https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/11033

 **REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT AT NYERI** **SUCCESSION APPEAL NO. E035 OF 2025** **IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF KARIUKI KIBAARA (DECEASED)** **MWANGI NJIRAINI *aka* KARIUKI RIBUTHI..………...…. APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **BEATRICE MUTHONI KIMOTHO….....…….….….. 1ST RESPONDENT** **CHARLES MAINA MUNORU …...……………….…. 2ND RESPONDENT** **NANCY NYARUAI GITONGA ….………...……….… 3RD RESPONDENT** **CAROLINE WACERA GITONGA …..………...….…. 4TH RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** 1. This is an appeal from the decision of Hon. Grace Kirugumi (SPM) given on 16.10.2025 in Karatina Succession Cause Number 140 of 2017. The decision in the lower court involved summons for confirmation of grant, protest dated 10.08.2023 and Mediation Agreement dated 13.03.2023. Before the said application for confirmation, the appellant had proceeded with the succession cause and grant was confirmed in favour of the appellant on one side and Nyaruai Gitonga, Wacera Gitonga and Kariuki Gitonga. 2. Summons for revocation dated 30.11.2022 was allowed paving way to the current summons which resulted in this appeal. The protest was allowed the mediation agreement dated 13.03.2023. 3. The appellant was aggrieved with the decision and set forth the following grounds of appeal: 4. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that one Joseph Ributhi Kariuki, a son of the deceased herein had no children while evidence had been led he was married at one time to one Mary Waithiegeni, the mother to the appellant. 5. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the appellant herein was not a grandson of the deceased herein. 6. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in misinterpreting a document which referred to land in Molo to refer to land parcel No. Ruguru/Karuthi/480, the subject matter of this cause. 7. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in holding that the notice to vacate and the refund of Kshs. 20,000/= touched on land parcel No. Ruguru/Karuthi/480 while in essence it referred to land in Molo belonging to Joseph Ributhi Kariuki which is not part of this cause. 8. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in not taking into account the circumstances under which the appellant herein left land parcel No. Ruguru/Karuthi/480 the subject matter of this cause. 9. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in distributing a portion of land parcel No. Ruguru/Karuthi/480 to the 3rd and 4th respondents who were not children of Joseph Ributhi Kariuki but his nieces. 10. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in disregarding the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses. 11. The petition had been filed by the appellant after citing the grandchildren of the deceased. The appellant listed 7 people as the beneficiaries of the deceased as follows: 1. Milka Njoki Ributhi - daughter in law 2. Mwangi Njiraini Ngari - Grandson 3. Rose Nyaruai Kibuthi - Granddaughter 4. Kariuiki Gitonga - Grandson 5. Nyaruai Gitonga - Granddaughter 6. Wachera Gitonga - Granddaughter 7. Wachira Gitonga - Grandson 12. The estate being dealt with was that of the late Kariuki Kibaara (deceased) who died on 19.08.1981 at a prime old age of 101 years after a long cough, after having been born at the turn of the 19th century in 1880 or thereabout. He left behind only one asset. It is not clear from the Chief’s letter who the grand children are in terms of the parents and the relationship with the deceased. 13. The only worldly possession of the late Kariuki Kibaara (Deceased) in his 101 sojourns in this earth was Ruguru/Karuthi/480 measuring 4.2 acres (1.7 hectares). The dispute is not on his possessions but on his progeny. The case has also been in court since 2017 but the real action was from 2021 when the summons for revocation were filed. 14. During the hearing of the protest, the appellant vehemently denied that he was Robert Mwangi Ngari. The protest was only to the extent that the appellant was not disclosing his true identity and was a stranger to the estate. They proposed to share the estate as follows: 1. Beatrice Muthoni Kimotho …...………… 1.05 acres 2. Charles Maina Munoru …...……………… 1.05 acres 3. Nancy Nyaruai Gitonga …...…………….. 1.05 acres 4. Caroline Wacera Gitonga …...………… 1.05 acres 15. The appellant on the other hand proposed to share the estate as follows: 1. Martha Nyaruai and Mangi Njirani Aka Kariuki Ributhi …… 2.1 acres * 1. Beatrice Muthoni Kimotho …...……… 1.05 acres 2. Charles Maina Munoru …...………… 1.05 acres 3. Nyaruai Gitonga, Wachera Gitonga, Wachira Gitonga and Kariuiki Gitonga…. 2.1 acres 1. From the pleadings, there is no clear-cut relationship between the parties. The above proposal was the same one in the revoked grant. In the application for revocation Beatrice Muthoni Kimotho indicated that the deceased was her father who had 2 wives. The wives were deceased. The second house has two children, that is Beatrice Muthoni Kimotho and Nyakinyua Munoru. The son is deceased but was represented in the proceedings by Charles Maina Munoru. 2. She indicated that the applicant and the people named in form P&A 5 were from the first house, that is, Milka Njoki Ributhi, Mwangi Njiraini Ngari, Rose Nyaruai Kibuthi, Kariuki Gitonga, Nyaruai Gitonga, Wachera Gitonga, and Wachira Gitonga. She lamented that the second house was left out. Indeed the Chief’s letter indicates so. The applicant at that point made irrelevant postulations that the deceased second daughter’s son should inherit through their father. The court rightly disregarded the misogynistic postulations. 3. In one of the replying affidavits, it was confirmed that there was one Joseph Ributhi Kariuki who died on 10.06.2016 but had no surviving children. It was stated that the late had employed the appellant as a shamba boy, and that is how he came to petition for their land. They denied ever being in court or signing any documents. They attached a eulogy, in a strange language. It however indicated that the deceased left behind a widow. *Ni atiga mutumia wake Milka Njoki na ciana itano (5) cia muruanyina na muthuri wake)/Milka Njoki* was murdered in 2016. She however survived the deceased, who had died in 1981. 4. In the application for confirmation, the appellant proceeded on the premises that his 2.1 acres is not available and therefore the parties are to share 2.1 acres in the following terms: 1. Martha Nyaruai and Mangi Njirani Aka Kariuki Ributhi - 1.05 acres jointly * 1. Nyaruai Gitonga, Caroline Wachera Gitonga and Wachira Gitonga – 1.05 acres * 1. The other half the heirs were said to be in agreement. 1. After acting alone since 2017, the appellant appointed Ms. Kinyua Kiama & Company Advocates to act for him. According to the appellant, he is a son of the late Ributhi Kariuiki, son of the deceased herein. He gave chronology on how he built in his father’s portion until the step mother was murdered and he was framed for the death and arrested. His house was torched. I need not go to evidence as it is necessary for the decision. 2. The appellant’s mother, Mary Waithegeni Njiraini, equally wrote a statement indicating that she was married to the late Ributhi Kariuki and left the second deceased to marry Julius Njiraini Ngari in 1967. There was also evidence of a maternal uncle, James Mwai. James Ngatia Kimondo and Leonard Njagi also wrote statements. 3. Caroline Wacera Gitonga wrote a statement indicating that Joseph Ributhi Kariuki was born in 1938 but did not have children. He died in 2016 as well as the wife. He stated that the petitioner’s name is Mwangi Robert Ngari which has no connection to their family. Another statement was written by Ndiritu Ngatia in indicating that Ributhi did not have children. 4. There appears to have been a partial settlement for the first house. However, the mediation agreement is not in the file. Analysis 1. This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to re-evaluate and assess the evidence and make its own conclusions. It must, however, keep at the back of its mind that a trial court, unlike the appellate court, had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses and hearing their evidence firsthand. In the case of Mbogo and Another vs. Shah [1968] EA 93 the Court stated: “…that this Court will not interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by an inferior court unless it is satisfied that its decision is clearly wrong, because it has misdirected itself or because it has acted on matters on which is should not have acted or because it failed to take into consideration matters which it should have taken into consideration and in doing so arrived at a wrong conclusion.” 1. The duty of the first appellate Court was discussed by Clement De Lestang, VP, Duffus and Law JJA, in the locus classicus case of **Selle and another Vs Associated Motor Board Company and Others [1968]EA 123**, where the Judges in their usual gusto, held by as follows: “.. this court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below. An appeal to this court ... is by way of re-trial and the Court of Appeal is not bound to follow the trial Court’s finding of fact if it appears either that he failed to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities or if the impression of demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence generally.” 1. The Court is to bear in mind that it had neither seen nor heard the witnesses. It is the trial court that has observed the demeanor and truthfulness of those witnesses. However, documents still speak for themselves. The observation of documents is the same as the lower court as parties cannot read into those documents matters extrinsic to them. However, this court’s the jurisdiction to review the evidence should be exercised with caution. In the case of **Peters vs Sunday Post Limited** [1958] EA 424, court therein rendered itself as follows: **“It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the findings on a question of fact, of the judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses…But the jurisdiction to review the evidence should be exercised with caution: it is not enough that the appellate court might have come to a different conclusion…”** 1. The Court is to bear in mind that it had neither seen nor heard the witnesses. It is the subordinate court that has observed the demeanor and truthfulness of those witnesses. However, documents still speak for themselves. The observation of documents is the same as the lower court as parties cannot read into those documents matters extrinsic to them. In **Fidelity & Commercial Bank Ltd V Kenya Grange Vehicle Industries Ltd (2017)eKLR**, the Court of Appeal, Ouko, Kiage and Murgor JJA held as doth;- “Courts adopt the objective theory of contract interpretation, and profess to have the overriding aim of giving effect to the expressed intentions of the parties when construing a contract. This is what sometimes is called the principle of four corners of an instrument, which insists that a document's meaning should be derived from the document itself, without reference to anything outside of the document (extrinsic evidence), such as the circumstances surrounding its writing or the history of the party or parties signing it. 1. In Gerald Dworkin, *Odgers' Construction of Deeds and Statutes* (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1967), the learned author at p. 106 states as follows: “Parol Evidence and written documents. It is a familiar rule of law that no parol evidence is admissible to contradict, vary or alter the terms of a deed or any written instrument. The rule applies as well as deeds as to contracts in writing. Although the rule is expressed to relate to parol evidence, it does in fact apply to all forms of extrinsic evidence. As it stands this is not a rule of interpretation but of law, and means that the interpretation of the document must be found in the document itself with the addition if necessary of such evidence as we have previously seen is admissible for explaining or translating words and expressions used therein” 1. This court does not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses as did the lower court, yet it must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions. 2. The burden was with the respondents to prove their case against the Appellant. On this subject, Section 107-109 of the Evidence Act, Cap 80 Laws of Kenya provides that: **107. (1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.** **(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.** **108. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.** **109. The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.”** 1. A party who invokes the aid of the law and asserts affirmative of an issue has the burden to prove the matters in issue. In **Anne Wambui Ndiritu –vs- Joseph Kiprono Ropkoi & Another [2005] 1 EA 334,** the Court of Appeal held that: **“As a general proposition under Section 107 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 80, the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. There is however the evidential burden that is case upon any party the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence which is captured in Sections 109 and 112 of the Act.”** 1. It follows that the initial burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff, but the same may shift to the Defendant, depending on the circumstances of the case. **The burden of proof also casts upon any party, the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence.** In **Evans Nyakwana –vs- Cleophas Bwana Ongaro [2015] eKLR** it was held that: **“As a general preposition the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. That is the purport of Section 107 (i) of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80 Laws of Kenya. Furthermore, the evidential burden…is cast upon any party, the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence. That is captured in Section 109 and 112 of law that proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person…The appellant did not discharge that burden and as Section 108 of the Evidence Act provides the burden lies in that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given as either side.”** 1. This is not a criminal trial. It is a civil trial in which the court must find for one party or the other on the balance of probabilities. The question as to what amounts to proof on a balance of probabilities was discussed by Kimaru, J in **William Kabogo Gitau vs. George Thuo & 2 Others** [2010] 1 KLR 526 as follows: **“In ordinary civil cases, a case may be determined in favour of a party who persuades the court that the allegations he has pleaded in his case are more likely than not to be what took place. In percentage terms, a party who is able to establish his case to a percentage of 51% as opposed to 49% of the opposing party is said to have established his case on a balance of probabilities. He has established that it is probable than not that the allegations that he made occurred.”** 1. This was further enunciated in the case of [**Palace Investments Limited v Geoffrey Kariuki Mwenda & Dollar Auctions [2015] KECA 616 (KLR)**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2015/616/eng%402015-06-19)**,** where the Court of Appeal [J Karanja, GG Okwengu, CM Kariuki, JJA] stated as follows: The burden of proof is placed upon the appellant and is to be discharged on a balance of probabilities. Denning J. in Miller –vs- Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 ALL ER 372 discussing the burden of proof had this to say:- “That degree is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: ‘We think it more probable than not’, the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are equal, it is not. Thus, proof on a balance or preponderance of probabilities means a win, however narrow. A draw is not enough. So, in any case in which the tribunal cannot decide one way or the other which evidence to accept, where both parties’ explanations are equally (un)convincing, the party bearing the burden of proof will lose, because the requisite standard will not have been attained.” 1. Courts have established that **the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability. Lord Nicholls** of Birkenhead in **Re H and Others (Minors) [1996] AC 563, 586**held that; **“The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the even was more likely than not. When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriated in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability…..”** 1. However, the parties proceed on a wrong trajectory and ended up mixing two completely different estates. The matter before the court related to one deceased only, that is the late Kariuki Kibaara (deceased) and none else. The parties walked down the garden path when they agreed to interrogate the estate of the late Ributhi Kariuki (deceased). The duty of the court at the point in time was to deal with one simple question - did the deceased heir survive his deceased father? If so, then award the estate. The extent of this is a question for his estate. We do not and cannot pretend to know beforehand the extent of the estate of a man born in 1938 and who died in 2016, aged 81. The deceased heir could as well be having beneficiaries and other creditors, who are not creditors of the deceased herein. 2. To be able to settle the question of the heirs of the late Ributhi Kariuki (deceased), it is important to postpone that question to the estate of the heir who died. This unfortunate settlement of the dispute in that estate has unnecessarily held parties at ransom. Deciding the fate of more than one estate in one file is the major cause of delays in distribution of the estate. What does section 39 of the Succession Act ask the court to do? 3. **Where an intestate has left no surviving spouse or children, the net intestate estate shall devolve upon the kindred of the intestate in the following order of priority-** 1. **father; or if dead** 2. **mother; or if dead** 3. **brothers and sisters, and any child or children of deceased brothers and sisters, in equal shares; or if none** 4. **half-brothers and half-sisters and any child or children of deceased half-brothers and half-sisters, in equal shares; or if none** 5. **the relatives who are in the nearest degree of consanguinity up to and including the sixth degree, in equal shares.** 4. **Failing survival by any of the persons mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (1), the net intestate estate shall devolve upon the State, and be paid into the Consolidated Fund.** 5. Section 40 of the Succession Act provides as follows in regard to polygamous marriages: * 1. **Where an intestate has married more than once under any system of law permitting polygamy, his personal and household effects and the residue of the net intestate estate shall, in the first instance, be divided among the houses according to the number of children in each house, but also adding any wife surviving him as an additional unit to the number of children.** 2. **The distribution of the personal and household effects and the residue of the net intestate estate within each house shall then be in accordance with the rules set out in**[**sections 35 to 38**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/1972/14/eng%402022-12-31#sections%2035%20to%2038)**.** 6. Therefore, to establish consanguinity up to the 6th degree, requires that the question of the survivors be dealt with separately. 7. In a case like the one of the deceased herein who had only children and no surviving spouse, section 38 is succinct as it provides for the way forward as follows: *Where an intestate has left a surviving child or children but no spouse, the net intestate estate shall, subject to the provisions of*[*sections 41 and 42*](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/1972/14/eng%402022-12-31#sections%2041%20and%2042)*, devolve upon the surviving child, if there be only one, or shall be equally divided among the surviving children.* 1. The reason why it is important to determine the question of survivorship, is to know whether a child is entitled to inherit. The only time it is important to determine if the deceased predeceased an heir and whether the heir had children, is when circumstances obtaining in section 41 of the Succession Act apply. Section 43 of the Act, on the other hand provides as follows: Where two or more persons have died in circumstances rendering it uncertain which of them survived the other or others, the deaths shall, for all purposes of this Act, be presumed to have occurred in order of seniority, and accordingly the younger shall be deemed to have survived the elder: Provided that, in the case of spouses who died in those circumstances, the spouses shall be presumed to have died simultaneously. 1. Section 41 of the Succession Act provides as follows: Where reference is made in this Act to the "net intestate estate", or the residue thereof, devolving upon a child or children, the property comprised therein shall be held in trust, in equal shares in the case of more than one child, for all or any of the children of the intestate who attain the age of eighteen years or who, being female, marry under that age, and for all or any of the issue of any child of the intestate who predecease him and who attain that age or so marry, in which case the issue shall take through degrees, in equal shares, the share which their parent would have taken had he not predeceased the intestate. 1. There is no room for determining who among the surviving children is survived by children or a spouse. In this case the late Ributhi Kariuki died on 18.06.2016 while the deceased died on 19.08.1981. He therefore survived the late Kariuki Kibaara (deceased). The estate of the late Ributhi Kariuki is entitled to inherit from the estate of the late Ributhi Kariuki. 2. It was conceded by the first responded in setting aside that the appellant and the heirs in form P&A 5 were all from one house. It was also conceded that when the late Ributhi Kariuki died on 18.06.2016, the appellant was on the suit land. He was only jettisoned when Milka died in December 2016. He was a suspect. He was not however convicted. 3. The house belonging to Milka was not set on fire while the appellants’ house was set on fire. The question one will ask is why will anyone set Milka’s house on fire where a servant was living? Such stories do not make sense. The setting on fire was an eviction directed to this very question. This reminds me of the words of Odunga J, as he then was, in **Kioko Peter v Kisakwa Ndolo Kingóku** [2019] KEHC 11387 (KLR): **….Parties and Counsel ought to give the court’s some credit that** **the courts are not manned by morons who can be easily duped into believing all manner of incredible stories with little or no iota of truth. It is these kinds of allegations that Madan, J (as he then was) had in mind when in N v. N [1991] KLR 685, he expressed himself in the following terms: I wish people would not tell me absurd and unbelievable lies. I feel disappointed if a lie told in court is not reasonable imitation of the truth and is not reasonably intelligently contrived. I wish people who tell lies before me would respect my grey hair even if they consider that my intelligence is not of high order. I wish the witness had not told me the most stupid of his lies, which both disappointed and made me feel intellectually insulted.** 1. Regarding lying witnesses, a South African case of **Matatiele Municipality & Others vs. President of the Republic of South Africa & others** (1) (CCT73/05) (2006) ZACC 2: 2006 (5) BCLR (CC); 2006(5) SA 47 (CC), posited as follows: In my view a person who deliberately either by commission or omission misleads the court and the public that a particular state of affairs exist while knowing very well that that is not the position cannot be said to be open, candid and transparent. Dishonest in my view is an Act which is antithesis to transparency and vice versa… 1. I do not take the evidence tendered by the respondents to have in any way displaced the evidence of the appellant as to his paternity. However, this is not for this matter. I find that the question of eviction is irrelevant to the matter herein and does not deserve even a minute of the court’s time. 2. In a nutshell, I find and hold that the court erred in law in disregarding evidence of Mary Waithiegeni to the extent of liaison with the deceased heir. Secondly, the court erred in failing to find and hold, which I now do, that the estate of the late Ributhi Kariuki who died on 18.06.2016 survived the deceased herein who died on 19.08.1981. 3. I find and hold that the purported eviction letter has nothing to do with the status of the estate of the late Ributhi Kariuki (deceased) as the heir of the estate of the late Kariuki Kibaara (deceased). In effect the appeal is merited and is accordingly allowed. 4. This leaves the issue of costs, which is governed by Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, which provides as follows: (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the costs of and incidental to all suits shall be in the discretion of the court or judge, and the court or judge shall have full power to determine by whom and out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid; and the fact that the court or judge has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of those powers: Provided that the costs of any action, cause or other matter or issue shall follow the event unless the court or judge shall for good reason otherwise order. (2) The court or judge may give interest on costs at any rate not exceeding fourteen per cent per annum, and such interest shall be added to the costs and shall be recoverable as such. 1. Costs are generally discretionary. However, the discretion is not arbitrary. The Court of Appeal in the case of **Farah Awad Gullet v CMC Motors Group Limited** [2018] KECA 158 (KLR) had this to say: **It is our finding that the position in law is that costs are at the discretion of the court seized up of the matter with the usual caveat being that such discretion should be exercised judiciously meaning without caprice or whim and on sound reasoning secondly that a court can only withhold costs either partially or wholly from a successful party for good cause to be shown.** 1. The Supreme Court set forth guiding principles applicable in the exercise of that discretion in the case of [**Rai & 3 others v Rai & 4 others** [2014] KESC 31 (KLR)](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kesc/2014/31/eng%402014-03-04), as follows: 18. It emerges that the award of costs would normally be guided by the principle that “costs follow the event”: the effect being that the party who calls forth the event by instituting suit, will bear the costs if the suit fails; but if this party shows legitimate occasion, by successful suit, then the defendant or respondent will bear the costs. However, the vital factor in setting the preference, is the judiciously-exercised discretion of the Court, accommodating the special circumstances of the case, while being guided by ends of justice. The claims of the public interest will be a relevant factor, in the exercise of such discretion, as will also be the motivations and conduct of the parties, prior-to, during, and subsequent-to the actual process of litigation 22. Although there is eminent good sense in the basic rule of costs - that costs follow the event- it is not an invariable rule and, indeed, the ultimate factor on award or non-award of costs is the judicial discretion. It follows, therefore, that costs do not, in law, constitute an unchanging consequence of legal proceedings - a position well illustrated by the considered opinions of this Court in other cases. The relevant question in this particular matter must be, whether or not the circumstances merit an award of costs to the Applicant. 1. This is a fight between siblings. I shall not add more fuel to the fire. Each party shall bear their own costs. Determination 1. The court makes the following orders: 2. The appeal is allowed. Both the protest and the part of the application for grant that was allowed by the lower court are dismissed. 3. In lieu thereof the grant is confirmed in respect of the second house as follows: 1. The estate of the late Ributhi Kariuki (deceased) - 0.7 acres to be located as possible and including the place the late Ributhi Kariuki (deceased) and his wife, including the burnt house were located. The land to be registered in the name of the estate of the late Ributhi Kariuki (deceased - 0.7 acres (deceased). 2. The estate of the late Gitonga Kariuki (deceased) - 0.7 acres. The land to be registered in the name of the estate of the late Gitonga Kariuki. 3. The estate of the late Nyakimere Kariuki (deceased) - 0.7 acres. The land to be registered in the name of the estate of the late Nyakimere Kariuki (deceased). 4. The heirs of the estate of the late Ributhi Kariuki (deceased) including the appellant are at liberty to carry out succession in that estate. 5. The estate of the late Gitonga Kariuki (deceased) and the estate of the late Nyakimere Kariuki (deceased), are at liberty to carry out succession in that estate. 6. Transmission be concluded within 6 months from today. 7. Lower court file together with this Judgment be transmitted to the lower court for issuance of the Certificate of Confirmation of grant. 8. Each party to bear its own costs. 9. The file is closed. **DELIVERED, DATED** and **SIGNED** at **NYERI** this **21st** day of **July** the year of our Lord **Two Thousand and Twenty-Six**. Judgment delivered through Microsoft Teams Online Platform. **KIZITO MAGARE** **JUDGE** **In the presence of: -** Mr. Kamwenji for the Appellant Mr. Kahiga for the Respondent Court Assistant – Esther