Narok County Government v Kemboy Law Advocates (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E006 of 2023) [2026] KEELC 3499 (KLR) (14 May 2026) (Ruling)

Narok County Government v Kemboy Law Advocates (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E006 of 2023) [2026] KEELC 3499 (KLR) (14 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3499 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Narok Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E006 of 2023 LN Gacheru, J May 14, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY MARA NGENCHE SAFARI CAMP LIMITED FOR LEAVE TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ORDERS OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 165(6) AND (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 8 AND 9 OF THE LAW OF REFORM ACT (CAP 26) OF THE LAWS OF KENYA IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 7 OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACT 2015IN THE MATTER OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ACT, 2007 AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION ACT, CAP 387 LAWS OF KENYA IN THE MATTER OF THE DECISION BY THE NAROK COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND THE MINISTRY OF TOURISM AND WILDLIFE TO DEMOLISH IN THE MAASAI MARA GAME RESERVE, SOUTH WEST OF NAROK DISTRICT Between Narok County Government Client and Kemboy Law Advocates Advocate Ruling 1.This ruling arises from the Client/Applicant’s Chamber Summons Reference dated 15th May 2025, filed pursuant to paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, challenging the ruling of the Taxing Officer, delivered on 9th May 2025. 2.In the impugned ruling, the Taxing Officer taxed the Advocate/Respondent’s Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, at a global sum of Kshs. 5,094,792/58, arising from legal services rendered in Narok ELC Judicial Review Application No. 7 of 2020, in which Mara Ngeche Safari Camp Limited, sought for Judicial Review Orders of Certiorari and Prohibition against the Narok County Government, the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, and the Attorney General. 3.The Client/ Applicant, being dissatisfied with the taxation, contends that the Taxing Officer misdirected himself in law and principle by improperly applying Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, resulting in what was alleged to be an excessive award, particularly in respect of instruction fees, service charges, attendances, and the application of the 50% uplift under Part B of Schedule 6. 4.The Advocate/Respondent opposes the Reference, maintaining that the Taxing Officer properly exercised his discretion within the established legal framework governing taxation of costs, and that no error of principle has been demonstrated to warrant interference by this Court. 5.The dispute, therefore, calls for this Court to determine the proper approach to interference with taxation under paragraph 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, and whether the Client/ Applicant has established any misdirection in principle, sufficient to justify setting aside or varying the taxed award. 6.In resolving the matter, the Court is guided by the settled jurisprudence that taxation of costs is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised on sound legal principles, and that interference is only warranted where such discretion has been shown to have been exercised wrongly in principle or in a manner that is manifestly unjust. 7.The Client/Applicant, Narok County Government, filed the present Chamber Summons dated 15th May 2025 pursuant to paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, and challenged the ruling and order of the Taxing Officer, which was, delivered on 9th May 2025. In that ruling, the Taxing Officer taxed the Advocate/Respondent’s Advocate Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023 at a total sum of Kshs. 5,094,792/58. The Applicant is aggrieved by that decision and seeks that the said ruling be set aside, that the Bill of Costs be taxed afresh, and that the matter be placed before a different Taxing Officer other than the one who rendered the impugned ruling. The Applicant further prays for the costs of the Reference. 8.The application is premised on the ground that the Taxing Officer misapplied the provisions of Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, resulting in an excessive and unjustified award. Further, that the instruction fees of Kshs. 2,000,000/= was manifestly high considering that the matter was neither complex nor novel. 9.The Applicant further challenges the taxation of various items relating to service and attendances, including items 10 and 40, which it contends are capped under the applicable schedule, as well as multiple attendance items which it alleges were allowed contrary to Schedule 6A(7). Further, that the Taxing Officer improperly enhanced the bill, including an alleged 50% increase, without legal justification. According to the Applicant, the overall taxation was unreasonable, excessive, and not anchored in the applicable law and principles governing taxation of costs, thereby exposing it to prejudice and potential loss of public funds. 10.The Application is supported by the Affidavit of John Mayiani Tuya, the County Secretary of Narok County Government, wherein he deponed that as a County Secretary, the facts stated thereon are within his knowledge or based on reliable information obtained in the course of duty. He confirmed that the Advocate/Respondent filed an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs, which was contested by the Applicant, and that the Taxing Officer subsequently delivered his ruling on 9th May 2025, taxing the bill at Kshs. 5,094,792/58. 11.The deponent further averred that upon being aggrieved by the decision, the Applicant sought written reasons from the court, and obtained the ruling through the judiciary e-filing system. It is deponed that, based on legal advice, the Taxing Officer misdirected himself by failing to properly apply Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, resulting in an excessive taxation. He reiterated that the instruction fees awarded were disproportionate to the nature of the matter, and that various items relating to service and attendances were wrongly taxed contrary to the applicable scale. Therefore, the decision is unlawful, excessive, and prejudicial to the Applicant. 12.That unless the ruling is set aside and the Bill of Costs re-taxed by a different Taxing Officer, the applicant stands to suffer injustice and unwarranted financial burden, and that it is in the interests of justice that the orders sought be granted. i. The Replying Affidavit sworn on 31/10/2025. 13.The Chamber Summons is opposed by the Advocate/Respondent through the Replying Affidavit sworn by Julius K. Kemboy, the Senior Partner at Kemboy Law Advocates, dated 31st October 2025, who averred that he had personal conduct of the underlying matter, Narok ELC Judicial Review Application No. 7 of 2020, and that the Bill of Costs was properly drawn and taxed in accordance with the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. He further averred that the Applicant’s Reference is of frivolous, vexatious, an abuse the court process, and a misconceived attempt to avoid contractual obligations arising from legal services duly rendered. 14.The deposed that the Taxing Officer’s ruling delivered on 24th April 2025, which taxed the Advocate Client Bill of Costs at Kshs. 5,094,792.58, was proper, and also contended that the Taxing Officer correctly exercised his discretion under Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. He maintained that the instruction fee of Kshs. 2,000,000/=, was justified given the complexity, importance, duration (approximately three years), and the labour involved in the Judicial Review proceedings. 15.The deponent further deposed that where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable, the Taxing Officer is vested with wide discretion to assess instruction fees based on relevant factors such as complexity, importance, conduct of proceedings, and professional input. He relied on judicial authority, including the Supreme Court decision in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Co. Advocates, to support the proposition that taxation is discretionary, and must consider all relevant circumstances. 16.On specific objections raised by the Applicant, he contended that service fees were properly taxed under Schedule 6(9), taking into account the distance between Nairobi and Narok and associated costs. He also defended the taxation of attendance items, stating that they were within the allowable scale under Schedule 6A(7) and supported by detailed documentation filed before the court. 17.Regarding the complaint that the bill was raised by 50%, he asserted that this was lawful under Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, which provides for a 50% increase in Advocate–Client costs. Further, that the issue was not raised before the Taxing Officer and cannot properly be introduced for the first time on a Reference. 18.The deponent relied on several authorities, including Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority, Dennis KN Magare v Armajit Singh Gahir, National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates, and Havi & Co. Advocates v Purma Holdings Ltd, to support the position that the 50% uplift is mandatory and properly applied in Advocate–Client taxation. 19.Ultimately, the deponent maintained that the Taxing Officer acted within his jurisdiction, applied the correct legal principles, and reached a fair and justified award. He urged the Court to dismiss the Client/Applicant’s Reference in its entirety with costs. i. The Client/Applicant’s submissions 20.The Reference was canvassed by way of written submissions. The Client/Applicant’s filed its written submissions in support of the Chamber Summons dated 15th May 2025, argued that the Taxing Officer erred in both law and principle in taxing the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs, at Kshs. 5,094,792.58. The Applicant submitted that the taxed amount was excessive, improperly reasoned, and contrary to the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, and therefore warrants interference by this Court under Rule 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. 21.The Applicant identified a single central issue for determination, namely, whether the Taxing Officer misdirected himself in the taxation of the Respondent’s Bill of Costs. It was its submissions that this Court has jurisdiction to interfere where the Taxing Officer has applied wrong principles or arrived at an award that is manifestly excessive, relying on Bank of Uganda v Sudhir Ruparelia & Another (Taxation Reference No. 1 of 2023) [2023] UGSC 12, which restates that judicial interference is justified where there is an error of principle that substantially affects the outcome. 22.The Applicant further relied on the well-established principles in Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others (No. 3) [1972] EA 162, as reaffirmed in Keziah Gathoni Supeyo v Yano t/a Yano & Co. Advocates [2019] eKLR, which emphasized that taxation must balance fair remuneration for advocates, access to justice, consistency in awards, and avoidance of excessive costs. Further, that the Taxing Officer failed to properly apply these principles, resulting in an unjustified award. 23.Its major ground of challenge relates to the instruction fee of Kshs. 2,000,000/=. The Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer misapplied Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order by failing to adequately assess the complexity and nature of the matter. The Applicant relied heavily in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, wherein it was held that instruction fees must be based on the value of the subject matter whether ascertainable, or otherwise, on judicial discretion guided by factors such as complexity, importance, labour, and interest of parties. 24.Further reliance was placed on Kyalo Mbobu T/A Kyalo & Associates Advocates v Jacob Juma [2015] eKLR and Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, which require taxing officers to give detailed and specific reasoning when exercising discretion, including consideration of labour, documentation, complexity, novelty, urgency, and time expended. The Applicant argued that the Taxing Officer failed to particularize these factors and instead applied a generalized approach, resulting in an excessive award. 25.The applicant further challenged the taxation of service fees, arguing that Items 10 and 40 were wrongly allowed contrary to Schedule 6(9) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, which caps service within three kilometres at Kshs. 1,400, with additional amounts only justified based on distance. Similarly, attendance items (including Items 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 41, 43, and 51) are said to have been taxed in breach of Schedule 6A(7), which prescribes limits on such fees. 26.A further significant issue raised is the 50% increase applied to the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. The Applicant also submitted that this was a misapplication of Part B of Schedule 6, arguing that the 50% uplift is only applicable where Party and Party Costs have already been taxed, which was not the case. Reliance was placed on Nyangito & Co. Advocates v Doinyo Lessos Creameries Ltd [2014] eKLR, where the Court held that the 50% increase applies only after Party and Party Costs, have been determined. The Applicant also cited Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates v County Government of Narok (Misc. Application E608 of 2019) eKLR, where it was held that applying the 50% increase without prior Party and Party taxation constitutes an error in principle warranting interference. 27.In conclusion, the Applicant argued that the Taxing Officer failed to properly apply Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, relied on general rather than specific reasoning, and wrongly enhanced the Bill of Costs, thereby producing an excessive and unjustified award. Therefore, it urged that this Court to find merit in the instant Reference, sets aside the ruling delivered on 9th May 2025, and either re-assesses the Bill of Costs or remits it for fresh taxation before another Taxing Officer. 28.The Advocate/Respondent filed its written submissions in opposition to the Client’s Chamber Summons Reference dated 15th May 2025 and urged the Court to uphold the Taxing Officer’s ruling delivered on 9th May 2025. It was its submissions that the Reference is unmerited, misconceived, and fails to demonstrate any error in principle or law that would justify interference with the Taxing Officer’s exercise of discretion under Rule 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. 29.At the outset, the Advocate/ Respondent emphasized that the principles governing interference with taxation are well settled in jurisprudence, citing the long-standing authority of Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Another [1972] EA 162, which underscores that costs must be fair, reasonable, and not oppressive, while also ensuring proper reimbursement of advocates. The Advocate/Respondent also relied on First American Bank of Kenya v Shah and Others (2002) EA 64, Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, and Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (Petition No. E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), to reinforce the principle that a Taxing Officer has broad discretion, only interfered with where there is a clear error of principle. 30.The Advocate/ Respondent further submitted that the Taxing Officer properly exercised discretion in assessing instruction fees, taking into account relevant factors such as the complexity, importance, duration (approximately three years), labour, and responsibility involved in representing the Client in Narok ELC Judicial Review Application No. 7 of 2020. Further, that the matter involved significant legal and factual complexity, including injunctive relief concerning activities at the Maasai Mara Game Reserve, and thus justified the award made. 31.Reliance was placed on Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, where the Court emphasized that taxation is not a mathematical exercise, but a matter of judicial opinion guided by experience and relevant factors. Further reliance is placed on Lucy Waithera & 2 Others v Edwin Njagi T/A E.K. Njagi & Company Advocates [2017] eKLR, which affirmed that interference is only warranted where discretion is exercised on wrong principles or irrelevant considerations. 32.On instruction fees, specifically, the Advocate relied heavily on the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates (supra), which held that where the value of subject matter is not ascertainable from pleadings, the Taxing Officer must exercise discretion considering factors such as complexity, importance, and conduct of proceedings. This position was reinforced in the case of Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (supra) and Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR, which confirm that instruction fees are determined by a combination of factors, not solely the value of the subject matter. 33.The Advocate/Respondent further submitted that the Taxing Officer properly considered these factors and expressly reduced the amount claimed, thereby demonstrating a judicious exercise of discretion. Further, it argued that the Client/ Applicant’s allegation that the matter was simple is unsupported, and ignored the prolonged litigation period and complexity of the judicial review proceedings. 34.Regarding contested items such as Service and Attendances, the Advocate/Respondent relied on Schedule 6(9) of the Advocates' Remuneration Order, to justify service fees, noting that the distance between Nairobi and Narok justified higher charges. For attendances, reliance was placed on Schedule 6A(7), which allows fees up to Kshs. 15,000/=, depending on the nature and duration of work done. The Advocate asserted that all items were properly supported by documentation, and incurred in the course of extensive legal representation. 35.On the issue of the 50% increase, the Advocate submitted that under Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates' Remuneration Order, an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs must be increased by 50% as a matter of law. Reliance was placed on Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority Oensin Scheme 8 Others [2017] KEELRC 498 (KLR), Dennis KN Magare v Armajit Singh Gahir & Others [2021] KEHC 12931 (KLR), National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates (2021) eKLR, and Havi & Co. Advocates v Purma Holdings Ltd & 2 Others [2024] KEHC 3690 (KLR), all of which affirm that the 50% uplift is mandatory and properly applied in Advocate–Client taxation. 36.The Advocate/ Respondent also submitted that the Client/Applicant cannot introduce new issues on Reference that were not raised before the Taxing Officer, citing the case of Showcase Property Ltd v Mugambi & Company Advocates [2020] eKLR and Ahmednasir Abdikadir & Company Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Ltd (2) [2006] 1 EA 5, which establish that a reference is appellate in nature and cannot entertain new arguments. 37.In conclusion, the Advocate/ Respondent argued that the Taxing Officer properly applied the law, exercised discretion judiciously, and reached a fair and reasonable award consistent with established principles of taxation. Therefore, the Reference is lacks merit and should be dismissed with costs. 38.The court has considered all the pleadings and submissions, and f from the said pleadings, rival written submissions, and respective Affidavits, this Court discerns the following issues for determination:i.Whether the Taxing Officer erred in principle and/or law in the taxation of instruction fees in the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023.ii.Whether the Taxing Officer erred in the taxation of service fees and attendance items under Schedule 6 and 6A of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014.iii.Whether the Taxing Officer erred in applying the 50% increase on the taxed Advocate–Client Bill of Costs under Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014.iv.Whether the Client/Applicant has established sufficient grounds to warrant interference with the Taxing Officer’s discretion.v.What orders should issue as to costs. 39.The Court has carefully considered the instant Chamber Summons Reference dated 15th May 2025, the pleadings in general, the submissions together with the cited authorities and the entire record of taxation, and singular question for determination in a Reference under paragraph 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014 is whether the Taxing Officer exercised his discretion on sound legal principles, and whether any error of principle has been demonstrated to warrant interference by this Court. 40.It is well settled that a court will not interfere with the decision of a taxing officer merely because it would have reached a different figure. Interference is only justified where it is shown that the taxing officer proceeded on the wrong principles, considered irrelevant considerations, failed to take into account relevant factors, or that the award is manifestly excessive or low as to amount to an error in principle. This position was authoritatively stated in the case of Premchand Raichand Ltd v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd (No. 3) [1972] EA 162 and reaffirmed in Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92. 41.On the first issue concerning instruction fees, the Court notes that the underlying matter was a Judicial Review Application, arising from a dispute involving alleged administrative actions by public bodies over land use and enforcement within the Maasai Mara Game Reserve. It is trite law that where the subject matter is not ascertainable from the pleadings, the taxing officer is clothed with discretion to assess instruction fees based on relevant considerations, including complexity, importance, novelty, responsibility undertaken, time expended, and the general conduct of proceedings. In Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates (supra), the Court of Appeal held that in such circumstances, the value of the subject matter is not the sole determinant and the taxing officer must exercise discretion judicially. 42.The Taxing Officer in the impugned ruling considered the nature of the proceedings, their duration, the multiplicity of parties, and the public interest element inherent in a judicial review touching on environmental and tourism regulation within a protected game reserve. Contrary to the client/ Applicant’s contention, the Court finds no evidence that the Taxing Officer ignored relevant factors or applied extraneous considerations. The mere fact that the Client / Applicant considers the matter “not complex” is not sufficient to displace the Taxing Officer’s discretion. As was stated in Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, taxation is not a mathematical exercise but an exercise of judicial judgment informed by experience and the circumstances of each case. The instruction fee of Kshs. 2,000,000/=, viewed in the context of prolonged litigation spanning several years and involving multiple public entities, cannot be said to be so manifestly excessive as to constitute an error of principle. 43.On the second issue regarding Service fees and Attendances, the Court has examined the relevant provisions of Schedule 6 and Schedule 6A of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014. Service fees under Schedule 6(9), are dependent on distance and attendant costs incurred. The Advocate has explained that the services involved travel between Nairobi and Narok and attendant logistical expenditure. The Client/ Applicant has not demonstrated with precision how the Taxing Officer misapplied the scale or failed to consider the correct distance band. Similarly, in respect of attendances, Schedule 6A(7) grants the Taxing Officer discretion to assess fees based on the nature, duration, and complexity of each attendance. 44.The Court reiterates the principle in First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others [2002] EA 64 that taxation is an exercise of judicial discretion and will only be interfered with where the discretion is exercised capriciously ,or on wrong principles. No such demonstration has been made in this case by the Client/Applicant. 45.On the third issue concerning the 50% increase under Part B of Schedule 6, the Court is alive to the divergent judicial interpretations that have arisen in practice. However, the prevailing position, as consistently affirmed in National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR, Havi & Co. Advocates v Purma Holdings Ltd [2024] KEHC 3690 (KLR), and Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority [2017] eKLR, is that the 50% uplift in Advocate–Client taxation is a statutory entitlement under the Remuneration Order, and is applicable where the bill falls within that regime. 46.The Client/ Applicant’s argument that such an increase is contingent upon prior Party and Party taxation is not borne out by the current structure of Schedule 6, which treats Advocate Client taxation as a distinct regime. The Court therefore finds and holds that no misdirection in principle in the application of the 50% increase, in the instant matter. 47.The Court further observes that even where there is disagreement on interpretation, the proper forum is not to substitute the Taxing Officer’s discretion with that of the court, but to demonstrate a clear error of principle. In Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Co. Advocates (Petition No. E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), the Supreme Court reiterated that taxation is a discretionary judicial function, and appellate interference must remain limited to cases of clear legal or factual misdirection. The Client/Applicant herein has not met this threshold. 48.On the fourth issue, whether sufficient grounds have been established to warrant interference, the Court finds and holds that the Client/ Applicant’s complaints largely relate to the quantum of taxation rather than identifiable errors of principle. It is trite that dissatisfaction with the amount taxed is not, in itself, a ground for interference. As stated in the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture ex parte Muchiri W’Njuguna (supra), a court will not interfere merely because it would have awarded a different figure. The Client/Applicant herein has not demonstrated that the Taxing Officer ignored relevant considerations, considered irrelevant factors, or applied wrong principles of law. 49.For the above reasons, this Court is not persuaded that the Taxing Officer misdirected himself in law or principle in arriving at the impugned taxation. The decision falls within the permissible ambit of judicial discretion as recognized in the authorities cited above. The instant Reference, therefore, lacks merit. 50.For the foregoing reasons and having considered everything in totality, the Court finds and holds that the Client/Applicant herein has failed to demonstrate any error of principle or misdirection on the part of the Taxing Officer to warrant interference with the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023. 51.Accordingly, the Client/Applicant’s Chamber Summons Reference dated 15th May, 2025 is hereby dismissed in its entirety with costs to the Advocate/Respondent. 52.The Taxing Officer’s Ruling delivered on 9th May 2025, is hereby upheld, with Costs to the Advocate/ Respondent.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAROK, THIS 14TH DAY OF MAY 2026.L. GACHERUJUDGEDelivered online in the presence ofElijah Meyoki….Court AssistantMs. Lyona H/B for Maina Ngaruiya for Client/ Applicant.Mr. Otieno H/B for Mr. Kere for Advocate/ Respondent.L. GACHERUJUDGE.14TH MAY 2026.