https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12483

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MURANG'A** **CIVIL APPEAL NO. 30 OF 2017** **NGERE TEA FACTORY LTD .............................. ……….1STAPPELLANT** **SAMUEL KIBE MUNGAI ..............................................2NDAPPELLANT** **VERSUS** **DAVID MUSYOKA MUNINI .................................. 1ST RESPONDENT** **PATRICK WANAINA KAGOIYA ......................... 2ND RESPONDENT** *(Being an Appeal from the Judgment and decree of Hon J.J Masiga (RM) delivered on 24th October 2016 In Muranga CMCC 91 of 2014 and CMCC123 of 2015)* **JUDGMENT** 1. The suit, the subject matter of this Appeal arose out of a road traffic accident that occurred on 17th day of February 2014 along the Thika-Gatanga road. The Respondents were travelling in motor vehicle registration number KAD 578T (The Canter) which was involved in a collision with the 1st Appellant's motor vehicle registration number KAP 146T (The Tipper). The canter was being driven by the 2nd Respondent, while the Tipper was being driven by the 2nd Appellant. 2. The Respondents filed separate suits in the lower court, which were later consolidated for hearing and determination. Upon hearing the witnesses, the learned trial Magistrate found the Appellants fully liable for the accident and awarded damages as follows: 3. **For the 1st Respondent**: General Damages of Kshs. 2,100,000/-; Special Damages at Kshs. 2,000/-; Future medical expenses of Kshs. 425,000/-; Cost of artificial leg at Kshs. 800,000/-; and Loss of future earnings for Kshs. 1,620,560/- 4. **For the 2nd Respondent:** General damages of Kshs. 800,000/- and Special Damages of Kshs. 839,000/- 5. The Appellants were aggrieved by the entire decision and moved to this court on Appeal. **Memorandum of Appeal** 1. The Appellants have presented the following grounds: 2. *THAT The learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to apportion liability fairly between the Parties.* 3. *THAT the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding the 1st Respondent an inordinately high amount of general damages of Kshs. 2,100,000.00 (Two Million One Hundred Thousand) that is excessive and unreasonable in the circumstances and are incomparable with recent awards for injuries similar to those sustained by the Respondent.* 4. *THAT the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by wrongly calculating the amount of future earnings due to the 1st Respondent and awarding the Respondent 1,620,000.00 (One Million six Hundred and Twenty Thousand) which is excessive in the circumstances given the casual nature of the Plaintiff's employment and that no evidence was given of the same.* 5. *THAT the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding the 2nd Respondent an inordinately high amount of general damages of Kshs. 800,000.00 (Eight Hundred Thousand) that is excessive and unreasonable in the circumstances and are incomparable with recent awards for injuries similar to those sustained by the Respondent.* 6. *THAT the learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by wrongly calculating the amount of special damages proved by the 2nd Respondent.* 7. *THAT the interest awarded in the decrees of the 1st and 2nd Respondents was wrongly calculated on the cumulative sum from the date of filing the suit.* 8. The Appeal was heard by way of Written Submissions. **The Appellants’ Submissions** 1. The Appellants submit that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the 2nd Respondent. They rely on the testimony of DW1, the 2nd Appellant who testified that he observed the oncoming canter approaching at an excessive speed of 100 km/h, moving in a zig-zag manner and appearing unstable. They argue that the trial court’s observations regarding this evasive manoeuvre were misguided and amounted to mere speculation. 2. To buttress this submission, they cite Section 3(4) of the Evidence Act, which provides that *“A fact is not proved when it is neither proved nor disapproved”,* and the case of ***Beta Bakers Company Limited v Mutinda & another KEHC (2024) 8574 (KLR),*** to argue that the court erred in believing the Respondents version without disapproving the evidence of DW1. They further rely on ***Neo Kingstone Hardware Limited v Maina (2024) KEHC 12380 (KLR)*** to emphasize that where both parties blame each other and evidentiary material is insufficient, liability remains unproved. 3. On the issue of quantum of damages, the Appellants contend that the awards were inordinately high and represented an entirely erroneous estimate. Regarding the 1st Respondent, they impugn the award of Kshs. 2,100,000/= for general damages as being incomparable with recent awards for similar injuries. They further challenge the award for loss of future earnings, submitting that the 1st Respondent failed to strictly prove his income or his profession as a loader or turn boy. 4. It is further submitted that the trial court erred in departing from the pleadings to apply the 2015 minimum wage guidelines which were not in effect in 2014, citing the case of ***Mwatela & another v Njuguna (2024) KEHC 9805 (KLR)***to suggest that a global sum of Kshs. 300,000/= would have been a more appropriate award for loss of earning capacity. 5. For the 2nd Respondent, the Appellants submit that the award of Kshs. 800,000/= for general damages was excessive and should be reduced to Kshs. 400,000/= in line with the decision in ***Herbart Otara Marube v Dankan Ochora (2022)eKLR****.* 6. They also challenge the award of Kshs. 839,000/= for special damages, arguing that the Respondents failed to provide strict proof of medical expenses and that the claim for vehicle damage was a misjoinder of causes of action that should have been pursued separately. 7. Finally, regarding interest, the Appellants submit that it is trite law that interest on general damages should only apply from the date of judgment at the court rate of 6% per annum, as provided under Section 26 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. 8. They further contend that any claim for interest prior to the judgment would be statute-barred under Section 4 (4) of the Limitations of Actions Act. 9. In conclusion they have urged this court to allow the appeal. **The Respondents’ Submissions** 1. The Respondents has contended that the Appellants’ memorandum of appeal primarily questioned the apportionment of liability rather than their underlying culpability, which effectively conceded their fault in causing the accident. They have argued that apportionment is a discretionary power of the trial court and should only be disturbed if proven to be "completely wrong". In defining the role of the court, they have cited Selle ***-vs- Associated Motor Boat Co. EA***, which establishes that: *“The first appellate court should evaluate the evidence presented and come up with its own conclusions, being reminded that the court did not see or hear the witnesses.”* 2. Regarding the credibility of the evidence, the Respondents submit that the trial court made a specific finding that the Appellants’ driver lied and provided incredible testimony. They pointed out that while the Respondents gave consistent accounts of the Tipper veering into their lane, the Appellants driver introduced a new and inconsistent version during oral testimony, referring to the presence of a third vehicle that forced him to swerve. 3. The Respondents further submit that they had established a prima facie case of negligence, which the Appellants failed to rebut. They relied on ***Nadwa -vs- Kenya Kazi Ltd (1988) eKLR***, where the court observed: *“In an action for negligence the burden is always on the plaintiffs to prove that the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant. However, if in the cause of trial there is proved a set of facts which raises a prima facie inference that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendant the issue will be decided in the plaintiffs favour unless the defendant's evidence provides some answer adequate to displace that inference.”* 4. The Respondents further maintain that the trial judge's decision to assign full liability should stand, as settled in ***Khambi and Another vs. Mahithi and Another (1968)EA 70***: where it was held that : *“It is well settled that where a trial Judge has apportioned liability according to the fault of the parties his apportionment should not be interfered with on appeal, save in exceptional cases, as where there is some error in principle or the apportionment is manifestly erroneous, and an appellate court will not consider itself free to substitute its own apportionment for that made by the trial Judge.”* 5. On the assessment of damages, the Respondents have argued that the trial court followed correct principles and that the awards were not inordinately high. They cited the standard for appellate interference set in ***Butt v Khan (1977) KLR***, where it was held that: “*An appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown the judge proceeded on wrong principles or that he misapplied the evidence in some material respect and so arrived at a figure which was inordinately high or low.”* 6. Regarding the Kshs. 800,000 awarded to the 2nd Respondent, they argued the figure was adequate given the injuries of badly shattered fractures and 10% permanent disability; that the award is comparable with the award in ***Charles Mwania & Another v Batty Hassan (2008)eKLR***. In respect to the 1st Respondent, who suffered an above-knee amputation and 100 % disability, and the award of Kshs. 2,100,000 in general damages it is submitted that the award was actually low compared to the awards in ***Catherine Njeri Njoroge v Benard N.Njeru (2016) eKLR*** or ***Geoffrey Mwaninki Mwinzi v Ibero (K) Limited(2014)*eKLR.** 7. Finally, the Respondents defended the award for **loss of future earnings**, arguing that the court correctly applied a 20-year multiplier and adapted the minimum wage for a loader. They relied on ***Jacob Ayiga Maruja & Another vs- Simeon Obayo (2005) eKLR*** to justify proving income without formal documents. **The Evidence** 1. The 1st Respondent, testified as PW1. He told the court that on the 17th February 2014, he was employed as a loader and conductor for the Mitsubishi Canter owned and driven the by 2nd Respondent. He testified that they were travelling from Gatanga towards Thika. He was seated on the passenger seat of the driver’s cabin. 2. He stated that they were descending a slope at the Gatoka area when he saw the 1st Appellant’s tipper, approaching from the opposite direction and descending a steep slope. It had the crossed over the yellow line onto their lane. He testified that 2nd Respondent, noticed the lorry’s trajectory, questioned it manoeuvres and immediately slowed down. He further stated that despite the 2nd respondent swerving to the extreme left, the Tipper continued its movement across the road and collided head-on with the canter. 3. He told the court that the point of impact on both vehicles was the front left side. Following the collision, he lost unconscious and only regained it at the hospital. He stated that he sustained a fractured left humerus which left his left hand numb with a wrist drop, fractures of the left tibia and fibula, and a crush injury to his right leg that necessitated an above-knee amputation. 4. PW1 further stated that he was 28 years old at the time of the hearing and had no prospects of future gainful employment due to his 100% permanent disability. He stated that at the time of the accident, he was earning Kshs 600/= or 700/= per day, totalling to Kshs.20,000/= per month. 5. On cross-examination, he conceded that he did not have formal employment records or documents to prove his earnings, due to the casual nature of his work. He maintained that he now depends entirely on his wife for his day-to-day requirements and remains confined to a wheelchair. 6. PW2 produced several medical records and payment receipts for the cost of treatments on behalf of the 1sr respondent. 7. PW3 was a police officer attached to the Thika Divisional Records Office, and had been summoned to produce documents related to the accident of 17th February 2014. 8. It was his testimony that a report of a serious road accident was lodged at their station at approximately 1:20 p.m. on the day of the occurrence, and that the report was made by the 2nd Appellant, who reported that the driver of the Canter had lost control and collided with his lorry. The 2nd Appellant maintained that he was heading towards Gatanga and that the collision occurred on the lane facing that direction. 9. He further testified that he recorded statements from other witnesses who provided a different account, from that of the 2nd Appellant; that the witnesses accounts were to the effect that the accident occurred on the left side facing the Thika direction. He produced Occurrence Book (OB) abstract and the police abstract dated 5th March 2015, which were admitted as Exhibits P6 and P5 respectively. 10. On cross-examination, PW3 testified that he had not visited the scene of the accident, noting that the primary entries in the OB were made by PC Mwendwa. He stated that the police abstract indicated the matter was pending under investigations. Upon re-examination, PW3 told the court that while the 2nd Appellant was the one who reported the accident on the day of the accident, the 1st Respondent did not report the matter until the 5th March 2014. 11. PW4 was Dr.Washington Wokabi, a Consultant Surgeon. He testified that he examined the 1st Respondent on 26th June 2014 and prepared a medical report dated 9th July 2014, (PMFI-7(a).) 12. He testified that the injuries sustained were major; that consisted of a fracture of the left humerus, a traumatic amputation of the right leg at the lower third of the thigh due to a crush injury, and open fractures of the left tibia and fibula. He further told the court that there was an injury to the radial nerve of the left arm, which had resulted in paralysis of the left wrist joint. At the time of this initial examination, the Respondent was confined to a wheelchair and his left leg exhibited signs of active infection. He formed the opinion that while the humerus was expected to heal, the nerve paralysis was likely permanent, though he suggested a surgical procedure to explore the nerve at an estimated cost of Kshs 200,000/=. For the the amputated limb, he recommended an artificial leg costing Kshs 250,000/=, and stated that such a prosthesis would require replacement every eight to ten years. He further stated that the fractures in the left leg might not unite, requiring a re-examination. 13. He further told the court that upon conducting a second examination on the 10th December 2014, (as per Exhibit PMFI-7(b),) he observed that the wrist paralysis had persisted and he then deemed it permanent. He also observed a mobility in the left leg fracture, indicating non-union, which would necessitate corrective surgery at an estimated cost of Kshs 250,000/=. He assessed the Respondent’s permanent incapacity at 100%, and stated that he has no prospects of ever working again, and will remain dependent on others for his personal hygiene and daily requirements. 14. In cross-examination, he placed a person’s average life expectancy at 60 years, and that the 1st respondent would require at least four artificial leg replacements during his lifetime, at an estimated total cost of Kshs.250,000/=. 15. The 2nd Respondent testified that he was the owner and driver of the Canter. He told the court that on the 17th February 2014, he was travelling from Gatanga towards Thika in the company of his loader, the 1st Respondent herein. 16. He testified that he observed the Appellants' Isuzu tipper approaching from the opposite direction; that the tipper was moving in a zig-zag manner, eventually crossing the yellow line and veering into his lane. He maintained that he took immediate evasive action by slowing down and swerving his vehicle to the extreme left, to the extent of moving off the road, in an attempt to avoid a collision. 17. He further told the court that as a result of the accident, he sustained injuries in the head, left hand and leg which was fractured. He was admitted to Thika Level 5 Hospital for treatment and later at Kijabe Hospital. 18. In support of 2nd Respondent case, one James Karuga Kariuki testified that he was a motor vehicle assessor. He produced a vehicle assessment report for the Canter., which he did. (P Exhb 2(a)). He placed the cost of repairing the vehicle at Kshs.723,260/-. However, his recommendation was that it was not economical to repair the vehicle and should be written off. He told the court that the pre-accident value of the motor vehicle was Kshs. 550,000/= and that the salvage value was Kshs.80,000/=. **The Defendants’ Case** 1. DW1, the was the driver of the 1st Appellant's Lorry and an employee of the 1st Appellant at the material time. He stated that he was driving the tipper lorry, which was fully loaded with quarry waste. He was travelling from a quarry heading towards Ngere and was driving at a speed of 50 km/h. As he approached the Gitaka area, he observed the Canter approaching from the opposite direction at a distance. He stated that the canter appeared to have lost control and was moving in a zig-zag manner. He further alleged that the canter was over-speeding, estimating, its speed at 100 km/h as it descended the slope while he was moving uphill. Upon noticing the canter’s instability, he slowed down to 10 km/h to give way. However, when the canter was only 10 metres away, it suddenly veered into his lane. DW1 stated that he swerved to the right to avoid a head-on collision. He insisted that there was no head-on collision and denied causing the accident. He blamed the driver of the canter for over-speeding and losing control. **Analysis and Determination** 1. This being a first appeal, this Court is obliged to reconsider and evaluate the evidence afresh and draw its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not see or hear the witnesses testify. That duty was stated in ***Selle & another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & others [1968] EA 123 and Peters v Sunday Post Limited [1958] EA 424.*** The Court must nevertheless give due allowance to the trial court's advantage in assessing the credibility of the witnesses. 2. The court has duly considered the evidence tendered, the memorandum of Appeal and the respective submissions. The following issues arise for determination: 3. *Whether the learned trial Magistrate reached the correct finding on liability and the apportionment thereof.* 4. *Whether the awards for general damages to the Respondents were excessive or represented an entirely erroneous estimate.* 5. *Whether the award for loss earning capacity to the 1st Respondent was based on correct principles and adequate evidence.* 6. *Whether the special damages awarded to the 2nd Respondent were strictly proved.* 7. *Whether the calculation of interest from the date of filing the suit was lawful.* *Liability* 1. Pursuant to the provisions of sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving negligence rested upon the Respondents and the burden had to be discharged on a balance of probabilities. Where the proved facts raise a prima facie inference of negligence, however, the evidential burden shifts to the opposing party to offer an adequate answer (***see Nandwa v Kenya Kazi Limited [1988] KLR 488.)*** 2. The two Respondents gave a consistent account. They testified that the Appellants' tipper crossed the yellow line into the canter's lane; that the 2nd Respondent slowed down and moved to the extreme left, partly off the carriageway; and that the collision occurred on the side of the road used by traffic travelling towards Thika, which was the lawful lane of the canter. Their evidence was mutually corroborative on the tipper's movement, the evasive action taken and the point of impact. 3. The 2nd Appellant gave the converse account, namely that the canter descended at excessive speed while zig-zagging and entered his lane. His explanation of his own evasive action is material. He stated that he swerved to the right. On his evidence, the canter was approaching from the opposite direction and had allegedly entered his lane. 4. The police witness did not investigate the accident and the police file was unavailable. The police abstract therefore did not determine culpability. It merely confirmed the occurrence of the accident and that investigations were pending. 5. I have independently reconsidered that evidence. A movement to the right as testified by the Appellant, moved the tipper towards the lawful lane the canter, not away from it. The 2nd Appellant also contradicted himself when he alleged that he swerved to the right, while insisting that the collision occurred on his lane. such a scenario was not logically possible. Further his testimony on the direction he swerved to corroborated the Respondent evidence on the point of collision. The Respondents' version was coherent and was not displaced by the 2nd Appellant’s contradictory testimony. 6. An appellate court does not interfere with an apportionment of liability unless the trial court acted on a wrong principle or the apportionment is manifestly erroneous (see Khambi ***& another v Mahithi & another [1968] EA 70.***) No such error has been demonstrated. There was no evidential basis upon which blame could fairly be attributed to the 2nd Respondent merely because both drivers accused each other. The finding that the Appellants were 100% liable is therefore affirmed. *General damages* 1. The assessment of damages is a matter of judicial discretion. An appellate court may interfere only where the award is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate, or where the trial court considered an irrelevant factor, omitted a relevant one, or otherwise acted on a wrong principle. That test was laid down in ***Butt v Khan [1981] KLR 349*** and later reiterated in several past decisions of the courts. 2. The 1st Respondent sustained a fracture of the left humerus with radial nerve injury and permanent wrist drop, open fractures of the left tibia and fibula with non-union, and a crush injury that resulted in an above-knee amputation of the right leg. He remained confined to a wheelchair and according to Dr Wokabi, required further surgery and lifelong prosthetic replacement. His permanent incapacity was assessed at 100%. These were grave, multiple and permanently disabling injuries. 3. Having regard to the severity of the amputation, the additional fractures, the permanent nerve palsy and the award levels prevailing when the trial judgment was delivered in 2016, the award of Kshs. 2,100,000 for pain, suffering and loss of amenities was in my view modest. Further the Appellants have not demonstrated that the trial Magistrate applied a wrong principle. There is no reason therefore for this court to disturb the award. 4. The 2nd Respondent sustained injuries to the head, left hand and leg, including a fracture that required admission at Thika Level 5 Hospital and further treatment at AIC Kijabe Hospital. The medical evidence placed his permanent incapacity at 10%. The award of Kshs. 800,000 was slightly higher, but the appellate test is not whether this Court would have awarded a different figure. It is whether the figure was wholly erroneous. On the injuries proved, the treatment undertaken and the permanent disability, the award was not so excessive to warrant the intervention of this court. *Loss of earning capacity* 1. Loss of earnings capacity is in the nature of general damages and a claimant is entitled to it, once disability is proved, whether the claimant was involved in gainful work or not, at the time of injury. 2. The 1st Respondent pleaded and testified that he worked as a loader or turn-boy and earned approximately Kshs. 600 to Kshs. 700 per day, or Kshs. 20,000 per month. He had no payslips or formal employment records because his work was casual. The absence of documentary records did not render his occupation or income incapable of proof. In ***Jacob Ayiga Maruja & another v Simeon Obayo [2005] eKLR,*** the Court of Appeal rejected the proposition that a person's occupation and earnings can only be proved through certificates, or documentary records. 3. Nevertheless, where the presented income is not supported by reliable records, the court must adopt a reasonable and conservative basis rather than accept the given figure without scrutiny. The learned Magistrate did so in this case. Instead of using the claimed Kshs. 20,000 monthly income, the court adopted Kshs. 6,752.35 as a modest wage for a manual worker, applied a multiplier of 20 years, and arrived at Kshs. 1,620,560. (i.e Kshs. 6,752.35 x 12 x 20.). The Appellant has argued that the wage guideline used was incorrect. However, they did not present to the court what they considered to be the correct minimum wage guideline then. 4. Although the trial court described the award as loss of future earnings, its substance was compensation for the proved total destruction of earning capacity. A court is concerned with the substance of the proved loss, and the term used does not justify setting aside an otherwise lawful award. 5. I therefore find no basis to substitute the award with an arbitrary global sum of Kshs. 300,000. The multiplier approach used by the trial court as well as the global approach proposed by the Appellant are both valid methods of assessing loss of earning capacity . This court has no reason therefore to fault the trial court for opting for one approach as opposed to the other. The multiplicand, multiplier and resulting award were also reasonable on the evidence. The award of Kshs. 1,620,560 is therefore affirmed. *Special damages awarded to the 2nd Respondent* 1. Special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, that is the principle applicable when it comes to assessing special damages. The 2nd Respondent produced hospital records and a bundle of receipts amounting to Kshs. 360,000. He also called the motor vehicle assessor, who produced the assessment report and was cross-examined. 2. The assessor placed the canter's pre-accident value at Kshs. 550,000 and its salvage value at Kshs. 80,000. Considering that the estimated repair cost of Kshs. 723,260 exceeded the vehicle's economic value, the vehicle was properly treated as a total loss. The recoverable material loss was therefore the pre-accident value less the salvage value, namely Kshs. 470,000, rather than the uneconomic repair cost. That approach accords with the compensatory principle of *restitutio in integrum* and avoids double recovery. 3. The medical expenses of Kshs. 360,000, the net value of the written-off vehicle of Kshs. 470,000, and the proved assessment expense of Kshs. 9,000 totalled Kshs. 839,000. 4. The Appellants’ argument that personal-injury and property-damage claims arising from the same tort were erroneously joined has no merit. The heads arose from the same accident and were properly pleaded and tried in the consolidated proceedings. Further such joinder occasioned no prejudice, but instead promoted the proportionate resolution of the dispute. The award of Kshs. 839,000 was strictly proved and is therefore upheld. *The question of interest.* 1. Section 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act confers discretion upon the court to award interest at such rate and for such periods as it considers reasonable. The settled practice in personal-injury claims is that interest on special damages runs from the date of filing suit, because the claimant has been kept out of money already expended, while interest on general damages runs from the date of judgment, when those unliquidated damages are assessed. (See ***Prem Lata v Peter Musa Mbiyu [1965] EA 592***.) 2. To the extent that the decrees record that interests were awarded on the cumulative awards from the dates of filing suit, made no distinguish between special damages and the unliquidated general damages. That was an error of principle. 3. The objection based on section 4(4) of the Limitation of Actions Act is, however, misplaced. That provision governs an action to recover arrears of interest on a judgment; it does not bar the court from awarding interest in the judgment under section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act. 4. Accordingly, interest on the special damages shall run at court rates from the respective dates on which the suits were filed while interest on general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities, loss of earning capacity, future medical expenses and the cost of prostheses shall run at court rates from the dates of judgments at the trial court until payment in full. 5. There was no legal basis for the Appellants' submission that the applicable court rate was invariably 6% per annum and this plea is consequently dismissed. 6. In view of all the aforegoing , the final orders are as follows: a). The appeal succeeds only on the question of the commencement of interest. The findings on liability and all the awards of damages are affirmed. b). For clarity, the decrees of the subordinate court are varied only in the following terms: i). Interest on special damages shall run at court rates from the respective dates of filing the suits until payment in full. ii). Interest on general damages, loss of earning capacity, future medical expenses and the cost of prostheses shall run at court rates from the date of judgment until payment in full. c). All the other terms of the judgment and decrees of the subordinate court remain undisturbed. d). As the Appeal has partly succeeded each party to meet their own costs. Dated, signed and delivered at Isiolo, via *Microsoft Teams*, this 30th day of July 2026. S. Chirchir Judge. In the presence of: Roba Katelo- Court Assistant Ms. Munyua for the Respondents.