Northern Block Residents Ltd & another v Makanjawa Company Ltd & 5 others (Environment and Planning Judicial Review E001 of 2023) [2026] KEELC 5285 (KLR) (14 August 2026) (Ruling)

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE ENVIRONMENT &LAND COURT AT NAIROBI** **ELCEPJR NO. E001 OF 2023** **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_** **IN THE MATTER OF: THE JUDICATURE ACT CHAPTER 8 OF THE LAWS OF** **KENYA** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT ACT** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE PHYSICAL AND LAND USE PLANNING ACT (NO. 13 OF 2019)** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE PHYSICAL AND LAND USE PLANNING** **(DEVELOPMENT PERMISSION AND CONTROL) (GENERAL) REGULATIONS, 2021** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF CONTEMPT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS** **BETWEEN** **NORTHERN BLOCK RESIDENTS LIMITED - 1ST APPLICANT** **CAROLINE WANGARI** **MURIUKI HENRY CHEGE** **NJOROGE JATIN PATEL** **LUCY MUTHONI NJOROGE** **SUING FOR AND ON BEHALF OF** **KITISURU RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION - 2ND APPLICANT** **VS** **MAKANJAWA COMPANY LIMITED - 1ST RESPONDENT** **NAIROBI CITY COUNTY - 2ND RESPONDENT** **NICHOLAS KAYU MUIGAI - 3RD RESPONDENT** **MARY WAMUHU MUIGAI - 4TH RESPONDENT** **HANNAH WAHU CAROLIAN - 5TH RESPONDENT** **CEC – URBAN DEVELOPMENT &** **PLANNING, NAIROBI CITY COUNTY** **MR. PATRICK ANALO AKIVANGA - 6TH RESPONDENT** **RULING** **[ with respect to the Applicants s' Notice of Motion dated 21/10/25]** **Introduction** 1. The Applicants filed the application dated 21/10/25 seeking the following orders; 2. This application be certified urgent and service of the application notice upon the Respondents be dispensed with in the first instance. 3. Pending the hearing and determination of this application, an order of injunction do issue restraining the Respondents, whether by themselves, their servants, agents, employees, contractors and/or otherwise howsoever, from carrying out, continuing with, permitting, or authorizing any construction, renovation or related works on L.R. No. 17/261 (Nairobi Block 218/770). 4. The 2nd and 6th Respondents be and are hereby found to be in contempt of the orders of this Court issued on 17th October 2024 and affirmed on 27th February 2025, by reason of authorizing, permitting the construction and renovation works on L.R. No. 17/261 (Nairobi Block 218/770) contrary to the said orders. 5. The 1st ,3rd, 4th, and 5th Respondents be and are hereby found to be in contempt of the orders of this Court issued on 17th October 2024 and affirmed on 27th February 2025, by reason of continuing construction and renovation works on L.R. No. 17/261 (Nairobi Block 218/,770) contrary to the said orders. 6. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Respondents be punished for contempt by committal to civil jail and/or payment of a fine in terms of Section 29 of the Environment and Land Court Act, Order 40 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and such further sanctions as the Court may deem fit, including sequestration of assets. 7. A Mandatory Order do issue directing the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents to purge the contempt by immediately ceasing all construction/renovation activities on L.R. No. 17/261 (Nairobi Block 218/770). 8. An Order of Prohibition do issue to the Nairobi City County and its officers to refrain from issuing, endorsing, or relying on any approvals purporting to authorize works on the suit property unless and until a procedurally valid change of user and all attendant approvals are obtained in accordance with the law. 9. A declaration that any approvals issued by the 2nd and or 6th Respondent to the 1st Respondent is null and void for failure to comply with the law and the order of this Honorable Court. 10. An order do issue to the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) Spring Valley Police Station to ensure compliance with the orders of the court. 11. Costs of and incidental to this application be borne by Respondents jointly and severally. 12. Such further or other orders as this Honourable Court shall deem just. 13. The application is based on the grounds annexed and the supporting affidavit of Caroline Wangari Muriuki, deposed on 21/10/25. She deposed as follows. 14. The Court rendered judgment in this matter on 17/10/24, quashing the Notification of approval for the change of user application No PLUPA – COU-005533N for L R No Nairobi B17/261 [Block 218/770] [hereinafter called the suit property] and issued a prohibition restraining the 1st Respondent from undertaking any alterations or renovations unless and until a procedurally valid change of use approval is obtained. 15. In its Ruling delivered on 27/2/2025, the court dismissed an application for review filed by the 1st Respondent, thereby confirming the validity of the judgment. 16. Equally, the applicants’ lawyers wrote to the 6th Respondent on 12/3/25 informing him that the judgment had not been stayed or appealed, and therefore remained binding. 17. On 12/3/25, the 1st Respondent wrote to the 2nd applicants stating that the meeting scheduled for 14/3/25 was not a public participation forum and that the relevant authorities had already issued the requisite licences and approvals. 18. On 14/3/25, the officials of the 2nd and 1st Respondents convened a residents' meeting to discuss the purported regularisation of the change of user when the residents in attendance opposed the proposals. 19. In July 2025, the applicants received reports of ongoing construction and/or renovation activities on the suit land. On arrival at the site, the deponent observed active works, including the demolition of internal walls and excavation. 20. On further inquiry, the applicants were informed that the 6th Respondent had authorised the 1st Respondent to proceed with the works by letter, which letter was not made available to the applicants or their advocate on record. 21. She avers that neither the 1st nor the 6th Respondents have initiated or obtained a fresh change of user or the necessary approvals as a precondition to carrying out the works in compliance with the court orders. 22. Any reliance on the quashed approvals is unlawful, and the ongoing construction/renovation activities are in contempt of court. Unless restrained and punished by this court, the impugned actions will undermine the court's authority and the rule of law. 23. The court was urged to find that the Respondents are in contempt of the court and accordingly punish them. 24. The 1st Respondent opposed the application through the Replying affidavit of Nicholas Kayu Muigai sworn on 12/11/25, who is also the 3rd Respondent and a director thereof. He deposed as follows; 25. That, in compliance with the judgment, the 1st Respondent commenced the regularisation of the application to change the user from residential to commercial. 26. On 3/3/25, in a letter addressed to the 6th Respondent, the 1st Respondent sought confirmation that due process was followed in obtaining the change of user; to give effect to the approvals previously granted, either by rubber-stamping and validating the change of user approval issued on 13/1/23, or by accepting and approving a fresh application. 27. In its response dated 4/3/25, allegedly authored by the 6th respondent on behalf of the 2nd Respondent, the 1st respondent was directed to convene a meeting with the applicants to seek consensus on the outstanding issues relating to the subject change of use. 28. In compliance, the 1st Respondent published two notices dated 7/3/25 and 11/3/25, inviting the representatives of the 2nd Respondent and the applicants to a consensus meeting on 14/3/25. 29. At the meeting, there were no dissenting views from the applicants, apart from concerns about security and traffic in the area, which were addressed to the applicants' satisfaction. He annexed the minutes, a detailed report, and the list of attendees shared them with the 2nd respondents through their advocates. 30. Following the public participation exercise, the 1st respondent received formal approval from the 2nd respondent, by letter dated 25/3/24, authorising the change of user and granting development permission. 31. It is then that the 1st Respondent proceeded with construction upon receipt of the said approvals, and therefore acted in compliance with the orders of the court. 32. In conclusion, it is averred that the applicants have not demonstrated any wilful disobedience of the court judgement, and contempt is not proven. 33. The 2nd Respondent opposed the application vide the replying affidavit sworn by Wilfred Masinde, the Deputy Director, Development Inspection and Planning Litigation, of the 2nd Respondent. He deposed as follows; 34. The 2nd Respondent has fully complied with the said judgment by not purporting to validate, reinstate, or quash the approvals for change of user. 35. After the judgment, the 1st Respondent submitted a new application for development and a change of use from residential to commercial on a separate parcel, LR No 17/262, in 2025, distinct from LR No 17/161, which was subject to court orders. The application was processed independently and complied with all statutory requirements, including public participation. Notices were published in the Daily Nation on 7/3/25 and 11/3/25, inviting public comments, objections, and representations within the deadline. Stakeholder engagement occurred, and various responses were considered. No significant objections were raised within the statutory period that would have led to rejection or deferral of the application. Upon compliance with the provisions of the Act [PLUPA] and in the absence of any legal impediment, the 2nd Respondent granted approval for the change of use for LR No 17/262 on 2/5/2025. 36. The approval for a change of user for LR No 17/262 cannot, in law and fact, constitute a continuation or defiance of the quashed approvals for LR No 17/261. Therefore, the 2nd Respondent at no time acted in disregard of the court orders. 37. That the 2nd Respondent did not issue any letter authorising construction or renovation works on LR No 17/161. The applicants have not produced the said letter or identified the officer purported to have issued it. If such a letter exists, it is a forgery and cannot bind the 2nd Respondent. 38. The photographs annexed to the applicants' supporting affidavit are impugned for lack of date, for lack of description of the property to which they refer, and for the works being carried out in contempt of the court orders. 39. None of its officers attended the meeting on 14/3/25, and the 2nd respondent is not involved in the construction work on the suit land and cannot be held responsible for the 1st respondent's actions. 40. In conclusion, he stated that the applicants have not sought leave of the court to enjoin the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th respondents to the suit, and that the applicants have not established contempt of court on the part of the 2nd respondent. 41. Vide its grounds of objection dated 14/11/25, the 6th Respondent opposed the application on the following grounds; 42. The supporting affidavit sworn by Caroline Wangari Muriuki on 21/10/25 was accompanied by unsealed annexures, contrary to Rule 9 of the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Rules. It is therefore fatally incompetent and should be struck out. 43. Because the applicants failed to seek leave of the court to join the 6th Respondent as a party to the suit, the 6th Respondent is therefore improperly joined to the suit contrary to Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. 44. On the basis of the above grounds, the application is defective, amounts to an abuse of the court's process, and ought to be struck out in limine. 45. Vide the replying affidavit sworn on 22/1/26, the 6th Respondent deposed that; 46. He is the County Executive Committee Member for Urban Development and Planning within the 2nd Respondent's office. 47. The application is fatal on two grounds. First, the supporting affidavits sworn by the applicants on 21/10/25 are not accompanied by sealed annexures. The annexures have no probative value in law and cannot be relied upon as evidence before the court. The failure to have the documents sealed by a commissioner of oaths therefore renders them legally worthless. Secondly, no leave was sought to join him to the suit; hence his joinder is improper, rendering the application incompetent in law. 48. In addition, he denied authorising, approving, permitting, sanctioning, or otherwise facilitating any construction, renovation, or development work on the suit land in breach of the court orders. 49. Further, the applicants have not annexed any letter, approval, authorisation, or document issued by him or his office authorising construction on the suit land. The allegations are speculative, spurious, and unfounded. If any such letter or approval exists, it is irregular, unlawful, forged, and incapable of binding the 2nd Respondent. 50. No specific acts constituting contempt on his part have been demonstrated. Specifically, the photos presented by the applicants are undated, do not disclose when they were taken, do not identify the exact location of the site, and do not show that the structure relates to the suit property or that it was constructed during the subsistence of the alleged contempt. 51. In response to the affidavit sworn on 19/1/26, he stated that the photographs are not accompanied by a certificate of electronic evidence as required under section 106B of the Evidence Act, rendering them inadmissible and not to be relied on in court. 52. He confirmed that no procedural-compliant application for change of use or redevelopment approval was submitted or approved by his office following the delivery of the judgement on 17/10/24 and the ruling of 27/2/25. 53. Commenting on the supplementary affidavit of 19/1/26, the deponent faulted the said pleading for having been filed without leave of the court to amend the application. 54. In a supplementary affidavit sworn by Caroline Wangari Muriuki on 19/1/2026, the deponent reiterated the contents of her earlier affidavit sworn on 21/10/25 and annexed exhibits duly marked and commissioned. **The written submissions** 1. Parties elected to canvass the application by way of written submissions. I have read and considered the submissions on the record and thank counsel for their insights and diligence. 2. Regarding whether the respondents are in contempt of the court orders, the applicants submitted that they are. Relying on the court's decision in Teachers Service Commission Vs Kenya National Union of Teachers & 2 others [2013] EKLR, the applicants submitted that contempt proceedings are sui generis and quasi-criminal in nature, and that they serve to safeguard the authority, dignity and efficacy of the judicial process and the administration of justice. 3. On the existence of clear and unambiguous court orders, the applicants submitted that the court delivered its judgement on 17/10/24, quashing approval No PLUPA – COU -00533N in respect of the suit land. The applicants' knowledge of the said orders is not in dispute, and in any event, the applicants' counsel notified the 6th respondent of the said orders via a letter dated 12/3/25, stating that the judgement was still in force, as it had not been appealed and/or set aside. The 6th respondent is therefore, in his official capacity, equally bound by the orders of the court, along with the 2nd respondent, which is the substantive respondent in the suit. 4. On wilful and continuing disobedience, the applicants submitted that the works observed on the suit land included demolition and excavation, which fall within the activities prohibited by the court. The respondent purported to rely on prior approvals quashed by the court or on an alleged authorisation letter that has never been presented to the court. It is alleged that the 6th respondent ordered the letter in contempt of the existing orders. 5. Regarding the unsealed annexures, the applicants argued that the alleged defect is overtaken by events, as they filed a supplementary affidavit dated 19/1/26, which reproduces the material facts and includes the sealed annexures. 6. On the alleged improper joinder of the 6th respondent, the applicants' argument that the 6th respondent ought to have been formally joined to the suit is misconceived, because contempt proceedings are sui generis and are directed at parties who have knowledge of the order. A public officer such as the 6th respondent cannot rely on the absence of formal joinder to shield himself from conduct that defeats a court order. The 6th respondent has been cited in his official capacity as an official of the 2nd respondent. 7. The 3rd, 4th, and 5th respondents submitted that they initiated the regularisation process, engaged the 2nd respondent, and conducted public participation as directed. Notices were published in the Daily Nation on 7/11/25 and 11/3/25, and a consensus meeting was held on 14/3/25, attended by the respondents and the applicants, as evidenced by the minutes of the meeting submitted to the 2nd respondent, which elicited no objections. The approval of the change of user was formally granted by the 2nd and 6th respondents vide the letter dated **25/3/25**; hence, there was no wilful disobedience of the court orders, as they resumed construction only after receiving the formal approvals. The 1st respondent acted in good faith and within the bounds of the law. For that reason, they argue that the applicants have not demonstrated any deliberate disobedience of the court orders. 8. In conclusion, they submitted that they have fully complied with the judgment and directions of the court issued on 17/10/24 and urged the court to dismiss the application. 9. The 6th Respondent submitted that the affidavit and annexures constitute critical evidence material which the court is required to rely on to establish contested facts. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the documents before the court are properly verified by the Commissioner of Oaths. Without this verification, the probity of the documents is called into question, and the authenticity and evidentiary value of the annexures are undermined. For that reason, the annexures, in their unsealed and unmarked state, are of no probative value in law; they are incapable of being admitted or relied upon by the court. Without valid exhibits, the supporting affidavit is rendered hollow, and the application is effectively incompetent and ought to be struck out in limine. 10. On joinder, the 6th respondent submitted that his joinder in the suit was improper and that the applicants ought to have sought leave of the court under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. He further submitted that joinder of a party to a suit is not automatic and can be effected only with leave of the court, either on application or suo motu, when the court is persuaded that it should act of its own motion in order to serve the interests of justice, where applicable. 11. Regarding whether the applicants have proved contempt of court on his part, the 6th Respondent denied signing any letter approving a change of user and authorising the 1st Respondent to commence construction. The alleged letter was not produced in evidence, and if it exists, it is a forgery and cannot be attributed to him. **Analysis and determination** 1. Having considered the application, the rival affidavit evidence, the submissions, and the issues that commend themselves for determination, they are as follows. 2. Whether the application is incompetent on account of unsealed and non-commissioned annexures 3. Whether the joinder of the 6th Respondents was improper 4. Whether the Respondents are in contempt of the court orders issued on 17/10/24. 5. What orders should the court issue 6. Costs of the application. **Whether the application is incompetent on account of unsealed and non-commissioned annexures** 1. It is averred by the 6th Respondent that the annexures to the supporting affidavit of Caroline Wanagri Muriuki, sworn on 21/10/25, have not been marked and sealed by the Commissioner for Oaths. For that reason, the 6th respondent seeks that the said annexures be struck off the record. 2. Rule 9 of the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Rules provides as follows: “All exhibits to affidavits **shall** be securely sealed thereto under the seal of the Commissioner, and shall be marked with serial letters of identification.” 1. An Affidavit and its annexures are admissible evidence. When proving a fact by Affidavit, the person must exhibit relevant documents. Such documents must be sealed by the Commissioner for Oaths and marked with serial letters, as required by law. 2. In the case of in [Solomon Omwega Omache & another v Zachary O Ayieko & 2 others (2016) eKLR](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2016/827), the court held that - “Although the point was not taken up by the plaintiffs, the court has a duty to uphold the sanctity of the record, noting that this is a court of record. Before the court is a replying affidavit with annexures that are neither marked nor sealed with the commissioner’s stamp. Are they really exhibits? I do not think so, and they cannot be properly admitted as part of the record. I expunge the exhibits, and in effect that renders the replying affidavit incomplete. Therefore, the same is also for rejection, as without the annexures it is valueless. This should serve as a wake-up call to practitioners not to be too casual when processing documents for filing, as it could be extremely costly to them or their clients, as crucial evidence could be excluded owing to counsel’s or their assistants’ lack of attention and due diligence." 1. I agree with the 6th Respondent that the fate of unmarked and unsealed annexures is similar to that of an unsigned affidavit, in that they have no legal value in the matter before the court. 2. That said, I have perused the record, and it is clear that the applicants successfully moved the court to file a supplementary affidavit on 17/11/25. None of the parties, including the 6th respondent, objected to the application. The record also shows that, upon service, the 6th respondent entered an appearance by counsel and filed his pleadings, again without any objection to his being enjoined to the suit. 3. I have perused the supplementary affidavit filed on 19/1/26 and am satisfied that the annexures comply with Rule 9 of the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Rules. The proper course for the applicants was to amend the application to align with the compliant affidavit and annexures. In the interests of justice, I am prepared to admit the pleadings despite drafting and procedural inelegance. The objection is therefore overtaken by events. **Whether the joinder of the 6th Respondents was improper** 1. Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules provides as follows; “The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added”. 1. The above provisions show that joinder is not automatic. Subject to the conditions being met, joinder is effected on application or by the court suo motu. However, in contempt proceedings, the position is rather different. 2. Following the invalidation of the Contempt of Court Act, 2016, the superior courts continue to exercise contempt jurisdiction under section 5 of the Judicature Act, read together with the applicable law and procedure of the High Court of Justice in England. Kenyan courts have continued to apply Part 81 of the English Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Directions thereunder on that basis. Part 81.3(1) expressly provides that a contempt application in existing proceedings is brought in those proceedings “whether or not the application is made against a party to those proceedings.” Therefore, as a general proposition, the mere fact that a person was not an original plaintiff, defendant or respondent does not render contempt proceedings against that person incompetent. 3. In the case of Bellevue Development Company Limited v Vinayak Builders Limited & another [2014] KEHC 5507 (KLR) when the court dealt with a similar issue stated; “Joinder of parties is possible after judgment. I will give some example where such joinder of parties is permitted; 1) in cases of representative suits; or 2) substitution of one or more parties, for instance, in case of death, or incapacity of a party or change of status of a party; or 3) in execution process. In the broader sense, it is deemed to be a kind of joinder of parties where a contemnor was not a party in the suit where judgment has already been entered and for which he is being cited for contempt of court. Equally, it is a joinder of parties where an objector raises objection to execution under Order 22 rule 51 of the CPR. However, any joinder of parties post-judgment will have to surmount any possible constitutional objections on the front of rules of natural justice and the principle of finality of litigation. Applying the said test on the present case, I find that Mr Paul Mwaniki Gachoka was not the subject of the earlier arbitral proceedings which were the subject of these proceedings. I have also found he was not a successor of the 2nd defendant although his appointment was after the resignation of the 2nd defendant herein. Although the 1st Respondent alludes to some sort of contempt, I have also found that Mr Gachoka has not been cited for contempt of court as by law required and this application is not one for contempt of court. I hold that he is not even a necessary party and should not be joined as a party in these proceedings”. 1. In this matter, the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Respondents assert that the 6th Respondent signed a letter dated 25/3/25, endorsing a change of user and authorising the commencement of construction and renovation activities. It is uncontested that the 6th Respondent has been cited for contempt in his official capacity as the CEC Urban Development and Planning in the 2nd Respondent's office. I have also examined the court orders that annulled the previous approval for change of user and prohibited the 1st Respondent from continuing the work until a change of user licence is obtained in accordance with the law. The process for securing a change of user involves the 2nd Respondent through the office of the 6th Respondent, who holds statutory responsibilities under PLUPA. Whether the 6th Respondent is guilty of contempt is a matter for the court to decide in due course. Presently, I find that the 6th Respondent is properly before the court; otherwise, how could he have defended his office if not duly enjoined? 2. The issue is answered in the negative. **Whether the Respondents are in contempt of the court orders issued on 17/10/24.** 1. According to Black's Law Dictionary 10th Edition, Contempt of court is defined as; " Contempt (also termed as contempt of court, judicial contempt) is a disregard of, disobedience to, the rules, or orders of a legislative or judicial body, or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behaviour or insolent language, in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb the proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body." 1. in the case of Samuel M. N. Mweru & Others vs National Land Commission & 2 Others (2020) eKLR, which both parties have relied on, Justice Mativo (as he then was) while dealing with issues of contempt of Court observed as follows: “The test for when disobedience of a civil order constitutes contempt has come to be stated as whether the breach was committed ‘deliberately and mala fide.’ [40] A deliberate disregard is not enough, since the non-complier may genuinely, albeit mistakenly, believe he/she is entitled to act in the way claimed to constitute the contempt. In such a case good faith avoids the infraction. [41] Even a refusal to comply that is objectively unreasonable may be bona fide (though unreasonableness could evidence lack of good faith). These requirements - that is the refusal to obey should be both wilful and mala fides, and that unreasonable non-compliance, provided it is bona fide, does not constitute contempt-accord with the broader definition of the crime, of which non-compliance with civil orders is a manifestation. They show that the offence is committed not by mere disregard of a court order, but by the deliberate and intentional violation of the court’s dignity, repute or authority that this evinces.[43] Honest belief that non-compliance is justified or proper is incompatible with that intent. 1. In the case of **Martin Nyaga Wambora & 4 Others vs. Speaker of the Senate & others (2014 eKLR**it was rightly observed that: “…….the disobedience of a Court order is a grave issue as it undermines the rule of law. Article 10 of the Constitution identified the rule of law as one of the guiding principles of governance. Article 3 of the Constitution is very clear that every person has an obligation to respect and defend the Constitution. So that any person who disobeys a court order violates the Constitution.” 1. On the importance of obeying court orders, it was held in the case of Shimmers Plaza Limited Vs. National Bank of Kenya Limited [2015] eKLR thus:- “The courts should not fold their hands in helpleness and watch as their orders are disobeyed with impunity left, right and centre. This would amount to abdication of our sacrosanct duty bestowed on us by the Constitution. The dignity and authority of the Court must be protected, and that is why those who flagrantly disobey them must be pushed, lest they lead us to a state of anarchy. We think we have said enough to send this important message across.” 1. Further in the case ofKenya Human Rights Commission v Attorney General & another [2018] EKLRthe court observed; **“**Contempt is the willful disobedience or disregard of a court orders, judgments decrees or directions. It is therefore the offence of being disobedient or discourteous towards courts and their officers in the form of behavior that opposes or defies the authority, justice and dignity of the court. Contempt manifests itself in the willful and intentional disregard of or disrespect for the authority of the courts, a behavior that is regarded illegal because it does not obey or respect the authority of the courts and their processes and tends to lower the dignity of the courts. The Constitution, Article 4(2), declares Kenya a democratic state founded on national values and principles of governance which include the rule of law and democracy. Disobedience and disregard of the authority of the courts violates national values and the Constitution. In that regard, courts punish for contempt in order to maintain their dignity, authority, the rule of law, democracy and administration of justice as foundational values in our constitution. Article 159 of the Constitution recognises the judicial authority of courts and tribunals established under the Constitution. Courts and tribunals exercise this authority on behalf of the people. The decisions courts make are for and on behalf of the people and for that reason, they must not only be respected and obeyed but must also be complied with in order to enhance public confidence in the judiciary which is vital for the preservation of our constitutional democracy. The judiciary acts only in accordance with the Constitution and the law (Article 160) and exercises its judicial authority through its judgments decrees orders and or directions to check government power, keep it within its constitutional stretch hold the legislature and executive to account thereby secure the rule of law, administration of justice and protection of human rights. For that reason, the authority of the courts and dignity of their processes are maintained when their court orders are obeyed and respected thus courts become effective in the discharge of their constitutional mandate”. 1. Punishing for contempt of court goes towards safeguarding the dignity and the authority of the court. This was the holding in the South African case of Nthabiseng Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality & another*CCT 19/11(75/2015)* when the court observed that; “The rule of law, a foundational value of the constitution, requires that the dignity and authority of the courts be upheld. This is crucial, as the capacity of courts to carry out their functions depends upon it. As the constitution commands, orders and decisions issued by a court bind all persons to whom and organs of state to which they apply, and no person or organ of state may interfere in any matter, with the functioning of the courts. It follows from this that disobedience towards courts orders or decisions risks rendering our courts impotent and judicial authority a mere mockery. The effectiveness of court orders or decisions is substantially determined by the assurance that they will be enforced.” 1. Farther afar in the case of Canadian Metal Co. Ltd v Canadian Broadcasting Corp(N0.2) [1975] 48 D.LR(30), the court stated that; “To allow court orders to be disobeyed would be to tread the road toward anarchy. If orders of the court can be treated with disrespect, the whole administration of justice is brought into scorn… if the remedies that the courts grant to correct… wrongs can be ignored, then there will be nothing left for each person but to take the law into his own hands. Loss of respect for the courts will quickly result into the destruction of our society.” 1. Courts therefore punish for contempt to insulate their processes and ensure compliance, so that the rule of law and the administration of justice are not undermined. Without this power, or where it is limited or diminished, the court is left helpless and its decisions would mean nothing. This ultimately erodes public confidence in the courts; endangers the rule of law, the administration of justice, and, more importantly, the development of society. That is why the court stated in Carey v Laiken [2015] SCC17 that; “Contempt of court rests on the power of the court to uphold its dignity and process. The rule of**law is directly dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and maintain their dignity and respect”** 1. It is therefore a fundamental rule of law that court orders be obeyed, and where an individual is enjoined by a court order to do or refrain from doing a particular act, he has a duty to carry out that order. The court has a duty to commit that individual for contempt of its orders where he deliberately fails to carry out such orders. As held in the case of Martin Nyaga Wambora and Another v Justus Kariuki Mate & Another [2014] eKLR, the duty to obey the law by all individuals and institutions is cardinal to the maintenance of the rule of law and the administration of justice. 2. In this case, the court in its judgement of 17/10/25 entered judgement against the 1st Respondent as follows; “a. an order of certiorari be and issued removing into the court and quashing forthwith the notification of approval dated the 13/1/2023 bearing application No PLUPA-COU-000533N in favour of the 3rd Respondent for the change of user and development on LR No 17/261 [Nairobi Block 218/770] with coordinates -1.2369, 36.7813 situated in Kitisuru, in Westlands subcounty, along Kitisuru Road. b. an order of prohibition is issued against the 3rd Respondent stopping the 3rd Respondent from continuing with any or any demolitions, renovations and/or construction works on the property known as LR No 17/261/[Nairobi Block 218/770] with coordinates -1.2396, 36.7813 situated in Kitisuru in Westlands Sub County along Kitisuru Road unless and until a change of user licence is procedurally obtained. c. Each party to bear their respective costs of the application/suit.” 1. The applicants have averred that the above orders have been disobeyed by the 1st Respondent; hence the need to find it and its directors guilty of contempt and to punish them accordingly. 2. It is averred that, notwithstanding the existence of the court orders quashing the change of user approval and prohibiting the 1st Respondent from carrying out construction and renovation on the suit land, they have commenced the said construction contrary to those orders, and that their actions constitute contempt punishable in law. 3. In order to succeed in civil contempt proceedings, the Applicants are duty bound to prove the following 4 elements; - 4. the terms of the Order (or injunction or undertaking) were clear and unambiguous and were binding on the Defendant; 5. the Defendant had knowledge of or proper notice of the terms of the Order; 6. the Defendant has acted in breach of the terms of the Order; and 7. the Defendant’s conduct was deliberate. 8. I have perused the orders of the court and, undoubtedly, there is no dispute as to their correctness or lack of ambiguity. The orders, therefore, as issued, were clear, unambiguous, self-effecting, and binding on the parties in all respects. 9. The record shows that the respondents were duly represented in court, so their knowledge of the orders was not raised as an issue. The parties were aware of the orders, and nothing has been placed before this court to suggest that they were unaware. 10. The crux of the matter before the court is whether the respondents are in breach of the terms of the orders; whether they are in wilful disobedience of the orders of the court; and whether they are guilty of contempt of the court orders. 11. At the core of the court's decision was the quashing of the 1st respondent's approval for a change of user. This approval was the notification of approval dated 13/1/23 – PLUPA -COU-000533N for parcel L R No 17/161 [Nairobi Block 218/770]. Following the quashing, the court ordered the 1st respondent to halt construction until and unless a change of user licence is obtained in accordance with the law. 12. To quash is to reject, invalidate, or nullify something issued by a court or a government authority. In criminal and civil contexts, a party may seek to quash a filing, notice, warrant, indictment, or order. The central idea is that the challenged document or action fails to meet legal standards, procedural requirements, or constitutional protections. When a court grants a quash order, the challenged action is effectively voided or set aside. In other words, the document does not exist in the eyes of the law. 13. The procedure for a change of user is set out in the Physical and Land Use Planning Act [PLUPA], read together with the provisions of the General Development Permission and Control Regulations. A change of user means any alteration in the use, purpose or level of activity within any property that results in a material change, producing a use that is completely different from the previous one and requiring development permission. 14. Section 56 of the PLUPA gives County Governments the power to control and regulate development within their jurisdictions. It provides as follows; the county governments shall have the power within their areas of jurisdiction to—(a)prohibit or control the use and development of land and buildings in the interests of proper and orderly development of its area;(b)control or prohibit the subdivision of land;(c)consider and approve all development applications and grant all development permissions;(d)ensure the proper execution and implementation of approved physical and land use development plans;(e)formulate by-laws to regulate zoning in respect of use and density of development;(f)reserve and maintain all the land planned for open spaces, parks, urban forests and green belts in accordance with the approved physical and land use development plans; and(g)consider and determine development planning applications made in respect of land adjoining or within reasonable vicinity of safeguarding areas. 15. Under Section 58 of the Act, any person who intends to carry out development must obtain development permission from the relevant County Executive Committee (CEC) Member. 16. So strict is the application of the Act, so much so that a person is prohibited from carrying out any development unless he has obtained the requisite development permission. Section 57 of PLUPA states; “A person shall obtain development permission from the respective county executive committee member by applying for development permission from that county executive committee member in the prescribed form and after paying the prescribed fees.(2)An applicants for development permission shall provide documents, plans and particulars as may be required by the respective county executive committee member to indicate the purposes of the proposed development.(3)An applicants for development permission shall indicate the proposed uses to which the land shall be put, the population density to which that land shall be subjected and the portion of the land the applicants shall provide for easements as a consequence of the applicants 's proposed development.(4)Where an applicants is not the registered owner of the land for which development permission is being sought, that applicants shall obtain the written consent of the registered owner of that land and the applicants shall provide that written consent to the respective county executive committee member at the time of applying for development permission.(5)The development permission granted by a county executive committee member shall be subject to compliance with the provisions of any other written law.(6)Where an applicants does not receive written response for development permission within sixty days, such permission shall be assumed to have been given in terms of this Act.(7)A person applying for development permission shall also notify the public of the development project being proposed to be undertaken in a certain area in such a manner as the Cabinet Secretary shall prescribe.(8)The notification referred to under sub-section (7), shall invite the members of the public to submit any objections on the proposed development project to the relevant county executive committee member for consideration. 1. Section 58 contains the process of how approval for change of user ought to be complied with. It states; A person shall obtain development permission from the respective county executive committee member by applying for development permission from that county executive committee member in the prescribed form and after paying the prescribed fees.(2)An applicant for development permission shall provide documents, plans and particulars as may be required by the respective county executive committee member to indicate the purposes of the proposed development.(3)An applicant for development permission shall indicate the proposed uses to which the land shall be put, the population density to which that land shall be subjected and the portion of the land the applicant shall provide for easements as a consequence of the applicant's proposed development.(4)Where an applicant is not the registered owner of the land for which development permission is being sought, that applicant shall obtain the written consent of the registered owner of that land and the applicant shall provide that written consent to the respective county executive committee member at the time of applying for development permission.(5)The development permission granted by a county executive committee member shall be subject to compliance with the provisions of any other written law.(6)Where an applicant does not receive written response for development permission within sixty days, such permission shall be assumed to have been given in terms of this Act.(7)A person applying for development permission shall also notify the public of the development project being proposed to be undertaken in a certain area in such a manner as the Cabinet Secretary shall prescribe.(8)The notification referred to under subsection (7), shall invite the members of the public to submit any objections on the proposed development project to the relevant county executive committee member for consideration. 2. Under section 59 of PLUPA, a person applying for development permission shall ensure that any documents, plans and particulars that are provided to the respective county executive committee member while applying for development permission have been prepared by the relevant qualified, registered and licensed professionals. 3. Each county executive committee member shall maintain a register of documents submitted by applicants for development permission and shall issue a submission certificate to every applicant who submits such documents. 4. Simply put, an applicant applies for development permission to the relevant authority at the county office; publishes the necessary notification in the daily newspapers, allowing 14 days for public views, objections and comments; The application and comments are weighed against the proposed development's compliance with established plans; The law requires the Planning Authority to serve notice on interested parties and the public, providing an opportunity for representations and objections; On consideration, the application is either rejected, allowed or modified, as the case may be. 5. In this case, the record shows that after the court's judgment, the 1st respondent wrote to the 2nd respondent and proceeded on the mistaken belief that regularising the previous approval would cure the fatal defect the court had identified when it nullified that approval. I say "mistaken" because the previous approval no longer exists. 6. The 1st respondent asserts that the 6th respondent, by letters dated 4/3/25 and 25/3/25, confirmed that the previous approval complied with the provisions of PLUPA, including the publication of the notice in the Daily Nation on 5/11/22, and directed the 1st respondent to convene a meeting with the area's residents' association to review the matter and build consensus. 7. On 7/3/25, the 1st respondent averred that it published a notice in the Daily Nation fashioned as ; “Makanjawa Co Limited issued Notification of Approval No PLUPA -COU-000533N, inviting relevant parties to participate in a meeting intended to regularise a notice of approval issued by the Urban Development Office on March 14, 2025”. 1. It is fundamental to note that the approval referred to in the notice above had been annulled by the court vide its judgment of 17/10/24. This raises the question of what, if any, was being regularised. The answer seems to be nothing. The notice suggests that approval was granted on March 14, 2025, seven days before the residents' meeting. If such approval was indeed obtained, what was the purpose of the residents’ meeting, ostensibly for public participation? Was this merely a superficial attempt to engage the public? I believe it was. Moreover, the notice states that it was issued in accordance with the court's orders. However, this is inaccurate; the court never instructed the 1st respondent to regularise an approval that had been declared void. Such approval cannot be reinstated by the mere issuance of a notice. A similar notice dated March 11, 2025, was published in the Daily Nation, purportedly in compliance with the court order, and suffers the same fate. 2. The 1st respondent claims residents did not object to the change of user, yet attendance lists and comments show that over 90% opposed it. The March 11, 2024, meeting minutes do not meet public participation standards, as they omit the names of organisational representatives and do not indicate a resident-focused agenda. The 1st respondent said public participation had been carried out, further casting doubt on the purported residents' meeting's objectives. Minutes show the meeting was disrupted, raising doubts about whether residents' views were considered. These minutes were used in the approval documents, as evidenced by the letter dated 25 March 2025 from the 6th respondent, further compromising genuine and meaningful public participation. 3. The 2nd Respondent explicitly informed the court that there was no application, consideration, or approval for a change of use of the suit land. It outlined the process by which the 1st Respondent secured approval for a change of use of adjacent land, specifically LR NO 17/262, rather than the suit land. The 1st Respondent has not explained its decision not to fully comply with the court orders in this matter, despite being fully aware of the prescribed procedures. 4. The 6th Respondent has denied signing, approving, or authorising the change of user in favour of the first respondent. He has denied signing the letters dated 4/3/25 and 14/3/25, including the penultimate letter of 14/3/25, and has described them as forgeries, misrepresentations, and, at best, untruths. It was the 1st Respondent who sought to rely on these letters; therefore, the burden of proof was on it to demonstrate otherwise. This could have been achieved by obtaining a handwriting expert to verify his authorship of the letters. However, the 1st Respondent, who bore the burden of proof, failed to do so, and consequently, the claim that the 6th Respondent signed the letters was not substantiated. As a result, the claim was dismissed. 5. Even if, for the sake of argument, the 6th Respondent had signed the approval letters [which was not substantiated], such approval would neither conform to the provisions of the PLUPA nor comply with this court's orders. I find the argument weak, and the alleged procedure being fatal does not aid the 1st Respondent at all. 6. The court concludes that the 1st Respondent provided no evidence regarding the change-of-user application to the 2nd Respondent, payment of application fees, the planning brief, public notices, public participation, and the outcome of the 2nd Respondent's consideration. None of the PLUPA Act requirements is met. This is despite the letter from the applicants' legal counsel expressing a willingness to discuss the project and share the residents' views. 7. Consequently, the court finds that the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th respondents were aware of the court orders; that these orders were explicit and unambiguous in their meaning and scope; and that they imposed obligations on and bound the aforementioned respondents. This is not in dispute. Despite the court orders being in force, they commenced construction and/or renovation activities on the subject property in utter disobedience, thereby acting in contempt of the court orders. Moreover, they failed to obtain approval for a change of use and attempted to reinstate an expired approval through improper means, namely by regularising a non-existent approval. The overall conclusion is that these respondents are in contempt of the court orders issued on 21/10/25. 8. With respect to the 2nd and 6th respondents, the court finds that the applicants s failed to establish contempt on their part. 9. In the end, the application is allowed in the following terms; 10. The 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Respondents are hereby found to be in contempt of the orders of this Court issued on 17th October 2024 and affirmed on 27th February 2025, by reason of continuing construction and renovation works on L.R. No. 17/261 (Nairobi Block 218/,770) contrary to those orders. 11. The 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Respondents are hereby punished for contempt by committal to civil jail and/or payment of a fine in terms of Section 29 of the Environment and Land Court Act and Order 40 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and such further sanctions as the Court may deem fit, including sequestration of assets. 12. A Mandatory Order do issue ordering the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents to purge the contempt by immediately ceasing all construction/renovation activities on L.R. No. 17/261 (Nairobi Block 218/770) and forthwith comply with the orders of the court of 17/10/24 within 60 days. 13. If, for whatever reason, the contemnors fail to purge the contempt as ordered by the court, they shall appear before the court in person on 27/10/26 to show cause why they should not be committed to civil jail for disobedience of the Court orders. 14. An Order of Prohibition is hereby issued to the Nairobi City County and its officers to refrain from issuing, endorsing, or relying on any approvals purporting to authorise works on the suit property unless and until a procedurally valid change of use and all attendant approvals are obtained in accordance with the law. 15. A declaration that any approvals issued by the 2nd and/or 6th Respondent to the 1st Respondent are null and void for failure to comply with the law and with the order of this Honourable Court. 16. An order to be issued to the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) at Spring Valley Police Station to ensure compliance with the orders of the court. 17. The 1st , 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents shall meet the cost of the application. 18. Orders accordingly **DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 14TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026 VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS.** **J G KEMEI** **JUDGE** **Delivered Online in the presence of:** 1. Ms Ouma HB Oluoch Olunya for the Applicants 2. N/A for the 2nd Respondent 3. Ms Shisia HB Murango for the 2nd Respondent 4. N/A for the 3rd -5th Respondent 5. Ms Munguti for the 6th Respondent 6. CA – Mr Amos