https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3478

Narok County Government v Kemboy Law Advocates (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E005 of 2023) [2026] KEELC 3478 (KLR) (14 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3478 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Narok Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E005 of 2023 LN Gacheru, J May 14, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF PETITION UNDER ARTICLES 20, 21, 22 AND 23 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA AND IN THE MATTER OF INFRINGEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS UNDER ARTICLES 40, 42, 43, 47, 69, AND 70 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION ACT (NUMBER 8 OF 1999) AND ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT ACT (NUMBER 19 OF 2011) AND IN THE MATTER OF ENVIRONMENT IMPACT ASSESS LICENSE NUMBER NEMA/EIA/PSL/6181 Between Narok County Government Client and Kemboy Law Advocates Advocate Ruling * 1.The matter for determination is Chamber Summons Application/ Reference arising from the ruling of the Taxing Officer, Hon. Daniel Ngayo, delivered on 9th May 2025, wherein the Advocate-Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, was taxed at a total of Ksh 14,295,823/= in favor of the Advocate/Respondent, Kemboy Law Advocates. 2.The Client/Applicant, Narok County Government, was aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said taxation and moved this Court by way of the instant Reference dated 15th May 2025, anchored under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014. The Client/ Applicant sought for orders of setting aside the impugned taxation; directing that the Bill of Costs be re-taxed afresh, and that such re-taxation be undertaken before a different taxing officer other than Hon. Daniel Ngayo; for costs of the application. 3.The Reference emanates from professional services rendered by the Advocate/Respondent to the Client/Applicant in connection with Narok Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2018, a matter involving constitutional and environmental law issues concerning alleged infringement of constitutional rights under Articles 20, 21, 22, 23, 40, 42, 43, 47, 69 and 70 of the Constitution, and the implementation of environmental and land governance frameworks under the Environmental Management and Coordination Act and the Environment and Land Court Act. 4.The Advocate/Respondent acted for the Client/Applicant in that matter for a period of approximately four years, from 2019 to 2022, culminating in the preparation of an Advocate-Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, following termination of instructions and non-settlement of fees. 5.The said Bill of Costs was taxed by the Taxing Officer upon hearing rival submissions from both parties. The Taxing Officer considered the applicable provisions of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, including Schedule 6, and assessed instruction fees and other items culminating in the impugned award. 6.The Client/ Applicant challenges the taxation on the grounds that the Taxing Officer allegedly misapplied Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order; failed to properly evaluate the complexity and nature of the matter, improperly allowed various items under the Bill of Costs, and erroneously applied a 50% increase to the taxed amount. The Client/Applicant contended that the resultant taxation is excessive, unreasonable, and contrary to established principles governing taxation of costs. 7.The Advocate/Respondent opposes the Reference, maintaining that the Taxing Officer properly exercised judicial discretion within the confines of the law; correctly applied the relevant principles governing taxation of Advocate-Client Bill of Costs, and arrived at a fair and reasonable assessment. Further, that no error of principle has been demonstrated to warrant the intervention of this Court. 8.It is against this background that the Court is called upon to determine whether the Client/ Applicant has met the threshold for interference with the Taxing Officer’s discretion under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 201 9.This Chamber Summons Reference is brought by the Client/Applicant, Narok County Government, pursuant to paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, as the Client/Applicant was aggrieved by the ruling delivered on 9th May 2025 by the taxing officer, wherein the Advocate/Respondent’s Advocate-Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023 was taxed at Ksh 14,295,823/=. 10.The application is premised on the contention that the Taxing Officer misdirected himself in law and fact by failing to properly apply Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, resulting in an award that is manifestly excessive and not supported by the applicable legal framework. The Client/ Applicant argued that the instruction fees assessed at Ksh 8,000,000/= was grossly disproportionate to the nature of the matter, which is said not to have been complex or novel. Further, that several items in the bill of Costs including various attendances and service charges, were allowed at rates contrary to the prescribed scales, with some items allegedly capped under the Advocates Remuneration Order, but nonetheless taxed at higher amounts. 11.The Client/ Applicant also takes issue with what it described as the Taxing Officer’s failure to adhere to the proper taxation guidelines under Schedule 6A (7) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, particularly in relation to multiple items in the Bill of Costs and further challenged an alleged 50% increase applied to the bill without legal justification. It is the Client/ Applicant’s position that the overall taxation was exorbitant, unreasonable, and inconsistent with established principles governing taxation of costs, and that it disregarded the need to safeguard public funds. 12.The Reference is supported by Affidavit John Mayiani Tuya, the County Secretary, Narok County Government who reiterated most of the grounds in support of the Reference. He deponed that the Advocate/Respondent commenced the matter by filing the Advocate-Client Bill of Costs, which was duly contested by the Client/Applicant. 13.He confirmed that the taxation resulted in the award of Ksh 14,295,823/= and that the Client/Applicant promptly sought written reasons for the decision in preparation for filing a Reference. Further, that, upon legal advice, he is informed that the Taxing Officer misapplied the applicable provisions of the Advocates Remuneration Order, and allowed items that were either excessive or not properly justified under the law. 14.The Client/ Applicant maintained that the impugned taxation was conducted in disregard of the governing legal framework, resulting in an unjustified and inflated award, and therefore, it is necessary in the interests of justice for the said ruling to be set aside and the Bill of costs subjected to a fresh taxation before a different taxing officer. 15.The Reference/Application is opposed vide the Replying Affidavit sworn by Julius K. Kemboy, the Senior Partner at Kemboy Law Advocates on 31st October 2025, the Advocate/Respondent herein. 16.The deponent conceded that his Law Firm acted for Narok County Government in Narok Constitutional Petition No. 16 of 2018, and that the Advocate-Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, was properly drawn following extensive professional work spanning approximately four years. Further, that the instant Reference/ Application is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process, intended to avoid legitimate contractual obligations arising from legal services rendered. 17.He supported the taxation by the Deputy Registrar at Ksh 14,295,823/=, including instruction fees of Ksh.8,000,000/=, and argued that the Taxing Officer properly exercised discretion under Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. He contended that the underlying suit was complex, involving issues of law and fact relating to Mara Naboisho Conservancy, land interests, and alleged unlawful development, and that the length and intensity of representation justified the instruction fees awarded. 18.Further, he argued that the Taxing Officer correctly considered relevant factors such as complexity, value, time spent, and importance of the matter, and that the Client/ Applicant has failed to demonstrate any error of principle. 19.On the issue of service fees, the deponent rejected the claim that such fees are capped at Ksh 1,400/=, and explained that Schedule 6 allows for additional reasonable costs depending on distance and circumstances, particularly given travel between Nairobi and Narok. 20.Regarding contested items in the Bill of Costs, he maintained that all attendances were properly justified and drawn in accordance with the Advocates Remuneration Order, and that the Client/ Applicant’s objections lack legal or factual basis. He also asserted that the Taxing Officer properly applied Schedule 6A, and had discretion to assess appropriate fees where applicable. 21.On the issue of the 50% increase, the deponent argued that it is lawfully anchored in Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, which provides for an automatic increase of taxed costs by 50% in Advocate-Client bills. Further, that the Client/ Applicant did not raise this objection before the Taxing Officer, and cannot introduce it for the first time in a Reference. He relied on several authorities, including National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates and Kinyua Muyaa & Co Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority, to support the position that the 50% uplift is mandatory and properly applied. 22.He also invoked the jurisprudence affirming that taxation is a discretionary exercise, and that a court on a Reference should not lightly interfere, unless there is clear error of principle. He concluded that the Client/Applicant has not demonstrated any misdirection in law or fact, and that the Reference herein is unmerited. Accordingly, he urged the Court to dismiss the Chamber Summons Application with costs, and uphold the Taxing Officer’s ruling in its entirety. 23.The Reference was canvassed by way of written submissions. The Client/Applicant filed its submissions through Maina Ngaruiya & Co Advocates, and urged the court to allow its Reference with costs. The Advocate/ Respondent filed its written submissions through Kemboy Law Advocates, and urged the court to dismiss the instant Reference with costs. 24.In its written submissions, the Client/Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer erred in law and principle in taxing the Advocate/Respondent’s Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, thereby warranting this Court’s intervention under Rule 11(1) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014. 25.The Client/ Applicant identified a single central issue for determination being; whether the Taxing Officer misdirected herself in law and principle in the taxation of the impugned bill. 26.Reliance was placed on the well-established principles governing interference with taxation decisions. The Applicant cites the decision in Bank of Uganda v Sudhir Ruparalia & Another (Taxation Reference 1 of 2023) [2023] UGSC 12, where the Supreme Court of Uganda reiterated that a judge will not ordinarily interfere with the Taxing Officer’s discretion unless it is demonstrated that the officer applied wrong principles or arrived at an award that is manifestly excessive or low. The Court further emphasized that interference is justified where such error of principle substantially affects the outcome, as earlier stated in Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol, Civil Application No. 23 of 1999 (Mulenga JSC). 27.The Client/ Applicant also relied on the case of Keziah Gathoni Supeyo v Yano t/a Yano & Co. Advocates [2019] eKLR, where the principles in Premchand Raichand Ltd v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd (1972) EA 162 were restated, which emphasized fairness to the successful party, avoidance of excessive costs that hinder access to justice, consistency in awards, and the requirement that taxation discretion be exercised judicially. 28.On instruction fees, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer misapplied the settled principles, and relied in the holding in the case of Joreth Limited v Kigano & Associates (2002) 1 EA 92, where the Court of Appeal held that instruction fees should be derived from the value of the subject matter as discernible from pleadings, judgment, or settlement, and where not ascertainable, the Taxing Officer must exercise discretion based on relevant factors such as complexity, importance, and labour involved. 29.The Client/Applicant further relied on the case of Kyalo Mbobu T/A Kyalo & Associates Advocates v Jacob Juma [2015] eKLR, which underscored that a taxing officer must demonstrate cogent reasons when enhancing instruction fees, including care and labour, volume of documents, complexity, novelty, and value of the subject matter. 30.Further reliance was also placed on the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others Ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, where the court emphasized that discretion must be exercised transparently and with specificity, and that general statements without detailed justification are insufficient. 31.The Client/Applicant argued that in the present case, although the Taxing Officer acknowledged the principles in Joreth, she failed to apply them with sufficient particularity. It is contended that the finding that instruction fees of Ksh 10,000,000/= (later taxed at Ksh 8,000,000/=) were fair lacked proper breakdown of relevant factors such as complexity, time expended, and labour, thereby rendering the exercise of discretion unstructured and excessive. 32.On service fees, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer erred by allowing item 5 contrary to Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, 2014, which allegedly caps service fees at Ksh 1,400/= within a specified radius. 33.On attendances, the Client/ Applicant challenges the taxation of items Nos 6, 16, 19, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 42, and 43, arguing that they were allowed contrary to Schedule 6A(7) of the Advocates Remuneration Order and were therefore excessive and unjustified. 34.On the 50% increase applied to the taxed bill of costs, the Client/Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer misapprehended the law by applying the 50% enhancement under Part B of Schedule VI, and argued that this provision only applies where party and party costs have been first taxed. In support, reliance is placed on Nyangito & Co. Advocates v Doinyo Lessos Creameries Ltd (2014) eKLR, where the Court held that the 50% increase is only applicable where party and party costs have been determined under Part A. 35.The Client/Applicant also relied on the case of Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates v County Government of Narok (Miscellaneous Application E608 of 2019) eKLR, where the court set aside a taxation on the basis that the 50% enhancement was improperly applied to an Advocate-Client bill of Costs, without prior party and party taxation. 36.In conclusion, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer committed multiple errors of law and principle, including failure to give cogent reasons for the exercise of discretion on instruction fees, misapplication of the Advocates Remuneration Order on service and attendances, and improper application of the 50% uplift. 37.Therefore, the Client/Applicant urged the Court to finds merit in the instant Chamber Summons, sets aside the taxation ruling delivered on 9th May 2025, and either retaxes the bill or remits it to a different Taxing Officer for fresh taxation. 38.The Advocate/ Respondent filed its written submissions in opposition to the Client’s Chamber Summons Reference, and submitted that the Taxing Officer acted within lawful discretion under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, and that no error of principle has been demonstrated to justify interference by the Court. Reliance was placed on the well-settled principles governing interference with taxation. 39.The Advocate/Respondent relied on the following cases; Premchand Raichand Limited & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Limited & Another [1972] EA 162, First American Bank of Kenya v Shah and Others (2002) EA 64, Joreth Ltd v Kigano and Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, and Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot and Company Advocates (Petition E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), to emphasize that taxation is a discretionary exercise guided by established principles, and that a court will only interfere where there is an error of principle or manifest excess or inadequacy. 40.Further, the Advocate/Respondent relied on Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol, Civil Application No. 23 of 1999 [2000] UGSC 3 and Lucy Waithera & 2 Others v Edwin Njagi t/a E.K. Njagi & Company Advocates [2017] eKLR, which underscore that taxation is primarily within the expertise of the taxing officer, and that judicial interference is limited to exceptional cases where discretion is improperly exercised. 41.On instruction fees, the Advocate/Respondent submitted that the Taxing Officer correctly applied the principles in Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] eKLR, which held that where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable from pleadings, the taxing officer must exercise discretion based on factors such as complexity, importance of the matter, interest of parties, and conduct of proceedings. 42.For the above submissions, the Advocate/Respondent relied on Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, where the court emphasized that taxation is not a mathematical exercise, but a matter of judgment grounded on experience, requiring consideration of relevant factors such as labour, documentation, urgency, and complexity. 43.Further reliance was placed on Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR, which reaffirmed that instruction fees are not determined solely by the value of the subject matter, but by a combination of factors including care, labour, complexity, and importance. 44.The Advocate/Respondent also relied on the case of Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission v Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya & Another [2014] eKLR, where the Court held that taxation involves a balancing exercise and no rigid formula exists for determining instruction fees. 45.The Advocate/Respondent argued that the Taxing Officer properly considered these principles in assessing instruction fees at Ksh 8,000,000/=, noting that the matter involved complex land and environmental issues relating to Mara Naboisho Conservancy, spanning approximately fou r(4) years of litigation, involving significant documentation, parties, and legal responsibility. 46.On the contested items of service and attendances, the Advocate/Respondent submitted that Schedule 6(9) of the Advocates Remuneration Order provides for service fees based on distance and reasonableness, and therefore the Taxing Officer correctly considered travel between Nairobi and Narok. Further, that attendances under Schedule 6A(7) allow for fees up to Ksh 15,000/= per attendance, and that the items challenged were properly drawn to scale and supported by documentary evidence. 47.On the issue of the 50% uplift, the Advocate/Respondent relied on Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates' Remuneration Order, and argued that it expressly provides for an automatic increase of 50% in Advocate-Client Bills of Costs. Reliance was placed in the case of Kinyua Muyaa Co Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority & Others (2017) KEELRC 498 (KLR), Dennis KN Magare v Armajit Singh Gahir & 5 Others [2021] KEHC 12931 (KLR), National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates (2021) eKLR, and Havi & Company Advocates v Purma Holdings Limited & 2 Others [2024] KEHC 3690 (KLR), all of which affirm that the 50% uplift is a mandatory statutory consequence of taxing Advocate-Client bills and does not require prior taxation of party and party costs. 48.The Advocate/Respondent further submitted that the issue of the 50% uplift was not raised before the Taxing Officer, and cannot be introduced for the first time on a Reference. Reliance was sought in the case of Showcase Property Limited v Mugambi & Company Advocates [2020] eKLR and Ahmednasir Abdikadir & Company Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Limited (2) [2006] 1 EA 5, which hold that a Reference court cannot entertain new issues not raised before the taxing master. 49.In conclusion, the Advocate/Respondent maintained that the Taxing Officer properly exercised discretion, applied the correct legal principles, and reached a fair and reasonable taxation. Therefore, it argued that the Client/Applicant’s Reference is devoid of merit, and should be dismissed with costs, and the Taxation Ruling of 24th April 2025, be upheld in its entirety. 50.Having considered the pleadings, the rival written submissions by both parties, the cited authorities and relevant provisions of law, the following issues arise for determination:i.Whether the Taxing Officer erred in principle in assessing instruction fees at KES 8,000,000/= in the Advocate-Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023.ii.Whether the Taxing Officer misapplied the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014 in taxing items relating to service fees and attendances.iii.Whether the Taxing Officer erred in law in applying the 50% increase under Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order to the taxed bill. Whether the Client has established sufficient grounds to warrant interference with the Taxing Officer’s discretion and setting aside or remitting the taxation for fresh assessment.iv.What orders should issue as to costs. Analysis and Determination 51.The law governing interference with a Taxing Officer’s decision is now well settled, and a court on a Reference does not exercise original jurisdiction, but a limited appellate jurisdiction, and will only interfere where it is demonstrated that the Taxing Officer committed an error of principle, took into account irrelevant factors, or failed to consider relevant ones, thereby arriving at an excessive or manifestly low award. 52.This position was first articulated in the classic authority of Premchand Raichand Ltd v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd [1972] EA 162, where Spry V-P stated that costs must be fair and reasonable, and taxation must avoid both oppression and undue extravagance. 53.The same principle was reaffirmed in First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others (2002) EA 64, where the Court of Appeal held that:“The taxation of costs is a matter of discretion which should not be interfered with unless it is shown that the taxing officer acted on a wrong principle of law or that the award is manifestly excessive.” 54.Similarly, in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, the Court of Appeal emphasized that taxation is not a mathematical exercise but a matter of judicial discretion guided by relevant factors such as the nature of the matter, its importance, complexity, and the value of the subject matter. 55.Further, in the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, the Court underscored that:“Taxation of costs is not a mathematical exercise; it is entirely a matter of opinion based on experience.” 56.The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed these principles in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (Petition No. E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), holding that judicial interference is only justified where there is demonstrable misdirection in principle affecting the outcome. Guided by these authorities, this Court must be slow to interfere with the Taxing Officer’s discretion unless clear error is established. 57.On Whether instruction fees were properly assessed, the Client/Applicant contended that the instruction fees of Ksh 8,000,000/= were excessive and unsupported by the complexity of the matter. The Advocate/Respondent, however, maintained that the Taxing Officer properly exercised discretion under Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014. 58.It is trite that where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable from the pleadings, the Taxing Officer is entitled to exercise discretion. This was clearly stated in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates (supra) where the Court held that:“If the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable, the taxing officer is entitled to use his discretion to assess such instruction fee as he considers just, taking into account the nature and importance of the matter, the interest of the parties, and the complexity of the case.” 59.This position was reinforced in the case of Kyalo Mbobu T/A Kyalo & Associates Advocates v Jacob Juma [2015] eKLR, where the Court held that the taxing officer must consider care, labour, complexity, volume of documentation, and time spent. 60.Similarly, in the case of Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR, the Court held that instruction fees are not dependent solely on value of subject matter but on a combination of relevant factors. 61.In the present case, the record shows that the underlying matter involved constitutional and environmental claims relating to Mara Naboisho Conservancy, spanning approximately four years of litigation, involving multiple parties, land use rights, environmental licensing, and allegations of infringement of constitutional rights. 62.The Taxing Officer expressly considered the duration, complexity, labour, and importance of the matter. In accordance with Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission v Chief Justice of Kenya & Another [2014] eKLR, taxation is an evaluative exercise requiring a balancing of competing factors rather than a rigid formula. Therefore, this Court finds and holds that no demonstrated error of principle in the award of instruction fees, was shown. 63.On Service fees and attendances, the Client/ Applicant challenged items relating to service fees and attendances, alleging misapplication of Schedule 6 and 6A of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. Under Schedule 6(9), service fees within three kilometers of a registry are capped, but additional reasonable costs are allowable depending on distance and circumstances. 64.The Advocate/ Respondent demonstrated that service involved travel between Nairobi and Narok, which reasonably attracts additional costs. On attendances, Schedule 6A(7) allows taxation of attendances at prescribed rates, and the Taxing Officer retains discretion to allow reasonable sums depending on the nature of work performed. 65.In the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna (supra), the Court emphasized that taxation must reflect actual work done and reasonable reimbursement, not rigid formulae. The Client/ Applicant has not demonstrated that the Taxing Officer ignored the applicable scale or applied irrelevant considerations. Mere dissatisfaction with quantum is not sufficient ground for interference. 66.On The 50% increase under Part B of Schedule 6, this court has noted a central issue raised is the alleged misapplication of the 50% uplift on Advocate-Client costs. Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order expressly provides that:“The fees as between advocate and client shall be increased by 50%.” 67.The interpretation of this provision has been considered in several decisions. In National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates (2021) eKLR, the Court held that the 50% uplift is automatic in Advocate-Client taxation, and is applied after assessment under Part A. Similarly, in Kinyua Muyaa Co Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority (2017) KEELRC 498 (KLR), the Court stated that the increase applies as a statutory consequence and is not discretionary once Advocate-Client taxation is undertaken. 68.In Dennis KN Magare v Armajit Singh Gahir & 5 Others [2021] KEHC 12931 (KLR), the Court reaffirmed that the proper procedure is to tax the bill under Part A and thereafter apply the 50% enhancement. 69.The Client/ Applicant’s reliance on Nyangito & Co. Advocates v Doinyo Lessos Creameries Ltd [2014] eKLR is distinguishable, as subsequent jurisprudence, particularly from the Court of Appeal and High Court, has clarified that the 50% increase applies to Advocate-Client bills of Costs, and is not dependent on prior taxation of party and party costs. Additionally, in the case of Showcase Property Limited v Mugambi & Co. Advocates [2020] eKLR, the Court held that a Reference cannot introduce new issues not raised before the Taxing Officer. 70.In this case, the record shows that the issue of the 50% increase was not substantively challenged before the Taxing Officer. Even so, the applicable legal framework supports its application in Advocate-Client taxation. Accordingly, no error of principle has been demonstrated. 71.On Whether interference is warranted, from the foregoing analysis, the Client/ Applicant has not demonstrated: misdirection in principle; consideration of irrelevant factors; or failure to consider relevant factors. What emerges is a challenge to the quantum of taxation, not to the legality of the process. 72.As stated in the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application No. 23 of 1999):“A judge will not interfere merely because he would have awarded a different figure.” 73.From the foregoing, this Court therefore finds no basis for interference with the taxing officer’s taxation and ruling dated 24th April 2025. 74.Having considered the instant Reference and the respective submissions, relevant provisions of law the Court finds and holds that:a.The Taxing Officer exercised proper discretion in accordance with the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014.b.No error of principle has been demonstrated in the taxation of instruction fees, service fees, attendances, or application of the 50% uplift.c.The Applicant’s Reference lacks merit. 75.Accordingly, the Chamber Summons dated 15th May 2025, be and is hereby dismissed entirely with costs to the Advocate/Respondent. Orders accordingly. DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAROK, THIS 14TH DAY OF MAY 2026.L. GACHERUJUDGEdelivered online in the presence ofElijah Meyoki... Court AssistantMs. Lyona H/B for Mr. Maina Ngaruiya for the Client /ApplicantMr. Otieno H/B for Mr. Kere for Advocate/Respondent L. GACHERUJUDGE14/05/2026