https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3480

Narok County Government v Kemboy Law Advocates (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E009 of 2023) [2026] KEELC 3480 (KLR) (14 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3480 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Narok Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E009 of 2023 LN Gacheru, J May 14, 2026 Between Narok County Government Client and Kemboy Law Advocates Advocate Ruling 1.The matter for determination herein is the Client/Applicant’s Chamber Summons Reference against the decision of the Taxing Officer arising out of the taxation of an Advocate Client Bill of Costs. The Client/Applicant, Narok County Government, moved this Court by way of a Chamber Summons Application dated 12th May 2025, pursuant to Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, seeking to set aside the Ruling delivered on 24th April 2025, by the Taxing Officer, Hon. Daniel Ngayo(SRM), wherein the Advocate/Respondent’s Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, was taxed at Kshs. 2,968,278/00. The Client/ Applicant further seeks that the said Bill of Costs, be re-taxed before a different taxing officer. 2.The dispute arises from legal services rendered by the Advocate/Respondent, Kemboy Law Advocates, to the Client/Applicant in Narok ELC Case No. 168 of 2018, wherein the Advocate/ Respondent represented the Client/Applicant in a land dispute. Following the cessation of the Advocate–Client relationship, the Advocate/ Respondent filed the impugned Bill of Costs which, after contestation, was taxed as aforesaid. 3.Aggrieved by the taxation, the Client/Applicant filed the present Reference contending that the Taxing Officer erred in law and principle, particularly in the award of instruction fees, the taxation of various items, and the application of a 50% increase on the taxed costs. 4.The Reference is opposed by the Advocate/Respondent, who not only defends the taxation as proper and lawful, but also raises a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2025, contending that the Reference is incompetent for having been filed out of time, and without leave of the Court, contrary to Paragraph 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. 5.The Court is therefore called upon to determine both the competency of the Reference and, if necessary the merits of the challenge to the taxation. The Chamber Summons Application is dated 12th May 2025, filed by the Client/Applicant pursuant to paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order 2014, seeking to challenge the taxation of an Advocate Client Bill of Costs. The Client’s application principally seeks orders to set aside the Ruling and taxation delivered on 24th April 2025, by the Taxing Officer, Hon. Daniel Ngayo, which assessed the Bill of Costs at Kshs. 2,968,278/=, and to have the bill re-taxed, afresh before a different taxing officer. The Applicant also seeks costs of the reference. 6.The Client/Application is premised on the grounds that although the Advocate/Respondent filed an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, which the Client/ Applicant contested, the Taxing Officer erred in both law and fact in his Ruling. Specifically, the Client/ Applicant contends that the Taxing Officer misapplied Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, leading to an excessive and unjustified award. It is argued that the instruction fee of Kshs. 1,500,000 /=, was inordinately high given that the value of the subject matter was unascertainable and the matter itself was neither complex nor novel, and required minimal time and effort. 7.Further, the Client/Applicant faults the Taxing Officer for allowing numerous items in the Bill of Costs—particularly those relating to drawing, perusals, photocopying, attendances, and services—which are either not provided for under Schedule 7 or were improperly taxed. 8.The Client/Applicant also asserts that the Taxing Officer unlawfully increased the bill by 50% and failed to adhere to prescribed limits, such as the standard fee for mentions and Rulings. It is contended that these errors resulted in a manifestly excessive award and demonstrate a disregard of the applicable legal principles, including the duty to safeguard public funds. 9.The Reference is supported vide the Supporting Affidavit sworn by John Mayiani Tuya, the County Secretary of Narok County Government, who reiterated and supports the grounds set out in the face of the Application. He deposes that he is duly authorized to swear the Affidavit, and that the facts are within his knowledge or based on information from counsel on record. He confirms that the Bill of Costs was contested and that the Taxing Officer delivered the impugned Ruling on 24th April 2025. 10.He further avers that the Client/ Applicant, being dissatisfied with the decision, promptly sought reasons for the taxation and obtained the Ruling through the Judiciary e-filing system. He maintains, that he learnt through the advice of counsel, that the Taxing Officer misapplied Schedule 7, awarded excessive sums, and improperly allowed items not sanctioned under the law. He emphasizes that the matter was straightforward, and did not justify the high instruction fees awarded. 11.The deponent highlighted the specific categories of items improperly allowed, including drawing fees, perusals, photocopying, registry attendances, and services, and reiterates that the statutory fee for mentions and rulings was disregarded. He contends that the cumulative effect of these errors rendered the taxation unlawful, and prejudicial to the Client/Applicant, particularly given the public nature of the funds involved. 12.In conclusion, both the application and the Supporting Affidavit assert that the Taxing Officer’s decision was fundamentally flawed, unjust, and contrary to established legal principles, thereby necessitating the intervention of the Court to set aside the taxation and order a re-taxation before a different taxing officer in the interests of justice. 13.The Reference is opposed by the Advocate/Respondent, who filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2025, and Replying Affidavit in opposition. The Preliminary Objection raises pure points of law, and seeks to have the Application/Reference dismissed at the outset, without proceeding to substantive hearing. 14.The Advocate/Respondent contends that the Reference/Application herein is incompetent for having been filed outside the strict timelines prescribed under Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. On this basis, the Advocate/ Respondent argued that the Application is bad in law, and constitutes an abuse of the court process. 15.Consequently, the Advocate/Respondent asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain or determine the Application/Reference. The Advocate/Respondent invites the Court to uphold the Preliminary Objection, and dismiss the Chamber Summons Reference/ Application in limine with costs. 16.Further the Advocate/Applicant filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by Julius K. Kemboy, Senior Partner at Kemboy Law Advocates, in opposition to the Client/Applicant’s Chamber Summons Reference Application, and deposed that he had conduct of the underlying matter being Narok ELC Case No. 168 of 2018, on behalf of the Client/Applicant, and is therefore competent to respond to the issues raised. 17.At the outset, the deponent characterizes the Reference/Application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process, and asserted that it is an attempt by the Client/Applicant to evade its obligation to pay legal fees lawfully due. He acknowledges that the application seeks to set aside the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, which had been taxed at KShs. 2,968,278/=, and to have the said Bill re-taxed before a different taxing officer, and to be awarded costs. 18.In response to the Client/Applicant’s core complaint regarding the alleged misapplication of Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, and the excessiveness of the award, the deponent maintains that the Taxing Officer properly exercised his discretion. He avers that the instruction fee of KShs. 1,500,000/=, was justified, given the complexity, nature, and duration of the matter, which spanned approximately four years, and involved substantial legal work, care, and diligence. 19.He further averred that where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable from the pleadings, the Taxing Officer is entitled to exercise discretion in assessing instruction fees, taking into account relevant factors such as the importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, and the conduct of the proceedings. 20.The deponent relied on several judicial authority, including Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (2024), to support the proposition that a taxing officer has wide discretion in such circumstances. He also emphasized that the Advocates Remuneration Order prescribes minimum—not maximum—fees, and therefore higher awards may be justified depending on the circumstances of the case. 21.Regarding the various items objected to by the Client/Applicant including drawing, perusals, photocopying, attendances, and services, the deponent asserts that these were properly taxed. He contends that Schedule 7 expressly allows for such items, and that the Taxing Officer acted within the law. He further noted that the Advocate/Respondent provided documentary support for all items claimed, and that the conduct of the case involved significant logistical effort, including travel between Nairobi and Narok. 22.On the issue of the 50% increase of the taxed costs, the deponent argues that this was lawful and mandatory under Part B of Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. He maintained that such an increment applies to Advocate–Client Bills of Costs, and does not depend on prior taxation of a Party-and-Party Bill of Costs. He further contended that the Client/Applicant is improperly raising this issue for the first time in this Reference, yet it was not canvassed before the Taxing Officer. 23.The deponent supports this position with case law, including Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority Pension Scheme & Others (2017), Dennis K.N. Magare v Armajit Singh Gahir & Others (2021), and National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates (2021), all of which affirm that Advocate–Client Bill of Costs are properly increased by 50% after taxation. He also cited the case of Havi & Co Advocates v Purma Holdings Limited (2024) eKLR, to demonstrate that such increments are justified, particularly in complex matters. 24.Finally, the deponent argues that this Court, in exercising its Reference jurisdiction, should not entertain issues that were not raised before the Taxing Officer. He urges the Court to uphold the Taxing Officer’s Ruling in its entirety, and to dismiss the Client/Applicant’s Application with costs, maintaining that the taxation was proper, lawful, and consistent with established legal principles. 25.The Reference was canvassed by way of written submissions, wherein the Client/Applicant filed its written submissions through Maina Ngaruiya Advocates, and urged the court to allow the Reference. The Advocate/Respondent filed its submissions through Kemboy Law Advocates, and urged the Court to allow its Preliminary Objection, and dismiss the instant Reference with costs. 26.The Client/Applicant’s written submissions are directed at two principal issues: First, resisting the Advocate’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2025; and secondly, supporting the Chamber Summons Reference Application dated 12th May 2025, seeking to set aside the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. 27.In opposing the Preliminary Objection, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Reference was properly and timeously filed within the framework of Paragraph 11(1) and (2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014. It was its further submissions that following the delivery of the taxation Ruling on 24th April 2025, the Client/ Applicant issued a Notice of Objection on 30th April 2025—well within the statutory fourteen-day period—and simultaneously sought reasons from the Taxing Officer. 28.The Client/ Applicant further argued that any delay in furnishing certified reasons cannot be attributed to it, and that upon accessing the Ruling through the Judiciary’s electronic portal, it proceeded to file the Reference on 12th May 2025, in compliance with the applicable procedure. On this basis, the Applicant argued that the Preliminary Objection is misplaced, and intended to defeat substantive justice. 29.Reliance was placed in the case of D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Limited v Joseph Muchina & Another (1980) eKLR, where Madan JA underscored that courts ought to sustain proceedings, rather than summarily terminate them, unless they are plainly untenable. The Client/ Applicant maintained that its Reference raises substantive legal issues deserving adjudication on merit. 30.Turning to the substance of the Reference, the Client/Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer erred both in law and in principle in the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs, thereby inviting the Court’s intervention. The governing principles on interference with taxation were set out in the case of Bank of Uganda v Sudhir Ruparalia & Another [2023] UGSC 12, where the Court held that a court may interfere where the taxing officer applies a wrong principle, reaches a manifestly excessive or low award, or occasions injustice. 31.Similarly, reliance was placed in the case of Keziah Gathoni Supeyo v Yano t/a Yano & Co. Advocates [2019] eKLR, which re-states the principles in Premchand Raichand Ltd v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd [1972] EA 162, emphasizing that costs must reflect fair reimbursement, remain reasonable, and not impede access to justice, and that discretion must be exercised judiciously. 32.With respect to instruction fees, the Client/Applicant challenges the award of KShs. 1,500,000/=, as excessive and unsupported by the circumstances of the case, particularly given that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable. The Client/Applicant invoked the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, which provides that where such value cannot be discerned from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement, the taxing officer must exercise discretion judiciously, guided by factors such as the nature and importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, and the overall conduct of the proceedings. 33.The Client/Applicant further relied on the case of Kyalo Mbobu t/a Kyalo & Associates Advocates v Jacob Juma [2015] eKLR and Ramesh Naran Patel v Attorney General & Another [2012] eKLR, for the proposition that any increase in instruction fees must be accompanied by clear and specific reasons. 34.Additionally, the client/Applicant invoked the holding in the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, where the Court emphasized that factors such as complexity, novelty, time expended, and volume of documentation must not only be cited, but demonstrably established. The Client/Applicant submitted that in the present case, the Taxing Officer merely made generalized references to these considerations without concrete justification, thereby rendering the award arbitrary and excessive. 35.On the question of the 50% increment, the Client/Applicant argued that the Taxing Officer misdirected himself in law by increasing the taxed costs by half. Further, that such an increment is only applicable where Party-and-Party costs have first been ascertained, and not in the direct taxation of an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. 36.In support of this position, the Client/Applicant cited the case of Nyangito & Co. Advocates v Doinyo Lessos Creameries Ltd [2014] eKLR, where the Court held that the 50% uplift applies after Party-and-Party costs have been determined. A similar position was adopted in the case of Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates v County Government of Narok (Misc. Application E608 of 2019) eKLR, where the Court found it erroneous to apply the 50% increment directly in an Advocate–Client taxation without prior Party-and-Party assessment. Therefore, the Client/ Applicant argued that the increase applied by the Taxing Officer was legally untenable. 37.Further, the Client/ Applicant impugned the taxation of various other items in the Bill of Costs, arguing that the Taxing Officer erred in finding that all items were properly drawn to scale. It also submitted that several items were either not provided for under Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, or were taxed in excess of the prescribed limits. 38.Specifically, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the charges relating to perusals, attendances, drawing, copying, and registry services were either unsupported by the scale or exceeded the allowable caps. In this regard, the Client/Applicant argued that the Taxing Officer failed to adhere to the statutory framework, resulting in inflated and unjustified awards. 39.In conclusion, the Client/Applicant maintained that the Preliminary Objection is devoid of merit and should be dismissed, and that the Reference has demonstrated clear errors of law and principle in the taxation process. Further, the Client/ Applicant urged the Court intervenes by setting aside, the impugned taxation and either re-assesses the Bill of Costs, or remits it for fresh taxation before a different Taxing Officer, in order to achieve a fair and just outcome. 40.The Advocate/Respondent’s filed its written submissions through Kemboy Law Advocates, wherein they set out two limbs: first, in opposition to the Client’s Chamber Summons Reference Application dated 12th May 2025; and secondly, in support of a Notice of Preliminary Objection, challenging the competence of that Reference. 41.In opposing the Reference, the Advocate/Respondent submitted that the Taxing Officer properly exercised his discretion in taxing the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, at Kshs. 2,968,278/00, and that no error of principle has been demonstrated to warrant interference by the Court. 42.For the above submissions, reliance was placed on the well-settled principle that a Judge will not interfere with a taxation unless it is shown that the taxing officer erred in principle or exercised discretion injudiciously. In this regard, the Advocate/Respondent cited the following cases; Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Another [1972] EA 162, First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 64, Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, and the Supreme Court decision in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), all of which affirm the limited scope of interference with taxation. Further reliance was placed in the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol [2000] UGSC 3, wherein it emphasized that matters of quantum fall within the special competence of the taxing officer. 43.The Advocate/Respondent also submitted that the taxing officer correctly applied the principles under the Advocates Remuneration Order, particularly Schedule 7, and took into account all relevant factors including the nature and importance of the matter, the time spent, the labour involved, and the interests of the parties. 44.For the above submissions, the Advocate/ Respondent cited the case of Lucy Waithera & 2 Others v Edwin Njagi t/a E.K. Njagi & Co. Advocates [2017] eKLR and Republic v Minister for Agriculture ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, which emphasize that taxation is a discretionary and evaluative exercise, not a mathematical one, and will only be disturbed where irrelevant factors are considered or relevant ones ignored. 45.On instruction fees, the Advocate/ Respondent argued that the Client/Applicant failed to demonstrate any misdirection by the taxing officer. Further, that where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable from the pleadings, the taxing officer is entitled to exercise discretion. In support, reliance was placed on the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] eKLR, which held that the value of the subject matter may be derived from pleadings, judgment, or settlement, failing which the taxing officer may assess fees based on the circumstances of the case. 46.This position was reinforced by the Supreme Court in the case of Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Co. Advocates [2024] KESC 44 (KLR). The Advocate/ Respondent further cited the case of Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR and Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission v Chief Justice of Kenya & Another [2014] eKLR, to emphasize that instruction fees are determined through a balancing of multiple factors including complexity, time, and responsibility. 47.The Advocate/Respondent maintained that the impugned matter involved complex land disputes, multiple parties, and extended proceedings over several years, thereby justifying the instruction fee awarded. Further, that other contested items—relating to perusal, attendances, service, and disbursements—were properly taxed in accordance with Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order and supported by documentary evidence. 48.On the issue of the 50% increase, the Advocate/ Respondent submitted that the taxing officer correctly applied Part B of Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, which mandates a 50% increase in Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. Authorities cited include Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority Pension Scheme & 8 Others [2017] eKLR, Dennis KN Magare & Another v Armajit Singh Gahir & 5 Others [2021] eKLR, National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR, and Havi & Company Advocates v Purma Holdings Ltd & 2 Others [2024] KEHC 3690 (KLR), all of which affirm that such increase is mandatory once an Advocate–Client Bill OF Costs is taxed. The Advocate/ Respondent further argued that the issue of the 50% increment was not raised before the taxing officer, and cannot be introduced for the first time on a Reference. Reliance was placed in the case of Showcase Property Ltd v Mugambi & Co. Advocates [2020] eKLR and Ahmednasir Abdikadir & Co. Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Ltd [2006] 1 EA 5. 49.Turning to the Preliminary Objection, the Advocate/ Respondent submitted that the instant Reference is incompetent for having been filed out of time and without leave, contrary to Paragraph 11(2) and (4) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. Further, that the timelines set therein are mandatory and jurisdictional, and reliance was sought in the case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, which defines a Preliminary Objection as a pure point of law capable of disposing of a matter. 50.Additional support was drawn from the case of Dismas Wambola v Cabinet Secretary, Treasury & 5 Others [2017] eKLR and Quick Enterprises Ltd v Kenya Railways Corporation (Kisumu HCCC No. 22 of 1999) on the nature of preliminary objections. 51.On the specific issue of timelines, the Advocate/Respondent cited the case of Aoro v Were [2022] KEHC 14628 (KLR), Muturi Mwangi & Associates v Mwangi [2024] KEELC 1604 (KLR), and Multiline Motors (Kenya) Ltd v Migori County Government (Civil Case No. 9 of 2016), all of which affirm that a Reference must be filed within fourteen days of receiving reasons from the taxing officer, failing which it is incompetent unless leave is obtained. The Advocate/Respondent also relied on the case of Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR, for the proposition that where a statute provides a specific procedure, it must be strictly followed. 52.Applying these principles, the Advocate/Respondent submitted that the Ruling on taxation was delivered on 24th April 2025, and made available electronically the same day; that the Client filed the Reference on 12th May 2025, outside the prescribed fourteen-day period; and that no leave was sought to extend time. Consequently, the Reference is fatally defective and an abuse of the court process. Further reliance was placed in the case of Evans Thiga Gaturu v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd [2012] eKLR and Muri Mwaniki & Wamiti Advocates v African Banking Corporation Ltd [2020] eKLR, where similar out-of-time References were struck out. 53.In conclusion, the Advocate/Respondent urged the Court to find and hold that the taxing officer acted properly and within the law; that no error of principle has been demonstrated, and that the Reference is both unmeritorious and incompetent. It further urged the Court to dismiss the instant Reference with costs, and to allow its Preliminary Objection. 54.Having considered the pleadings herein, the rival written submissions by the parties, and the cited authorities, the court finds the following issues arise for determination:i.Whether the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2025 is merited.ii.Whether the Client/Applicant’s Reference dated 12th May 2025 is competent under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order.iii.If the Reference is competent, whether the Taxing Officer erred in law and/or principle in taxing the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023.iv.Whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders sought. 55.On whether the Preliminary Objection is merited, the court finds that the law on the issue of preliminary objections is well settled. In the classicus case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, the Court held that a preliminary objection consists of a pure point of law, which, if argued successfully, may dispose of the suit. Similarly, in the case of Dismas Wambola v Cabinet Secretary, Treasury & 5 Others [2017] eKLR, it was emphasized that such an Objection must not involve contested facts. 56.The Advocate/Respondent’s Preliminary Objection is premised on the contention that the Reference was filed outside the timelines prescribed under Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order and without leave of the Court. 57.Paragraph 11(2) provides that once reasons are supplied by the Taxing Officer, the Objector must file a Reference within fourteen (14) days, such receipt. The importance of adherence to this procedure was underscored in the case of Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR, where the Court held that where a statute provides a clear procedure, it must be strictly followed. 58.The Court record herein record shows that the Ruling on taxation was delivered on 24th April 2025. The client/ Applicant issued a Notice of Objection on 30th April 2025, and subsequently filed the Reference on 12th May 2025. The Client/ Applicant contended that it acted within time upon accessing the Ruling of the Taxing master, through the Judiciary portal. 59.In the case of Aoro v Were [2022] KEHC 14628 (KLR), the Court clarified that time begins to run once reasons are available, and that a ruling containing reasons may suffice. Further, in the case of Muturi Mwangi & Associates v Mwangi [2024] KEELC 1604 (KLR), the court reiterated that the timelines under Paragraph 11 are mandatory, unless extended by the Court. 60.In the instant Reference, there is no evidence that the Client/ Applicant sought enlargement of time under Paragraph 11(4). However, the Court must also consider whether the Ruling itself contained sufficient reasons and whether the Client/Applicant acted within a reasonable timeframe. 61.Guided by the principle in D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Ltd v Joseph Muchina & Another [1980] eKLR, that courts should sustain rather than terminate proceedings on technicalities, this court is persuaded that the Reference was filed within a reasonable time after the Client/ Applicant accessed the Ruling of the taxing master, and consequently, it will not strike out purely the Reference merely on procedural grounds. 62.Accordingly, the Preliminary Objection is not merited and is hereby dismissed. 63.Whether the Taxing Officer erred in law and principle, the court has taken note of the principles governing interference with taxation are well settled. In the case of Premchand Raichand Ltd v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd [1972] EA 162, the Court held that costs should not be so high so as to deny access to justice, and that a taxing officer must exercise discretion judiciously. 64.Similarly, in the case of First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 64, it was held that a judge will not only interfere with taxation where there is an error of principle. Further, in the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol [2000] UGSC 3, the court emphasized that questions of quantum are primarily within the domain of the taxing officer. 65.On Instruction Fees, the Client/Applicant challenged the instruction fee of Kshs. 1,500,000/=, and alleged that it was excessive, and should be set aside. The court will borrow from the holding in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, where the Court held that; where the value of the subject matter cannot be ascertained, the taxing officer is entitled to exercise discretion, taking into account the nature, importance, and circumstances of the case. The same position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates [2024] KESC 44 (KLR). 66.From the Court record, the Taxing Officer considered the nature of the dispute, its duration, and the work involved, and there is no evidence that irrelevant factors were considered or relevant ones ignored. As was stated in the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, taxation is not a mathematical exercise, but an exercise of discretion based on experience. 67.From the above analysis this court finds no basis to interfering with the instruction fee, as awarded by the taxing master. 68.On Taxation of other items, the Applicant contended and submitted that several items were either not provided for under Schedule 7 or were excessive. However, in the case of Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR, the Court held that a taxing officer must consider factors such as labour, time, and complexity. 69.The Advocate/ Respondent demonstrated that the items taxed related to perusals, attendances, and disbursements, all of which are recognized under the Advocates Remuneration Order, and thus this court finds and holds that no specific error of principle has been demonstrated. 70.On the 50% increment, the applicable law is Part B of Schedule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. In the case of Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority Pension Scheme & 8 Others [2017] eKLR, the Court held that Advocate–Client Bill of Costs are increased by 50% after taxation. This position was affirmed in the case of National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR and Dennis KN Magare v Armajit Singh Gahir & Others [2021] eKLR. 71.From the above analysis and the borrowing from the various holdings of the superior Courts, this Court is persuaded that the Taxing Officer correctly applied the law in increasing the taxed costs by 50%. 72.Whether the Court should interfere with the taxation, the court finds that the threshold for interference was summarized in the case of Keziah Gathoni Supeyo v Yano t/a Yano & Co. Advocates [2019] eKLR, where the Court reiterated that interference of taxing master’s discretion is only justified where there is an error of principle or manifest excess. This finds and holds that no such error has been demonstrated in this case. The Client / Applicant’s dissatisfaction appears to be largely with the quantum, which alone is not a sufficient ground for interference. 73.In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court finds and holds as follows:i.The Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20th May 2025, is without merit and is hereby dismissed.ii.The Client/Applicant’s Chamber Summons Reference dated 12th May 2025, fails on the merit.iii.The taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, at Kshs. 2,968,278/00 is consequently upheld.iv.The instant Reference is dismissed with costs to the Advocate/Respondent.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAROK, THIS 14TH DAY OF MAY 2026.L. GACHERU.JUDGEDelivered online in the presence of.Elijah Meyoki… Court Assistant.Ms. Lyona h/b for Mr. Maina Ngaruiya for Client/ Applicant.Mr. Otieno h/b for Mr. Kere for Advocate/ Respondent.L. GACHERUJUDGE14/ 05/ 2026.