[2020] KEHC 9451 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

APPELLATE SIDE

(Coram: Odunga, J)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 189 OF 2011

NANCY MUSILI.........................................................APPELLANT

VERSUS

JOYCE MBETE KATISI.........................................RESPONDENT

(Being an appeal from the ruling of the Chief Magistrate’s Court of Kenya at Machakos delivered on the 8/11/2011 by the Honourable Thuranira Jaden in Machakos Chief Magistrate’s Civil Suit No. 518 of 2007)

JOYCE MBETE KATISI................................................PLAINTIFF

=VERSUS=

NANCY MUSILI...........................................................DEFENDANT

RULING

1. By a plaint dated 13th June, 2007, the Respondent herein claimed from the Appellant Kshs 900,000/= together with costs and interests.

2. The cause of action according to the plaintiff arose from the fact that by an agreement dated 23rd March, 2007, the Respondent lent to the Appellant Kshs 1,050,000. 00 which was due for repayment on 30th March, 20072nd June, 2009. In part payment of the said sum, the Appellant paid to the Respondent a sum of Kshs 150,000/= leaving a balance of Kshs 900,000. 00.

3. On 18th July, 2007 a default judgement was entered in favour of the Respondent against the Appellant in the sum of Kshs 900,000. 00 together with costs. According to the affidavit of service, the Appellant was served with summons to enter appearance on 21st June, 2007 at Precious Blood Secondary School where the appellant was working as a teacher upon being pointed out by the Respondent. While the Appellant accepted the same, she declined to acknowledge service by signing for the same.

4. By an application dated 7th September, 2007, the Appellant sought an order that the judgement dated 18th July, 2007 and all consequential orders be set aside and that she be granted unconditional leave to enter appearance and file a defence out of time and that her annexed draft defence be deemed as duly filed and served upon payment of the requisite fees. In the same application was a prayer that the process server be summoned for cross-examination on the alleged service on the Appellant. The said application was based on the fact that the Appellant was never served as alleged by the process server. According to the Appellant she had never met the said process server and only became aware of the suit on 29th August, 2007 when she was informed by one Kibe Kimana that her property had been proclaimed and confirming through her advocates that a default judgement had been entered against her on 18th July, 2007. The Appellant also disputed the same process server’s allegation that he served her with Notice of Entry of Judgement on 18th July, 2007. It was the Appellant’s position that he had a defence which discloses triable issues hence she ought not to have been condemned unheard.

5. That application seems to have been dismissed on 1st December, 2009 for non-attendance. By an application dated 27th October, 2010, the Appellant applied for similar orders to the application dated 7th September, 2007 which application suffered similar fate.

6. It was that decision that triggered this appeal. After hearing the appeal, this court on 23rd day of October, 2019 found no merit in the appeal and dismissed the same. The Appellant is aggrieved by the order of dismissal and intends to challenge the same in the Court of Appeal.

7. In the meantime, by a Notice of Motion dated 20th November, 2019, the Appellant/Applicant seeks that pending the hearing and determination of the said appeal, this court stays execution of the lower court’s decree, the subject of this appeal.

8. According to the Appellant she has never been afforded an opportunity of being heard in the matter in which she is being compelled to settle a debt she does not owe.

9. In opposing the application, the Respondent contended that the Applicant has not satisfied the conditions for grant of stay pending appeal. It was however contended that in the event that the court allows the application, the applicant ought to be ordered to deposit the entire decretal sum in a joint interest earning account within 30 days.

10. It is clear that all that this Court did in the judgement against which the Applicant intends to appeal was to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal against the decision by the trial court declining to set aside the interlocutory judgement. There is a long line of authorities where the Court of Appeal has held that where a case is dismissed, the court does not grant any positive order in favour of the Respondents which is capable of execution. See Yagnesh Devani & Others vs. Joseph Ngindari & 3 Others Civil Application No. Nai. 136 of 2004, Mombasa Seaport Duty Free Limited vs. Kenya Ports Authority Civil Application No. Nai. 242 of 2006 and William Wambugu Wahome vs. The Registrar of Trade Unions & Others Civil Application No. Nai. 308 of 2005.

11. In Kwench Limited vs. Nairobi City County & 2 Others Civil Application No. Nai. 106 of 2014,the Court of Appeal on 10th October, 2014 expressed itself as follows:

“On the second limb on whether the success of the intended appeal would be rendered nugatory if the order sought is not granted, it is our view that this aspect has not been established. The reason for this is that, having regard to the impugned ruling before us, it is questionable whether or not there is any order capable of being stayed by this Court, save for costs...In the ruling, the court did not order the applicant to do or abstain from doing any act for which a stay order would be efficacious. Considering that the learned judge only gave an opinion, after which a negative order of dismissal was issued, we find that there was nothing capable of being stayed.”

12. It is therefore my view that unless the Court grants a positive order a party may not invoke the provisions of Order 42 rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

13. It is clear that what the applicant seeks to stay is the decision of the trial court and not the decision of this court. However, the decision which the applicant intends to appeal against to the Court of Appeal is not the decision of the trial court but the decision of this court dismissing his appeal.

14. In The Hon. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o & 2 Others vs. The Minister for Finance & Another Civil Application No. Nai. 273 of 2007,the Court of Appeal expressed itself as follows:

“It is trite law that the Court of Appeal is a creature of statute and can only exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it y statute. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to grant interim reliefs in civil proceedings pending appeal is circumscribed by rule 5(2)(b). It is apparent that under that rule the Court can only grant three different kinds of temporary reliefs pending appeal, namely, a stay of execution, an injunction and a stay of further proceedings. That rule has been construed to the effect that each of the three types of reliefs must relate to the decision of the superior court appealed from. Where the High Court has merely dismissed the suit with costs, any execution can only be in respect of costs since the High Court has not ordered any of the parties to do anything or refrain from doing anything or to pay any sum and therefore there is nothing arising out of the High Court judgement for the Court of Appeal in an application for stay, to enforce or to restrain by injunction. A temporary injunction asked for is extraneous to a stay of execution as it does not relate to what the High Court ordered to be done or not to be done and the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to entertain it...Where the superior court merely upheld the preliminary objection and as a consequence stuck out the application for judicial review with costs, the order striking out the application is not capable of execution against the applicant save for costs. Moreover since the order of stay is neither an order of stay of execution or stay of proceedings nor an order of injunction of the species envisaged by Rule 5(2)(b), the Court has no jurisdiction to grant such an order since the orders sought do not relate to what the superior court decided.”

15. Similarly, in Raymond M Omboga vs. Austine Pyan Maranga Kisii HCCA No. 15 of 2010, Makhandia, J (as he then was) held:

“The court cannot see how it can order stay of the decree that is not the subject of an appeal. Had the aforesaid order been the subject of this appeal then different considerations would have applied. The court would have looked at it alongside the settled principles aforesaid for granting stay of decree. The order dismissing the application is in the nature of a negative order and is incapable of execution save, perhaps, for costs and such order is incapable of stay. Where there is no positive order made in favour of the respondent which is capable of execution, there can be no stay of execution of such an order...The applicant seeks to appeal against the order dismissing his application. This is not an order capable of being stayed because there is nothing that the applicant has lost. The refusal simply means that the applicant stays in the situation he was in before coming to court and therefore the issues of substantial loss that he is likely to suffer and or the appeal being rendered nugatory do not arise... It is trite law that stay of execution pending appeal can only be granted against the order being appealed against. Put differently, an order for stay of execution pending appeal cannot be granted if the intended appeal is not against the order sought to be stayed; yet this is what obtains in this application where the applicant’s appeal is against the order of dismissal of his application, yet the stay sought is against the subordinate court’s judgement or decree.”

16. Where therefore the application for stay is directed to a decision against which the intended appeal is not directed a stay of execution pending that appeal, it has been held, is not available and the application is rendered incompetent on that score. See Muhamed Yakub & another vs. Mrs Badur Nasa Civil Application No. Nai. 285 of 1999.

17. Apart from the foregoing, I have carefully considered the application, the affidavits filed, submissions made as well as authorities cited by counsel for both parties. Order 42 rule 6(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules provides as follows:

“(1) No appeal or second appeal shall operate as a stay of execution or proceeding under a decree or order appealed from except in so far as the court appealed from may order but, the court appealed from may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree or order, and whether the application for such stay shall have been granted or refused by the court appealed from, the court to which such appeal is preferred shall be at liberty, on application being made, to consider such application and to make such order thereon as may to it seem just, and any person aggrieved by an order of stay made by the court from whose decision the appeal is preferred may apply to the appellate court to have such order set aside.

(2) No order for stay of execution shall be made under subrule (1) unless –

(a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and

(b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”

18. In Vishram Ravji Halai vs. Thornton & Turpin Civil Application No. Nai. 15 of 1990 [1990] KLR 365,the Court of Appeal held that whereas the Court of Appeal’s power to grant a stay pending appeal is unfettered, the High Court’s jurisdiction to do so under Order 41 rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules is fettered by three conditions namely, establishment of a sufficient cause, satisfaction of substantial loss and the furnishing of security. Further the application must be made without unreasonable delay. To the foregoing I would add that the stay may only be granted for sufficient cause and that the Court in deciding whether or not to grant the stay and that in light of the overriding objective stipulated in sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, the Court is nolonger limited to the foregoing provisions. The courts are now enjoined to give effect to the overriding objective in the exercise of its powers under the Civil Procedure Act or in the interpretation of any of its provisions. According to section 1A(2) of the Civil Procedure Act “the Court shall, in the exercise of its powers under this Act or the interpretation of any of its provisions, seek to give effect to the overriding objective” while under section 1B some of the aims of the said objective are; the just determination of the proceedings; the efficient disposal of the business of the Court; the efficient use of the available judicial and administrative resources; and the timely disposal of the proceedings, and all other proceedings in the Court, at a cost affordable by the respective parties.

19. In Stephen Boro Gitiha vs. Family Finance Building Society & 3 Others Civil Application No. Nai. 263 of 2009,Nyamu, JA on 20/11/09 held inter alia that the overriding objective overshadows all technicalities, precedents, rules and actions which are in conflict with it and whatever is in conflict with it must give way.

20. The same Judge in Kenya Commercial Bank Limited Vs. Kenya Planters Co-Operative Union Civil Application No. Nai. 85 of 2010 held that:

“where there is a conflict between the statute (overriding objective principle) and a subsidiary legislation (rules of the court) the statute must prevail. Although the rules have their value and shall continue to apply subject to being O2 complaint, the O2 principle is not there to fulfil them but to supplant them where they prove to be a hindrance to the O2 principle or attainment of justice and fairness in the circumstances of each case”.

21. It therefore follows that all the pre-Overriding Objective decisions must now be looked at in the light of the said provisions. This does not necessarily imply that all precedents are ignored but that the same must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to the said objective. What is expected of the Court is to ensure that the aims and intendment of the overriding objective as stipulated in section 1A as read with section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act are attained. It is therefore important that the Court takes into consideration the likely effect of granting the stay on the proceedings in question. In other words, the Court ought to weigh the likely consequences of granting the stay or not doing so and lean towards a determination which is unlikely to lead to an undesirable or absurd outcome. What the Court ought to do when confronted with such circumstances is to consider the twin overriding principles of proportionality and equality of arms which are aimed at placing the parties before the Court on equal footing and see where the scales of justice lie considering the fact that it is the business of the court, so far as possible, to secure that any transitional motions before the Court do not render nugatory the ultimate end of justice. The Court, in exercising its discretion, should therefore always opt for the lower rather than the higher risk of injustice. See Suleiman vs. Amboseli Resort Limited [2004] 2 KLR 589. This was the position of Warsame, J (as he then was) in Samvir Trustee Limited vs. Guardian Bank Limited Nairobi (Milimani) HCCC 795 of 1997 where he expressed himself as hereunder:

“Every party aggrieved with a decision of the High Court has a natural and undoubted right to seek the intervention of the Court of Appeal and the Court should not put unnecessary hindrance to the enjoyment and exercise of that right by the defendant. A stay would be overwhelming hindrance to the exercise of the discretionary powers of the court…The Court in considering whether to grant or refuse an application for stay is empowered to see whether there exist any special circumstances which can sway the discretion of the court in a particular manner. But the yardstick is for the court to balance or weigh the scales of justice by ensuring that an appeal is not rendered nugatory while at the same time ensuring that a successful party is not impeded from the enjoyment of the fruits of his judgement. It is a fundamental factor to bear in mind that, a successful party is prima facieentitled to the fruits of his judgement; hence the consequence of a judgement is that it has defined the rights of a party with definitive conclusion. The respondent is asserting that matured right against the applicant/defendant…For the applicant to obtain a stay of execution, it must satisfy the court that substantial loss would result if no stay is granted. It is not enough to merely put forward mere assertions of substantial loss, there must be empirical or documentary evidence to support such contention. It means the court will not consider assertions of substantial loss on the face value but the court in exercising its discretion would be guided by adequate and proper evidence of substantial loss…Whereas there is no doubt that the defendant is a bank, allegedly with substantial assets, the court is entitled to weigh the present and future circumstances which can destroy the substratum of the litigation…At the stage of the application for stay of execution pending appeal the court must ensure that parties fight it out on a level playing ground and on equal footing in an attempt to safeguard the rights and interests of both sides. The overriding objective of the court is to ensure the execution of one party’s right should not defeat or derogate the right of the other. The Court is therefore empowered to carry out a balancing exercise to ensure justice and fairness thrive within the corridors of the court. Justice requires the court to give an order of stay with certain conditions.”

22. On the first principle, Platt, Ag.JA (as he then was) in Kenya Shell Limited vs. Kibiru [1986] KLR 410, at page 416 expressed himself as follows:

“It is usually a good rule to see if Order XLI Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules can be substantiated. If there is no evidence of substantial loss to the applicant, it would be a rare case when an appeal would be rendered nugatory by some other event. Substantial loss in its various forms, is the corner stone of both jurisdictions for granting a stay. That is what has to be prevented. Therefore without this evidence it is difficult to see why the respondents should be kept out of their money”.

23. On the part of Gachuhi, Ag.JA (as he then was) at 417 held:

“It is not sufficient by merely stating that the sum of Shs 20,380. 00 is a lot of money and the applicant would suffer loss if the money is paid. What sort of loss would this be? In an application of this nature, the applicant should show the damages it would suffer if the order for stay is not granted. By granting a stay would mean that status quo should remain as it were before judgement. What assurance can there be of appeal succeeding? On the other hand, granting the stay would be denying a successful litigant of the fruits of his judgement.”

24. Dealing with the contention that there was no evidence that the 1st Respondent would be able to refund the decretal sum if paid over to the Respondent, Hancox, JA (as he then was) in the above cited case when he expressed himself as follows:

“I therefore think in the circumstances that these comments were unfortunate. Nevertheless, having considered the matter to the full, and with anxious care, there is in my judgement no justification whatsoever for holding that there is a likelihood that the respondents will not repay the decretal sum if the appeal is successful and that the appeal will thereby be rendered nugatory. The first respondent is a man of substance, with a good position and prospects. It is true his house was, in his words, reduced to ashes, but I do not take that against him. Both seem to me to be respectable people and there is no evidence that either will cease to be so, in particular that the first respondent will not remain in his job until pensionable age.”

25. Therefore, the mere fact that the decree holder is not a man of means does not necessarily justify him from benefiting from the fruits of his judgement. On the other hand, the general rule is that the Court ought not to deny a successful litigant of the fruits of his judgement save in exceptional circumstances where to decline to do so may well amount to stifling the right of the unsuccessful party to challenge the decision in the higher Court. In Machira T/A Machira & Co Advocates vs. East African Standard (No 2) [2002] KLR 63 it was held that:

“to be obsessed with the protection of an appellant or intending appellant in total disregard or flitting mention of the so far successful opposite party is to flirt with one party as crocodile tears are shed for the other, contrary to sound principle for the exercise of a judicial discretion. The ordinary principle is that a successful party is entitled to the fruits of his judgement or of any decision of the court giving him success at any stage. That is trite knowledge and is one of the fundamental procedural values which is acknowledged and normally must be put into effect by the way applications for stay of further proceedings or execution, pending appeal are handled. In the application of that ordinary principle, the court must have its sight firmly fixed on upholding the overriding objective of the rules of procedure for handling civil cases in courts, which is to do justice in accordance with the law and to prevent abuse of the process of the court”.

26. Where the allegation is that the respondent will not be able to refund the decretal sum the burden is upon the applicant to prove that the Respondent will not be able to refund to the applicant any sums paid in satisfaction of the decree. See Caneland Ltd. & 2 Others vs. Delphis Bank Ltd. Civil Application No. Nai. 344 of 1999.

27. The law, however appreciates that it may not be possible for the applicant to know the respondent’s financial means. The law is therefore that all an applicant can reasonably be expected to do, is to swear, upon reasonable grounds, that the Respondent will not be in a position to refund the decretal sum if it is paid over to him and the pending appeal was to succeed but is not expected to go into the bank accounts, if any, operated by the Respondent to see if there is any money there. The property a man has is a matter so peculiarly within his knowledge that an applicant may not reasonably be expected to know them. In those circumstances, the legal burden still remains on the applicant, but the evidential burden would then, in those circumstances, where the applicant has reasonable grounds which grounds must be disclosed in the application that the Respondent will not be in a position to refund the decretal sum if the appeal succeeds, have shifted to the Respondent to show that he would be in a position to refund the decretal sum. See Kenya Posts & Telecommunications Corporation vs. Paul Gachanga Ndarua Civil Application No. Nai. 367 of 2001;ABN Amro Bank, N.K. vs. Le Monde Foods Limited Civil Application No. 15 of 2002.

28. What amounts to reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent will not be able to refund the decretal sum is a matter of fact which depends on the facts of a particular case. In my view even if it were shown that the respondent is a man of lesser means, that would not necessarily justify a stay of execution as poverty is not a ground for denial of a person’s right to enjoy the fruits of his success. Suffice to say as was held in Stephen Wanjohi vs. Central Glass Industries Ltd. Nairobi HCCC No. 6726 of 1991, financial ability of a decree holder solely is not a reason for allowing stay; it is enough that the decree holder is not a dishonourable miscreant without any form of income.

29. In an application for stay the Court must consider the overriding objective and balance the interest of the parties to the suit since the court is enjoined place the parties on equal footing. Since the overriding objective aims, inter alia, to facilitate the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of the civil disputes governed by the Act, the balancing of the parties’ interest is paramount in an application for stay of execution pending appeal. However, the law still remains that where the applicant intends to exercise its undoubted right of appeal, and in the event it was eventually to succeed, it should not be faced with a situation in which it would find itself unable to get back its money. Likewise, the respondent who has a decree in his favour should not, if the applicant were eventually to be unsuccessful in its intended appeal, find it difficult or impossible to realize the decree. This is the cornerstone of the requirement for security, and it is trite that once the security provided is adequate its form is a matter of discretion of the Court. See Nduhiu Gitahi vs. Warugongo [1988] KLR 621; 1 KAR 100; [1988-92] 2 KAR 100.

30. Still on the issue of the overriding objective, the principle of proportionality requires the Court to take into account the amount of money involved; the importance of the case; the complexity of the issues; and the financial position of each party. See Machira T/A Machira & Co Advocates vs. East African Standard (No 2) [2002] KLR 63.

31. It is with this in mind that the Court of Appeal in Job Kilach vs. Nation Media Group & 2 Others Civil Application No. Nai. 168 of 2005 while citing Oraro & Rachier Advocates vs. Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited Civil Application No. Nai. 358 of 1999 held that where there is a decree against the applicant but the amount is colossal, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the decretal sum is a very large sum, which by Kenyan standards very few individuals will be in a position to pay without being overly destabilized. Therefore, where there is a large sum of money involved the Court may take that in consideration in an application for stay of execution. Where execution of a money decree is sought to be stayed, in considering whether the applicant will suffer substantial loss, the financial position of the applicant and that of the respondent becomes a central issue. The court cannot shut its eyes where it appears the possibility of the respondent refunding the decretal sum in the event that the applicant is successful in his appeal is doubtful. The court has to balance the interest of the applicant who is seeking to preserve the status quopending the hearing of the appeal so that his appeal is not rendered nugatory and the interest of the respondent who is seeking to enjoy the fruits of his judgement. In other words, the court should not only consider the interest of the applicant but has also to consider, in all fairness, the interest of the respondent who has been denied the fruits of his judgement. See Attorney General vs. Halal Meat Products Ltd Civil Application No. Nai. 270 of 2008; Kenya Shell Ltd vs. Kibiru & Another [1986] KLR 410; Mukuma vs. Abuoga [1988] KLR 645. In the latter case the amount in question was Kshs. 4,000,000. 00. Therefore, if the applicant were to prove that if compelled to settle the decretal sum it may well fold up hence be disabled in pursuing his otherwise merited appeal, the Court may, while also taking into account the prospects of the Respondent being able to be paid if the appeal were to fail, grant the stay sought.

32. With respect to the issue whether or not the applicant stands to suffer substantial loss in Job Kilach vs. Nation Media Group & 2 Others Civil Application No. Nai. 168 of 2005 the Court of Appeal citing Oraro & Rachier Advocates vs. Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited Civil Application No. Nai. 358 of 1999 held that where there is a decree against the applicant but the amount is colossal, it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the decretal sum is a very large sum, which by Kenyan standards very few individuals will be in a position to pay without being overly destabilized. In the said case the amount in question was Kshs. 4,000,000. 00. However, in this case it is not contended that the applicant is not in a position to pay the said sum or that if made to pay the same it is likely to find itself in some financial embarrassment.

33. The law however is not that in monetary decrees a stay of execution is not to be granted. What the Court stated in Kenya Shell Case was that normally in such decrees the appeal is unlikely to be rendered nugatory. However, Order 42 rule 6 recognises that there may exist sufficient cause even in such decrees. Where execution of a money decree is sought to be stayed, in considering whether the applicant will suffer substantial loss, the financial position of the applicant and that of the respondent becomes a crucial issue. The court cannot shut its eyes where it appears the possibility of the respondent refunding the decretal sum in the event that the applicant is successful in his appeal is doubtful. The court has to balance the interest of the applicant who is seeking to preserve the status quopending the hearing of the appeal to ensure that his appeal is not rendered nugatory and the interest of the respondent who is seeking to enjoy the fruits of his judgement. In other words, the court should not only consider the interest of the applicant but has also to consider, in all fairness, the interest of the respondent who has been denied the fruits of his judgement. SeeAttorney General vs. Halal Meat Products Ltd Civil Application No. Nai. 270 of 2008; Kenya Shell Ltd vs. Kibiru & Another(supra); Mukuma vs. Abuoga [1988] KLR 645.

34. It is not sufficient to merely state that the decretal sum is a lot of money and the applicant would suffer loss if the money is paid. In an application of this nature, the applicant should show the damage it would suffer if the order for stay is not granted since by granting stay would mean that the status quowould remain as it were before the judgement and that would be denying a successful litigant of the fruits of his judgement which should not be the case if the applicant has not given to the court sufficient cause to enable it to exercise its discretion in granting the order of stay. See Kenya Shell Ltd vs. Benjamin Karuga Kibiru and Another (supra).

35. Where the allegation is that the respondent will not be able to refund the decretal sum the burden is upon the applicant to prove that the Respondent will not be able to refund to the defendants any sums paid in satisfaction of the decree. See Caneland Ltd. & 2 Others vs. Delphis Bank Ltd. Civil Application No. Nai. 344 of 1999.

36. The law, however appreciates that it may not be possible for the applicant to know the respondent’s financial means. The law is therefore that all an applicant can reasonably be expected to do, is to swear, upon reasonable grounds, that the Respondent will not be in a position to refund the decretal sum if it is paid over to him and the pending appeal was to succeed but is not expected to go into the bank accounts, if any, operated by the Respondent to see if there is any money there. The property a man has is a matter so peculiarly within his knowledge that an applicant may not reasonably be expected to be aware of. In those circumstances, the legal burden still remains on the applicant, but the evidential burden would then have shifted to the Respondent to show that he would be in a position to refund the decretal sum. See Kenya Posts & Telecommunications Corporation vs. Paul Gachanga Ndarua Civil Application No. Nai. 367 of 2001;ABN Amro Bank, N.K. vs. Le Monde Foods Limited Civil Application No. 15 of 2002.

37. What amounts to reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent will not be able to refund the decretal sum is a matter of fact which depends on the facts of a particular case.

38. In this case, apart from the bare averment by the Applicant that she cannot afford to pay the sum in question, there is no other material disclosed by the Applicant that would satisfy the conditions prescribed for grant of stay. Even if the stay were to be granted the same would be granted upon furnishing of security and the applicant herein has not stated that she is prepared to furnish the same.

39. In the premises the applicant has failed to satisfy the conditions to grant of stay sought herein. The application, which is unmerited fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.

40. It is so ordered.

Read, signed and delivered in open Court at Machakos this 11th day of March, 2020

G V ODUNGA

JUDGE

Delivered the presence of:

Mr Nzei for Mr Nthiwa for the Respondent

Miss Owano for Mr Namada for the Appellant

CA Geoffrey