https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12084

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAROK** **MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO. E009 OF 2024** **(CORAM: HON. CHARLES M. KARIUKI J.)** **MICHELLE S NIRENSTEIN……………………………CLIENT/ APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **OYOMBA MOSOTA AND** **WAMWEA ADVOCATES…...............................……...ADVOCATE/RESPONDENT** **RULING** 1. **INTRODUCTION** 2. This is a ruling on the Client/Applicant's Chamber Summons dated 5th February 2025 brought under Rule 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order challenging the decision of the Taxing Officer (Hon. Philis Lusiah Shinyada) delivered on 23rd January 2025 in respect of the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. The Bill of Costs was taxed at Kshs. 12,785,484.73, including instruction fees of Kshs. 6,386,285.60 and getting-up fees of Kshs. 2,128,761.87. 3. The Applicant principally contends that the Taxing Officer erred by failing to uphold an alleged retainer agreement dated 8th January 2024, wrongly assessing instruction fees under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order instead of the alleged agreement, and improperly allowing getting-up fees. The Respondent opposes the reference, maintaining that no valid fee agreement existed in respect of Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024, that the alleged agreement related to a different suit, and that the Taxing Officer correctly exercised her discretion. The Court is therefore called upon to determine whether the impugned taxation discloses any error of principle or law warranting interference. 4. **PLEADINGS** 5. **Chamber Summons** 6. The Chamber Summons dated 5th February 2025 sought the following orders: 7. **THAT the Honourable Court be pleased to set aside the Ruling of Hon. Philis Lusiah Shinyada of High Court Miscellaneous Civil Application No. E009/2024 in its entirety.** 8. **THAT the Honourable Court sets aside the instruction fees taxed at Kshs. 6,386,285.60/= and the same be awarded as per the retainer agreement dated 8th January 2024.** 9. **THAT the Honourable Court sets aside the fees for getting up taxed at Kshs. 2,128,761.87/=.** 10. **THAT the court upholds the retainer agreement dated 8th January 2024.** 11. **THAT the cost of this application be provided for.** 12. The application was brought under Rule 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, and Article 159 of the Constitution. 13. The Applicant contended that the taxing master erred in law and fact by disregarding a valid retainer agreement allegedly established through a series of written correspondence and the parties' conduct, notwithstanding reliance on authority recognising that contractual agreements may arise from correspondence. 14. It was argued that the taxing master failed to evaluate the parties' communications properly, the Respondent's issuance of an invoice in accordance with the agreed fee structure, the Applicant's payment of the agreed deposit, and the Respondent's continued acceptance of instructions, all of which demonstrated mutual acceptance of the retainer agreement. 15. The Applicant further asserted that the taxing master wrongly relied on the value pleaded in the plaint to assess instruction fees despite the substantive suit remaining undetermined, improperly awarded getting-up fees where the matter had not proceeded to trial, failed to apply binding precedent, and consequently reached a decision founded on errors of law and fact that unjustly enriched the Respondent. 16. **Supporting Affidavit** 17. In her supporting affidavit sworn on 5th February 2025, Michelle S. Nirenstein reiterated that the Respondent had lodged an advocate-client bill of costs for Kshs. 23,634,822.79, which she opposed through a replying affidavit and written submissions before the taxing master taxed the bill at Kshs. 12,785,484.73. 18. She deposed that the taxation was fundamentally flawed because the parties had intended from the outset to regulate their relationship through a written retainer agreement governing both the scope of legal services and the applicable fees. She explained that following discussions held on 5th January 2024 concerning disputes over the ownership, management and control of Mara Napa Camps and its assets, the Respondent prepared and transmitted a retainer agreement, which she reviewed, amended, and returned without objection from the Respondent. According to the Applicant, the agreement expressly provided that continued instructions would constitute acceptance of its terms, rendering her unsigned acceptance immaterial. 19. She averred that the Respondent thereafter issued demand notices, instituted legal proceedings within the agreed scope of work, accepted her instructions, and received payment of the agreed deposit, thereby confirming the existence and performance of the retainer agreement. 20. She maintained that the taxing master failed to consider these facts, wrongly ignored the operative retainer agreement, assessed instruction fees solely based on the pleadings and an unproven value of the subject matter, and consequently taxed the bill on an erroneous basis. 21. She therefore urged the Court to set aside the taxation and direct that advocate-client fees be determined in accordance with the retainer agreement. 22. **Replying Affidavit** 23. In the replying affidavit sworn on 16th January 2026, Collins Ochieng' Oyomba, a partner in the Respondent law firm, opposed the Applicant's reference and contended that it was founded on material misrepresentations, non-disclosure of facts, and a misconceived attempt to overturn a properly reasoned taxation. 24. He deposed that the alleged retainer agreement dated 8th January 2024 did not relate to Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024, which gave rise to the impugned bill of costs, but rather to the earlier Narok ELC Case No. E003 of 2024, where the Applicant had instructed the Respondent to institute proceedings on her behalf. He asserted that the High Court suit was a separate matter filed against the Applicant after the retainer discussions had taken place, and that the Respondent was subsequently instructed to defend her without any agreement on fees. Consequently, upon cessation of instructions, the Respondent was entitled to lodge an advocate-client bill of costs, which the taxing master accurately assessed at Kshs. 12,785,484.73 in accordance with the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. 25. The Respondent further maintained that the taxing master had already considered and correctly rejected the Applicant's contention that the unsigned draft retainer agreement applied to the High Court suit. It was argued that the Applicant had failed to demonstrate any error of law or principle warranting interference with the taxation. The deponent emphasised that the purported retainer agreement was never executed, related exclusively to the contemplated Environment and Land Court proceedings, and did not satisfy the mandatory requirements of section 45 of the Advocates Act, which requires fee agreements to be in writing and signed by the client. He averred that both parties rejected the draft agreement after the Applicant proposed amendments, with no consensus ever being reached, and that the subsequent High Court proceedings could not have been covered by an agreement negotiated before that suit even existed. 26. The Respondent also rejected the Applicant's reliance on correspondence, continued instructions, payment of a deposit, and partial performance as proof of a binding retainer, contending that such matters could not override the statutory requirements governing advocate-client fee agreements. He maintained that the taxing master considered all relevant material, correctly exercised her discretion in assessing instruction and getting-up fees under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, and that the present reference merely sought to re-litigate factual issues already determined during taxation. 27. The Respondent therefore urged the Court to uphold the ruling and certificate of taxation issued on 23rd January 2025 and dismiss the reference with costs. 28. **PARTIES SUBMISSIONS** 29. **Client /Applicant’s Submissions.** 30. The Client submitted that the Taxing Officer erred in finding that there was no valid retainer agreement between the parties and in taxing the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order instead of enforcing the agreed remuneration. Counsel argued that the Advocate’s conduct demonstrated acquiescence, waiver, and estoppel, having prepared the retainer agreement, accepted the Client’s amendments, continued acting on the Client’s instructions without proposing any variation to the agreed fees, accepted payment of the agreed deposit, and rendered services pursuant to the agreement. It was therefore contended that the Advocate could not subsequently deny the existence or applicability of the retainer agreement or insist on taxation outside its terms. In support, reliance was placed on **Yusuf Mohammed Jiwa t/a Jiwa & Another v Mwangi & 2 Others [2024] KECA (KLR),** where the Court of Appeal adopted the principles of acquiescence stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 16 (4th Ed. Reissue, 2000) para. 924, **Duke of Amherst v Earl of Leeds (1846) 41 ER 886, and Chairman, State Bank of India & Another v M.J. (2022) 2 SCC 301.** The Applicant further cited **Kenya National Assurance Co. Ltd v Kimani & Another [1987] eKLR, Bilita Wambui Kiarie v Embakasi Ranching Company Ltd [2022] eKLR, 748 Air Services Ltd v Theuri Munyi [2017] eKLR, Sita Steel Rolling Mills Ltd v Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd [2007] eKLR, Serah Njeri Mwobi v John Kimani Njoroge [2013] eKLR, Seascapes Ltd v Development Finance Company of Kenya Ltd [2009] eKLR, and Mohamed v Walker Kontos Advocates & Another (Misc. Application E008 of 2020) [2022] KEHC 16797 (KLR)**, for the proposition that waiver and estoppel may arise from a party’s conduct. 31. The Client further argued that an unsigned agreement may nevertheless be binding where the parties’ conduct demonstrates acceptance of its terms. It was submitted that Clause 5 of the retainer agreement expressly contemplated acceptance through continued instructions, making execution non-essential once the Advocate accepted and acted upon the instructions. The Applicant relied on **Kakuta Maimai Hamisi & Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Returning Officer, Kajiado East Constituency [2017] eKLR, Reveille Independent LLC v Anotech International (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 443, Erick Barasa Makokha & 2 Others v Neema Ya Mungu Investment Co. Ltd [2021] eKLR, Majanja Luseno & Co. Advocates v Leo Investments Ltd & Another [2017] eKLR, Wahome & Akedi Advocates v Migwi & 2 Others (Sued as Interim Administrators of the Estate of George Irungu Karanja – Deceased) (Misc. Application E248 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 8011 (KLR), and Corporate Insurance Company Ltd v Kang’ethe & Mola Advocates [2021] eKLR**, maintaining that correspondence, payment, and performance may establish a binding remuneration agreement notwithstanding the absence of signatures. 32. The Applicant further contended that the retainer agreement governed not only the earlier Environment and Land Court proceedings but also Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024. Counsel submitted that the agreement was drafted in broad terms to cover all legal work arising from the Client’s instructions relating to the management of Mara Napa Camp and ownership of Cis-Mara/Talek/406, including future litigation. It was argued that the Advocate’s issuance of a Deposit Request Note dated 20 February 2024 after commencement of the High Court suit, coupled with acknowledgement of the deposit in the Bill of Costs, constituted unequivocal recognition that the retainer agreement applied to the defence of the suit. Consequently, the Advocate was estopped from asserting that the agreement was confined to the earlier ELC proceedings. 33. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Applicant submitted that if the Court found the retainer agreement inapplicable, the Taxing Officer nevertheless correctly exercised discretion in assessing instruction fees because the value of the subject matter remained unascertainable. Reliance was placed on **Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates, Supreme Court Petition No. E011 of 2023**, where the Supreme Court held that where the value of the subject matter cannot be ascertained from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement, the taxing officer is entitled to exercise discretion. The Applicant also relied on **Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, Estate of Ogilvie: Ogilvie v Massey [1910] P 243, and Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others Ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR**, submitting that instruction fees should amount to reasonable compensation, avoid unjust enrichment, and reflect the complexity and importance of the matter. 34. Finally, the Client challenged the award of getting-up fees, arguing that the statutory conditions under Schedule VI paragraph 2(ii) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order had not been met because the suit had neither been confirmed for hearing nor adequately prepared for trial. It was submitted that the Taxing Officer failed to provide reasons for awarding getting-up fees and improperly exercised discretion. In support, reliance was placed on **Ngati & 3 Others v Embakasi Village Craft Curios & Jua Kali Association & 7 Others [2023] KEELC 21068 (KLR),** where the court held that getting-up fees are only recoverable once a matter has been confirmed for hearing and sufficiently prepared for trial. The Applicant therefore urged the Court to set aside the taxation, uphold the retainer agreement, disallow the getting-up fees, and find that the sums already paid adequately compensated the Advocate for the services rendered. 35. The Client submitted that the Advocate was estopped from denying the existence and applicability of the retainer agreement by reason of his conduct. It was argued that after receiving the Client’s amendments to the draft agreement, the Advocate accepted and acted upon the revised terms without proposing any changes to the agreed fees or negotiating an alternative billing arrangement. By continuing to represent the Client and performing the agreed legal services, the Advocate acquiesced in the terms of the retainer and waived any right to contend later that the agreement was invalid for want of execution. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed on **Yusuf Mohammed Jiwa t/a Jiwa & Another v Mwangi & 2 Others [2024] KECA (KLR),** which adopted the principles on acquiescence stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 16 (4th Ed., Reissue, 2000) para. 924; **Duke of Amherst v Earl of Leeds (1846) 41 ER 886; Chairman, State Bank of India & Another v M.J. [2022] 2 SCC 301; Kenya National Assurance Co. Ltd v Kimani & Another [1987] eKLR (adopting Lickiss v Milestone Motor Policies at Lloyd’s [1966] 2 All ER 972); Bilita Wambui Kiarie v Embakasi Ranching Company Ltd [2022] eKLR; 748 Air Services Ltd v Theuri Munyi [2017] eKLR; Sita Steel Rolling Mills Ltd v Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd [2007] eKLR; Seascapes Ltd v Development Finance Company of Kenya Ltd [2009] eKLR; and Mohamed v Walker Kontos Advocates & Another (Misc. Application E008 of 2020) [2022] KEHC 16797 (KLR).** 36. The Client further argued that the absence of her signature did not invalidate the retainer agreement because the parties’ conduct demonstrated acceptance of its terms. It was submitted that the Advocate drafted the agreement, included a clause providing that continued instructions would constitute acceptance, accepted instructions, rendered legal services, issued invoices, and received payment pursuant to the agreed fee structure. According to the Client, the subsequent conduct of the parties gave contractual force to the unsigned agreement and established a binding remuneration arrangement. To support this position, reliance was placed on **Reveille Independent LLC v Anotech International (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 443; Erick Barasa Makokha & 2 Others v Neema Ya Mungu Investment Co. Ltd [2021] eKLR; Majanja Luseno & Co. Advocates v Leo Investments Ltd & Another [2017] eKLR; Corporate Insurance Company Ltd v Kang’ethe & Mola Advocates [2021] eKLR; and Wahome & Akedi Advocates v Migwi & 2 Others (Sued as Interim Administrators of the Estate of George Irungu Karanja (Deceased)) (Misc. Application E248 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 8011 (KLR). The Client distinguished Kakuta Maimai Hamisi, Peris Pesi Tobiko v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Returning Officer, Kajiado East Constituency [2017] eKLR,** arguing that, unlike in that case, the present dispute involved extensive correspondence and conduct evidencing acceptance of the agreement. 37. On the applicability of the retainer agreement to Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024, the Client submitted that the Advocate had abandoned his earlier position denying the existence of any retainer and instead shifted to contending that the agreement related only to the Environment and Land Court matter. It was argued that this amounted to approbating and reprobating. The Client maintained that the agreement was broadly drafted to cover all legal services arising from the instructions concerning the management of Mara Napa Camp and ownership of Cis-Mara/Talek/406, including future litigation. Particular reliance was placed on the clauses dealing with instructions, scope of work, and fees, together with the Advocate’s conduct in issuing a Deposit Request Note after the High Court suit had already been filed and crediting the deposit in the Bill of Costs. According to the Client, those actions conclusively demonstrated that both parties understood the retainer agreement to govern the defence of the High Court suit. 38. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the Client submitted that if the Court found no binding retainer agreement, the instruction fees should nevertheless not have been assessed based on the pleaded value of the subject matter because that value remained disputed and unascertained. Reliance was placed on **Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates, Supreme Court Petition No. E011 of 2023**, where the Supreme Court held that where the value of the subject matter cannot be ascertained from the pleadings, judgment or settlement, the taxing officer must exercise discretion reasonably. The Client also relied on **Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, Estate of Ogilvie: Ogilvie v Massey [1910] P 243, and Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR,** submitting that taxation should provide fair and reasonable remuneration without resulting in unjust enrichment. 39. Finally, the Client challenged the award of getting-up fees, contending that the main suit had neither been confirmed for hearing nor prepared for trial when the Bill of Costs was filed. It was submitted that the Taxing Officer failed to satisfy the statutory requirements under Schedule VI paragraph 2(ii) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, which requires confirmation for hearing and preparation for trial before getting-up fees become payable. The Client relied on **Ngati & 3 Others v Embakasi Village Craft Curios & Jua Kali Association & 7 Others [2023] KEELC 21068 (KLR),** arguing that getting-up fees are only recoverable where the suit has been confirmed for hearing and the advocate has demonstrated trial preparation. The Client therefore urged the Court to set aside the award of getting-up fees, uphold the retainer agreement as governing the parties’ remuneration, and allow the reference with costs. 40. **Advocate/Respondent’s Submissions.** 41. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant's reference lacked merit and failed to establish any basis upon which the Court could interfere with the taxing master's decision delivered on 23rd January 2025. It was argued that the taxing master properly exercised her discretion, correctly applied the provisions of the Advocates Act and the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, 2014, and that the Applicant had merely sought to re-open factual issues that had already been conclusively determined during taxation. The Respondent identified the principal issues as whether a valid retainer agreement existed in respect of Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024, whether the taxing master erred in assessing instruction and getting-up fees, and whether the reference disclosed any error of principle warranting the intervention of the High Court. 42. On the existence of a retainer agreement, the Respondent submitted that the alleged agreement dated 8th January 2024 neither related to nor governed the proceedings giving rise to the advocate-client bill of costs. Rather, it concerned the earlier Narok ELC Case No. E003 of 2024, in which the Respondent had been instructed to institute proceedings on behalf of the Applicant. The Respondent contended that the subsequent High Court suit was a separate matter in which the Applicant instructed the Respondent to defend her without any negotiated or executed fee agreement. It was further submitted that the alleged retainer remained unsigned and therefore failed to satisfy the mandatory requirements of section 45(1) of the Advocates Act. Reliance was placed on **Omulele & Tollo Advocates v Mount Holdings Limited [2016] eKLR,** where the Court of Appeal held that oral or informal instructions create only a retainer relationship and not a binding fee agreement, and Kuria v Humphrey & Co. LLP, Miscellaneous Application No. E843 of 2022, where the High Court held that, absent a written fee agreement complying with section 45 of the Advocates Act, advocate-client fees are payable under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. The Respondent also submitted that the Applicant had previously admitted that the draft agreement related exclusively to the Environment and Land Court matter, and that the court in Narok ELC Miscellaneous Application No. E007 of 2024 had already determined its applicability to that dispute. 43. The Respondent further argued that, having rendered professional services without a valid fee agreement, the Respondent was entitled to taxation under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. Reliance was placed on **Ahmednasir Abdikadir & Co. Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Ltd [2006] eKLR,** where the court affirmed that, in the absence of a valid written and signed advocate-client fee agreement, remuneration falls to be assessed under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. It was submitted that the taxing master correctly applied the applicable schedule in assessing the advocate-client bill at Kshs. 12,785,484.73 after considering all the material placed before her, including the alleged retainer agreement and the parties' correspondence. 44. On the scope of the Court's jurisdiction in a reference, the Respondent submitted that interference with taxation is only permissible where the taxing master acted on a wrong principle or committed an error of law. Reliance was placed on **Kipkorir, Titoo & Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR**, where the Court of Appeal held that a judge should not interfere with a taxing officer's exercise of discretion unless an error of principle is demonstrated, and **Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Another [1972] EA 162,** where the East African Court of Appeal held that taxation is an exercise of judicial discretion and judicial interference is justified only where the discretion has been improperly exercised or the award is manifestly excessive or inadequate. The Respondent maintained that the Applicant had demonstrated no such error. 45. Regarding the award of getting-up fees, the Respondent submitted that the taxing master properly exercised her discretion under paragraph 2 of Schedule VI of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order after considering the pleadings filed, the defence prepared, and the interlocutory proceedings undertaken. It was contended that the Applicant's dissatisfaction with the amount awarded did not amount to an error of principle. 46. Finally, the Respondent argued that the reference was an impermissible attempt to re-litigate factual matters already determined during taxation rather than a legitimate challenge on points of law. Reliance was also placed on **Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] eKLR**, where the Court of Appeal held that in assessing instruction fees a taxing officer is entitled to consider the pleadings, the nature and importance of the matter, the interests of the parties, and the value of the subject matter where ascertainable. The Respondent therefore urged the Court to find that the taxing master had exercised her discretion judiciously, uphold the ruling and certificate of taxation issued on 23rd January 2025, dismiss the Applicant's reference with costs, and award the costs of the reference to the Respondent. 47. **ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION** 48. Having considered the pleadings, affidavits and submissions, the following issues arise for determination: 49. **Whether there existed a valid and enforceable retainer agreement governing the Advocate's remuneration in Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024.** 50. **Whether the Taxing Officer committed an error of principle or law in assessing the instruction fees under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order.** 51. **Whether the award of getting-up fees was erroneous.** 52. **Whether the Applicant has established grounds for this Court to interfere with the taxation.** 53. **ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION** 54. **Whether there existed a valid and enforceable retainer agreement governing the Advocate's remuneration.** 55. The Applicant's primary argument is that although the retainer agreement dated 8th January 2024 remained unsigned, it became binding through correspondence, payment of the agreed deposit, continued instructions, and the Advocate's conduct. The Applicant further invokes the doctrines of estoppel, acquiescence, and waiver. 56. The Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the alleged agreement related exclusively to Narok ELC Case No. E003 of 2024 and not to Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024, which generated the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs. It is further contended that the agreement never became binding because it was neither finalised nor signed as required by statute. 57. The law governing advocate-client remuneration agreements is found in section 45(1) of the Advocates Act, which provides that an agreement fixing an advocate's remuneration is only binding where it is in writing and signed by the client or his duly authorised agent. 58. The Court of Appeal in **Omulele & Tollo Advocates v Mount Holdings Limited [2016] eKLR** held that although oral instructions may establish a retainer relationship, they do not constitute a binding remuneration agreement under section 45. Similarly, in **Kuria v Humphrey & Co. LLP, Misc. Application No. E843 of 2022**, the High Court reiterated that where no written agreement satisfying section 45 exists, remuneration is governed by the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. 59. The Applicant invited this Court to find that the Respondent's conduct constituted acquiescence, waiver, and estoppel. Authorities including **Yusuf Mohammed Jiwa t/a Jiwa & Another v Mwangi & 2 Others [2024] KECA (KLR)**, **Kenya National Assurance Co. Ltd v Kimani & Another [1987] eKLR**, **Bilita Wambui Kiarie v Embakasi Ranching Company Ltd [2022] eKLR**, and **Mohamed v Walker Kontos Advocates & Another (Misc. Application E008 of 2020) [2022] KEHC 16797 (KLR)** were cited to demonstrate that contractual rights may, in appropriate circumstances, be waived through conduct. 60. While the equitable doctrines of waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are well recognised, they cannot be invoked to defeat the mandatory requirements of section 45 of the Advocates Act. Parliament expressly requires that an advocate–client remuneration agreement be in writing and signed by the client or the client's duly authorised agent. In the absence of compliance with those statutory requirements, remuneration falls to be determined under the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. 61. I find from the correspondence and the contemporaneous documents that the draft retainer agreement was negotiated in relation to the contemplated Environment and Land Court proceedings. There is insufficient evidence demonstrating that the parties subsequently extended that draft agreement to govern the defence of Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024. 62. Although the Applicant relies on authorities such as **Majanja Luseno & Co. Advocates v Leo Investments Ltd & Another [2017] eKLR**, **Corporate Insurance Company Ltd v Kang'ethe & Mola Advocates [2021] eKLR**, and **Reveille Independent LLC v Anotech International (UK) Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 443**, those authorities concerned contractual situations distinguishable from the present statutory framework governing advocate-client remuneration agreements under section 45. 63. Consequently, I am unable to find that the unsigned draft agreement constituted a binding remuneration agreement applicable to Narok High Court Civil Case No. E001 of 2024. The Taxing Officer therefore cannot be faulted for declining to enforce it. 64. **Whether the Taxing Officer erred in assessing instruction fees.** 65. A judge hearing a reference does not undertake a fresh taxation. The Court only intervenes where the taxing officer acted on a wrong principle, considered irrelevant matters, omitted relevant matters, or arrived at a manifestly excessive or low award. 66. The applicable principles are well settled. In **Kipkorir, Titoo & Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR**, the Court of Appeal held that interference is justified only where there is an error of principle. Likewise, in **Premchand Raichand Ltd & Another v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd & Another [1972] EA 162**, the Court emphasised that taxation is a matter of judicial discretion and should not be disturbed unless exercised on a wrong principle. 67. The Applicant argued that the Taxing Officer improperly relied on the pleaded value of the subject matter and failed to appreciate that the substantive suit remained undetermined. Reliance was placed on **Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates, Supreme Court Petition No. E011 of 2023**, **Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92**, and **Republic v Minister for Agriculture & 2 Others ex parte Samuel Muchiri W'Njuguna & 6 Others [2006] eKLR**. 68. The authorities correctly cited state that where the value of the subject matter cannot be ascertained from the pleadings, judgment or settlement, the taxing officer is entitled to exercise discretion while considering the nature, importance, and complexity of the matter. 69. The taxing officer appreciated the Applicant's argument that the substantive suit had not been determined. She nevertheless evaluated the pleadings, the nature of the claim, the value disclosed therein and the applicable provisions of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order before assessing instruction fees. That exercise cannot be said to disclose any error of principle. 70. Mere dissatisfaction with the amount awarded does not constitute an error of principle. Accordingly, this Court finds no basis for interfering with the instruction fees. 71. **Whether the award of getting-up fees was erroneous.** 72. The Applicant contends that the suit had neither been confirmed for hearing nor adequately prepared for trial and that getting-up fees were therefore improperly awarded. 73. Paragraph 2 of Schedule VI of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order governs getting-up fees. The provision contemplates that such fees become payable where issues have been joined and the matter has been prepared for hearing. 74. The Applicant relied on **Ngati & 3 Others v Embakasi Village Craft Curios & Jua Kali Association & 7 Others [2023] KEELC 21068 (KLR)** to argue that getting-up fees are only recoverable where the matter has been confirmed for hearing. 75. The Respondent, however, submits that pleadings had closed, a defence had been prepared, interlocutory applications prosecuted, and substantial preparation undertaken before instructions were terminated. 76. Whether getting-up fees are payable depends on the particular procedural stage reached and the extent of preparation undertaken. It is primarily a matter falling within the discretion of the taxing officer. 77. Paragraph 2 of Schedule VI does not make formal hearing confirmation the sole determinant of entitlement to getting-up fees. The material consideration is whether the proceedings had progressed beyond the preliminary stages and the advocate had substantially prepared the matter for hearing. The taxing officer found that pleadings had closed, a defence had been filed, and substantial preparation had been undertaken. The Applicant has not demonstrated that those findings were unsupported by the record or that the taxing officer misapprehended paragraph 2 of Schedule VI. No error of principle has therefore been established. 78. **Whether the reference should succeed.** 79. Ultimately, this Court's jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order is supervisory rather than appellate. It is not enough for an applicant to demonstrate that another conclusion was possible. The applicant must establish an error of principle. 80. Having considered the impugned ruling, the affidavits, and the rival submissions, I am satisfied that the taxing officer correctly found that no binding remuneration agreement governed the High Court proceedings, properly applied the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, and exercised her discretion on sound legal principles. The Applicant has therefore failed to demonstrate any error of law or principle warranting interference under Rule 11. 81. **DISPOSITION** 82. **Accordingly, the Chamber Summons dated 5th February 2025 is dismissed.** 83. **The ruling of the Taxing Officer (Hon. Philis Lusiah Shinyada) delivered on 23rd January 2025, together with the Certificate of Taxation issued pursuant thereto, is hereby upheld.** 84. **The costs of this reference shall be borne by the Client/Applicant**. 85. Orders accordingly. **DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED AT NAROK, THIS 30TH DAY OF JULY 2026** **CHARLES KARIUKI** **JUDGE**