https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4675

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT OF KENYA** **AT KAJIADO** **ELC APPEAL NO. E042 OF 2024** **LININI NJABASHA** ...................................................................................... **1ST APPELLANT** **KELEMPU MAINKO NCHAPASHA** ........................................................ **2ND APPELLANT** **JOSHUA MOSIANY** .................................................................................... **3RD APPELLANT** **VS** **THE LAND REGISTRAR, KAJIADO** .................................................... **1ST RESPONDENT** **THE DISTRICT SURVEYOR** ................................................................. **2ND RESPONDENT** **AND** **PAUL MBARNOTI** ....................................................................... **1ST INTERESTED PARTY** **WILLIAM KELELU** ................................................................... **2ND INTERESTED PARTY** **WILBERFORCE MUSHAKO** .................................................... **3RD INTERESTED PARTY** **GIDEON RESANCHO** ................................................................ **4TH INTERESTED PARTY** **NENAA SITAPI** ............................................................................ **5TH INTERESTED PARTY** **JOSIAH KAPONDA** .................................................................... **6TH INTERESTED PARTY** **LEKOKO PARTEU** ..................................................................... **7TH INTERESTED PARTY** **KUTETE MPOKE** ....................................................................... **8TH INTERESTED PARTY** **WILLIAM NTISHA** ..................................................................... **9TH INTERESTED PARTY** ### **JUDGEMENT** #### **Introduction and Background** #### This matter pertains to an appeal preferred by the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Appellants against the 1st and 2nd Respondents, alongside nine Interested Parties. The appeal seeks to challenge the decision delivered by the 1st Respondent (the Land Registrar, Kajiado) on the 19th of January 2024. Despite being properly served, the Respondents did not participate in the proceedings. #### The dispute originates from a boundary and demarcation determination undertaken by the 1st Respondent. On the 19th of January 2024, the Land Registrar, Kajiado, delivered the impugned decision which substantively altered the existing property boundaries affecting the Appellants and the Interested Parties. #### In arriving at the contested determination, the Land Registrar relied on Sections 18(1) and (3) of the Land Registration Act to conclude that the boundaries of the suit property were not previously fixed. Consequently, the Registrar relied heavily on a surveyor’s report, GPS satellite mapping, and the physical presence of cattle trails to establish new boundary lines. This exercise effectively resulted in the amendment of the existing map, replacing a previously recognized straight access road with a zig-zag configuration. Furthermore, the ensuing boundary alterations had the direct effect of reducing the registered acreage of the Appellants' titles while simultaneously increasing the acreage allotted to the Interested Parties. Aggrieved by this outcome, the Appellants filed the present Memorandum of Appeal. #### The Appellants, being dissatisfied with the decision of the Land Registrar Kajiado delivered on 19th January 2024, hereby appeal to this Honourable Court against the whole decision on the following grounds: #### That the Land Registrar erred in law and fact by failing to appreciate the oral evidence by the Appellants herein requiring the straight road as in the map to be adopted as was and be opened and in doing so arrived at an erroneous decision. #### That the Land Registrar erred in law and fact by seeking to amend the map and erroneously altered boundaries to reflect the zig-zag road complained about despite empirical evidence to the contrary and in doing so arrived at an erroneous decision. #### That the Land Registrar erred in fact by relying on cattle trails to show demarcations while there were clear beacons which showed clear boundary markings. #### That the Land Registrar erred in fact by relying on GPS satellite mapping to show boundary markings despite there being a map that showed already marked boundaries in relation to the suit property. #### That the Land Registrar erred in law and fact by relying on sections 18(1) and (3) to show that the boundaries in relation to the suit property were not fixed and in doing so arrived at an erroneous decision. #### That the Land Registrar erred by reducing the registered titles of the Appellants in terms of acreage and increasing those of the interested parties thereby unjustly enriching them. #### That the Land Registrar erred in law and fact by relying on the surveyors report and in doing so misapprehended the facts of the dispute. #### The Appellant prays that: #### The Appeal be allowed. #### The decision of the Land Registrar dated 19th January 2024 be set aside and be substituted with an order that the road as reflected in the map be adopted as the true findings of the court. #### Costs of the Appeal. 1. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. **Analysis of Submissions** 1. The Appellants seek to set aside the decision of the Land Registrar, Kajiado, dated 19th January 2024, concerning the boundary and access road dispute regarding land parcels Kajiado/Dalalekutuk/3250 and Kajiado/Dalalekutuk/3249. The Appellants’ submissions are structured around two primary issues for determination. 2. ***Whether the Land Registrar Erred in Law and Fact Regarding Boundary and Access Road Determination*** 3. The Appellants contend that the Land Registrar misdirected himself both in law and in fact by failing to rely on the Registry Index Map (RIM), which clearly depicted a straight access road, opting instead for a "zig-zag" configuration that lacks support from official survey records. 4. The Appellants argue that the Registrar disregarded critical existing physical beacons in favor of transient and informal "cattle trails," which they submit cannot serve as a legal basis for boundary determination. 5. It is submitted that the reliance on GPS satellite mapping to override existing official cadastral records was improper absent legal validation. 6. To support their position that boundary disputes must be resolved through proper survey mechanisms and statutory procedures, the Appellants rely on the authority of***Azzuri Limited v Pink Properties Limited [2017] KEELC 2604 (KLR)****.* 7. Further relying on **Mwangi v Kaboro [2024] KEELC 6546 (KLR)**, the Appellants emphasize that, pursuant to Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, a Land Registrar must anchor any boundary determination on proper processes and records. They submit that the Land Registrar's failure to reconcile the surveyor's report with the Registry Index Map (RIM) and physical features rendered the decision flawed. 8. ***Whether the Land Registrar Acted Ultra Vires and Unlawfully*** 9. The Appellants submit that the Land Registrar exceeded his statutory mandate by altering the boundaries and acreage of their parcels. 10. The Appellants contend that the Registrar’s jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Land Registration Act is limited to the ascertainment and determination of boundaries, not the reallocation of land or the reduction of acreage. This is supported by the case of ***Kiarie Wamutu v Mungai Kiarie & another [1982] KECA 52 (KLR)****,* which affirmed that the Registrar’s jurisdiction must be confined strictly within the statutory framework. The Appellants invite the Court to consider Article 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which protects the right to property and prohibits arbitrary deprivation. They argue that the impugned decision, by reducing their registered acreage and increasing that of the Interested Parties, resulted in an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process. 11. The Appellants conclude that the decision of the Land Registrar was not merely a wrong decision but one arrived at through a fundamentally flawed process, necessitating that it be set aside in its entirety and substituted with an order adopting the road as reflected in the Registry Index Map. **Issues for Determination** 1. Based on the pleadings, the Memorandum of Appeal, the reliefs sought, and the Appellants' submissions, the issues for determination may be framed as follows: 2. ***Whether the Land Registrar, in determining the disputed boundaries and access road, properly exercised his mandate under Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012.*** 3. ***Whether the Land Registrar erred in law and fact by relying on the surveyor's report, GPS satellite mapping, and cattle trails instead of the Registry Index Map (RIM), existing beacons, and other cadastral records in determining the boundary and access road.*** 4. ***Whether the Land Registrar acted ultra vires or exceeded his statutory jurisdiction by altering the boundaries and registered acreage of the Appellants' parcels, thereby affecting their proprietary rights.*** 5. ***Whether the Appellants have established sufficient grounds to warrant interference by this Court with the decision of the Land Registrar dated 19th January 2024.*** 6. ***What orders should this Court grant, including the issue of costs.*** **Analysis and Determination** ### ***A. Whether the Land Registrar, in determining the disputed boundaries and access road, properly exercised his mandate under Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012.*** 1. The first issue for determination is whether, in rendering the decision dated 19th January 2024, the Land Registrar exercised the statutory mandate conferred upon him under Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012, or whether he acted outside the confines of that mandate. 2. The jurisdiction of the Land Registrar in matters relating to boundary disputes is a creature of statute. It is neither inherent nor unlimited. Consequently, the Registrar is obligated to act strictly within the powers donated by the Land Registration Act and in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. Where a statutory office exercises powers beyond those expressly conferred by law, such action is liable to be interfered with by the Court on appeal. 3. Section 18 of the Land Registration Act provides: *"Except where, in accordance with section 20, it is noted in the register that the boundaries of a parcel have been fixed, the cadastral map and any filed plan shall be deemed to indicate the approximate boundaries and the parcel's approximate situation only."* 1. Further, Section 18(2) provides: *"The court shall not entertain any action or other proceedings relating to a dispute as to the boundaries of registered land unless the boundaries have been determined in accordance with this section."* 1. Section 19 of the Act sets out the manner in which the Registrar is required to undertake that mandate. It provides, in material part: *"If the Registrar considers it desirable to indicate on a filed plan approved by the office or otherwise to define in the register the precise position of the boundaries of a parcel or if an interested person applies to the Registrar, the Registrar shall, after giving all persons appearing by the register to be affected an opportunity of being heard, cause to be defined by survey, in accordance with the law relating to surveys, the precise position of the boundaries in question."* 1. Section 19(2) further provides: *"The Registrar shall make a note in the register and on the cadastral map or filed plan that the boundaries of the parcel have been fixed, and thereupon the parcel shall be deemed to have had its boundaries fixed under this Act."* 1. A plain reading of the foregoing provisions demonstrates that the Registrar's jurisdiction is confined to the ascertainment and determination of uncertain or disputed boundaries. The statutory process contemplates that such determination be undertaken through a lawful survey, after affording all affected parties an opportunity to be heard, culminating in the fixing of boundaries and the making of appropriate entries in the register and cadastral records. The Act does not confer upon the Registrar jurisdiction to redistribute land between adjoining proprietors, alter proprietary interests, or reallocate acreage under the guise of boundary determination. 2. The Court of Appeal underscored the limited nature of the Registrar's jurisdiction in***Kiarie Wamutu v Mungai Kiarie & Another [1982] eKLR***, where it held: ***"A statutory tribunal can only do that which the statute creating it empowers it to do. It has no inherent jurisdiction and cannot enlarge its powers by implication."*** 1. The foregoing principle remains applicable under the present statutory framework. The Land Registrar is therefore required to remain within the four corners of the powers conferred by the Land Registration Act. 2. Similarly, in ***Azzuri Limited v Pink Properties Limited [2017] eKLR,*** the Environment and Land Court emphasized the statutory role of the Land Registrar in boundary disputes and observed that: ***"The Land Registrar is the statutory authority mandated to determine and fix disputed boundaries in accordance with Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act before the Court can assume jurisdiction over such disputes."*** 1. The significance of that decision is that although Parliament intended to vest the initial jurisdiction over boundary disputes in the Land Registrar, such jurisdiction is not absolute but must be exercised strictly in accordance with the statutory procedure prescribed under the Act. 2. The Court has carefully examined the impugned decision dated 19th January 2024. It is evident that the Land Registrar undertook a site visit together with the District Surveyor and considered a survey report before arriving at his findings. It is also apparent that the parties were present during the exercise and participated in the proceedings. To that extent, the procedural requirements relating to notification, participation, and hearing cannot be faulted. 3. The Appellants, however, contend that the Registrar exceeded his mandate by abandoning the Registry Index Map, adopting a zig-zag access road, altering existing boundaries, and ultimately reducing the acreage comprised in their registered titles while increasing the acreage allocated to the Interested Parties. 4. This Court is alive to the legal distinction between **determining an uncertain boundary** and **altering registered proprietary interests**. The former falls squarely within the Registrar's jurisdiction under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act. The latter does not. 5. Where, in the process of resolving a boundary dispute, it becomes apparent that the exercise would effectively result in cancellation of existing registered acreage, transfer of land from one proprietor to another, rectification of title, or redistribution of proprietary interests, the Registrar must proceed with utmost circumspection. Such questions ordinarily implicate title and ownership rights protected under Article 40 of the Constitution and may require invocation of the Court's jurisdiction under the Land Registration Act rather than administrative determination. 6. Article 40(1) of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to acquire and own property, while Article 40(2)(a) provides that Parliament shall not enact a law that permits the State or any person— *"to arbitrarily deprive a person of property of any description or of any interest in, or right over, property of any description."* 1. Accordingly, although a lawful boundary determination may incidentally reveal discrepancies in acreage, the Registrar cannot employ the statutory process as a mechanism for reallocating land without lawful justification grounded upon the survey records and the applicable law. 2. The Court has equally considered the Appellants' argument that the Registrar wrongly relied upon Sections 18(1) and (3) of the Act in concluding that the boundaries were unfixed. That submission, in itself, is not persuasive. Section 18 expressly recognizes that unless boundaries have been fixed in accordance with the Act, the Registry Index Map only indicates approximate boundaries. Therefore, the mere existence of a Registry Index Map does not conclusively establish the precise legal position of a disputed boundary. Indeed, the very purpose of Sections 18 and 19 is to empower the Registrar to ascertain the precise position of uncertain boundaries through a lawful survey. 3. The Court therefore finds that the Land Registrar was properly seized of jurisdiction to entertain the boundary dispute and to undertake an inquiry under Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act. The Registrar cannot be faulted merely for invoking those statutory provisions or for undertaking a boundary determination. 4. Whether, however, the Registrar correctly exercised that jurisdiction by relying upon the evidence before him, by departing from the Registry Index Map, by adopting the zig-zag road, and by making findings that allegedly altered the acreage of the respective parcels are distinct questions that concern the propriety of the exercise of that jurisdiction rather than its existence. Those questions shall be addressed under the subsequent issues for determination. 5. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Land Registrar acted **within the scope of his statutory jurisdiction** in assuming and hearing the boundary dispute pursuant to Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act. The challenge on this issue therefore fails. ### ***B. Whether the Land Registrar erred in law and fact by relying on the Surveyor's Report, GPS satellite mapping and cattle trails instead of the Registry Index Map (RIM), existing beacons and other cadastral records in determining the disputed boundary and access road.*** 1. The gravamen of this appeal is not that the Land Registrar lacked jurisdiction to determine the dispute, but rather that in exercising that jurisdiction, he misapprehended the evidence and consequently arrived at an erroneous determination. The Appellants contend that the Registrar disregarded the Registry Index Map (RIM), existing survey beacons and the physical features on the ground and instead relied on a survey report, GPS satellite mapping and cattle trails to redefine the boundary and alter the access road from a straight alignment to a zig-zag configuration. 2. Being a first appellate court, this Court is under a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the material that was before the Land Registrar and arrive at its own independent conclusion while bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses who appeared before the Registrar. Although this appeal emanates from an administrative determination, the appellate duty remains the same: to determine whether the decision was supported by the evidence and the applicable law. 3. The starting point is the legal status of a Registry Index Map under the Land Registration Act and the Survey Act. Section 18(1) of the Land Registration Act provides: *"Except where, in accordance with section 20, it is noted in the register that the boundaries of a parcel have been fixed, the cadastral map and any filed plan shall be deemed to indicate the approximate boundaries and the parcel's approximate situation only."* 1. The legal consequence of the above provision is that a Registry Index Map is not conclusive evidence of the precise position of parcel boundaries unless those boundaries have been fixed in accordance with the Act. It follows that the Appellants' submission that the Registrar was legally bound to adopt the straight road merely because it appears on the Registry Index Map cannot, standing alone, be sustained. Parliament deliberately qualified the evidentiary value of the cadastral map by declaring that it depicts only approximate boundaries where no fixed boundaries exist. 2. However, the converse is equally true. The statutory qualification of the Registry Index Map does not grant the Land Registrar unfettered discretion to disregard official cadastral records altogether. Rather, the Registrar is required to evaluate all available evidence, including the Registry Index Map, survey plans, deed files, survey records, existing beacons, field observations and the survey conducted under Section 19 of the Act, before arriving at a reasoned determination. 3. The Environment and Land Court has consistently held that boundary determination is fundamentally a technical exercise requiring reliance on lawful survey evidence. While a Registry Index Map is not conclusive as to the exact position of boundaries, neither can it be ignored where it forms part of the official cadastral records relating to the parcel. The Registrar must therefore reconcile any apparent inconsistency between the Registry Index Map and the physical situation on the ground and give reasons for preferring one source of evidence over another. 4. The impugned decision demonstrates that the Registrar principally relied upon three factors, namely: (a) the Surveyor's Report; (b) GPS satellite mapping; and (c) cattle trails observed during the site visit. 5. This Court has no difficulty with the Registrar relying on the Surveyor's Report. Indeed, Section 19(1) of the Land Registration Act expressly requires the Registrar to cause the disputed boundary to be defined by survey. A professional survey undertaken in accordance with the applicable survey laws constitutes one of the primary evidentiary tools in boundary determination. Consequently, the mere fact that the Registrar relied upon the Surveyor's Report cannot, without more, constitute an error of law. 6. Equally, this Court is not persuaded that the use of GPS technology is, in itself, unlawful. Advances in surveying technology have made satellite positioning systems an accepted component of modern cadastral surveys. GPS data, where obtained through recognized surveying practice and interpreted by qualified survey personnel, may properly aid in locating parcel positions and identifying existing survey coordinates. Technology, however, remains only an evidentiary aid. It cannot supersede statutory survey records nor replace the legal procedures governing boundary determination. 7. The more difficult question concerns the Registrar's reliance on cattle trails as evidence of the legal boundary. 8. A cattle trail is, by its very nature, a physical path formed by repeated movement of livestock. Such a trail may indicate historical usage or long-standing occupation, but it is not, without more, a legally recognized survey monument or cadastral boundary. Unlike survey beacons, boundary marks established under the survey laws or officially authenticated survey records, cattle trails possess no independent legal status capable of determining proprietary boundaries. 9. Accordingly, while the Registrar was entitled to observe cattle trails as one of the physical features existing on the land, such observation ought only to have been considered as corroborative evidence and not as the principal basis upon which legal boundaries were determined. Physical occupation may explain historical use of land but cannot displace registered survey evidence unless supported by cogent technical findings. 10. The Appellants further contend that there existed identifiable survey beacons on the ground which the Registrar ignored. This allegation is of considerable significance. Survey beacons constitute permanent survey monuments established during cadastral surveys and ordinarily provide the most reliable physical evidence of parcel boundaries. Where existing beacons are found intact and correspond with official survey records, a decision departing from those beacons requires clear and reasoned justification. 11. Unfortunately, the impugned decision does not demonstrate whether the Registrar undertook any detailed reconciliation between the existing beacons, the Registry Index Map, the survey records and the conclusions ultimately reached in the Surveyor's Report. Nor does the decision sufficiently explain why the straight access road reflected in the cadastral records ceased to represent the correct position while the observed zig-zag alignment was preferred. 12. Administrative decisions affecting proprietary rights are required to be reasoned. Affected parties are entitled not merely to know the outcome but also the factual and legal basis upon which that outcome has been reached. The duty to give reasons becomes even more compelling where, as alleged herein, the decision has the effect of altering long-standing boundaries and reducing the acreage reflected in registered titles. 13. The absence of a clear analytical explanation connecting the survey findings with the ultimate conclusions renders the impugned decision vulnerable to appellate interference. The Court is unable to discern from the record how the Registrar reconciled the apparent inconsistency between the Registry Index Map, the existing physical beacons and the conclusions ultimately adopted. 14. Nevertheless, this Court is unable to accept the Appellants' broader submission that the Registry Index Map alone ought to have determined the dispute. Such an approach would be contrary to Section 18(1) of the Land Registration Act, which expressly recognizes that the cadastral map indicates only approximate boundaries unless fixed under the Act. 15. The proper legal approach required the Registrar to consider all the available evidence holistically, including the Registry Index Map, the survey records, existing beacons, the Surveyor's Report and the physical features observed during the site visit, before providing cogent reasons for preferring one body of evidence over another. 16. In the present appeal, while the Registrar cannot be faulted for relying upon the Surveyor's Report and modern surveying technology, this Court finds that the decision inadequately explained the evidentiary basis upon which the official cadastral records and existing survey beacons were displaced. Equally, undue reliance appears to have been placed upon cattle trails, which possess limited probative value in determining legal boundaries. 17. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Land Registrar fell into error, not because he relied upon the Surveyor's Report or GPS technology, but because the impugned decision failed to demonstrate a rational reconciliation of all the relevant cadastral evidence before departing from the Registry Index Map and the existing survey monuments. To that extent, Issue No. 2 is determined in favour of the Appellants. ### **C. *Whether the Land Registrar acted ultra vires or exceeded his statutory jurisdiction by altering the boundaries and registered acreage of the Appellants' parcels, thereby affecting their proprietary rights.*** 1. The Appellants contend that whereas the Land Registrar was empowered to ascertain and determine disputed boundaries under Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, he exceeded that mandate by effectively reallocating land between neighbouring proprietors. They submit that the impugned decision resulted in a reduction of the acreage comprised in their registered titles and a corresponding increase in the acreage of the Interested Parties, thereby amounting to an unlawful deprivation of property. 2. The doctrine of **ultra vires** is a cardinal principle of administrative law. It dictates that a statutory decision-maker may only exercise those powers expressly conferred upon him by the Constitution or statute. Any act undertaken outside the scope of those powers is unlawful and liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the question before this Court is whether the impugned decision merely determined the location of the common boundary between adjoining parcels, as contemplated under the Land Registration Act, or whether it went further and altered proprietary interests in land. 3. As already observed, the jurisdiction of the Land Registrar is principally donated by Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act. Those provisions empower the Registrar to ascertain, determine and, where appropriate, fix disputed boundaries after carrying out the requisite survey and hearing affected parties. They do not confer authority upon the Registrar to cancel titles, rectify the register in a manner affecting ownership, redistribute land between proprietors or vary the acreage contained in registered titles except in the manner specifically permitted by statute. 4. The distinction between **boundary determination** and **determination of ownership** is both real and significant. A boundary dispute concerns the ascertainment of the precise line separating adjoining parcels. A dispute that requires one registered proprietor to surrender part of his registered land to another, or one that results in the alteration of the extent of proprietary rights reflected in the register, transcends the Registrar's administrative mandate and enters the realm of adjudication of title, a jurisdiction reserved to the courts in accordance with the Constitution and the applicable land statutes. 5. This position is reinforced by Article 40(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which provides: *"Subject to Article 65, every person has the right, either individually or in association with others, to acquire and own property—* *(a) of any description; and* *(b) in any part of Kenya."* 1. Further, Article 40(2)(a) provides that Parliament shall not enact a law permitting any person— *"to arbitrarily deprive a person of property of any description or of any interest in, or right over, property of any description."* 1. The constitutional protection afforded to property rights necessarily requires that any administrative process affecting registered interests in land be undertaken strictly within the limits prescribed by law and in observance of due process. 2. The Court has carefully considered the impugned decision alongside the Appellants' grounds of appeal. A recurring complaint throughout the appeal is that the Registrar's decision reduced the acreage reflected in the Appellants' registered titles while enlarging that of the Interested Parties. If that allegation is borne out by the record, the legal consequences are significant. 3. A lawful boundary determination may, in certain circumstances, reveal that the physical occupation of land has never corresponded with the legal boundary. Such a finding may require parties to occupy their respective parcels in accordance with the true boundary. That consequence, however, is fundamentally different from an administrative reallocation of land from one registered proprietor to another. 4. The Court is alive to the fact that acreage reflected in a title deed is not always conclusive where the actual survey establishes the true extent of a parcel. Minor discrepancies between the acreage stated in the register and the acreage established upon precise survey are not uncommon and do not, without more, demonstrate that the Registrar acted outside his jurisdiction. What is prohibited is an exercise whereby, under the guise of determining a boundary, the Registrar effectively divests one proprietor of land for the benefit of another without lawful authority. 5. The record before this Court, however, does not disclose that the Registrar undertook any process of rectification of the register pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Neither does the impugned decision explain the legal basis upon which the acreage reflected in the parties' registered titles was altered. No statutory provision is cited authorizing such variation, nor is there any finding that the registered acreage had arisen from fraud, mistake or any other circumstance recognized under the Act. 6. Equally absent from the decision is any analysis demonstrating whether the apparent reduction in acreage was merely the mathematical consequence of locating the correct legal boundary or whether it constituted an actual redistribution of land. That distinction is critical because the Registrar's jurisdiction extends only to the former. 7. Where an administrative decision substantially interferes with registered proprietary rights, the decision-maker bears the burden of demonstrating the legal foundation upon which such interference is based. The impugned decision falls short of that standard. It neither explains how the revised boundary correlates with the official survey records nor addresses the consequential alteration in acreage complained of by the Appellants. 8. In the absence of such explanation, the Court is unable to conclude that the alteration of acreage, if indeed it occurred, was merely incidental to the lawful ascertainment of the true boundary. Rather, the decision creates the appearance that the Registrar's exercise extended beyond boundary ascertainment into the reallocation of proprietary interests without express statutory authority. 9. This Court is mindful that statutory powers must be exercised proportionately and only to the extent necessary to achieve the statutory objective. The objective of Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act is the ascertainment of uncertain boundaries—not the redistribution of registered land. Any exercise producing the latter result must be supported by clear statutory authority, which is absent in the present case. 10. Consequently, while the Court has already found under Issue No. 1 that the Land Registrar was properly seized of jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, it equally finds that the manner in which the impugned decision affected the acreage and proprietary interests of the parties exceeded what Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act contemplate. To that extent, the Registrar acted beyond the scope of the statutory mandate vested in the office. 11. This Court finds that, insofar as the impugned decision resulted in the alteration of the registered acreage of the Appellants' parcels and the corresponding enlargement of the Interested Parties' parcels without demonstrating a lawful statutory basis for such alteration, the Land Registrar exceeded the limits of the jurisdiction conferred under the Land Registration Act. That aspect of the decision cannot therefore be allowed to stand. ### ***D. Whether the Appellants have established sufficient grounds to warrant interference by this Court with the decision of the Land Registrar dated 19th January 2024.*** 1. Having found that the Land Registrar was properly vested with jurisdiction to entertain the boundary dispute but erred in the manner in which that jurisdiction was exercised, the remaining question is whether the errors identified are of such magnitude as to justify this Court interfering with the impugned decision. 2. It is now settled that an appellate court does not interfere with the decision of a statutory tribunal or administrative body merely because it would have reached a different conclusion. Intervention is only warranted where it is demonstrated that the decision-maker misdirected himself on the law, misapprehended the evidence, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to consider relevant matters, acted outside the scope of the statutory mandate, or arrived at a decision that cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence on record. 3. This principle is particularly important in appeals arising from determinations made by the Land Registrar under Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act. Parliament entrusted the Registrar with the primary responsibility of resolving boundary disputes because such disputes ordinarily involve technical matters requiring expertise in land registration and cadastral surveys. Consequently, courts must exercise restraint and accord due deference to technical findings that are properly supported by the evidence and reached in accordance with the law. 4. That deference, however, is not absolute. Where the decision demonstrates material errors of law, procedural irregularity, irrationality, or a failure to apply the applicable statutory framework, the appellate court not only has the jurisdiction but also the duty to intervene. 5. In the present appeal, the Court has already made three material findings. 6. First, the Land Registrar lawfully assumed jurisdiction under Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act to determine the boundary dispute. The Appellants' challenge to the Registrar's jurisdiction therefore fails. 7. Secondly, although the Registrar was entitled to rely upon the Surveyor's Report and modern surveying technology, the impugned decision failed to demonstrate how the Surveyor's findings were reconciled with the Registry Index Map, the existing survey beacons and the official cadastral records before departing from the straight access road reflected therein. Equally, undue evidentiary weight appears to have been placed upon cattle trails, which, standing on their own, do not constitute legally recognized boundary markers. 8. Thirdly, the impugned decision appears to have had the effect of reducing the acreage comprised in the Appellants' registered parcels while correspondingly increasing the acreage attributed to the Interested Parties. The decision does not identify the statutory authority under which such alteration was undertaken, nor does it explain whether the change was merely incidental to locating the true legal boundary or amounted to a substantive redistribution of registered land. That omission is material because the Land Registration Act limits the Registrar's role to boundary ascertainment and does not confer a general power to alter proprietary rights. 9. Taken cumulatively, these deficiencies persuade this Court that the impugned decision cannot be sustained. 10. The duty imposed upon a statutory decision-maker is not merely to reach a conclusion but to demonstrate, through a reasoned analysis, how that conclusion is supported by the evidence and the applicable law. A decision affecting registered land rights must exhibit a rational connection between the evidence considered, the statutory provisions applied and the conclusions ultimately reached. Where that logical nexus is absent, the decision becomes vulnerable to appellate interference. 11. The Court is also mindful that the right to property guaranteed under Article 40 of the Constitution is a fundamental right deserving of vigilant protection. Although a lawful boundary determination may inevitably affect the manner in which adjoining proprietors occupy their land, any administrative decision that substantially alters the extent of registered interests must be firmly anchored in the law and supported by cogent evidence. The impugned decision falls short of that standard. 12. The Appellants have urged this Court not only to set aside the Registrar's decision but also to substitute it with an order adopting the straight road reflected in the Registry Index Map as the true boundary. 13. This Court is unable to accede to that invitation. 14. The Registry Index Map, by virtue of Section 18(1) of the Land Registration Act, depicts only approximate boundaries unless those boundaries have previously been fixed under the Act. Consequently, the Court cannot, merely because it has found fault with the Registrar's reasoning, elevate the Registry Index Map into conclusive proof of the legal boundary. To do so would amount to this Court undertaking a technical surveying exercise without the benefit of the statutory processes contemplated under Sections 18 and 19 of the Act. 15. An appellate court should be slow to substitute its own technical findings where the evidentiary record is insufficient to permit it to conclusively determine the true position of the disputed boundary. The more appropriate course, where the original determination is vitiated by material legal and evidentiary errors, is to set aside the impugned decision and remit the dispute for a fresh determination undertaken strictly in accordance with the law. 16. Such a course safeguards both the statutory role assigned to the Land Registrar and the constitutional rights of the parties by ensuring that the dispute is reconsidered through a lawful, transparent and properly reasoned process. 17. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Appellants have established sufficient grounds for appellate intervention. The decision of the Land Registrar dated 19th January 2024 cannot be allowed to stand. However, this Court declines the Appellants' invitation to substitute the impugned decision with an order adopting the straight access road as reflected in the Registry Index Map. Instead, the interests of justice would best be served by setting aside the impugned determination and remitting the dispute to the Land Registrar, Kajiado County, for a fresh boundary determination, to be undertaken jointly with the County Surveyor, in strict compliance with Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, after considering all relevant cadastral records, survey evidence, existing beacons and the parties' representations, and by rendering a fully reasoned decision. ***e. What orders should this Court grant, including the issue of costs?*** 1. Having carefully re-evaluated the record of appeal, the impugned decision of the Land Registrar dated 19th January 2024, the grounds of appeal, and the written submissions filed by the Appellants, this Court is satisfied that the appeal partially succeeds. 2. The Court has found that the Land Registrar was properly seized of jurisdiction under Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012 to hear and determine the boundary dispute. Consequently, the Appellants' challenge to the Registrar's jurisdiction fails. 3. However, the Court has equally found that the impugned decision was vitiated by material errors in the exercise of that jurisdiction. In particular, the Registrar failed to satisfactorily demonstrate how the conclusions reached reconciled the Surveyor's Report with the Registry Index Map, the existing survey beacons and other official cadastral records. The decision further placed undue reliance on cattle trails without adequately explaining their evidentiary significance in relation to legally recognized survey evidence. More importantly, the decision appears to have altered the acreage of the parties' registered parcels without identifying the statutory basis for such alteration or demonstrating that the change was merely incidental to the lawful ascertainment of the true boundary. 4. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies renders the impugned decision unsafe. It cannot therefore be permitted to stand. 5. The Appellants have urged this Court to substitute the Registrar's decision with an order directing that the straight access road depicted on the Registry Index Map be adopted as the correct boundary. While the Court appreciates the basis of that prayer, it is not persuaded that such an order would be appropriate in the circumstances of this case. 6. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court does not extend to undertaking a fresh technical survey or making factual determinations that properly fall within the statutory mandate of the Land Registrar and the County Surveyor. As already observed, Section 18(1) of the Land Registration Act expressly provides that, unless boundaries have been fixed, the Registry Index Map depicts only approximate boundaries. Consequently, the Court lacks a sufficient evidentiary basis upon which it can conclusively declare the straight access road to be the true legal boundary. 7. The appropriate remedy is therefore to remit the dispute to the Land Registrar for fresh consideration. Such reconsideration must be undertaken strictly in accordance with Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act and in compliance with the constitutional principles of fairness, reasoned decision-making and protection of property rights. During that exercise, the Land Registrar shall consider and reconcile all relevant evidence, including the Registry Index Map, the survey records, existing survey beacons, the Surveyor's Report, physical features on the ground and any other relevant cadastral records before rendering a reasoned determination. 8. On the issue of costs, Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that costs ordinarily follow the event unless the Court, for good reason, orders otherwise. Although the Appellants have substantially succeeded in demonstrating that the impugned decision cannot stand, this remains a boundary dispute involving neighbouring proprietors, and the Respondents did not participate in these appellate proceedings despite being duly served. In the circumstances, the Court is of the considered view that the interests of justice will be best served by directing that each party bears its own costs of the appeal. 9. In the end result, the Court makes the following orders: 10. ***The Appeal is partially allowed.*** 11. ***The decision of the Land Registrar, Kajiado, dated 19th January 2024 is hereby set aside in its entirety.*** 12. ***The dispute concerning the boundary and access road affecting the suit parcels is hereby remitted to the Land Registrar, Kajiado County, for a fresh determination, to be undertaken jointly with the County Surveyor in strict compliance with Sections 18 and 19 of the Land Registration Act, 2012.*** 13. ***The prayer seeking substitution of the Land Registrar's decision with an order adopting the straight access road reflected in the Registry Index Map is declined.*** 14. ***Each party shall bear its own costs of this appeal.*** It is so ordered. **Dated, Signed and Delivered at Kajiado Virtually this 20th Day of July 2026.** **M.D. MWANGI** **JUDGE** **In the virtual presence of:** Mr. Chacha for the Appellants N/A by the Respondents and Interested Parties Court Assistant: Alex **M.D. MWANGI** **JUDGE**