https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4232

Kedoki v Kariuki (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Case E010 of 2026) [2026] KEELC 4232 (KLR) (Environment and Land) (9 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 4232 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Naivasha Environment and Land Environment and Land Miscellaneous Case E010 of 2026 MC Oundo, J July 9, 2026 Between Muteno Eve Kinaiyo Kedoki Applicant and Grace Mumbi Kariuki Respondent (Being an Application for extension of time for filing a Memorandum of Appeal and Record of Appeal out of time from the Ruling of Hon. N.S Lutta (CM), dated 31st July 2024 in the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Naivasha ELC Case No.1 of 2022 under Section 16A of the Environment and Land Court Act, section 79G of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 43 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya and an Application for stay of execution of Judgement of Honourable N.S Lutta (CM) dated 23rd July 2023 under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules) Ruling 1.Coming up for determination is a Notice of Motion Application dated 2nd April, 2026 brought under the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B, 3A and 79G of the Civil Procedure Act, Section 16A of the Environment and Land Court Act, Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya and all enabling provision of law wherein the Applicant has, sought for the following orders:i.Spentii.Spent.iii.That the Honourable Court be pleased to order a stay of execution of the judgement of the Hon. N.S Lutta delivered on 26th July 2023 and consequential orders therein pending the hearing and determination of the intended Appeal.iv.That the Court be pleased to grant leave to the Appellant to lodge an appeal out of time and/or extend the time within which the Applicant can lodge an Appeal against the Ruling of Hon. N.S Lutta delivered on 31st July 2024.v.The costs of the Application be provided for. 2.The said Application is premised on the ground on its face and the Joint Supporting Affidavit of even date sworn by Muteno Eve Kinaiyo Kedoki, the Applicant herein who deposed that the Respondent had filed a Plaint dated 18th February 2015 before the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Nakuru being Civil Suit 149/2015 against her wherein she had duly filed a Statement of Defence dated 7th August 2015 through her then advocate J.A Simiyu Advocates. 3.That subsequently, without notice, the said suit was transferred to Naivasha sometime in the year 2019 on an Application by the Plaintiff. That she was also not served with a hearing notice; hence, she and all her witnesses did not get a chance to testify and tender in evidence. 4.That accordingly, the Court delivered a judgment on 26th July 2023 in favour of the Plaintiff and thereafter issued a decree against her on 17th October 2023. That afterwards, her advocate filed an application dated 1st November 2023 seeking to set aside said judgement and reopen the defence case, which application she was not made aware of by her advocate, who kept her in the dark. 5.That it was only in October 2025 when her previous advocate released her file that she realised that her advocate had neglected her matter entirely by absconding mentions and hearings, instead of delivering services due as agreed. That further, upon her current advocate on record perusing the Court file, she discovered that a Ruling on the application dated 1st November 2023 had been delivered dismissing it with costs. That subsequently, she was facing imminent eviction from a parcel of land which she had occupied for more than two decades, as well as committal to civil jail. 6.She deposed that the execution proceedings were ongoing in Naivasha MCELC 1/2022 where a Notice of Show Cause was scheduled for 8th April 2026 where adverse orders may be made against her which would be unfortunate since she was not given a chance to tender in a defence. That she is desirous of appealing the ruling and subsequently defending the suit; hence she would be prejudiced if the orders herein were not granted. 7.She contended that the reason for the delay in filing the Appeal was inadvertent and excusable for the above reasons and that further that by the time she learnt about the Ruling in October 2025, time to appeal had already lapsed. That it was only on instructing new Counsel who made an application to come on record that she had managed to garner the Court’s audience. 8.She argued that the time between the date of ruling and the instant application was not inordinately long but reasonable within the law since she had brought the Application herein at the earliest opportunity considering the circumstances. She contended that her intended Appeal is merited and raises arguable grounds, as it is not frivolous, vexatious, or scandalous, nor is it an abuse of the Court process. That the Respondent would not suffer any prejudice if the time for filing and serving the Appeal is extended or if the matter is allowed to go through the Appeal process. 9.That it is in the interest of justice for the Honourable Court to extend the time for filing the Appeal and to grant her leave to file such Appeal and Record of Appeal out of time. That unless the Honourable Court grants the prayers sought in the instant Application, she would be condemned unheard, denied her right to appeal and subsequently suffer enormous loss. 10.In response and in opposition to the Applicant’s Application, the Respondent, through her Replying Affidavit dated 8th April 2026, deposed that the instant Motion is misconceived, lacks merit and ought to be dismissed with costs, the same having been filed close to two years after the impugned ruling. She contended that the Applicant's explanation was general, unsupported by documentary proof, and did not account for the day-to-day delay, since it is not enough for a party to simply blame mistakes of Counsel; rather, the mistake must be explained and must not be due to indolence. 11.She argued that the Applicant had been awakened from her slumber by the service upon her of a Notice to Show Cause why she should not be committed to civil jail for failure to pay costs awarded and orders by the court that she attend court physically. That the Applicant’s intended appeal would raise no triable issues and that the orders sought would not serve any useful purpose. She contended that the Applicant had based her Notice of Motion on falsehoods, as the Court record demonstrates that she was duly notified of all the steps taken in the court proceedings but failed to take the opportunity. 12.She deposed that the continued delay in the conclusion of the instant matter denied her from enjoying the fruits of a lawfully obtained judgement while the Applicant continued to enjoy rent and protection. That, in any event, the Applicant had not offered any security, which renders the court without jurisdiction to grant the orders, as security was mandatory, not optional. 13.She thus prayed that the instant Application be dismissed with costs. 14.The instant Application was disposed of by way of written submissions which I shall proceed to summarise as hereinunder. Applicants’ Submissions. 15.The Applicant, vide her Submissions dated 27th April 2026, outlined three (3) issues for resolution as follows:i.Whether the Applicant should be allowed to lodge an appeal out of time.ii.Whether the Honourable Court should issue an order of Stay of execution.iii.Who shall bear the costs of the matter? 16.On the first issue for determination as to whether the Applicant should be allowed to lodge an appeal out of time, the Applicant argued that denying the extension would violate the cardinal rule of natural justice: audi alteram partem (no man shall be condemned unheard). The delay in filing the appeal was entirely due to the gross negligence and indolence of her former counsel, which should not be visited upon an innocent client. She cited the cases of:i.Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Salat v IEBC & 7 others [2014] KESC 12 (KLR) to outline the foundational criteria for extending time, which is an equitable, case-by-case discretionary remedy requiring proof of a reasonable explanation for the delay, lack of prejudice to the respondent, and promptness.ii.Osman v Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Interior Coordination of National Government & 4 others (Civil Application E338 of 2025) to support the argument that a client cannot be blamed when their previous advocate fails to notify them of the delivery of a judgment or critical trial court proceedings.iii.Benson Mugo Kariuki v Margaret Wangeci & 7 others (Civil Application E250 of 2023) [citing Mwangi v Mwangi [1999] to establish that while a lawyer's simple inaction combined with a client’s careless attitude will defeat an application, the court should exercise its wide discretion to hear a case on its merits if the litigant proves they are personally doing their best. Rules of procedure should be servants of justice, moving from form to substance. 17.In her argument, she submitted that her previous advocate failed to notify her of the defence hearing, failed to file submissions, and attempted to re-open the case without her knowledge, keeping her completely in the dark until the execution stage. That her intended appeal was arguable, not frivolous, possessed a high chance of success, and protected the non-derogable right to a fair hearing. She further submitted that the Respondent would suffer no prejudice because she was in physical possession of the property, and any potential prejudice could be remedied by an award of costs. 18.On the second issue for determination as to whether the court should issue an order of stay of execution, the Applicant sought to halt the execution of the judgment dated 26th July, 2023 and the resultant decree, anchoring the request on the provisions of Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules arguing that if the stay is denied, she (a widow and a peasant farmer) faces immediate eviction from the property that has been her home for two decades, her assets would be seized, and she would be financially ruined from the pursuit of costs. That execution warrants had already been issued in Naivasha CMELC No. 1 of 2022 and had only been stayed because she was admitted to the hospital. She relied on the decision in Desbro (Kenya) Limited v General Printers Limited; NCBA Bank Kenya PLC & another (Objectors) [2021] eKLR where the court referred to the case of Tropical Commodities Suppliers Ltd Vs International Credit Bank (in Liquidation) Kampala Miscellaneous Application No. 379 of 2003 to define substantial loss as a qualitative rather than mathematical concept, referring to any loss of real worth or value as distinguished from a nominal loss. 19.She argued that her application had been brought timeously when weighed against the unique and excusable circumstances of the delay (being misled and kept in the dark by her former counsel) and explicitly stated her willingness to deposit security and requests the court to fix fair and reasonable terms. 20.She relied on the decision in Mwanza v Mulinge [2024] KEHC 1847 (KLR) to emphasize the court's duty to balance the competing interests of both parties. That while the Respondent was entitled to the fruits of a judgment, the injustice to her, if the application is dismissed, could vastly exceed the prejudice to the Respondent if it is allowed. 21.On the last issue as to who shall bear the costs of this matter, she relied on the provisions of Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act to reinforce the statutory mandate and standard court practice that costs follow the event and sought for costs to be awarded in accordance with this principle. 22.In conclusion, she sought that the Court grant her the two main prayers, namely leave to lodge an appeal out of time against the Magistrate’s Court ruling dated 31st July, 2024, and an order for Stay of Execution of the judgment dated 26th July, 2023, and the resulting decree, pending the final determination of the intended appeal. Respondent’s Submission 23.The Respondent, on the other hand, vide her undated submissions, summarised the factual background, arguing that the Applicant was procedurally seeking extensions of time and stay of execution for two distinct decisions, the Judgment of 26th July, 2023 and the Ruling of 31st July, 2024, within a single, omnibus application for which the Court should decline this blanket exercise of discretion. 24.She outlined the established criteria for extending time and argued that the Applicant had failed to satisfy any of them. She cited the following authorities in support of her argument:i.Leo Mutiso v Rose Hellen Wangari Mwangi (1999) 2 E.A. 231 CA that established the core principles governing the extension of time: length of delay, reasons for delay, chances of appeal success, and degree of prejudice to the Respondent and proceeded to submit that under this precedent, a delay of one year was explicitly deemed inordinate and inexcusable.ii.Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v IEBC & 7 others [2014] eKLR (SC), to reinforce that an extension of time is a discretionary equitable remedy, not a right, and the burden rests entirely on the applicant to explain the delay to the satisfaction of the court.iii.Andrew Kiplagat Chemiaringo v Paul Korir Kibet, to argue that a delay of one year and six months was historically treated by the courts as inordinate and inexcusable.iv.Habo Agencies Ltd v Wilfred Odhiambo Musingo [2015] eKLR, which held that a party cannot simply shift all blame onto their advocate; the mistake must be reasonably explained and must not stem from sheer indolence.v.Utalii Transport Company Ltd & 3 others v NIC Bank & Anor [2014] eKLR, to argue that the court should not reward an indifferent litigant who deliberately sleeps on their rights and only seeks court intervention once execution begins. 25.She then contended that the delay of 16 months for the 2024 ruling and 21/2 years for the 2023 judgment were massive. The excuse of "being left in the dark" generally lacked documentary proof, and failed to provide a day-by-day account. 26.She asserted that the lower court record explicitly proved that the Applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and had been notified of every step, thus rendering her claims of ignorance completely false. She was only "awakened from her slumber" when served with a Notice to Show Cause (NTSC) for civil jail. 27.The Respondent submitted that the draft Memorandum of Appeal and the Statement of Defence consisted of general denials and frivolous untruths that carried zero chance of success. 28.She argued that reopening a matter after two years severely undermined the principle of finality in litigation, stripping her of rights that had already crystallized. 29.That the Applicant failed to meet the mandatory elements of Order 42 Rule 6(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules. She relied on the decision in the following cases.i.Utalii Transport Company Ltd v NIC Bank & Anor [2014] eKLR to show that even an unexplained delay of a few months is legally sufficient to deny an equitable order for a stay of execution.ii.George O. Omondi v Gulab P. Shah [2000] eKLR to confirm that a one-year delay disentitles a party to discretionary stay orders.iii.Machira T/a Machira & Co Advocates v East African Standard [2002] eKLR to enforce the fundamental principle that a successful party is legally entitled to realize and enjoy the fruits of their judgment.iv.Halai & Anor v Thorntorn & Turpin (1963) Ltd [1990] eKLR 365 and Avun Sharma v Shana Raikundalia [2014] eKLR to establish that the offer and provision of security for the due performance of the decree is a mandatory statutory requirement, not an optional proposal. The court possesses no legal discretion to waive it. 30.She then submitted that the execution concerned costs of approximately KSh 100,000/= and the cancellation of an unauthorized land lease which were purely financial or rectifiable matters that could be refunded or reversed if the appeal succeeds. Furthermore, her evidence was proof that the Applicant did not actually live on the land but had merely leased it out for rent. 31.She also submitted that the Applicant did not deposit or structurally propose security in her application, making the Notice of Motion fundamentally and fatally defective. 32.In conclusion, the Respondent’s argument was that the Applicant had dismally failed to clear the legal thresholds for either relief. The motion was an abuse of process designed solely to obstruct lawful execution and the same should be dismissed with costs. Determination. 33.Having considered the application before the court herein, the opposition thereto, the submissions by both parties, the authorities cited, and the applicable law, the Applicant brings his application seeking an order from the court to stay execution of the Judgment of 26th July, 2023 and consequential orders therein, in Naivasha CMELC Case No.1 of 2022. The Applicant further seeks leave for an extension of time within which to lodge an Appeal against the Ruling of 31st July 2024. 34.Consequently, the pending issues for determination are whether this court should grant the Applicant the orders sought for being;i.Whether the Applicant has met the threshold for extension of time to lodge an appeal out of time.ii.Whether the Applicant satisfies the conditions for the grant of a stay of execution pending appeal. 35.On the first issue concerning the order of leave to appeal out of time, Section 79G of the Civil Procedure Act gives an appellate court discretion to extend time for filing an appeal from the subordinate Court to the High Court. (Read Environment and Land Court) stipulates as follows;“Every appeal from a subordinate court to the High Court shall be filed within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree or order appealed against, excluding from such period any time which the lower court may certify as having been requisite for the preparation and delivery to the appellant of a copy of the decree or order:Provided that an appeal may be admitted out of time if the appellant satisfies the court that he had good and sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. ‘’ 36.In the case of Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat vs. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others [2014] eKLR, the Supreme Court of Kenya held that:“… it is clear that the discretion to extend time is indeed unfettered. It is incumbent upon the Applicant to explain the reasons for delay in making the application for extension and whether there are any extenuating circumstances that can enable the Court to exercise its discretion in favour of the Applicant.“… we derive the following as the underlying principles that a Court should consider in exercising such discretion:i.extension of time is not a right of a party. It is an equitable remedy that is only available to a deserving party, at the discretion of the Court;ii.a party who seeks extension of time has the burden of laying a basis, to the satisfaction of the Court;iii.whether the Court should exercise the discretion to extend time, is a consideration to be made on a case- to- case basis;iv.where there is a reasonable [cause] for the delay, [the same should be expressed] to the satisfaction of the Court;v.whether there will be any prejudice suffered by the Respondent, if extension is granted;vi.whether the application has been brought without undue delay; andvii.whether in certain cases, like election petitions, public interest should be a consideration for extending time” 37.Has the Applicant fulfilled the above requirements so as to be granted leave to file her appeal out of time? The Applicant asserts that the original suit (Civil Suit 149/2015) was transferred from Nakuru to Naivasha in 2019 without her knowledge. She was never served with a notice of hearing, preventing her and her witnesses from testifying before judgment was entered against her. 38.She further asserted that her previous advocate entirely neglected the case, missed court dates, and filed an application to set aside the judgment without informing her. She claimed she was kept completely in the dark and only discovered that the case had been decided and that her set-aside application had been dismissed when she retrieved her case file in October 2025 and noted that execution proceedings are underway, with a Notice of Show Cause set for 8th April, 2026, thus placing her at risk of imminent eviction from land she has occupied for over twenty years, as well as potential committal to civil jail. 39.She argued the delay was inadvertent and excusable under the circumstances, the intended appeal was highly arguable and not frivolous, and denying the application would mean she is condemned unheard. 40.The Respondent’s argument in opposing the application was that the application was filed nearly two years after the July 2024 ruling. She argued that the Applicant failed to provide a sufficient, day-to-day explanation for this delay, asserting that simply blaming previous counsel was insufficient to excuse indolence. 41.She contended that court records prove the Applicant was actively notified of all court proceedings but chose not to participate and was only "awakened from her slumber" when served with the Notice to Show Cause to attend court and face civil jail. 42.The Respondent maintained that the intended appeal lacked merit and would serve no useful purpose. The delay had prevented her from enjoying the fruits of a lawfully obtained judgment. Furthermore, she noted that the Applicant had failed to offer any financial security for the stay of execution, which she asserted was a mandatory legal requirement for the court to grant such orders. 43.I have considered the Applicant's intended Memorandum of Appeal, in which her dissatisfaction with the trial Magistrate's decision, herein noted as the trial Judge’s decision (sic) was that the court had erred in law by finding that the Appellant had not adduced any plausible reason to justify her failure to pursue her defence, the court failed to interrogate, appreciate, consider and give due weight to all the facts in issue, the court also erred by finding that the Respondents had properly discharged their mandate of proper notice to the Appellant and lastly that the trial court erred by upholding a judgement that ignored the principles espoused in Article 159 of the Constitution thus grossly undermining the principles and right to Fair hearing. 44.The parameters for the exercise of such discretion were clearly set out in the case of Thuita Mwangi vs Kenya Airways Ltd, [2003[ eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held as follows“The list of factors a court would take into account in deciding whether or not to grant an extension of time is not exhaustive. Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules (Cap. 9 sub-leg) gives the single judge unfettered discretion and so long as the discretion is exercised judicially, a judge would be perfectly entitled to consider any other factor outside those listed so long as the factor is relevant to the issue being considered…..’’ 45.In this case, the judgment was delivered on 26th July, 2023. The Applicant applied to set the same aside vide an application dated the 1st November 2023 wherein, in a ruling delivered on the 31st July 2024, the application was dismissed with costs. It was only in October 2025, upon extracting her file and instructing new counsel, that the Applicant discovered the set-aside application had been dismissed, facing imminent eviction from land she has occupied for over two decades and a Notice to Show Cause why she should not be committed to civil jail scheduled for 8th April, 2026. She moved this court in an application dated the 2nd April, 2026, a delay of approximately 16 months and 21/2 years after the judgment of 26th July, 2023. 46.The Respondent has confirmed that the Applicant does not reside on the suit land but had leased it out to third parties for rent and therefore would not suffer any loss if an extension of time is not granted. 47.The Court of Appeal in Marete & another v Murwanja [2025] KECA 1505 (KLR) had held as follows:“The impugned ruling was delivered on 18th April 2024. The Applicants were supplied with copies of the ruling and proceedings by 23rd May 2024. By law, they were expected to file their appeal within 60 days thereof. Instead, this application was lodged on 20th May 2025 — nearly a full year out of time. A delay of one year is, by any standard, inordinate and calls for a compelling explanation.’’ 48.In yet another case in Bains Construction Co. Ltd v John Mzare Ogowe [2011] eKLR, the Court of Appeal had observed as follows:“It is to some extent true to say mistakes of Counsel as is the present case should not be visited upon a party but it is equally true when Counsel as agent is vested with authority to perform some duties and does not perform it, surely such principal should bear the consequences”. 49.While this court acknowledges that the mistake or inaction of an advocate can form a basis for extension, such mistakes must be clearly explained and not mask a party's own indolence. The Applicant claims she discovered the ruling in October 2025. Even if this court takes October 2025 as the date of awareness, the Applicant waited another five months before filing this application in April 2026. No day-by-day explanation has been offered for this secondary delay. Equity aids the vigilant, not the indolent, of a party who only rushes to court when execution proceedings, specifically, a Notice to Show Cause, threaten physical liberty. The court notes the Respondent's assertion that the lower court record shows the Applicant's active participation, casting doubt on the claim of complete ignorance. Consequently, the delay remains unexplained and inexcusable and granting the application would occasion prejudice to the Respondent. 50.As to the Second issue, as to whether there should be a stay of execution, Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, stipulates as follows:“No Appeal or second Appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order Appealed from except in so far as the court Appealed from may order but, the court Appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court Appealed from, the court to which such Appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the Appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.(2)No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) unless—(a)the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the Applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and(b)such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the Applicant.’ 51.There are three conditions for granting a stay order pending Appeal under Order 42 Rule 6 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules, to wit:i.The Court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the Applicant unless a stay of execution is ordered;ii.The application is brought without undue delay andiii.Such security as the Court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him/her has been given by the Applicant. 52.For the Applicant to succeed in the present application, the onus was on her to satisfy the conditions as set down under Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Indeed, the purpose of a stay of execution is to preserve the substratum of the case. In the case of Consolidated Marine. vs. Nampijja & Another, Civil App.No.93 of 1989 (Nairobi), the Court held that: -“The purpose of the application for stay of execution pending Appeal is to preserve the subject matter in dispute so that the right of the Appellant who is exercising his undoubted right of Appeal are safeguarded and the Appeal if successful is not rendered nugatory”. 53.On the first condition of proving that substantial loss may result unless a stay order is made, it was incumbent upon the Applicant to demonstrate what kind of substantial loss she would suffer were the stay order not made in her favour. 54.What amounts to substantial loss was expressed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Mukuma vs. Abuoga (1988) KLR 645 where the Lordships stated that;“Substantial loss is what has to be prevented by preserving the status quo because such loss would render the Appeal nugatory.” 55.The Applicant herein contends that she would suffer irreparable loss if a stay were not granted, as she risked being evicted from the suit land, thus occasioning her substantial loss. The Respondent, whose submission was uncontested, countered by stating that the Applicant had indeed leased the suit premises for rent. That further, the execution concerned costs of approximately KSh 100,000/= and the cancellation of an unauthorised land lease, which were purely financial or rectifiable matters that could be refunded or reversed if the appeal succeeds. 56.Platt, Ag.JA (as he then was) in Kenya Shell Limited vs. Kibiru [1986] KLR 410, at page 416 expressed himself as follows:“It is usually a good rule to see if Order XLI Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules can be substantiated. If there is no evidence of substantial loss to the Applicant, it would be a rare case when an Appeal would be rendered nugatory by some other event. Substantial loss in its various forms, is the corner stone of both jurisdictions for granting a stay. That is what has to be prevented. Therefore without this evidence it is difficult to see why the Respondents should be kept out of their money”.On the part of Gachuhi, Ag.JA (as he then was) at 417 held:“It is not sufficient by merely stating that the sum of Shs 20,380.00 is a lot of money and the Applicant would suffer loss if the money is paid. What sort of loss would this be" In an application of this nature, the Applicant should show the damages it would suffer if the order for stay is not granted. By granting a stay would mean that status quo should remain as it were before judgement. What assurance can there be of Appeal succeeding" On the other hand, granting the stay would be denying a successful litigant of the fruits of his judgement. The applicant has not given to court sufficient materials to enable it to exercise its discretion in granting the order of stay” 57.This being the case, and while keeping in mind that the Applicant is not in possession of the suit premises, and further in exercising the court’s discretion, to always opt for the lower rather than the higher risk of injustice, I find that the Applicant has not discharged the first condition of proving that substantial loss may result unless a stay order is made. 58.On the second condition, having already found that the application suffered from an inordinate and unreasonable delay of 16 months to 21/2 years, the Applicant fails the temporal requirement, as unexplained delays are fatal to equitable reliefs like a stay of execution. 59.More fundamentally, regarding the requirement of security for the due performance of the decree, the provision or structural offering of security is a mandatory, non-optional statutory command. While the Applicant stated a general "willingness" to deposit security within her submissions, she failed to propose any tangible or concrete security within the body of her motion or affidavits. A mere statement of willingness, absent a formal financial or material undertaking, does not satisfy the strict mandatory threshold of Order 42 Rule 6(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 60.Litigation must come to an end, and a successful party should not be lightly denied the fruits of their judgment; therefore, granting a blanket stay under these terms would amount to rewarding delay. 61.In the end, I find that the Applicant’s Notice of Motion Application lacks merit, fails to satisfactorily account for the inordinate delay, and fails to satisfy the mandatory statutory thresholds required for a stay of execution. 62.Accordingly, the Applicant’s Notice of Motion Application dated 2nd April, 2026 is hereby dismissed in its entirety with costs. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIVASHA VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS THIS 9TH DAY OF JULY 2026.M.C. OUNDOENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT– JUDGE