https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3450

Narok County Government v Kemboy Law Advocates (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E008 of 2023) [2026] KEELC 3450 (KLR) (14 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3450 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Narok Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E008 of 2023 LN Gacheru, J May 14, 2026 Between Narok County Government Client and Kemboy Law Advocates Advocate Ruling 1.The Ruling herein is in respect of Chamber Summons Application/ Reference brought under Paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order by the Client/Applicant, Narok County Government, challenging the taxation ruling delivered on 24th April 2025, by the Taxing Officer, Hon. Daniel Ngayo. 2.The impugned ruling taxed the Advocate/Respondent’s Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July, 2023, at Kshs. 2,820,25.90 arising from legal services rendered in Narok ELC Appeal No. 3 of 2018. 3.The Client/Applicant seeks to set aside the said taxation on grounds that the Taxing Officer erred in law and principle, particularly in respect of instruction fees, specific items on service and attendances, and the application of a 50% increase. The Advocate/Respondent opposes the instant Reference, maintaining that the taxation was proper, lawful, and within the discretion of the Taxing Officer. 4.This Chamber Summons Reference is filed by the Client/Applicant pursuant to paragraph 11(2) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, seeking to challenge the taxing officer ruling delivered on 24th April 2025. The application principally seeks orders to set aside the said ruling which taxed the Advocate/Respondent’s Advocate–Client Bill of Costs at Kshs. 2,820,25/.90, and that the said the Bill of Costs be re-taxed afresh before a different Taxing Officer. The Client/ Applicant further prays for costs of the reference. 5.The Reference/ Application is premised on several grounds,among them being that; the Taxing Officer misapplied the provisions of Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, resulting in an excessive and unjustified award; that the instruction fees of Kshs. 1,500,000/=, was inordinately high given that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable; and the matter was neither complex nor novel. 6.The Client/ Applicant also faults the Taxing Officer for allowing various items: such as service, attendances, and court appearances at amounts exceeding the prescribed statutory limits, and for generally allowing items not drawn to scale. Further, that the Taxing Officer unlawfully increased the bill of Costs by 50% and failed to take into account the duty to safeguard public funds. 7.The Client/ Applicant averred and asserted that these errors rendered the taxation decision unjust and contrary to established legal principles, thereby necessitating interference by the Court. 8.The Reference/ Application is supported by John Mayiani Tuya, the County Secretary of Narok County Government, vied his sworn Affidavit even dated , wherein he deponed that the facts stated herein are within his knowledge or based on information from counsel on record. He confirmed that the Advocate/Respondent filed the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 4th July 2023, which was contested, and that the Taxing Officer subsequently taxed it at Kshs. 2,820,252/90, vide his ruling of 24th April 2025. 9.It was his further averments that the Client/ Applicant, being dissatisfied with the said ruling, issued a Notice dated 30th April 2025, requesting reasons for the taxation with a view to filing a Reference, and later obtained the ruling through the Judiciary e-filing portal. He echoed the grounds set out in the Chamber Summons Application, emphasizing that the Taxing Officer misapplied Schedule 6, awarded manifestly excessive sums, disregarded statutory caps on service and attendance fees, and improperly enhanced the bill of Costs. He maintained that the matter was straightforward and did not justify the high instruction fees awarded. 10.Further, that the impugned taxation is not anchored in law, policy, or practice, and that unless the same is set aside, it will occasion injustice to the Client/ Applicant. The deponent urged the Court to allow the instant Application, set aside the taxation ruling, and direct a fresh taxation before a different Taxing Officer in the interest of justice. 11.The instant Reference is opposed through the Replying Affidavit of Julius K. Kemboy, the Senior Partner of Kemboy Law Advocates sworn on 31st October 2025, wherein he deposed that he had personal conduct of Narok ELC Appeal No. 3 of 2018, on behalf of the Client/Applicant and is therefore competent to respond to the issues raised. 12.He characterized the Reference/ Application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process, asserting that it is a deliberate attempt by the Client/Applicant to evade payment of lawful legal fees. He outlined the orders sought in the application, namely the setting aside of the taxation ruling delivered on 24th April 2025, re-taxation of the Bill of Costs before a different Taxing Officer, and an award of costs to the Client. 13.In response to the substantive complaints, the deponent maintains that the Taxing Officer properly exercised his discretion under Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. He justified the instruction fees of Kshs. 1,500,000/=, arguing that the matter was complex, involved substantial legal and factual issues, and required extensive time, care, and labour over a period of approximately four years. Further, that where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable, the Taxing Officer is vested with wide discretion to assess reasonable instruction fees based on relevant factors such as the nature and importance of the case, the interests of the parties, and the conduct of proceedings. He relied on judicial authorities which affirm such discretion of the taxing officer. 14.The deponent refuted the Client/ Applicant’s contention that certain items were taxed in excess of statutory limits. On service fees (items 6 and 25), he explained that the prescribed amount applies only within a limited radius, and additional charges are permissible depending on distance, including travel between Nairobi and Narok. 15.Regarding attendances (items 28, 30, and 35), he contended that the applicable provisions allow higher amounts than alleged by the Client/ Applicant, and that the proceedings were conducted physically, incurring additional costs. 16.He also asserted that all items in the Bill of Costs were properly supported by documentation and were drawn to scale in accordance with the Advocates Remuneration Order. He emphasized that the substantial work undertaken by his Law Firm, including preparation of pleadings, court attendances, and continuous representation of the Client, which justifies the amounts claimed. 17.On the issue of the 50% increase of the taxed costs, the deponent argues that such an increment is mandatory under Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order in Advocate–Client Bills. He also contended that the Client/ Applicant is improperly raising this issue for the first time in the Reference, despite not having objected before the Taxing Officer. He further supports the legality of the increment by citing relevant case law, asserting that the Taxing Officer acted correctly in applying the increase to the taxed amount. 18.Finally, the deponent maintained that the Court, in exercising its Reference jurisdiction, should not interfere with the Taxing Officer’s decision unless there is a clear error of principle, which has not been demonstrated. He urged the Court to uphold the taxation ruling in its entirety and dismiss the Client/Applicant’s application with costs, asserting that the instant Reference is unmeritorious and does not meet the threshold for setting aside a taxation decision. 19.The Instant Application/Reference was canvassed by the way of written submissions. The Client/Applicant filed its submissions through Maina Ngaruiya &Advocates, and urged the court to allow its Reference. The Advocate/Respondent filed its written submissions through Kemboy Law Advocates, and urged the court to dismiss the instant Reference. 20.The Client/Applicant’s written submissions dated 23rd January, 2026, wherein it submitted that the Reference is properly anchored under Rule 11(1) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, and invites the Court to determine whether the Taxing Officer erred in law and principle in taxing the Advocate/Respondent’s Bill of Costs. 21.Further, the Client/ Applicant outlined the legal framework governing a court’s interference with a taxing officer’s discretion. The Client/ Applicant submitted that while taxation is a discretionary exercise, such discretion must be exercised judiciously and in accordance with established principles. The Applicant urged the Court to intervene where there is an error of principle or where the award is manifestly excessive or low. 22.Reliance was placed in the case of Bank of Uganda v Sudhir Ruparalia & Another (Taxation Reference No. 1 of 2023) [2023] UGSC 12, where the Supreme Court of Uganda held that judicial interference is warranted only in exceptional circumstances, particularly where the taxing officer applies a wrong principle or arrives at an award that results in injustice. The Applicant further relies on the case of Keziah Gathoni Supeyo v Yano t/a Yano & Co. Advocates [2019] eKLR, which adopted the principles in Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others (No. 3) (1972) EA 162, emphasizing that costs should be fair, reasonable, and not so high as to impede access to justice, and that consistency and judicial discretion must guide taxation. 23.Turning to the issue of instruction fees, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer awarded an excessive and unjustified sum, having failed to properly apply the guiding principles. Further, that although the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable, the discretion exercised ought to have been grounded in clear and specific reasoning. 24.Reliance was also placed in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates (2002) 1 EA 92, where the Court of Appeal held that where the value of the subject matter cannot be determined from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement, the taxing officer must exercise discretion based on factors such as the nature and importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, and the conduct of the proceedings 25.Further, the Client/Applicant argued that in the present case, the Taxing Officer merely made generalized observations without demonstrating how those factors justified the substantial instruction fee awarded. To reinforce this argument, the Client/ Applicant cites Kyalo Mbobu t/a Kyalo & Associates Advocates v Jacob Juma [2015] eKLR and Ramesh Naran Patel v Attorney General & Another [2012] eKLR, which emphasized that a taxing officer must expressly identify and analyze the factors informing the exercise of discretion, including the complexity of the matter, the labour involved, and the volume of documentation. 26.Further reliance was placed in the case of Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR, where the Court stressed that awards of costs must be supported by specific and cogent justification, and that generalized reasoning is insufficient. The Client/ Applicant submitted that the failure by the Taxing Officer to provide detailed reasoning renders the award of instruction fees erroneous in principle and warrants interference. 27.Further, the Client/ Applicant challenged the taxation of specific items relating to service and attendances, and submitted that the Taxing Officer allowed amounts exceeding the statutory limits prescribed under the Advocates Remuneration Order. In particular, the Client/ Applicant argued that service fees are capped at Kshs. 1,400/=, and that the amounts awarded under items 6 and 25 were therefore unlawful. Similarly, the amounts awarded for attendances under items 28, 30, and 35 are said to contravene Schedule 6A (7), which provides for capped fees. It contended that these awards demonstrate a clear misapplication of the law. 28.On the issue of the 50% increase of costs, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer fundamentally misapprehended the law by applying the increment to an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs in the absence of a prior taxation of Party-and-Party costs. In support of this position, reliance was placed in the case of Nyangito & Co. Advocates v Doinyo Lessos Creameries Ltd [2014] eKLR, where the Court held that the 50% increment under Part B of Schedule VI applies only after Party-and-Party costs have been determined. 29.The Client/ Applicant also cited the case of Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates v County Government of Narok (Miscellaneous Application E608 of 2019) [eKLR], in which the Court found that it was an error in principle for a taxing officer to add 50% directly to an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs, without first establishing Party-and-Party costs. The Client/ Applicant argued that the application of the 50% increase in the present case was unlawful and a misdirection by the Taxing Officer. 30.In conclusion, the Client/ Applicant submitted that the Taxing Officer committed several errors of law and principle, including awarding excessive instruction fees without adequate justification, disregarding statutory limits on certain items, and improperly applying the 50% increment. 31.It was argued that these errors, , render the taxation manifestly excessive and unjust. Therefore, the Client/Applicant urged the Court to allow the instant Reference, set aside the taxation ruling, and either reassess the Bill of Costs or remit it for fresh taxation before a different Taxing 32.The Advocate/Respondent’s filed its written submissions dated 16th February 2026, in opposition to the instant Reference, and submitted that the Reference is unmeritorious and invited the Court to uphold the decision of the Taxing Officer, arguing that the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs at Kshs. 2,820,252/90 was proper, lawful, and grounded in settled principles. 33.The Advocate/Respondent outlined the applicable legal framework governing interference with taxation decisions, emphasizing that such interference is limited, and only permissible where there is a clear error of principle. Reliance is placed in the case of Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Another [1972] EA 162, which sets out the foundational principles of taxation, including fairness, reasonableness, and the need to avoid excessive awards. 34.The Advocate/ respondent also cited the case of First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others (2002) EA 64 and Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates (2002) 1 EA 92, as well as the recent Supreme Court decision in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (Petition E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), all of which affirm that a taxing officer exercises judicial discretion that should not be lightly interfered with. 35.Further reliance was placed in the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application No. 23 of 1999) [2000] UGSC 3, where it was held that a judge should not interfere merely because he would have awarded a different figure. 36.The Advocate/Respondent further submitted that the Taxing Officer properly exercised this discretion and applied the correct legal principles. In particular, it is argued that the Taxing Officer considered all relevant factors under Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, including the nature and importance of the matter, the care and labour involved, the complexity of the issues, and the duration of the proceedings. 37.On instruction fees, which form the core of the dispute, the Advocate/Respondent submitted that the Client/Applicant has failed to demonstrate any error in principle. Further, that the value of the subject matter was not ascertainable from the pleadings, thereby entitling the Taxing Officer to exercise discretion. 38.Reliance was placed on Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] eKLR, which authorizes the taxing officer to determine instruction fees based on relevant factors where value is indeterminate. This position was reinforced by the Supreme Court in the case of Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (supra), which affirmed that the taxing officer has broad discretion in such circumstances. 39.The Advocate/Respondent further relied on the case of Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR, where the Court held that instruction fees should not be determined solely by the value of the subject matter but must also take into account factors such as the complexity of the case, the labour involved, the volume of documents, and the interests of the parties. 40.Further reliance was sought in the case of Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission v Chief Justice of the Republic of Kenya & Another [2014] eKLR, where the Court observed that there is no precise formula for calculating instruction fees, and the process involves a balancing of competing considerations. The Advocate therefore submits that the Taxing Officer correctly exercised discretion by considering these factors, including the complexity of the appeal, the duration of representation (approximately four years), and the work undertaken. 41.With respect to the impugned items on service and attendances (items 6, 25, 28, 30, and 35), the Advocate/Respondent argued that the Client/Applicant’s objections are based on a misinterpretation of the law. It is submitted that the alleged cap of Kshs. 1,400/=, for service applies only within a limited geographical radius, and additional charges are permissible depending on distance, as provided under Schedule 6(9) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. 42.Similarly, the Advocate contends that Schedule 6A (7) allows for higher charges for attendances—up to Kshs. 15,000—and that the amounts awarded were therefore within the permissible scale. It was further submitted and emphasized that the work involved physical attendance in court and travel between Nairobi and Narok, justifying the costs incurred. 43.On the issue of the 50% increase of the taxed amount, the Advocate strongly defends the Taxing Officer’s approach, arguing that it is expressly mandated under Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The Advocate/Respondent submits that the Client/Applicant improperly raised this issue for the first time in the reference, contrary to established principles that a reference cannot introduce new issues not canvassed before the Taxing Officer. 44.In support of this position, reliance was placed in the case of Showcase Property Limited v Mugambi & Company Advocates [2020] eKLR and Ahmednasir Abdikadir & Company Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Limited (2) [2006] 1 EA 5, where courts held that issues not raised before the taxing officer cannot be introduced at the reference stage. 45.Substantively, the Advocate/Respondent maintained that the 50% increment is mandatory in Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. Reliance was placed in the case of Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority Pension Scheme & 8 Others [2017] eKELRC 498 (KLR), where the Court held that fees under Schedule 6 are to be increased by 50% in Advocate–Client taxation. 46.Additional support was drawn from the case of Dennis K.N. Magare & Another v Armajit Singh Gahir & 5 Others [2021] KEHC 12931 (KLR) and National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR, both of which affirm that the proper approach is to tax the Advocate–Client Bill and thereafter increase the amount by 50%. 47.The Advocate/Respondent also cited the case of Havi & Company Advocates v Purma Holdings Limited & 2 Others (Misc. Civil Cause No. E032 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 3690 (KLR), where the Court upheld a 50% increment based on the complexity and nature of the matter. 48.In conclusion, the Advocate/Respondent submitted that the Taxing Officer correctly applied the law, exercised discretion judiciously, and arrived at a fair and reasonable award. Further, that the Client/Applicant failed to demonstrate any error of principle or misdirection that would justify interference by the Court. 49.Ultimately, the Advocate/Respondent urged the Court to dismiss the instant Reference with costs, and maintained that the taxation was proper and in accordance with both the Advocates' Remuneration Order and established judicial authority. 50.Having considered the pleadings and rival submissions, the issues that arise for determination are:i.Whether the Taxing Officer erred in principle in the taxation of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs.ii.Whether the instruction fees awarded were excessive or unjustified.iii.Whether the taxation of items on service and attendances was contrary to the Advocates (Remuneration) Order.iv.Whether the 50% increase of the taxed costs was lawful.v.What orders should issue, including costs of the Reference. 51.The law governing taxation of costs is settled ; that is a matter within the discretion of the taxing officer, and a judge will only interfere where there is an error of principle or where the award is manifestly excessive or low. 52.In Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Others (No. 3) (1972) EA 162, the Court laid down guiding principles, including that costs should be fair, reasonable, and not impede access to justice. 53.Similarly, in the case of First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others (2002) EA 64, the Court held that interference is justified where the taxing officer has applied a wrong principle or failed to consider relevant factors. 54.The above position was restated in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates (2002) 1 EA 92, and more recently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates (Petition E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR), that the taxing officer exercises judicial discretion which should not be lightly interfered with. 55.Further, in the case of Bank of Uganda v Banco Arabe Espanol (Civil Application No. 23 of 1999) [2000] UGSC 3, t emphasized that a judge ought not to interfere merely because he would have arrived at a different figure. 56.Guided by the foregoing authorities, this Court must determine whether the impugned taxation discloses any error of principle. 57.On Whether the instruction fees were excessive, the core complaint by the Client/ Applicant relates to the award of instruction fees of Kshs. 1,500,000. The principles applicable where the value of the subject matter is not ascertainable were clearly stated in the case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates (supra), namely that the taxing officer is entitled to exercise discretion taking into account: the nature and importance of the matter; the interests of the parties; the general conduct of proceedings; and all other relevant circumstances. 58.This position was reaffirmed in the case of Jeremiah Muku v Methodist Church in Kenya Trustees Registered & Another [2015] eKLR, where the Court held that instruction fees are not solely dependent on value but also on complexity, labour, and responsibility involved. 59.Additionally, in the case of Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission v Chief Justice of Kenya & Another [2014] eKLR, the Court emphasized that taxation is not a mathematical exercise but a balancing of competing factors. 60.From the record, the Taxing Officer expressly considered: the nature of the Appeal; the duration of representation (approximately four years); the work involved; and the interests of the parties. 61.While the Client/ Applicant argued that the reasoning was generalized, this Court is satisfied that the Taxing Officer identified relevant factors and exercised discretion accordingly. The Applicant has not demonstrated that the amount awarded was so manifestly excessive as to warrant interference, nor that irrelevant considerations were taken into account. 62.Accordingly, no error of principle has been established in respect of instruction fees. 63.On Taxation of items on service and attendances, the Client/ Applicant contended and submitted that items on service and attendances exceeded statutory limits. However, Schedule 6(9) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order provides that service fees of Kshs. 1,400/= apply only within a limited radius, and additional charges may be allowed depending on distance. 64.In the present case, the services involved travel between Nairobi and Narok, and the Taxing Officer was entitled to consider such distance and attendant costs. 65.Regarding attendances, Schedule 6A(7) allows for charges up to Kshs. 15,000/=, depending on the nature of attendance. Consequently, this Court finds and holds that the Taxing Officer acted within the permissible scale and there is no evidence of misapplication of the law. Dissatisfaction with the quantum alone is not a ground for interference, as held in Lucy Waithera & 2 Others v Edwin Njagi t/a E.K. Njagi & Co. Advocates [2017] eKLR. 66.On Whether the 50% increase was lawful, the Client/ Applicant argued that the 50% increment was improperly applied without prior taxation of Party-and-Party costs. 67.However, Part B of Schedule 6 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order provides that Advocate–Client Bill of Costs shall be increased by 50% over the fees prescribed. The correct legal position has been clarified in several decisions. In Kinyua Muyaa & Co. Advocates v Kenya Ports Authority Pension Scheme & 8 Others [2017] eKELRC 498 (KLR), the Court held that the increase applies to Advocate–Client Bill of Costs, and is not dependent on prior taxation of Party-and-Party costs. 68.Similarly, in the case of National Bank of Kenya v Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo Advocates [2021] eKLR, the Court held that the proper approach is to tax the Advocate–Client Bill and thereafter increase it by 50%. The same reasoning was adopted in Dennis K.N. Magare & Another v Armajit Singh Gahir & 5 Others [2021] KEHC 12931 (KLR). 69.This Court is persuaded by the latter line of authorities, which represents the prevailing and more coherent interpretation of the Remuneration Order.Accordingly, the Taxing Officer did not err in applying the 50% increase. 70.Further, as correctly submitted by the Advocate/ Respondent, the issue was not raised before the Taxing Officer and cannot properly be introduced at the reference stage, as was held in the case of Ahmednasir Abdikadir & Co. Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Ltd (2) [2006] 1 EA 5 and Showcase Property Ltd v Mugambi & Co. Advocates [2020] eKLR. 71.Having carefully considered the Pleadings in totality and the rival written submissions, the Court finds and holds that the Client/ Applicant has failed to demonstrate: any error of principle; misapplication of the law; or that the award was manifestly excessive or unjust. 72.Consequently, the Court concludes that the Taxing Officer exercised his discretion judiciously and in accordance with established legal principles. 73.Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:a.The Client/Applicant’s Chamber Summons dated 12th May, 2025 is hereby dismissed.b.The taxation ruling delivered on 24th April, 2025 is hereby upheld.c.The Client/Applicant shall bear the costs of the Reference.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED AT NAROK, THIS 14TH DAY OF MAY, 2026L. GACHERUJUDGE.14th May 2026.Delivered online in the presence of.Elijah Meyoki - Court Assistant.N/A for the Appellant/ApplicantN/A for the RespondentsL. GACHERUJUDGE.14th May 2026.