https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3449

Narok County Government v Kemboy Law Advocates (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E010 of 2023) [2026] KEELC 3449 (KLR) (14 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3449 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Narok Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E010 of 2023 LN Gacheru, J May 14, 2026 Between Narok County Government Client and Kemboy Law Advocates Advocate Ruling 1.This is a Reference brought by the Client/Applicant herein, Narok County Government, under Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, which challenges the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs by the Advocate/ Respondent, Kemboy Law Advocates. The impugned taxation Ruling was delivered on 9th May 2025, by the Taxing master, Hon. Daniel Ngayo, who assessed the Bill of Costs at Kshs. 14,511,588/=, with instruction fees of Kshs. 8,000,000/=. 2.The said taxation arose from legal services rendered in Narok Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 2018, wherein the Advocate/ Respondent represented the Client/Applicant in a land-related constitutional dispute. Dissatisfied with the said taxation Ruling, the Client/ Applicant seeks to set aside the entire ruling and have the Bill of Costs re-taxed before a different taxing officer. 3.The jurisdiction of this Court in a Reference of this nature is well settled. Under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, the Court may interfere with a taxation where it is demonstrated that the taxing officer erred in principle or that the award is manifestly excessive or inadequate. 4.This position has been consistently affirmed in various decided cases such as Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others [1972] EA 162 and First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 64. 5.This Chamber Summons Application is dated 15th May 2025, brought by the Client/Applicant under Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, and it challenged the decision of the Taxing Officer, which was delivered on 9th May 2025. 6.In said Ruling, the Advocate/Respondent’s Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023 was taxed at Kshs. 14,511,588/=, with instruction fees being assessed at Kshs. 8,000,000/=. The Client/Applicant seeks to have the said Ruling set aside in its entirety and the Bill of Costs taxed afresh before a different taxing officer. The Client/Applicant also prays for costs of the Reference to be awarded to it. 7.The application is grounded on the contention that the Taxing Officer erred both in law and in principle in the manner in which he exercised his discretion. The Client/ Applicant argues that the provisions of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order were misapplied, resulting in an award that is manifestly excessive and unjustified in the circumstances. 8.In particular, the Client/ Applicant challenges the instruction fees awarded, asserting that the underlying matter was neither complex nor novel so as to warrant such a high figure. It is further contended that several items in the Bill of Costs, including those relating to service and attendances, were improperly allowed at rates exceeding those prescribed under the Advocates Remuneration Order. 9.Further, the Client/ Applicant faults the Taxing Officer for increasing the taxed costs by 50%, arguing that such an increment was unwarranted and contrary to the law. Overall, the Client/ Applicant maintains that the taxation failed to adhere to established principles, and risks occasioning injustice, particularly given the public nature of the funds involved. 10.In response, the Advocate/Respondent, through the Replying Affidavit sworn on 31st October 2025, by Julius K. Kemboy, opposes the instant application, and urges the Court to uphold the taxation Ruling as delivered by the taxing master. The Advocate/ Respondent characterizes the Reference as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process, contending that it is merely an attempt by the Client/ Applicant to evade its contractual obligation to pay legal fees. 11.The Advocate/ Respondent defends the instruction fees awarded, asserting that the Taxing Officer properly exercised his discretion after considering all relevant factors, including the complexity of the matter, the time and labour expended, the importance of the issues involved, and the interests of the parties. Further, that the underlying matter, namely Narok Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 2018, was complex and protracted, having been handled over a period of approximately five years, and therefore justified the instruction fees awarded. 12.The Advocate/ Respondent further avers that the Taxing Officer correctly applied Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, particularly in circumstances where the value of the subject matter was not readily ascertainable from the pleadings, thereby necessitating the exercise of discretion. That the Objections raised by the Client/ Applicant regarding service and attendance charges are rebutted, with the Advocate/Respondent explaining that the amounts allowed were consistent with the provisions of the Advocates Remuneration Order, especially when factors such as distance and the nature of physical court attendances are taken into account. 13.With regard to the 50% increase in the taxed costs, the Advocate/ Respondent maintains that such an increment is expressly provided for under Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order in respect of Advocate–Client Bills of Costs. Further, that this issue was not raised before the Taxing Officer and cannot properly be introduced at the Reference stage. The Advocate/ Respondent emphasizes that all items in the Bill of Costs were duly supported by documentation and were taxed on merit. 14.In conclusion, the Advocates/ Respondent asserts that no error of principle or misdirection has been demonstrated to warrant interference with the Taxing Officer’s decision. The Court is therefore urged to dismiss the instant Reference with costs, and uphold the taxation as carried out. 15.The Reference was canvassed by way of written submissions, wherein the Client/ Applicant filed its submissions through Maina Ngaruiya Advocates & Co Advocates, whereas the Advocate/ Respondent filed its submissions through Kemboy Law Advocates. 16.The Client/Applicant’s written submissions in support of the Chamber Summons Application are dated 15th May 2025, wherein the Client/ Applicant challenges the taxation of the Advocate/Respondent’s Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. The Client/ Applicant framed the central issue for determination as; whether the Taxing Officer erred in law and in principle in taxing the Bill of Costs. 17.The Client/ Applicant sets out the legal framework governing References from taxation under Paragraph 11(1) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, and emphasizes that this Court has jurisdiction to interfere where the Taxing Officer discretion, where he has acted on a wrong principle or where the award is manifestly excessive. 18.In support of this position, reliance was placed in the case of Bank of Uganda v Sudhir Ruparelia & Another (Taxation Reference No. 1 of 2023) [2023] UGSC 12, where the Supreme Court of Uganda reiterated that a Judge will only interfere with taxation where there is an error of principle or where the award is so high or so low as to amount to an injustice. 19.The Client/Applicant further relied on the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol Civil Application No. 23 of 1999, where the court outlined the limited circumstances under which a court may interfere with a taxing officer’s discretion. 20.Further reliance was placed on the case of Keziah Gathoni Supeyo v Yano t/a Yano & Co. Advocates [2019] eKLR, which restates the classic principles in Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others No. 3 [1972] EA 162. These principles include; costs should fairly compensate a successful party, should not be so high as to hinder access to justice, and must be awarded consistently, with the taxing officer exercising discretion judiciously and not whimsically. The Client/ Applicant submitted that these principles were not adhered to in the present taxation. 21.On the issue of instruction fees, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer misdirected herself by awarding an excessive and unjustified sum. The Client/Applicant relied on Joreth Limited v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, where the Court of Appeal held that the value of the subject matter should be derived from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement, and where it is not ascertainable, the taxing officer must exercise discretion judiciously, taking into account relevant factors such as the nature and importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, and the general conduct of the proceedings. The Applicant argued that although the Taxing Officer acknowledged these principles, but failed to apply them properly, and instead arrived at an exaggerated figure. 22.The Client/ Applicant further relied on the case of yalo Mbobu t/a Kyalo & Associates Advocates v Jacob Juma [2015] eKLR, where the court emphasized that a taxing officer must specifically demonstrate the factors considered in enhancing instruction fees, including the care and labour involved; the nature and importance of the matter; the value of the subject matter, and the complexity or novelty of the issues. 23.Similarly, in the case of Ramesh Naran Patel v Attorney General & Another [2012] eKLR, the court held that these factors must be broken down with clarity and specificity. The Client/ Applicant argued that in the present case, the Taxing Officer merely generalized these factors without providing a cogent and particularized justification. 24.The Client/Applicant also relied heavily on the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others Ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, where the court underscored that the exercise of discretion in taxation must be supported by detailed reasoning, including the level of responsibility, novelty, time spent, and volume of documentation involved. It is submitted that the Taxing Officer failed to meet this threshold, thereby rendering the award arbitrary and unjustified. 25.In addition to instruction fees, the Client/Applicant challenged specific items in the Bill of Costs, and argued that the Taxing Officer erred in allowing service charges beyond the prescribed limit under the Advocates Remuneration Order, particularly for items where service is capped at Kshs. 1,400/=. Further, that the amounts allowed for attendances were excessive and contrary to Schedule 6A(7) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. 26.On the issue of the 50% increase of costs, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer fundamentally misapprehended the law, and that the increase under Part B of Schedule 6 applies only where Party-and-Party Costs have already been taxed. 27.In support of this argument, the Client/ Applicant relied on the case of Nyangito & Co. Advocates v Doinyo Lessos Creameries Ltd [2014] eKLR, where the court held that the 50% increment is applicable only after Party-and-Party Costs have been determined. Further reliance was placed in the case of Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates v County Government of Narok (Misc. Application No. E608 of 2019) [2020] eKLR, where the court held that a taxing officer errs in principle by adding 50% directly to an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs, without first determining Party-and-Party costs. 28.In conclusion, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer departed from well-established principles of taxation, awarded excessive and unjustified sums, and misapplied the law regarding the 50% increment. It urged them to find that the taxation was erroneous in law and principle, set aside the taxing maser’s ruling of 9th May 2025, and either reassess the Bill of Costs or remit it for re-taxation before a different taxing officer. 29.The Advocate/Respondent’s filed its written submissions dated 15th May 2025, in opposition to the Client’s Chamber Summons Application. It sought to uphold the ruling delivered on 9th May 2025, by the taxing Master, wherein the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs was taxed at Kshs. 14,511,588/=. The Advocate/ Respondent maintained that the Taxing Officer properly exercised his discretion in accordance with the law and established principles governing taxation, and that no basis has been laid to warrant interference by the Court. 30.At the outset, the Advocate/ Respondent underscored the well-settled principle that a Judge will not interfere with the discretion of a taxing officer unless it is shown that the Officer erred in principle or that the award is manifestly excessive or low. Reliance was placed in the case of Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Another [1972] EA 162, as affirmed in subsequent authorities including First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 64, Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, and the Supreme Court decision in the case of Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (Petition E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), which authorities establish that taxation is a matter of discretion, to be exercised judiciously, and that costs should be fair, reasonable, and reflective of the work done. 31.The Advocate/ Respondent further relied on the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application No. 23 of 1999) [2000] UGSC 3, which reiterates that a court should not interfere with a taxing officer’s assessment merely because it would have awarded a different figure. Similarly, in the case of Lucy Waithera & 2 Others v Edwin Njagi t/a E.K. Njagi & Co. Advocates [2017] eKLR, the court held that interference is only justified where discretion has not been exercised judiciously, such as where irrelevant factors are considered or relevant factors ignored. 32.On the general principles guiding taxation, the Advocate/Respondent cited the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, wherein the court emphasized that taxation is not a mathematical exercise, but one grounded in experience, judgment, and fairness. The Advocate/ Respondent further submitted that the Taxing Officer adhered to these principles and properly evaluated the Bill of Costs. 33.Regarding instruction fees, the Advocate/ Respondent submitted that the Client/Applicant has failed to demonstrate any error in principle, and that the instruction fees encompass the entire scope of legal work, including taking instructions, advising the client, preparing the case, and conducting proceedings, as explained in Kuloba, Judicial Hints on Civil Procedure (2nd ed.). 34.Further, the Advocate/Respondent relied on the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, where the Court of Appeal held that where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable, the taxing officer has discretion to determine a reasonable fee based on factors such as the nature and importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, and the conduct of proceedings. 35.The Advocate/Respondent also invoked the Supreme Court decision in the case of Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (Petition E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), which affirmed that where the value of the subject matter cannot be determined, the taxing officer is entitled to exercise discretion guided by the factors set out in Schedule 6. 36.Additional, support is drawn from the case of Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR, where the court emphasized that instruction fees are determined not solely by the value of the subject matter, but also by factors such as care and labour, complexity, and the interests of the parties. Similarly, in Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission v Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya & Another [2014] eKLR, the court recognized that there is no fixed formula for calculating instruction fees and that the process involves a balancing of various considerations. 37.The Advocate/Respondent further submitted that in the present case, the Taxing Officer properly considered all relevant factors, including the complexity of the constitutional petition, the time spent (approximately five years), the nature of the dispute involving land rights and public interest, and the professional responsibility borne by counsel. Therefore, the award of Kshs. 8,000,000/= as instruction fees was justified and reasonable. 38.On the contested items relating to service and attendances, the Advocate/Respondent submitted that the Client’s objections are based on a misinterpretation of the Advocates Remuneration Order, and that the cap of Kshs. 1,400/=, for service applies only within a limited geographical radius, and additional charges are permissible depending on distance, as provided under Schedule 6. Further, that the attendance fees were properly taxed within the permissible limits, noting that the applicable provisions allow charges of up to Kshs. 15,000/=, and that the services were rendered during a period when physical court attendance was required. 39.With respect to the 50% increase of costs, the Advocate/ Respondent firmly supports the Taxing Officer’s decision, arguing that such an increase is mandatory under Part B of Schedule 6 for Advocate–Client Bills of Costs. Further, that the Client’s argument—that such an increase is only applicable after taxation of Party-and-Party costs—is erroneous. In support of this position, reliance was placed on the case of Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority Pension Scheme & 8 Others [2017] eklr 498 (KLR), where the court held that the 50% increase applies to Advocate–Client costs irrespective of whether Party-and-Party Costs have been taxed. 40.Further reliance was placed in the case of Dennis K.N. Magare & Another v Armajit Singh Gahir & 5 Others [2021] KEHC 12931 (KLR), where the court upheld the practice of taxing an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs, and subsequently increasing it by 50% in accordance with Schedule 6. 41.Similarly, in the National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR, the court clarified that the correct approach is to apply Schedule 6(A) and then increase the amount by 50% under Schedule 6(B), without the need for prior taxation of Party-and-Party costs. The Advocate/Respondent also cited the case of Havi & Company Advocates v Purma Holdings Limited & 2 Others (Misc. Civil Cause No. E032 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 3690 (KLR), where the court affirmed that a 50% increment is justified, particularly in complex matters. 42.Additionally, the Advocate/Respondent argued that the issue of the 50% increase was not raised before the Taxing Officer, and therefore cannot be introduced at the Reference stage. Reliance was placed on the case of Showcase Property Limited v Mugambi & Company Advocates [2020] eKLR and Ahmednasir Abdikadir & Company Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Ltd (2) [2006] 1 EA 5, which establish that a Reference is akin to an appeal and cannot entertain issues not previously raised before the taxing officer. 43.In conclusion, the Advocate/Respondent submitted that the Taxing Officer correctly applied the law, exercised discretion judiciously, and arrived at a fair and reasonable taxation. Further, that the Client/Applicant has failed to demonstrate any error of principle or misdirection to justify interference. The Court was urged to dismiss the instant Reference with costs and uphold the taxation in its entirety. 44.Having considered the pleadings herein, the rival written submissions by the parties, and cited authorities, the following issues arise for determination:i.Whether the Taxing Officer erred in law and principle in the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023.ii.Whether the instruction fees of Kshs. 8,000,000/= were excessive and unjustified.iii.Whether the taxation of the impugned items (including service and attendances) was contrary to the Advocates (Remuneration) Order.iv.Whether the increase of the taxed costs by 50% was lawful.v.What orders should issue, including costs of the Reference. 45.On whether the Court can interfere with the Taxing Officer’s discretion, the court took into account the principles governing interference with taxation, which are trite, that a Judge will not interfere with the discretion of a taxing officer unless it is shown that: the officer acted on a wrong principle, failed to consider relevant factors, considered irrelevant factors, or the award is so manifestly excessive or low as to amount to an injustice. 46.In the case of Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others [1972] EA 162, the Court held that costs must be reasonable, fair, and not impede access to justice. Similarly, in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, the Court of Appeal emphasized that taxation is an exercise of judicial discretion. Further, in the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol [2000] UGSC 3, the court held that a Judge should not interfere merely because he would have awarded a different figure. 47.Guided by these authorities, this Court must examine whether the Client/ Applicant has demonstrated an error of principle as opposed to mere dissatisfaction with the quantum. 48.On whether the instruction fees were excessive, it is instructive to note that Instruction fees form the core of an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs, and are intended to cover the entire scope of legal work, including taking instructions, advising, preparation, and conduct of the matter. This position was reinforced in the case of Premchand Raichand (supra). 49.Further, in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, the Court held that where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement, the taxing officer has discretion to assess instruction fees based on factors such as:a.nature and importance of the matter;b.complexity of the issues;c.interests of the parties;d.general conduct of proceedings. 50.The Supreme Court in the case of Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates [2024] KESC 44 (KLR) reaffirmed that where the value is indeterminate, the taxing officer’s discretion is paramount, provided it is exercised judiciously. 51.The Client/ Applicant argued that the matter was neither complex nor novel and that the Taxing Officer failed to justify the enhancement. Reliance was placed on the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others Ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, where the Court stressed that discretion must be supported by clear reasoning. 52.Upon perusal of the impugned ruling on taxation, it is evident that the Taxing Officer considered the nature of the dispute (a constitutional land matter), the duration (approximately five years), the volume of documentation, and the public interest involved. These are relevant considerations under Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. 53.Similarly, in the case of Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR, the Court held that instruction fees are not determined solely by value, but by a combination of factors, including labour, complexity, and importance. 54.In the instant matter, although the figure of Kshs. 8,000,000/= is substantial, this Court is not persuaded that it is so manifestly excessive as to amount to an error of principle, to warrant his court interference. 55.On whether the taxation of specific items was erroneous, the Client/Applicant challenged the various items relating to service and attendances. Under Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, service fees are capped within a limited radius, but allow additional reasonable charges depending on distance. The Advocate/ Respondent has demonstrated that the services herein involved travel between Nairobi and Narok, which justifies enhanced charges. With respect to attendances, Schedule 6A permits charges up to Kshs. 15,000/= depending on the nature of attendance. 56.In the Court in case of Lucy Waithera & 2 Others v Edwin Njagi t/a E.K. Njagi & Co. Advocates [2017] eKLR, it was held that a taxing officer’s discretion will only be interfered with where it is shown that irrelevant factors were considered or relevant ones ignored. The Client/ Applicant has not demonstrated with specificity how the impugned items violated the scale or were improperly allowed. Mere dissatisfaction with the amounts is insufficient. 57.On whether the 50% increase was lawful, the Applicant argued that the 50% increment applies only after taxation of Party-and-Party costs, relying on the case of Nyangito & Co. Advocates v Doinyo Lessos Creameries Ltd [2014] eklr and Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates v County Government of Narok [2020] eKLR. However, the Respondent, relied on various authorities supporting the contrary position, including: Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority Pension Scheme & 8 Others [2017] eklr 498 (KLR); National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR; Dennis K.N. Magare & Another v Armajit Singh Gahir & 5 Others [2021] KEHC 12931 (KLR). 58.These authorities interpret Part B of Schedule 6 to mean that Advocate–Client Bill of costs are derived by applying Schedule 6(A) and increasing the result by 50%, without the necessity of first taxing Party-and-Party costs. 59.Considering the findings of superior courts in the above cited cases, this Court finds and holds the latter line of authorities more persuasive, as it accords with the plain wording of the Remuneration Order. Additionally, it is not disputed that the issue of the 50% increment was not raised before the Taxing Officer. 60.In the following cases; Ahmednasir Abdikadir & Co. Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Ltd [2006] 1 EA 5 and Showcase Property Ltd v Mugambi & Co. Advocates [2020] eKLR, the courts held that a Reference cannot introduce new issues not canvassed before the taxing officer. Accordingly, the challenge to the 50% increment fails both substantively and procedurally. 61.Having carefully considered the pleadings and the rival written submissions, it is the considered findings and holding of this court that:i.The Client/ Applicant has not demonstrated any error of principle on the part of the Taxing Officer;ii.The instruction fees, though high, were justified by the nature, complexity, and duration of the matter;iii.The taxation of the impugned items was within the discretion of the Taxing Officer and in accordance with the Remuneration Order;iv.The 50% increase of costs was lawful and properly applied. 62.Consequently, the Chamber Summons Application dated 15th May 2025, is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. Further, the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, as assessed on 9th May 2025, is hereby upheld, with Costs of this reference are awarded to the Advocate/Respondent.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAROK, THIS 14TH DAY OF MAY 2026.L. GACHERUJUDGE.Delivered online in the presence ofElijah Meyoki…Court AssistantMs. Lyona H/B for Mr. Maina Ngaruiya for the Client/ Applicant.Mr. Otieno H/B for Mr. Kere for Advocate/Respondent.L. GACHERUJUDGE.14/ 05/2026.