https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/9173

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION** **PETITION NO. E058 OF 2025** **IN THE MATTER OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLE 22(1)** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT, 2015** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION OF RIGHTS OR FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLES 2, 10, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 47, 48, 49 AND 50 OF THE CONSTITUTION** **BETWEEN** **NATURE STARS COMPANY LIMITED................................................1ST PETITIONER SAMUEL MUNYUI NJERI................................................................2ND PETITIONER MICHAEL MWANGI GATANA..........................................................3RD PETITIONER HOPE IJAZA MUSALIA....................................................................4TH PETITIONER BABRA ATIENO NYUMBA...............................................................5TH PETITIONER JOYCE MSAVI ONGWELI.................................................................6TH PETITIONER** **VERSUS** **BERNARD AYUGI, SUB COUNTY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS** **OFFICER (SCCIO) RUAI POLICE STATION........................................1ST RESPONDENT SERGEANT MURASO..................................................................2ND RESPONDENT CORPORAL WASOME.................................................................3RD RESPONDENT OFFICER COMMANDING RUAI POLICE STATION...........................4TH RESPONDENT DIVISIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OFFICE (DCIO) RUAI........5TH RESPONDENT INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE.............6TH RESPONDENT DIRECTORATE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.............................7TH RESPONDENT THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS...................................8TH RESPONDENT JOSEPH NDUNGU KARANJA........................................................9TH RESPONDENT THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL.................................................10TH RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** **INTRODUCTION** 1. The Petitioners moved this Honourable Court vide an Amended Petition dated 7th March 2025 seeking redress for alleged violations of their fundamental rights and freedoms arising from investigations, search, seizure, arrest, and potential prosecution by the Respondents. The Petition challenges the constitutionality of the actions of police officers from Ruai Police Station who on 6th February 2025 entered the business premises of the 1st Petitioner, seized various items, arrested four employees, and locked the business premises. The Petitioners contend that these actions were conducted without search warrants, without adherence to statutory procedures, and were actuated by malice and political influence from the 9th Respondent, a Member of County Assembly. The Respondents have opposed the Petition, with the police Respondents asserting that their actions were lawful and within their mandate, the Director of Public Prosecutions arguing that no decision to prosecute has been made and the Petition is premature, and the 9th Respondent denying any political interference and contending that he merely lodged a legitimate complaint after discovering that the land whose shares he had purchased was encumbered. **BACKGROUND** 1. The 1st Petitioner is a private limited liability company duly incorporated under the Companies Act, 2015, and carries on the business of inviting members of the public to subscribe for shares for purposes of purchasing parcels of land, upon which subscribers are issued with ballots. The 2nd Petitioner is a director of the 1st Petitioner, while the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Petitioners are employees of the 1st Petitioner. 2. On or about 5th January 2025, the 9th Respondent subscribed for shares in the 1st Petitioner and paid a sum of Kshs.3,000.00. Subsequently, the 9th Respondent referred one hundred members who each paid a similar sum, amounting in aggregate to Kshs.300,000.00. Thereafter, the 9th Respondent demanded a refund from the 2nd Petitioner, stating that he was no longer interested in the investment opportunity. The 2nd Petitioner informed him that refunds could only be processed on an individual basis and not as a lump sum in respect of the one hundred members. 3. The 9th Respondent, who is the Member of County Assembly for Kiamaiko Ward, thereafter lodged a complaint at Ruai Police Station on 6th February 2025 vide OB No. 26/6/2/2025, alleging that the 2nd Petitioner had induced him to sell land which was subject to an existing ownership dispute. The 9th Respondent stated that, upon conducting due diligence through the Member of County Assembly for Ruai, he established that the parcel of land situated in the Ruai Sewerage area, which previously belonged to Cyrus Shakhalaga Khwa Jirongo, was the subject of a pending matter before the Court of Appeal regarding ownership. 4. Following the said complaint, the 1st to 5th Respondents proceeded to the premises of the 1st Petitioner on 6th February 2025 at approximately 2.30 pm. According to the 1st Respondent’s Replying Affidavit, a team of officers from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations visited Nature Stars Company Limited and found three ladies, namely the 4th, 5th, and 6th Petitioners, attending to customers. The Petitioners, however, contend that the officers entered the premises without prior notice, without the authority of the 1st Petitioner’s directors or employees, and without any search warrants. 5. Upon arrival, the police officers arrested the 4th, 5th, and 6th Petitioners. The 3rd Petitioner later arrived at the premises and identified himself as a trustee of the 2nd Petitioner, whereupon he was also arrested. The officers thereafter conducted a search within the premises and seized various items, including Kshs.30,000.00 in cash, one computer desktop, one MacBook laptop, three keyboards, a computer mouse, one mobile phone, various national identity cards and KRA PIN certificates, sale agreements, receipts, the 1st Petitioner’s original trading licence, and the office padlock and keys. The officers further secured the premises by replacing the existing padlock with a new one and retained the keys. 6. The four arrested Petitioners were escorted to Ruai Police Station and booked into custody. According to the 1st Respondent’s Replying Affidavit, they were informed of the reasons for their arrest and of their rights under Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution, including the right to communicate with persons who could raise police bond on their behalf. The Petitioners, however, contend that they were not informed of the reasons for their arrest. The four Petitioners were unable to raise police bond. On 7th February 2025, a person who claimed to be an advocate appeared before the Sub-County Criminal Investigations Officer, Ruai, and offered to stand surety for cash bail, but the arrangement did not materialise. Later that day, the 3rd Petitioner contacted his relatives, raised cash bail of Kshs.30,000.00, and was released. The other three Petitioners were released before the expiry of 24 hours. The arrested Petitioners were directed to appear before the Magistrates Court at Makadara Law Courts on 11th February 2025. However, as at the time of filing the Petition and during the hearing of this matter, no charges had been preferred against any of the Petitioners. 7. The Petitioners filed the instant Petition on 7th February 2025, alleging violation of their constitutional rights. In response, the Respondents filed various pleadings, including Grounds of Opposition and Replying Affidavits. **THE PETITIONERS’ CASE** 1. The Petitioners’ case is anchored on the contention that the actions of the 1st to 5th Respondents on 6th February 2025 were unlawful, unconstitutional, and an abuse of office. The Petitioners assert that the 1st to 5th Respondents stormed into the 1st Petitioner’s office without search warrants, arbitrarily seized the listed properties, locked the business premises, and arrested the 3rd to 6th Petitioners without informing them of the reasons for their arrest. The Petitioners further contend that the arrested Petitioners were not presented in court within 24 hours as required by Article 49(1)(f) of the Constitution, and that to date, no charges have been preferred against them. 2. The Petitioners averred that the search and seizure violated Article 31 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to privacy, including the right not to have their person, home, or property searched, and their possessions seized. The Petitioners submitted that under Section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code, police officers are required to obtain search warrants from a court before conducting a search, and that the Respondents had not demonstrated any basis for entering the premises without a warrant under Sections 57 or 60 of the National Police Service Act. The Petitioners relied on the case of ***Standard Newspapers Limited & another v Attorney General & 4 others [2013] eKLR***, where the court held that police officers must abide by the law and due process, and that arbitrary searches and seizures violate constitutional protections. 3. Regarding the arrest and detention, the Petitioners submitted that the 1st to 5th Respondents violated Article 49(1)(a)(ii) and (c) of the Constitution by failing to inform the arrested Petitioners of the reasons for their arrest and their right to communicate with an advocate. Further, the Petitioners argued that the failure to present the arrested persons in court within 24 hours contravened Article 49(1)(f). The Petitioners relied on the case of ***Reuben Mwangi v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others [2012] eKLR***, where the court held that whenever a Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates the stifling of or threats of infringement of rights by investigative and prosecutorial agencies, the court should intervene and stop such a prosecution. 4. The Petitioners further argued that the dispute between the 1st Petitioner and the 9th Respondent is purely civil in nature, arising from a commercial transaction where the 9th Respondent paid a non-refundable subscription fee. The Petitioners submitted that the criminal justice system should not be used as a tool for settling civil disputes or personal scores. They relied on the case of ***Okul & 2 others v Director of Criminal Investigations & another; Maina (Interested Party) (Constitutional Petition 238 of 2022) [2022] KEHC 15947 (KLR)****,* where the court held that where a claim is better dealt with in a civil court as opposed to invoking the criminal justice system, the court ought to intervene. Further reliance was placed on the decision in ***Eunice Khalwali Miima v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others [2017] eKLR***, where the court stated that if an applicant demonstrates that criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court will not hesitate to halt such proceedings. 5. The Petitioners contended that the 9th Respondent, being a Member of County Assembly, used his political influence to coerce the police Respondents to act against the Petitioners. They pointed to text messages annexed to the Supporting Affidavit as evidence of threats. The Petitioners prayed for declarations that their rights under Articles 28, 29, 31, 40(3), 47, and 49 had been violated, an order for the return of the seized properties, an order to unlock the business premises, a conservatory order restraining any further arrests or prosecution, compensation in the sum of Kshs.10,000,000.00 and costs. **THE 1ST TO 7TH RESPONDENTS’ CASE** 1. The 1st to 7th Respondents opposed the Petition through a Replying Affidavit sworn by No. 231693 Mr. Bernard Yugi, ASP, the Sub-County Criminal Investigations Officer in charge of Ruai. It was deponed that on 6th February 2025, the 9th Respondent visited Ruai Police Station and made a report vide OB No. 26/6/2/2025 that he was lured by the 2nd Petitioner into selling a parcel of land that belonged to Cyrus Shakhalaga Khwa Jirongo, which was subject to a pending court case. 2. It was averred that investigations commenced and established that the 9th Respondent had mobilized a group of one hundred customers who paid subscription fees and later demanded refunds after discovering the land dispute. The 1st Respondent further stated that on 5th February 2025, the 9th Respondent called the 2nd Petitioner to meet at a restaurant in Njiru, but upon seeing customers who resembled police officers, the 2nd Petitioner ran away and accused the 9th Respondent of calling police to arrest him. 3. The 1st to 7th Respondents contended that the search and seizure were conducted in accordance with Sections 119, 120, and 121 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 75) and Section 20 of the Police Act. The 1st Respondent averred that an inventory was prepared and signed by the arrested Petitioners. Regarding the release of the arrested persons, it was argued that the 3rd Petitioner was released on cash bail of Kshs.30,000.00, and the other three were released before the lapse of 24 hours as the 24-hour period ended outside court hours and the next day was a weekend. 4. They also filed Grounds of Opposition dated 19th May 2025 arguing that the Petition is premature and an abuse of court process as the Petitioners have not exhausted available legal remedies, that the search and seizure were undertaken lawfully in accordance with the National Police Service Act and the Criminal Procedure Code, and that the Petitioners had failed to demonstrate any constitutional violations attributable to the Respondents. Through the Attorney General, the Respondents submitted that the police have a duty to investigate complaints, and that the court should not interfere with ongoing investigations unless it is demonstrated that the Respondents acted outside their mandate or in bad faith. 5. The court was thus urged to dismiss the Petition with costs. **THE 8TH RESPONDENT’S CASE** 1. The 8th Respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions, opposed the Petition through Grounds of Opposition dated 24th October 2025 and written submissions. The 8th Respondent argued that the Petition is premature, misconceived, and an abuse of the court process as the investigation file had not been forwarded to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for consideration, and consequently, no decision to charge had been made under Article 157(6) of the Constitution. Further, it is contended that conservatory orders are not available in anticipation of a possible prosecution, and that the Petitioners must await a concrete decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions before invoking the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. 2. The 8th Respondent further submitted that the Petitioners had not demonstrated any violation or threatened violation of their rights by the actions of the Director of Public Prosecutions, as the complaint was still at the investigative stage. Reliance was placed on the decision in ***Leonard Otieno v Airtel Kenya Limited [2018] eKLR***for the proposition that a litigant bears the burden of proof in respect of the propositions he asserts to prove his claim, and that decisions on violation of constitutional rights cannot be based upon unsupported hypotheses. Further reliance was placed on the case of ***Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No.1) [1979] KLR 154***for the principle that constitutional violations must be pleaded with a reasonable degree of precision. 3. The 8th Respondent prays that the Amended Petition be dismissed with costs. **THE 9TH RESPONDENT’S CASE** 1. The 9th Respondent opposed the Petition through an Answer to Petition dated 25th February 2025, a Replying Affidavit sworn on 25th February 2025, and written submissions dated 31st May 2025. The 9th Respondent admitted that he subscribed to the 1st Petitioner’s shares and referred one hundred members. However, he contended that he later discovered that the parcel of land situated in Ruai Sewerage area had a pending case in the Court of Appeal concerning its ownership, and that the land did not belong to the 1st Petitioner. 2. The 9th Respondent deponed that he was introduced to the 2nd and 3rd Petitioners by his pastor, Reverend Peter Nuthu, who informed him that the 1st Petitioner was selling shares for a parcel of land that previously belonged to Cyrus Shakhalaga Khwa Jirongo. The 9th Respondent visited the 1st Petitioner’s office and was assured that upon registering and paying a refundable fee of Kshs.3,000.00, he would be allocated a plot. The 9th Respondent stated that he rallied one hundred people, hired two buses to transport them to the 1st Petitioner’s office, whereupon they paid the subscription fee. 3. The 9th Respondent further averred that on 23rd January 2025, he met the Member of County Assembly for Ruai, who warned him that the parcel of land had a case pending in the Court of Appeal and that anyone purporting to sell shares in respect of that land was a fraudster. The 9th Respondent then called the 2nd Petitioner and asked why he was purporting to sell shares for a disputed land. The 9th Respondent stated that the people he had rallied pressured him for refunds, and he lodged a complaint with the police. 4. The 9th Respondent denied using his political influence to coerce the police Respondents, arguing that he has a right as a citizen to lodge a complaint where he suspects a crime has occurred. He submitted that his role ended once he lodged the complaint, and it was upon the police to conduct their own independent investigations. Reliance was placed on the case of ***Republic v Commissioner of Police and Another ex parte Michael Monari & Another [2012] eKLR***, where the court held that the police have a duty to investigate on any complaint once a complaint is made, and the court would be reluctant to intervene as long as the prosecution and those charged with the responsibility of making decisions to charge act in a reasonable manner. 5. The 9th Respondent further submitted that the dispute was not purely civil, as the 2nd Petitioner had a history of similar investigations by DCI Kiambu East in 2024 concerning obtaining money by false pretences through an entity known as Kasarini Farmers Co-operative Society Limited (1964) and argued that the conduct of the 2nd Petitioner is tainted and needs to be investigated. 6. The 9th Respondent urges the court to allow the criminal court to prosecute the criminal case to its entirety and dismissing the Petition with costs as the Petitioners have not proved their case against the 9th Respondent. **THE 10TH RESPONDENT’S CASE** 1. The 10th Respondent, the Honourable Attorney General, was joined as a party pursuant to the Court’s order dated 5th March 2025. Although duly served, the Attorney General did not file a response to the Amended Petition. However, the Attorney General filed Grounds of Opposition on behalf of the 1st to 7th Respondents, which the Court has duly considered **ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION** 1. Having carefully considered the Amended Petition, the responses, the affidavits, the written submissions, and the authorities cited by the parties, the Court is of the view that the following issues arise for determination: 2. ***Whether the search and seizure conducted by the 1st to 5th Respondents at the 1st Petitioner’s premises on 6th February 2025 were lawful and complied with constitutional and statutory requirements.*** 3. ***Whether the arrest and detention of the 3rd to 6th Petitioners violated their rights under Article 49 of the Constitution.*** 4. ***Whether the continued investigations and the threat of criminal prosecution in relation to the dispute between the 1st Petitioner and the 9th Respondent constitute an abuse of the criminal justice system and a violation of the Petitioners’ constitutional rights.*** 5. ***Whether the 9th Respondent used his political influence to instigate the police actions, thereby violating the Petitioners’ rights.*** 6. ***Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought*** **Whether the search and seizure conducted by the 1st to 5th Respondents at the 1st Petitioner’s premises on 6th February 2025 were lawful and complied with constitutional and statutory requirements.** 1. The starting point in determining this issue is the constitutional protection accorded to the right to privacy and property. Article 31 of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to privacy, including the right not to have their person, home, or property searched, and their possessions seized. Article 40 protects the right to acquire and enjoy property and prohibits the State from arbitrarily depriving any person of property except in accordance with the Constitution and the law. These protections extend to juristic persons, including companies, whose premises and property are equally protected from unlawful State intrusion. 2. The Court is nevertheless mindful that the rights under Articles 31 and 40 are not absolute. Article 24 permits limitation of rights where such limitation is provided for by law and is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. The State, through its investigative agencies, is therefore entitled to undertake searches and seizures where there exists a lawful basis and where the exercise of that power is carried out in a manner that is necessary, proportionate, and consistent with constitutional safeguards. 3. The statutory framework governing searches and seizures by police officers is principally found in the Criminal Procedure Code and the National Police Service Act. Section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides the general procedure requiring a police officer seeking to search premises to obtain a warrant issued by a court or magistrate upon being satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that anything necessary for an investigation into an offence is likely to be found therein. 4. The requirement for judicial authorisation is not, however, absolute. The law recognises circumstances where the obtaining of a warrant may not be practicable. Section 57 of the National Police Service Act permits entry without a warrant in limited circumstances, including where delay in obtaining a warrant is likely to prejudice an investigation or where entry is required in relation to a person suspected of having committed a cognizable offence. Similarly, Section 60(1) permits warrantless entry and seizure where an investigating officer has reasonable grounds to believe that delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would substantially prejudice the investigation, provided the statutory requirements, including recording the grounds of belief, are satisfied. 5. The question for determination, therefore, is not whether the Respondents were entitled to investigate the complaint made by the 9th Respondent, but whether the manner in which they exercised their investigative powers complied with the constitutional and statutory safeguards governing search and seizure. 6. In the present matter, the Respondents have not demonstrated the legal basis upon which the search and seizure of 6th February 2025 was undertaken. The 1st Respondent merely stated that the search was conducted pursuant to Sections 119, 120, and 121 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 20 of the Police Act. However, no search warrant was produced before the Court. Further, the Respondents did not demonstrate that the circumstances contemplated under Sections 57 or 60 of the National Police Service Act existed so as to justify dispensing with a warrant. 7. In particular, there was no evidence that the investigating officers recorded the grounds upon which they believed that obtaining a warrant would prejudice the investigation, as contemplated under Section 60(1) of the National Police Service Act. Equally, there was no evidence placed before the Court showing that the requirements for entry without a warrant under Section 57 were complied with. The mere existence of a complaint and the commencement of investigations could not, without more, justify the complete displacement of the statutory safeguards governing entry into private premises and seizure of property. 8. The Court finds guidance in the decision of ***Standard Newspapers Limited & another v Attorney General & 4 others [2013] eKLR***, where Mumbi Ngugi J (as she then was) held that the search and seizure carried out by police officers on the premises of the petitioners was unlawful because the officers had not obtained search warrants. The court thus stated: - ***“While it is true that police have a duty to prevent commission of crimes, they must, just like everyone else, abide by the law, and there must be due process in everything that they do in exercise of their mandate to prevent the commission of crime. To hold otherwise would be to say that the rules and dictates of democracy are too tedious to observe and an unnecessary inconvenience; and this would result in anarchy and negate the very core principles of our Constitution.”*** 1. The Court is further guided by the decision in ***Robert Mwangi Mugo v OCS Nyahururu Police Station & 2 others [2022] KEHC 2534 (KLR),*** where the Court held that the entry into, search of, and seizure of property from the petitioner’s premises was arbitrary and violated the petitioner’s right to privacy and dignity. The Court emphasized that the police had failed to demonstrate any basis upon which it was impracticable to obtain a search warrant, and further found that the items seized had no discernible nexus to the alleged offence of possession of narcotics. 2. Applying the foregoing principles, the Court finds that the Respondents failed to justify the search and seizure undertaken on 6th February 2025. The Petitioners’ premises were entered, various items were seized, and the premises were secured without the Respondents demonstrating the existence of a warrant or the circumstances that would have legally permitted a warrantless search. 3. The Court has also considered the nature and extent of the items seized. They included cash, computers, mobile phones, identification documents, KRA PIN certificates, agreements, receipts, the 1st Petitioner’s trading licence, and the office padlock and keys. While investigative agencies may seize items reasonably connected to an alleged offence, the Respondents were required to demonstrate the nexus between the seized items and the offence under investigation. No explanation was offered before this Court as to why the entire range of items seized, including the trading licence and office padlock, was necessary for purposes of the investigation. 4. The Respondents’ contention that an inventory was prepared does not cure the absence of a lawful basis for the search. An inventory records the items taken after a seizure has occurred. It does not, by itself, validate the legality of the preceding entry and search. Further, although the Respondents alleged that the inventory was signed, the same was not placed before Court for consideration. 5. The Court further finds that the locking of the 1st Petitioner’s premises was not shown to have a legal foundation. The Respondents did not identify any statutory provision empowering them, in the circumstances of this case, to close the Petitioner’s business premises during investigations. The continued closure of the premises interfered with the 1st Petitioner’s ability to carry on its business and amounted to an unlawful interference with its property rights and its right to lawful and procedurally fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution. 6. Accordingly, the Court finds and holds that the search and seizure conducted by the 1st to 5th Respondents on 6th February 2025 were unlawful for want of demonstrated compliance with the constitutional and statutory safeguards governing searches and seizures. The seizure of the 1st Petitioner’s property and the locking of its premises violated the 1st Petitioner’s rights under Articles 31, 40(3), and 47 of the Constitution. **Whether the arrest and detention of the 3rd to 6th Petitioners violated their rights under Article 49 of the Constitution** 1. Article 49(1) of the Constitution enumerates the rights of arrested persons. These include the right to be informed promptly, in a language that the person understands, of the reason for the arrest, the right to remain silent, and the right to communicate with an advocate and other persons whose assistance is necessary. Article 49(1)(f) provides that an arrested person has the right to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible, but not later than twenty-four hours after being arrested, or if the twenty-four hours ends outside ordinary court hours or on a day that is not an ordinary court day, the end of the next court day. 2. The Court has considered the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Petitioners. The 1st Respondent’s Replying Affidavit states that upon arrest, the Petitioners were informed of their rights under Article 49(1)(h) of the Constitution and advised on the availability of police bond. However, the affidavit does not state that the arrested Petitioners were informed of the specific reasons for their arrest, as required under Article 49(1)(a). The Respondents were under a constitutional obligation not merely to effect the arrest but to demonstrate compliance with the safeguards attendant to such arrest. 3. The Court is mindful that the burden in constitutional litigation rests upon the party alleging violation to establish the same. However, once a prima facie complaint of infringement is raised, the State actors who exercised coercive powers are expected to place before the Court sufficient material demonstrating that such powers were exercised within the constitutional and statutory framework. In the present case, no evidence was placed before the Court demonstrating that the Petitioners were furnished with the reasons for their arrest or that they were facilitated to communicate with an advocate or any other person of their choice. 4. The Court therefore finds that the Respondents failed to discharge the obligation of demonstrating compliance with Article 49(1)(a) and Article 49(1)(c) of the Constitution. The mere assertion that the Petitioners were informed of their rights generally does not, without more, satisfy the constitutional requirement that an arrested person be promptly informed of the specific reason for the arrest and afforded the opportunity to seek legal assistance. 5. On the question of production before court within twenty-four hours, the material facts are not disputed. The arrests occurred on 6th February 2025 at approximately 2.30 p.m. The 1st Respondent contends that the Petitioners were released before the expiry of the constitutional period and that the period extended because the following day was not a court day. The Court has considered this explanation against the established chronology of events. 6. Twenty-four hours from the time of arrest lapsed at approximately 2.30 p.m. on Friday, 7th February 2025. The said day was an ordinary court day. The Respondents were therefore required, unless a lawful exception applied, to present the arrested Petitioners before a court within that period. Instead, the Petitioners were released at approximately 8.00 p.m. on 7th February 2025, as evidenced by the cash bail receipt annexed to the Petitioners’ pleadings. 7. The explanation advanced by the 1st Respondent that the period expired outside court hours because the following day was a weekend is, with respect, not borne out by the facts. The next day following the arrest was Friday, 7th February 2025. Further, even in circumstances where the constitutional period expires outside ordinary court hours or on a day that is not an ordinary court day, Article 49(1)(f) does not authorise continued detention indefinitely. It requires presentation before a court at the end of the next court day. 8. The Respondents have not demonstrated that there existed compelling circumstances justifying the failure to present the arrested Petitioners before a court within the prescribed period. The Court therefore finds that the continued detention of the 3rd to 6th Petitioners beyond the constitutional period violated Article 49(1)(f) of the Constitution. 9. The Court further notes that the Petitioners were released without any charges having been preferred against them. Although the State is entitled to investigate suspected criminal conduct, investigative powers must be exercised in a manner consistent with constitutional safeguards and the requirement that administrative action be lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. 10. In the present matter, the Petitioners were arrested on 6th February 2025 and directed to appear before the Magistrates Court at Makadara Law Courts on 11th February 2025. However, no charges were preferred against them, and no explanation has been offered for the continued pendency of the investigations. The mere existence of an investigation cannot justify keeping a person under the shadow of possible prosecution indefinitely. 11. The Court draws guidance from the decision in ***Reuben Mwangi v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others; UAP Insurance & another (Interested Parties) [2021] eKLR***, where A. C. Mrima J (as he then was) stated: - ***“It is, hence, a settled legal principle and position that whenever a Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates the stifling of or threats of infringement of rights, fundamental freedoms, the Constitution and/or the law by the investigative and prosecutorial agencies, a Court should not hesitate to intervene and stop such a prosecution. Such intervention by the Courts should, however, be in clearest of the cases.”*** 1. Although in that case the Petitioner had already been charged, the principle that investigative and prosecutorial powers must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution applies equally where a person remains under investigation and faces the continuing threat of prosecution. The State is entitled to investigate suspected criminal conduct. However, such investigations cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely without reasonable progress or a clear decision on whether criminal proceedings will be instituted. 2. The continued summoning of the Petitioners to the police station, while leaving them under the unresolved threat of arrest and prosecution, constitutes an interference with their right to freedom and security of the person under Article 29 of the Constitution and amounts to administrative action that must meet the constitutional threshold of lawfulness, reasonableness, and procedural fairness under Article 47. 3. In the present case, the 3rd to 6th Petitioners were arrested and detained for approximately thirty (30) hours and were thereafter released without any charges being preferred against them. As at the date of this judgment, a period of over nine months has lapsed since the arrest, yet no decision to charge has been made. 4. The 8th Respondent, the Director of Public Prosecutions, informed the Court that the investigation file had not been forwarded to his office for consideration, while the 1st Respondent maintained that investigations were ongoing. No explanation, however, was placed before the Court to justify the prolonged pendency of the investigations or to demonstrate the steps taken towards their conclusion. 5. The Court reiterates that while investigative agencies have a constitutional mandate to investigate suspected criminal offences, that mandate is not unfettered. Investigations must be conducted in a manner that is lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair as required under Article 47 of the Constitution. In the circumstances of this case, the continued maintenance of the Petitioners under the shadow of possible prosecution, without a decision being made for an extended period and without a sufficient explanation for the delay, falls short of the constitutional standard of expeditious administrative action. 6. Accordingly, the Court finds and holds that the arrest and detention of the 3rd to 6th Petitioners violated their rights under Article 49(1)(a) (right to be informed of the reason for arrest), Article 49(1)(c) (right to communicate with an advocate), and Article 49(1)(f) (right to be brought before a court within 24 hours). The continued pendency of the investigations without any charges having been preferred also violates the Petitioners’ right to fair administrative action under Article 47. **Whether the continued investigations and the threat of criminal prosecution in relation to the dispute between the 1st Petitioner and the 9th Respondent constitute an abuse of the criminal justice system and a violation of the Petitioners’ constitutional rights.** 1. The Petitioners contend that the dispute between the 1st Petitioner and the 9th Respondent is essentially a commercial dispute arising from a transaction in which the 9th Respondent paid a non-refundable subscription fee of Kshs.3,000.00. They argue that the criminal justice process was invoked, not for the legitimate investigation of an offence, but as a means of compelling repayment and exerting pressure upon the Petitioners. 2. The 9th Respondent disputes this characterization. He contends that the transaction involved a parcel of land whose ownership was disputed, and that the 2nd Petitioner knew or ought to have known that the land was not available for sale. The 9th Respondent further pointed to the fact that the 2nd Petitioner had been arrested in 2024 in a similar matter involving Kasarini Farmers Co-operative Society Limited (1964), where the complainants had paid a sum of Kshs.2,160,000.00 for land that was not available. The 9th Respondent argues that there is a pattern of conduct by the 2nd Petitioner that warrants criminal investigation. 3. The Court has also considered the allegation that the 2nd Petitioner had previously been arrested in connection with a separate complaint involving Kasarini Farmers Co-operative Society Limited (1964). The record shows that the 2nd Petitioner was arrested on or about 8th April 2024 and presented before the **Kiambu Law Courts in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. E152 of 2024.** The said proceedings did not result in the 2nd Petitioner being charged. The Court notes, however, that the said matter involved a different complainant, a different entity, and different circumstances from those presently before Court. The existence of a previous complaint or investigation, without more, cannot by itself establish criminal propensity or justify continued infringement of constitutional rights. Equally, the fact that a previous investigation did not culminate in charges does not, standing alone, prove that the present investigation is an abuse of process. 4. In the present matter, the relevant criminal offence alleged is that of obtaining money by false pretences under Section 313 of the Penal Code. The offence requires more than a mere failure to perform a contractual obligation. It requires proof of a false representation, knowledge of its falsity at the time it was made, and an intention to defraud, resulting in the obtaining of money or property. 5. The question therefore before the Court is not whether the Petitioners should be immune from investigation, nor whether the 9th Respondent was entitled to make a complaint. The question is whether, from the material presented before the Court, the continued use of the criminal process was for the legitimate purpose of investigating a disclosed criminal offence or whether it had been deployed for an ulterior purpose. 6. The Court has examined the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The evidence before the Court indicates that the 9th Respondent paid a subscription fee of Kshs.3,000.00. The receipt produced before Court describes the payment as non-refundable. The 9th Respondent subsequently sought a refund, not only of his own payment but also of monies paid by other persons whom he had introduced. The 1st Petitioner’s position was that any refund could only be considered upon individual requests by the respective members. 7. On the material before Court, the dispute appears to have crystallized around whether the subscription payment was refundable and whether the 1st Petitioner would honour the expectations of the members introduced by the 9th Respondent. While such circumstances may justify civil proceedings or further inquiry, the Court has not been shown sufficient material demonstrating that, at the time the money was received, the Petitioners made a representation they knew to be false or that they obtained the money with an intention to defraud. 8. The Court is guided by the caution sounded by the Court of Appeal in ***Commissioner of Police & The Director of Criminal Investigation Department & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 4 others [2013] eKLR***, where the stated: ***“It is not in the public interest or in the interest of the administration of justice to use criminal justice process as a pawn in civil disputes. It is unconscionable and a travesty of justice for the police to be involved in the settlement of what is purely a civil dispute being litigated in court.”*** 1. Similarly, in ***Jirongo v Soy Developers Ltd & 9 others [2021] KESC 32 (KLR)*** the Supreme Court stated that: - ***“Criminal proceedings, whether accompanied by civil proceedings or not, cannot and should never be used in the manner that the 2nd and 3rd respondents have done. It is indeed advisable for parties to pursue civil proceedings initially and with firm findings by the civil court on any alleged fraud, proceed to institute criminal proceedings to bring any culprit to book***.” 1. In the present case, the Court is faced with a situation where the 9th Respondent paid Kshs.3,000.00 as a subscription fee. The receipt annexed to the Supporting Affidavit indicates that the fee is non-refundable. The 9th Respondent later changed his mind and demanded a refund, not only of his Kshs.3,000.00 but also of the Kshs.300,000.00 paid by the one hundred members he referred. The 2nd Petitioner explained that the company could only refund the 100 members if they came individually to make such demands. The 9th Respondent then lodged a police complaint, alleging that the 2nd Petitioner had lured him into selling a parcel of land whose ownership was disputed. 2. The Court has examined the text messages annexed as NS-5 to the Supporting Affidavit. The messages show that the 9th Respondent threatened to use police officers to close down the Petitioner’s business. One message read, *“You will see what will happen to your office tomorrow. I have already talked to the OCS.”* These messages, which were not challenged by the 9th Respondent, strongly suggest that the complaint to the police was motivated not by a genuine desire to enforce the criminal law, but by a desire to pressure the 2nd Petitioner into refunding the money. This is precisely the type of abuse of the criminal justice system that the Court of Appeal warned against in the***Commissioner of Police & the Director of Criminal Investigation Department & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 4 others (supra).*** 3. In ***Republic v. Commissioner of Co-operatives ex parte Kirinyaga Tea Growers Cooperative Savings & Credit Society Ltd CA 39/97 119991 EALR 245*** the Court of Appeal warned against the improper use of power in the following words: - ***“...it is axiomatic that statutory powers can only be exercised validly if they are exercised reasonably. No statute ever allowed anyone on whom it confers power to exercise such power arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith….”*** 1. The Court also notes that the 9th Respondent is a Member of County Assembly, a position which carries public influence and access to state institutions. The Court accepts that the 9th Respondent, like any other citizen, was entitled to lodge a complaint with the police if he genuinely believed that an offence had been committed. However, the Court is required to examine the circumstances in which the complaint was made and the purpose for which the criminal process was invoked. 2. The text messages annexed as NS-5, which were not controverted by the 9th Respondent, indicate that prior to the lodging of the complaint, the 9th Respondent had threatened to use police intervention against the 2nd Petitioner and to have the Petitioners’ business premises closed. The timing and content of the messages, when considered together with the subsequent police action, leads the Court to the conclusion that the criminal process was invoked, at least in part, for the collateral purpose of exerting pressure upon the Petitioners to refund the monies paid by the 9th Respondent and the persons he had introduced, rather than solely for the legitimate enforcement of the criminal law. 3. The Court further finds that the manner in which the complaint was acted upon was disproportionate to the circumstances presented. The Respondents seized the 1st Petitioner’s property, locked its premises, arrested its employees, and detained them for over thirty hours without charges being preferred. While the police are empowered to investigate allegations of crime, such powers must be exercised reasonably, lawfully, and for the purpose for which they were conferred. 4. In the circumstances of this case, there were less intrusive investigative measures available to the Respondents, including obtaining statements from the 9th Respondent and the alleged members, summoning the 2nd Petitioner to record a statement, and conducting further inquiries into the transaction before resorting to coercive measures. The decision to undertake a search, seize a wide range of items, close the premises, and arrest employees, viewed together with the circumstances surrounding the complaint, demonstrates that the criminal process was deployed in a manner inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of proportionality. 5. In ***Okul & 2 others v Director of Criminal Investigations & another Maina (Interested Party) (supra),*** M. Thande J held that a dispute arising from an agreement for sale of an apartment was more appropriately addressed through the civil process rather than through the criminal justice system. The Court observed that civil law provides mechanisms for resolving disputes arising from alleged breach of contract, including recovery of monies and enforcement of judgments. 6. The Court finds that the dispute between the 1st Petitioner and the 9th Respondent, on the material before Court, arose from a commercial transaction. The 9th Respondent paid a subscription fee, which was described in the receipt as non-refundable. He later sought a refund, while the 1st Petitioner maintained that the terms of the transaction did not permit such refund. This dispute, without more, is capable of determination through civil proceedings or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms where applicable. 7. The Court reiterates that a contractual or commercial dispute may, in appropriate circumstances, disclose a criminal offence. However, for an offence of obtaining money by false pretences under Section 313 of the Penal Code to arise, there must be evidence of a false representation made knowingly, and with intent to defraud. From the material placed before Court, the Respondents have not demonstrated that the Petitioners obtained the money through a representation known to be false at the time it was made. What is apparent is a disagreement concerning the performance and consequences of a commercial arrangement. 8. Accordingly, the Court finds and holds that the continued investigations and threat of criminal prosecution arising from the transaction between the 1st Petitioner and the 9th Respondent constitute an abuse of the criminal justice process. The Court reaches this conclusion not merely because the dispute has a civil element, but because the circumstances demonstrate that the criminal process was invoked for a collateral purpose, the investigative measures adopted were disproportionate, and the investigations have continued for over nine months without any charges being preferred or sufficient justification being advanced for the delay. 9. The continued actions of the Respondents violate the Petitioners’ rights under Article 29 of the Constitution (freedom and security of the person), Article 47 (fair administrative action), and Article 50(1) (right to a fair hearing, including the right to have disputes resolved without unreasonable delay). **Whether the 9th Respondent used his political influence to instigate the police actions, thereby violating the Petitioners’ rights.** 1. The Petitioners allege that the 9th Respondent, by virtue of being a Member of County Assembly, used his position and influence to procure police action against them for a collateral purpose. The 9th Respondent denies this allegation and maintains that he merely exercised his right, as any other citizen, to report suspected criminal conduct to the police. 2. The Court has considered the evidence relied upon by the Petitioners in support of this allegation, particularly the text messages annexed as NS-5 to the Supporting Affidavit. The said messages were not denied by the 9th Respondent. In the messages, the 9th Respondent made reference to his ability to have the Petitioners’ office closed and stated that he had already communicated with the OCS. The Court considers these communications in the context in which they were made and the events that followed thereafter. 3. The Court reiterates that the mere act of making a complaint to the police, even by a person holding public office, cannot in itself amount to a violation of constitutional rights. Every person is entitled to seek the intervention of law enforcement agencies where they genuinely believe that an offence has been committed. The issue for determination is whether the 9th Respondent went beyond the lawful reporting of a complaint and used his public position to improperly influence the exercise of state power. 4. From the material before Court, the Court finds that the messages sent by the 9th Respondent went beyond a simple report of suspected criminal conduct. The reference to his ability to have the Petitioners’ premises closed, coupled with the subsequent police action, demonstrates that the 9th Respondent invoked his position and access to state institutions in a manner calculated to place pressure upon the Petitioners. 5. The Court is not required to establish that the 9th Respondent issued a direct command to the police officers. Constitutional violations may arise where public power is improperly invoked or influenced for a collateral purpose. In this case, the sequence of events is relevant. The threats preceded the complaint, and the complaint was followed by immediate and extensive police action, including the search of the Petitioners’ premises, seizure of property, closure of the premises, and arrest of employees. The Court has already found that those actions were unlawful and disproportionate. 6. The Court therefore draws the inference that the 9th Respondent’s invocation of his position as a Member of County Assembly was not merely incidental, but formed part of an attempt to exert pressure upon the Petitioners through state machinery. The use of public office or influence to secure state action for a private purpose is inconsistent with the constitutional values of accountability, fairness, and respect for the rights of others. 7. The Court finds that the 9th Respondent’s conduct in threatening to use his position to cause adverse state action, in circumstances where the dispute was essentially commercial in nature, violated the Petitioners’ rights to human dignity under Article 28 and their right to freedom and security of the person under Article 29 of the Constitution. 8. The Court further finds that the conduct offended the principle of equality before the law under Article 27 of the Constitution, not because the 9th Respondent was prohibited from reporting a complaint, but because he sought to invoke his public position to obtain state intervention in a manner not ordinarily available to an ordinary citizen. 9. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 9th Respondent violated the Petitioners’ constitutional rights under Articles 27, 28, and 29 of the Constitution by improperly invoking his political position and influence to procure police action against them. **Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought.** 1. Having found that the Petitioners’ constitutional rights were violated, the Court is now required to consider the appropriate reliefs. Article 23(3) of the Constitution empowers the Court to grant appropriate reliefs, including a declaration of rights, an injunction, a conservatory order, compensation, and orders of judicial review where appropriate. 2. The first relief sought is declaratory. The Court has found that the 1st to 5th Respondents violated the 1st Petitioner’s rights under Articles 31, 40(3), and 47 of the Constitution through the unlawful search and seizure of its property and the unlawful closure of its premises. 3. The Court has further found that the arrest and detention of the 3rd to 6th Petitioners violated their rights under Article 49 of the Constitution, including the right to be informed of the reasons for arrest and the right to be brought before a court within the prescribed constitutional period. 4. The Court shall accordingly issue declarations to that effect. 5. With regard to the prayer for a mandatory order compelling the 1st to 5th Respondents to return the seized property, the Court finds that the continued retention of the said property has not been justified. The Respondents have not demonstrated that the items remain necessary for any lawful investigative purpose or that they are required as exhibits in any pending criminal proceedings. More than nine months have elapsed since the seizure and no charges have been preferred. The items seized included documents and property necessary for the operation of the 1st Petitioner’s business, including its trading licence. The continued retention of such property, in the absence of any lawful justification, amounts to a continuing violation of the Petitioners’ rights. The Court shall therefore order the immediate return of all property seized on 6th February 2025 as listed in the Amended Petition. 6. Regarding the prayer for an order compelling the 1st to 4th Respondents to unlock the 1st Petitioner’s premises, the Court has already found that the Respondents had no lawful basis for sealing the premises. The continued closure of the premises constitutes a continuing interference with the 1st Petitioner’s rights under Article 40 and its right to lawful and fair administrative action under Article 47. 7. The Court shall therefore order the Respondents to immediately unlock the premises and return possession and control thereof to the 1st Petitioner. 8. On the prayer for a conservatory order restraining the Respondents from further summoning, arresting, charging, or otherwise taking steps against the Petitioners in relation to the transaction forming the subject of this Petition, the Court has found that the criminal investigative process was invoked for a collateral purpose and has been conducted in a manner inconsistent with constitutional safeguards. 9. The Court is mindful that the power to prosecute is vested in the Director of Public Prosecutions under Article 157 of the Constitution. This Court does not usurp that mandate. However, Article 157(11) expressly requires the Director of Public Prosecutions to avoid abuse of the legal process. 10. Where a Court has found that an investigation is founded on an improper purpose and that constitutional rights have been violated in the course of that investigation, the Court has a duty to prevent further violation of rights. 11. Accordingly, the Court shall issue an order restraining the Respondents from taking any further coercive action against the Petitioners arising from the complaint by the 9th Respondent and the transaction the subject of this Petition, unless undertaken in accordance with the Constitution and the law. 12. The Petitioners have also sought compensation. The Court has found multiple violations of their constitutional rights. The 1st Petitioner’s premises were unlawfully searched, its property seized, and its business operations interfered with through the closure of its premises. The 3rd to 6th Petitioners were arrested and detained without compliance with constitutional safeguards and were released without being charged. 13. The violations were compounded by the continued uncertainty arising from investigations that have remained pending for over nine months without any explanation for the delay. 14. In assessing compensation, the Court is guided by the principle that there is no mathematical formula for determining damages for constitutional violations. The Court must consider the nature of the violation, the circumstances in which it occurred, the extent of prejudice suffered, and the duration of the violation. 15. The Court draws guidance from the decision in ***Gichuhi v County Government of Kirinyaga & 2 others [2024] KEELC 5961 (KLR),*** where the court stated that there can be no mathematical assessment for compensation for constitutional violations, and that the court in making an assessment should consider the nature of the violations, the circumstances, and the duration when the violations occurred. The court awarded Kshs. 7,500,000.00 as compensation for violation of the petitioner’s rights under Articles 40 and 47 over a period of more than ten years. 16. In the present case, the violations were serious and involved unlawful intrusion into private premises, seizure of property, interference with business operations, unlawful arrest and detention, and continued uncertainty arising from an investigation that has not culminated in charges. Having considered the circumstances of this case, the Court awards a global sum of Kshs.4,000,000 as compensation for violation of the Petitioners’ constitutional rights. The award shall be apportioned as follows: Kshs.2,500,000 to the 1st Petitioner for the violation of its rights under Articles 31, 40(3), and 47; Kshs.500,000 to the 3rd Petitioner; Kshs.500,000 4th Petitioner; Kshs.250,000 to the 5th Petitioner and Kshs.250,000 to the 6th Petitioner for the violation of their rights under Articles 28, 29, and 49. 17. In making this award, the Court has taken into account that the 5th and 6th Petitioners’ exact period of detention was not fully demonstrated, although it remains undisputed that they were arrested and detained without being charged. 18. On the issue of costs, the general principle is that costs follow the event. The Petitioners have substantially succeeded in their Petition. The Respondents, having violated the Petitioners’ constitutional rights, should bear the costs. The Court will order that the costs of the Petition be paid by the 1st to 7th Respondents and the 9th Respondent jointly and severally. The 8th Respondent did not actively participate in the violations, and the Court will not order costs against the 8th Respondent. The Court has considered the conduct of the 9th Respondent in sending threatening messages and using his position to influence the police, and finds that the 9th Respondent should bear a portion of the costs. **CONCLUSION** 1. For the reasons set out above, the Court finds that the Petitioners have proved their case on a balance of probabilities. The Court has found that the Respondents’ actions and omissions, as set out in the judgment, violated the Petitioners’ constitutional rights under Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 40(3), 47, and 49 of the Constitution. The Petitioners are therefore entitled to the reliefs sought. Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders: 1. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the search of the 1st Petitioner’s business premises and the seizure and confiscation of its office items by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Respondents on 6th February 2025, without search warrants or lawful justification, violated the 1st Petitioner’s rights under Articles 31, 40(3), and 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 2. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the locking of the 1st Petitioner’s business premises by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Respondents on 6th February 2025 was unlawful and violated the 1st Petitioner’s rights under Articles 40(3) and 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 3. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the arrest and detention of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Petitioners on 6th and 7th February 2025 violated their rights under Article 49(1)(a), (c), and (f) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 4. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the continued investigations and the threat of criminal prosecution in relation to the transaction between the 1st Petitioner and the 9th Respondent constitute an abuse of the criminal justice system and violate the Petitioners’ rights under Articles 29, 47, and 50(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 5. A declaration be and is hereby issued that the 9th Respondent, by sending threatening messages invoking his position as a Member of County Assembly and by using his political influence to instigate police action against the Petitioners, violated the Petitioners’ rights under Articles 27, 28, and 29 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 6. A mandatory order be and is hereby issued directing the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Respondents to return to the 1st Petitioner all properties seized from the 1st Petitioner’s premises on 6th February 2025, including Kshs.30,000.00 in cash, one computer desktop, one MacBook laptop, three keyboards, one computer mouse, one mobile phone, various national identity cards and KRA PIN certificates, various sale agreements, receipts, the 1st Petitioner’s original trading licence, the office padlock and keys, and any other documents or items seized, within seven (7) days from the date of this judgment. 7. A mandatory order be and is hereby issued directing the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Respondents to unlock the 1st Petitioner’s business premises located at Chokaa along Kangundo Road, and to return the keys to the 1st Petitioner, within seven (7) days from the date of this judgment. 8. A conservatory order be and is hereby issued restraining the Respondents, whether by themselves, their servants, agents, or any other persons acting through them, from charging, summoning, harassing, intimidating, arresting, or initiating criminal proceedings against the Petitioners or any of the 1st Petitioner’s directors, employees, agents, or servants in relation to the complaint lodged by the 9th Respondent on 6th February 2025 or any matter arising from the transaction between the 1st Petitioner and the 9th Respondent, pending the hearing and determination of any civil dispute between the parties. For the avoidance of doubt, this order does not preclude the 8th Respondent from making a decision on any investigation file that may be forwarded, but any such decision must be made in accordance with Article 157(11) of the Constitution and having regard to the findings of this judgment. 9. The Petitioners are hereby awarded compensation in the global sum of Kshs.4,000,000.00 for the violations of their constitutional rights. The sum shall be apportioned as follows: Kshs.2,500,000.00 to the 1st Petitioner; Kshs.500,000.00 to the 3rd Petitioner; Kshs.500,000.00 to the 4th Petitioner; Kshs.250,000.00 to the 5th Petitioner; and Kshs.250,000.00 to the 6th Petitioner. The compensation shall be paid by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th Respondents jointly and severally. 10. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th Respondents shall bear the costs of the Petition jointly and severally. 11. The 8th Respondent shall bear its own costs. Orders accordingly. File closed accordingly. **DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT KIAMBU THIS 11TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.** **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_** **BAHATI MWAMUYE MBS** **JUDGE**