Njagi & 4 others v State Law Office & 2 others (Appeal E049 of 2026) [2026] KELEAT 4 (KLR) (17 July 2026) (Judgment)

Njagi & 4 others v State Law Office & 2 others (Appeal E049 of 2026) [2026] KELEAT 4 (KLR) (17 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KELEAT 4 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Legal Education Appeals Tribunal Appeal E049 of 2026 J Njiriri, Chair, J Ngulu, F Oketch, M Munoko & Y Godana, Members July 17, 2026 Between Geoffrey Nthiga Njagi 1st Appellant Emmanuel Omondi Mwimali & 3 others & 3 others 2nd Appellant and State Law Office 1st Respondent Kenya School of Law & another & another 2nd Respondent Judgment A. Introduction 1.The Appellants jointly filed a Memorandum of Appeal dated 20th May 2026 challenging the decision of the 1st Respondent made on 26th April 2026 deferring their admission to the Advocates Training Programme to the next academic year.They sought the following orders:a.Orders of Certiorari to quash the decision to defer Appellants.b.Orders of Mandamus to compel the 2nd Respondent to readmit the Appellants into the current academic year cohort and allow Appellants to participate in all academic activities including submission of their project work, class attendance and reasonable accommodation to participate in oral examinations.c.That the appellant be allowed to submit original degree certificates onor before August 11, 2026.d.An order of mandamus compelling the 1st and 2nd Respondents to allow the Appellants to continue with their ATP classes, project work and oral exams pending the determination of this Appeal. B. The Appeal 1.The Appellants contend that they were admitted to the 2026/2027 AdvocatesTraining Programme cohort after presenting letters of completion from Mount Kenya University pending the issuance of their Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree certificates. They state that they met all other admission requirements, paid the requisite fees, attended classes, and commenced project work. 2.They further contend that they were due to graduate on 7th August 2026 and undertook to submit their original degree certificates by 11th August 2026. They argue that their request for an extension of time to submit the certificates was not considered and that granting the extension would not prejudice the Respondents. C. The Response 1.The 1st and 2nd Respondents opposed the Appeal through the Replying Affidavit of Lawrence Ndirangu, an Academic Services Officer of the 2nd Respondent, sworn on 6th July 2026. They contend that the Appellants' admission was conditional upon verification of their original academic documents before registration into the nominal roll, and that the Appellants failed to produce their original degree certificates despite an extension of the submission deadline to April 2026. 2.The Respondents further contend that project work and oral examinations formpart of the Bar examinations and cannot be undertaken by candidates who have not satisfied the admission requirements. 3.They maintain that the Appellants' admission was deferred, not revoked, incompliance with the applicable Regulations and that allowing the Appeal would compromise the integrity of the admission process. D. Parties' Submissions The Appellants 1.The Appellants submitted that the sole issue for determination is whether the1st Respondent was justified in law in deferring their admission for failure to submit their original Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree certificates within the prescribed period. 2.They argued that by presenting letters of completion, they demonstrated theireligibility for the conferment of the Bachelor of Laws degree within the meaning of paragraph 1 of the 2nd Schedule to the Kenya School of Law Act. They submitted that the provision contemplates two categories of eligible applicants: those already holding an LL.B degree and those who have become eligible for its conferment. 3.Consequently, possession of the degree certificate at the point of admission isnot an absolute requirement. In support of this position, they relied on Kevin K. Mwiti & Others v Kenya School of Law & 2 Others (2015), where the Court held that there is no inflexible requirement that an applicant must have a degree certificate where they are otherwise eligible for its conferment. They also relied on this Tribunal's decision in Gitau & Another v Kenya School of Law, Appeal No. E021 of 2023, in which the Tribunal found that possession of the degree certificate was not a prerequisite for undertaking oral examinations. The 1st and 2nd Respondents 4.The 1st and 2nd Respondents identified four issues for determination, namely whether the Appellants' right to fair administrative action was violated; whether the impugned decision was illegal, irrational, unreasonable or procedurally unfair; whether the decision to defer the Appellants was justified and lawful; and whether the Appellants had a legitimate expectation. 5.On the right to fair administrative action, they submitted that the impugneddecision complied with Article 47 of the Constitution and was lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. In support, they relied on John Wachiuri t/a Githakwa Graceland & Wandumbi Bar & 50 Others v County Government of Nyeri [2016] KEHC 6107 (KLR) on the principles of legality, procedural fairness and rationality in administrative decision-making. 6.They further submitted that Regulation 7 of the Kenya School of Law (TrainingProgrammes) Regulations requires applicants to produce the relevant academic certificates and transcripts before enrolment. They contended that the Appellants failed to comply with this requirement and relied on this Tribunal's decision in Daniel Njenga v Kenya School of Law, Appeal No. LEAA/E040/2026, where the Tribunal upheld the deferment of an Appellant. 7.On legitimate expectation, the Respondents submitted that no legitimateexpectation can arise where its fulfilment would require a public body to act contrary to statute. They argued that the Appellants could only legitimately expect the Respondents to verify their academic qualifications in accordance with the Kenya School of Law Act and the applicable Regulations. E. Analysis and Determination 1.Having considered the Memorandum of Appeal, the response thereto, theparties' submissions and the applicable law, the Tribunal finds that the following issues arise for determination:i.Whether the decision to defer the Appellants from the AdvocatesTraining Programme was unlawful.ii.Whether the Appellants are entitled to the reliefs sought. i. Whether the Decision to Defer the Appellants from the Advocates Training Programme was Unlawful. 15.The Appellants' principal contention is that, having successfully completedtheir Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) programme and having become eligible for the conferment of the degree, they ought not to have been deferred merely because their degree certificates had not yet been issued by their university. They further contend that the Respondents ought to have accommodated them until after their scheduled graduation, when the certificates would become available. 16.The Tribunal notes that considerable reliance was placed by both parties onsection 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act and the Second Schedule thereto. The Court of Appeal had, however, already settled the legal position in Otinga v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Education & 3 others [2025] KECA 460 (KLR) where it declared section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act and the Second Schedule thereto null and void to the extent that they purport to prescribe admission requirements into the Advocates Training Programme. The Court held that the statutory mandate to prescribe admission requirements lies exclusively with the Council of Legal Education under section 8(3)(a) of the Legal Education Act and that the Legal Education Act constitutes the governing statutory framework regulating legal education in Kenya, including admission into the Advocates Training Programme. 17.In light of that decision, the legality of the Respondents’ decision falls to bedetermined under the Legal Education Act, the Regulations made thereunder and the constitutional principles governing fair administrative action, rather than the impugned provisions of the Kenya School of Law Act. 18.The Appellants do not dispute that, at the time the impugned decision wasmade, they had not been conferred with the Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) degree by Mount Kenya University. Their own pleadings acknowledge that graduation was scheduled for 7th August 2026, several months after commencement of the academic programme, and that they sought leave to submit their degree certificates by 11th August 2026. 19.Equally, it is not disputed that the Respondents permitted the Appellants tocommence classes and participate in certain preliminary academic activities while verification of their academic qualifications remained pending. The impugned decision did not terminate their candidature permanently nor revoke their admission altogether. Rather, it deferred their participation in the 2026/2027 Advocates Training Programme cohort to the next academic year, upon compliance with the outstanding academic verification requirements. 20.The Tribunal considers this distinction material. The impugned decision didnot question the Appellants' academic capability or permanently exclude them from the Advocates Training Programme. Rather, it deferred their continued participation pending verification that they had attained the qualification upon which their admission depended. 21.Although the Court of Appeal in Otinga(supra) invalidated section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act and the Second Schedule thereto as prescribing admission requirements into the Advocates Training Programme, the Court did not hold that legal education providers are precluded from verifying compliance with the admission requirements prescribed under the Legal Education Act and the regulatory framework made thereunder. Rather, the Court affirmed that the responsibility for prescribing those requirements rests with the Council of Legal Education. 22.The issue before this Tribunal is therefore not whether the Respondentspossessed power to prescribe admission criteria, that question having been conclusively settled by the Court of Appeal. The issue is whether the Respondents acted unlawfully in deferring the Appellants’ participation pending verification that they had satisfied the admission requirements prescribed under the applicable legal framework. The Tribunal finds that nothing in Otinga case (supra) deprives the Respondents of the administrative responsibility to undertake such verification before permitting candidates to complete the programme or qualify for assessmen. 23.In the present case, although the Appellants had completed their Bachelor ofLaws studies, they had not yet graduated or been conferred with the degree at the time the impugned decision was made. They accordingly sought additional time within which to submit the degree certificates once issued by the university. In those circumstances, the Respondents did not impose a new admission criterion. They merely deferred the Appellants' progression until compliance with the applicable admission requirements could be verified. ii. Whether the Appellants are Entitled to the Reliefs Sought. 24.Having determined that the impugned decision was lawful, the Tribunal turnsto the question whether the Appellants are entitled to the reliefs sought in the Memorandum of Appeal. The Tribunal observes that the reliefs sought by the Appellants have substantially been overtaken by events. They sought orders compelling the Respondents to permit them to continue attending classes, submit project work, sit oral examinations and remain within the current academic cohort pending graduation. 25.The record now shows that the programme has continued to run and thoseacademic milestones have either been completed or substantially progressed. Granting the orders sought would require the Tribunal to direct the Respondents to reintegrate the Appellants into an academic programme whose instructional timetable, project assessments, oral examinations and related academic processes have already substantially progressed. 26.Courts and tribunals do not ordinarily issue mandatory or coercive orderswhere the practical circumstances upon which the orders were predicated have fundamentally changed. Judicial relief must remain capable of practical implementation. In Swanya Limited v Daima Bank Limited [2026] KECA 717 (KLR) the court stated:“Courts do not act in vain. Where an order of the Court has become incapable of practical implementation, the Court retains jurisdiction to intervene. This principle flows from the inherent jurisdiction of courts to ensure that their processes do not degenerate into instruments of futility. Judicial orders are intended to produce real legal consequences and not merely theoretical declarations. Where the factual conditions necessary for the operation of an order have fundamentally altered or ceased to exist, the Court must retain the authority to revisit its own orders so that its processes remain directed toward practical justice rather than procedural formalism...” 24.Applying that principle to the present Appeal, an order compelling theRespondents to permit participation in academic activities that have already taken place would serve no useful legal purpose and would, in effect, require the Tribunal to reconstruct an academic programme that has substantially progressed beyond the stage contemplated in the Appeal. Such an order would therefore be incapable of practical implementation and would amount to an exercise in futility. 25.The Tribunal has also considered whether the impugned decision violatedArticle 47 of the Constitution or the Fair Administrative Action Act. The material placed before the Tribunal does not demonstrate that the Respondents acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith. 26.The Appellants were informed of the outstanding documentation, wereallowed to commence aspects of the programme pending verification, and were not permanently excluded from legal training. The decision reached was one of deferment rather than expulsion, and no material has been placed before the Tribunal demonstrating that the decision was actuated by improper purpose, discrimination or procedural unfairness. F. Disposition 30.In light of the foregoing, the Tribunal finds that the Appeal lacksmerit. Accordingly, the Appeal is hereby dismissed in its entirety and the orders sought in the Memorandum of Appeal dated 20th May 2026 are declined. 31.Given the nature of the dispute, each party shall bear its own costs. It is so ordered. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 17TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.HON. JULIANA NJIRIRI - CHAIRHON. JOSHUA NGULU- MEMBERHON. FELIX OKETCH - MEMBERHON. MOSES MUNOKO – MEMBERHON. GODANA YATANI – MEMBER