter was seized by the uneven bench held the status quo as would not prejudice any party to the dispute. When the very authority to issue the Gazette Notice authorizing the duty-free importation was under challenge, it could not be said that the Respondents had a right to implement the impugned Gazette Notice. 34.This Court, respectfully, does not see how anything it has done in these proceedings of the Court in this petition leading to the Ruling of 5/8/2026 now subject of appeal, is manifestation of any bias on the part of the Court to anybody including the reasonable man or the reasonable bystander informed of the facts of the case in the dispute and context of the petitions before the Court. 35.To the contrary will be discerned, if I say so myself, a desire to have for jurisprudential purposes and for the purpose of the substantive relief sought by both sides in , adjudicated by the court finally. The proposal for the multiple bench is, in the words of 5-judge bench in the Don’s case [Eric V. J. Makokha & 4 others v Lawrence Sagini & 2 others [1994] KECA 60 (KLR)], based on the breadth and sophistication of the matter as to justify the strengthening of the numerical composition of the court’s normal bench by more heads. 36.To what effect would alleged bias on a single judge affect the determination by an enlarged bench if that constitutional course were taken? And, certainly, a biased judge would seek to keep the case to himself, to his own control and under his own thumb and whim! And how would a biased judge have allowed the phased implementation of the similarly impugned Gazette Notice for duty-free importation of rice as in Petition No. E009 of 2025 with which this Petition is sought to be consolidated? 37.The Respondents/applicants would appear to be aggrieved that the Court seeks to have a full determination of the dispute before any validation of the duty-free importation scheme under the Gazette Notices. Respectfully, the Court finds no merit in the application for recusal against the Court. 38.However, before the application for recusal herein, the 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6 Respondents filed an Notice of Appeal dated 6/8/2026 from the Ruling of this Court delivered on 5/8/2026 and, contemporaneously, an application for stay of proceedings in this court, specifically an order “That there be a stay of proceedings in regard to the scheduled hearings in the proceedings, pending the hearing and determination of an intended Application for stay or intended appeal before the Court of Appeal.” 39.The Petitioners and the 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6 Respondents both expressly decry likely prejudice in this matter that may be caused by delay, for the Respondents by the mechanism for the appointment of the proposed uneven bench of the Court and, for the Petitioner by the two applications for recusal and for stay of proceedings pending appeal from the Ruling of 5/8/2026 on which the application for recusal and grounds thereof are based. 40.It is clear that the expedited hearing and determination of the dispute herein is in the interests of all the parties. This Court would, therefore, presume that, despite lack of proof of bias, insistence by the Court on hearing and determining this petition, which may occasion further delay by precipitating a second application for stay of proceedings pending appeal, is not in the best interests of any party to the Petition. 41.With respect, it would appear that the best intentions of this court in seeking a full, final and fair determination of the dispute has, wittingly or unwittingly, been read as a manifestation of bias on the part of the Court, thereby rendering the continued conduct of the proceedings by this court to be subject of speculation on impartiality, whatever the final outcome may be. 42.This Court takes no personal interest or property in any matter before it and it must, in the interest of securing the process of the Court from any allegations of bias, allow the hearing of the dispute by another court. Let the stream of justice be seen to run pure without any suspicions of bias, however unfounded. Orders 43.Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the Court finds that the application for recusal herein dated 7/8/2026 is without merit and it is dismissed. 44.However, to the end that justice in the matter is clearly seen to be done and no imputations of bias are laid on the eventual determination of the Court, this Court will allow another Court to deal with the matter. 45.Consequently, the Court shall forthwith send the file to the Principal Judge of the High Court for allocation. 46.Further directions/orders in the matter or on the hearing of the applications and the Petition shall be taken before the Court appointed by the Principal Judge of the High Court. 47.There shall be no order as to costs.Order accordingly. DATED AND DELIVERED THIS 20TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026.EDWARD M. MURIITHIJUDGEAppearances:Mr. Musyoki and Mr. Muge for the Petitioner.Mr. Kaumba for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, & 6th Respondents.Mr. Ochieng for the 4th & 7th Respondents.Mr. Masake for the 1st Intended Interested Party.Mr. Maroa for the 2nd intended Interested Party.